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(vi) 
ABSTRACT 
A competitive marketplace for goods, services and 
associated credit is in no small measure dependent upon 
the existence of adequately informed consumers. 
Consumers who are ignorant of the full nature, quantity 
and price of items sold, or credit available, in the 
market cannot make a rational purchasing decision. 
Chapter I endeavours to place the topic of consumer 
information in socio-economic perspective, considers the 
necessity for government intervention in the marketplace 
and outlines basic objectives of consumer protection 
legislation. 
Chapter II is devoted to business self regulation 
with emphasis being placed upon the codes of advertising 
practice. While it is recognised that self regulatory 
schemes exhibit considerable potential to advance the 
consumer interest, self regulatory codes of conduct 
and practice suffer through incomplete subscription to 
such codes and through inadequate sanctions for 
enforcement. This dictates that self regulation alone 
is not enough and that legislative intervention and 
control is essential. 
(vii) 
The consumer is accorded a comprehensive and 
diverse bundle of rights by statute and at common law 
and Chapter III examines the nature and extent of the 
consumer's remedies as against an advertiser, sel r, 
etc. Given the dependence of substantive rights on 
procedural rights, it is argued that the real measure 
of benefit conferred lies in the ease of implementation 
of these rights, or otherwise. Consideration is given 
to small claims tribunals as important low cost forums 
for the settlement of disputes and to class and 
representative actions. 
Chapter IV discusses statutory control of advertising 
in New Zealand and liberal reference is made to the 
regulation of advertising in the United States where 
considerable development has occured in the fields of 
corrective advertising and advertisement substantiation. 
It is suggested that New Zealand could benefit by the 
promulgation of rules designed to achieve these ends. 
Furthermore, it is pointed out that control over the genus 
of unfair advertising is at best partial and it is 
suggested that the legislature take appropriate steps to 
remedy deficiencies in this area. 
The disclosure of information outside the 
advertising arena is examined in Chapter V and, in 
particular, attention is focused on the mandatory 
disclosure regime introduced by the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 and on packaging and labelling laws. The valiant 
(viii) 
efforts of organisations such as the Consumers' 
Institute who disseminate much useful information 
relating to goods, services and credit, is discussed. 
In conclusion it is argued that various measures 
be implemented to improve the quantity and quality of 
information available in the New Zealand market and 
to this end it is proposed that a new Consumer 
Information Act be enacted. It is also submitted that 
this legislation, and other consumer protection legislation, 
be administered under the umbrella of a Consumer Affairs 
Department. 
(ix) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
(1) GENERAL 
•on some not distant day, the voice of 
each individual seller may well be lost 
in the collective roar of all together. 
Like injunctions to virtue and warnings 
of socialism, advertising will beat 
helplessly on ears that,have been 
conditioned by previous assault to utter 
immunity .... It will be worth no ones 
while to speak, for since all speak none 
can hear. 1 
John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society 
(1958), 202. 
Before a decision to purchase or hire a ~roduct or 
service is made a consumer usually consults, or is exposed 
to, several sources of information ranging from advertising 
to point-of-sale disclosure by the seller. In this 
dissertation the nature of the controls, statutory and 
otherwise, over the quantity, quality and nature of this 
information fall to be assessed. The scope of the enquiry 
is confined to consumer transactions in respect of goods 
and services, 1 although illustrations may be drawn from 
outside this frame of reference. However, as the 
extension of credit is so often connected inextricably with 
the disposition of goods and services, it is proposed to 
extend the ambit of this enquiry to embrace information 
pertaining to the availability and nature of credit. 
(1) As to the definition of "goods 11 and "services", see: 
the Sale of Goods Act 1908, s 2(1); the Merchandise 
Marks Act 1954, s 2(1); the Consumer Information 
Act 1969, s 2(1); the Hire Purchase Act 1971, 
s 2(1); the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 2(1). 
2 
A definition of the term 'consumer' for all purposes 
is difficult to give. In the narrow sense a consumer 
may be viewed as a person who acquires goods or services 
for private use or consumption; that is, for non-business 
2 purposes. However, many of the problems encountered by 
small companies, unincorporated traders and farmers when 
dealing with large business enterprises are very similar 
to those faced by the consumer who acquires goods for 
private use, and the solutions and protections afforded 
to the latter group may be allocated appropriately to the 
former. 3 Consequently for purposes of this dissertation 
the term 'consumer' refers to any person, natural or 
legal, to whom goods, services or credit are supplied or 
sought to be supplied by another in the course of a 
business carried on by him. 4 
As subsequent chapters will reveal, there are a myriad 
of laws and voluntary constraints regulating the provision 
of information in its various guises. Numerous statutes 
and regulations have as their principaL or incidental 
object the control of advertising, packaging and labelling, 
and the mandatory disclosure of information relating to 
(2) See, for example, the Final Report of the Committee 
on Consumer Protection (Cmnd. 1781, 1962) para 2.The 
"Molony" Comrni ttee describe a 'consumer • as 'one who 
purchases (or hire-purchases) goods for private use 
or consumption'. 
(3) Refer to: Cranston, Consumers and the Law (1978), 8; 
Aaker and Day, Consumerism (2 ed, 1974}, xvii; 
Taperell, Vermeesch and Harland, Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection (1974), 174. 
(4) Obviously the context may dictate that a more limited 
interpretation must be placed on the term, as where 
the legislature has restricted the ambit of the 
protective mechanisms of certain statutes to those 
persons it has perceived to be in greatest need of 
protection or assistance. See, for example, the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 15(1) (d); the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971, ss 12 (1) (c), 22 (4}; the Door to 
Door Sales Act 1967, s 2(1}. 
3 
goods or services. While this is a fact of modern life, 
the justification for such extensive regulation is less 
clear. Therefore it is proposed in this Introduction to 
consider briefly some fundamental issues in an endeavour to 
place the topic of 'consumer information' in a proper 
economic and social context. 
(2) GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION vs. MARKET REGULATION 
A fundamental question is: should legislation be 
enacted for the protection of the consumer and for the 
mandatory disclosure of information or should the market 
and the common law be preferred over state regulation? 
'Laissez-faire' was the rallying cry of philosophers 
and businessmen in the nineteenth century and both groups 
were against bureaucratic restrictions on freedom of 
opinion and enterprise. As Dalton5 comments 
'Belief in laissez-faire was like belief in 
pre-marital chastity, a conviction about 
what ought to be, rather than actual knowledge 
of who actually does what to whom in the real 
world. The economists supplied the underlying 
rationale for governmental chastity, for 
continence in its market interventions and 
spending.' 
(5) Economic Systems and Society (1974), 44. See also 
Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), 13-14, 
where he comments: "The economists were teaching that 
wealth, commerce and machinery were the children of 
free competition - that free competition had built 
Man .... The principle of the Survival of the Fittest 
could be regarded as a vast generalisation of the 
Ricardian economics. Socialist interferences became, 
in the light of this grander synthesis, not merely 
inexpedient, but impious, as calculated to retard the 
onward movement of the mighwprocess by which we 
ourselves had risen like Aphrodite out of the 
primeval slime of Ocean r,. 
4 
Laissez-faire found its economic expression in free 
enterprise and the superiority of the market over public 
regulation or control as an instrument of economic co-
ordination. Today the leading advocatesof the laissez-
faire approach are the Chicago school of economists and 
their disciples in various other parts of the world. 
Fundamental to this treatment of the consumer and his 
position in the economy generally, is the assertion that 
the consumer is sovereign. According to this theory the 
consumer's role is to guide the economy to the production 
of goods and services that he wants - the consumer, in 
short, expresses his wishes by casting 'dollar votes•. 6 
The aggregate of 'votes' cast dictate what the economy 
should produce, how production can be efficiently organised 
and how the resulting output should be distributed. View-
ed in this way the consumer is sovereign because, for 
example, if consumers are dissatisfied with the quality of 
a particular commodity they will collectively cease to 
purchase that commodity. Finding that the commodity is no 
longer ·commercially saleable at that price the producer 
may be forced to improve the product quality, lower the 
price or abandon production altogether. 
Furthermore, competition among businesses is said to 
minimise the risk of undesirable trade practices. This 
point may be elaborated upon by reference to advertising. 
(6) Samuelson, Economics (8 ed. 1970), 40. 
5 
Free market theorists argue that legislative interference 
to combat the joint problems of misleading and uninformat-
ive advertising is unnecessary and potentially harmful. 
It is argued that where there is a plurality of sellers of 
goods and services that have unequal attributes, for 
example, the sellers of superior goods and services will 
accurately inform consumers, through advertising, of the 
attributes of their products and will challenge and expose 
any misleading or inaccurate claims by competitors; that 
is, competitive forces generate accurate information about 
goods and services and the seller of the superior productor 
service has an incentive to fully inform the consumer. 
Businesses which resort to deception to encourage sales 
will soon lose patronage to their competitors when dis-
illusioned consumers find, or are advised, that the product 
or service does not measure up to advertised expectations. 
Consequently such businesses will have to modify their 
behaviour or run the risk of the ultimate market sanction -
1 . 'd t• 7 1qu1 a 1on. Proponents of the laissez-faire approach 
therefore see consumer protection legislation as unnecess-
ary, given consumer sovereignty in the market place. 
However there are certain debatable assumptions under-
lying the analysis upon which the edifice of consumer sov- · 
ereignty is erected. There has to exist a situation of 
{7) See, for example, Posner, 'Strict Liability: A 
Comment', (1973) 2 The Journal of Legal Studies 205, 
211; Samuelson, op.cit., chapter 3; Cranston, 
Consumers and the Law (1978), 20i Cranston, 'Creeping 
Econom1cs' , [1977] British Journal of Law and 
Society 103, 104, Dickey and Ward, 'Consumer Legis-
lation in Socio-Economic Perspective: Observations 
from the Enactments of One State', (1978) 13 
University of Western Australia Law Review 378, 397. 
6 
perfect competition which entails, inter alia: 
(i) The presence of large numbers of independently acting 
buyers and sellers operating in the market for any 
particular product, resource or service. 
This emphasises the fact that the essence of compet-
ition is the widespread diffusion of economic power 
among the individual units, that is, the manufactur-
ers, sellers and consumers, which comprise the econ-
omy. In particular where a large number of buyers 
and sellers are present in a particular market, no 
one buyer or seller will be able to demand or offer a 
quantity of the product sufficiently large to notice-
ably influence the price. 8 For example, if a 
(8) Samuelson, Economics (8 ed 1970), 61-63 explains how 
supply and demand determine market price and quantity. 
Demand is a schedule reflecting the willingness of 
buyers to purchase a given product during a specific 
time period at each of the various prices at which it 
might be sold. 
Supply is a schedule showing the amounts of a product 
which producers would be willing to offer in the 
market during a given time period at each possible 
price at which the commodity might be sold. 
Under competition, the interaction of market demand 
and market supply will adjust to the point at which 
quantity demanded and the quantity supplied are equal. 
This is the equilibrium price and quantit~ 
PRICE 
4 
3 
2 
SUPPLY 
1 ~------~-------- DEMAND 1 2 3 4 
QUANTITY 
In accordance with the law of demand consumers will 
ordinarily buy more of a product at a low price than 
at a high price. Therefore the relationship between 
price and quantity is inverse. The law of supply 
stipulates that producers will offer more of a product 
at a higher price than they will at a low price; thus 
the re~ationship between price and quantity supplied 
1s a d1rect one. 
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product becomes unusually scarce the price will rise, and 
if there is a single producer or a small group of producers 
acting together, who decide to restrict the supply of a 
particular product he or they can raise the price to an 
artificially high leve1. 9 The essence of competition is 
that there are so many sellers that each, because he is 
contributing an almost negligible fraction of the total 
supply, has virtually no control over the product price. 
Similarly, buyers are plentiful and act independently and 
thus no single buyer can manipulate the market to his 
advantage. 
(9) A decrease in supply has a price increasing 
effect 
e.g. 
SUPPLY 2 
1 
PRICE 
P2 
Pl 
DEMAND 
S2 Sl QUANTITY 
8 
(ii) Sellers and buyers must be free to enter or leave 
particular markets. In particular there must be no 
significant obstacles preventing new firms from est-
ablishing themselves and selling their goods in 
competitive markets. 10 
(iii) The goods and services available must be homogeneous 
and traded at a single price. Consequently compet-
itive firms must be producing a standardized or approx-
imately standardized product so that, given a single 
price, the consumer is indifferent as to the seller 
from which he purchases i.e. in a competitive market 
the products of firms B, C, D, E et9 are looked upon 
by the buyer as perfect substitutes for that of firm 
A. 
(iv) There is perfect knowledge of the price of such 
commodities and products on the part of buyers and 
sellers. 
Under conditions of perfect competition laissez-faire 
economic theory declares the consumer to be sovereign and 
rejects any argument for government intervention in the 
market place. Given the four assumptions outlined above, 
market forces are said to ensure that firms produce the 
goods and services that the community as a whole most 
wishes to consume and that these goods and services 
(10) Brozen, The Competitive Economy: Selected 
Readings (1975), 7. 
9 
(a) meet the minimum standards the community at large is 
prepared to accept; (b) are produced in the most efficient 
manner possible given the existing state of technology; 
and (c), are available within those technological limits 
at the lowest possible price. 11 
However in practice perfect competition in any market 
is a rare phenomenon12 and the assumptions upon which 
perfect competition is founded do not reflect the realit-
ies of the market place for most goods and services. 
First, it is generally accepted today that imperfect comp-
etition is the prevalent form of market organisation, 
that is, oligopoly, monopolistic competition and pure 
monopoly. 13 Oligopoly is defined in the Commerce Act 
1975 as meaning a situation where the market for goods and 
services or a large part of such a market is supplied by a 
small number of firms. 14 A high proportion of manufact-
uring industries in all Western Countries are oligopolist-
ic15 and New Zealand is no exception. In New Zealand in 
(11) See, for example, Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive 
Economics (5 ed, 1979), 243; Brozen, op. cit., 64; 
Samuelson, op. cit., 55; Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and 
Competition--(1971), Chs 20-21. 
(12) Samuelson, OJ2. cit~ 43 says 'in the real world compet-
ition is nownere near "perfect"'~ 
(13) See text and references below. 
(14) Commerce Act 1975, s 2(1); Areeda and Turner, Anti-
Trust Law (1978), Vol II, para 404,(a), define 
simply as a situation "in which a few relatively 
large sellers account for all or the bulk of the out-
put"; see also Kaysen and Turner, Anti-Trust Policy 
(1959), Chapter II; Brozen, op.cit, 215. 
(15) Lipsey, op.ci~, 283. 
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1976-1977 eighty-six percent of manufacturing industries 
had a four firm concentration in excess of forty percent 
16 
of the market. When a few firms dominate the market 
their individual market shares will be significantly large 
so that each firm's actions and policies will have reper-
cussions for other firms. 17 B . 18 t th t 'th a1n commen s a ere 
is an interdependence of non-dependence of the price and 
output policies of rivals, and each will determine his 
price and output in light of the concurrent moves or in-
duced reactions of rival firms'. Due to the mutual inter-
dependence peculiar to oligopoly there is considerable 
incentive for a group of oligopolistic manufacturers or 
sellers to form some sort of collusive agreement in respect 
of prices. 19 
(16} New Zealand Census of Manufacturing 1976-1977. 
(17) A characteristic of oligopoly is that usually the 
firms will be producing virtually standardised or 
homogeneous goods. Because each firm supplies a 
large portion of total industry output, actions 
taken by one firm to improve its share of the 
market will directly and immediately affect its 
rivals. For example, if one firm lowers its 
price it will initially gain sales at the expense 
of its rivals; the rivals will be forced to 
retaliate to recover their market shares. 
(18) Industrial Organisation (1968), 29. 
(19) Samuelson, op.ci~, 490; Lipsey, op. citfl 284. 
11 
Monopolistic competition on the other hand describes a 
situation anaiD.gous to that of perfect competition, with 
the important distinction being that each firm sells a 
product that is somewhat differentiated from that of its 
competitors. 20 Although the firms in such an industry are 
producing the same general type or class of product, the 
particular product of each firm will have certain disting-
uishing features which set it off to some extent from those 
of other firms in the industry. The monopolistically 
competitive firm can effect modest price increases without 
losing sales to competitors because buyers recognise smme 
difference between the products of various sellers. Cons-
umers are likely to have definite preferences for the 
products of specific sellers, and relatively small price 
increases will not cause buyers to change their brand 
allegiance and seek out the close substitute products of 
rival firms in that industry. Entry into a monopolistic-
ally competitive industry may be difficult because a new 
firm must not only incur considerable research and product 
development costs to produce a distinguishable product, 
but in addition considerable advertising outlays may be 
necessary to inform consumers about the new product and its 
alleged advantages.21 Finally we turn to monopoly which 
represents the most extreme departure from the model of 
(20) Samuelson, op.cit, 493: Lipsey, op. cit, 284. 
(21) Keltey, New Consumerism: Selected Readings (1973), 
Ch.lO; Tibor Scitovsky, 'Ignorance as a source of 
oligopoly power', ~95~American Economic Review 48. 
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perfect competition. Monopoly exists 'whenever an industry 
is in the hands of a single producer'~ 2 It follows from 
this that the monopolises product is unique in that there 
are no close substitutes available. From the consumer's 
point of view he must buy the product from the monopolist 
or do without. In the model of perfect competition the 
individual firm exercises no control over product price 
because it contributes only a negligible proportion of the 
total supply. However the pure monopolist exercises <:::on-
siderable control over price and the reason is obvious -
the monopolist controls the total quantity supplied and by 
manipulating supply can cause the product price to change. 
Like perfect competition, imperfect competition in 
the guises of oligopoly, monopolistic competition and pure 
monopoly are only models representing abstractions or 
approximations of reality; that is, between the extremes 
of perfect competition and pure monopoly lie an almost un-
23 limited variety of market arrangements. What is revealed, 
however, is that to the degree that competition declines 
so will producers and resource suppliers be less subject to 
the will of consumers. In light of the fact that imperfect 
competition prevails to a greater.or lesser extent in most 
markets it is a fiction to cling to the concept of consumer 
sovereignty based upon the abstract model of perfect 
competition. 
(22) Lipsey, £B ci~, 261; see the Commerce Act 1975, 
s 2(1). 
(23) Samuelson, op,ci~, 43 comments that 'All economic 
life is a blend of competitive and monopoly elements'. 
13 
Second, the assumption of freedom of entry into markets, 
being a cornerstone of perfect competition, is manifestly 
24 
unrealistic in many cases. E. Scott Maynes enumerates 
some typical barriers to entry as being 
"large capital requirements, lack of access to 
technology, control of raw materials, or 
government regulation that seeks to conserve 
the competitors rather than competition." 25 
A further formidable barrier to entry exists where econom-
ies of scale are substantial, that is, where reasonably 
efficient production will be possible only with a small 
26 
number of producers. Likewise where there are a limited 
number of producers producing a homogeneous product in an 
industry confronted with inelastic demand, 27 there is a 
powerful incentive towards collusion and merger. No 
newcomer can obtain a market share except at the expense 
of competitors who may collectively retaliate if the price 
is cut. In addition rivalry from small, relatively unknown 
(24) 'Consumer Protection: The Issues' (1979) 2 Journal 
of Consumer Policy 97, 100. 
(25) See generally Green and Nader 'Economic Regulation 
vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man' (1973) 
82 Yale Law Journal 871. 
(26) The American automobile industry provides a good ill-
ustration. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler controll-
ed over 90 percent of the automobile market in the 
United States in the early 1970's.They. faced very 
little competition from new entrants because in order 
to achieve the low unit costs essential to survival, 
any new entrants would necessarily have had to start 
out as large producers - this would have required 
enormous capital investment. See Lipsey, op cit, 222; 
Brazen, op. ci~, 264; Samuelson, ~·cit,, 462.---
(27) Where price changes result in only modest changes 
in amount purchased, demand is said to be inelastic. 
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producers sometimes fails to have any significant effect 
on price, quality, or selling conditions of the established 
firms - in fact, new firms are often unable to get a foot-
hold because of their inability to overcome the goodwill 
advantage of the established enterprises. 
Advertising may amount to a substantial barrier to 
entry and thus promote market power in the hands of a few, 
as, in the absence of adequate knowledge about competing 
goods, consumers are likely to rely upon heavily advertised 
goods and to trade with sellers with an established name. 
Superficially this may seem to be a legitimate reward for a 
seller who expends funds on advertising and provides con-
sumers with information about the merits of his particular 
goods. However, often a product, no matter how meritor-
ious, cannot reach the consumer unless the producer can 
afford a huge advertising outlay necessary to create a 
market share. Advertising may therefore act as a barrier 
to entry insulating sellers already in the market from 
competition. Product differentiation and the cor ollary 
of brand loyalty create a substantial goodwill advantage 
for established sellers and in spite of the fact that sub-
stantial profits might prevail in a particular market, new 
producers may not be able to overcome the barriers. A new 
entrant seeking to penetrate such a market must initiate 
a price war in an endeavour to undercut established sellers 
(with potentially disastrous consequences), or embark upon 
a major advertising campaign to dislodge or disturb exist-
ing brand loyalties. This latter course may be financially 
prohibitive, but even if it is not, it is fraught with 
difficulties in that it is easier to induce repeat pur-
15 
chases than to occasion a switch in brands, and consequent-
ly a new entrant's campaign must be even more intensive 
than that of the established sellers. 28 
Third, goods and services available in any particular market 
are not necessarily homogeneous and traded at a single 
price. 29 The very essence of the monopolistically compet-
itive firm is based upon the notion of product different-
. t. 30 1a 1on. Because products are differentiated, competition 
(28) See, generally: Comandor and Wilson, Advertising and 
Market Power (1974), 46; Hirsch, Law and Economics 
{1979), 253; Simon, Issues in the Economics of 
Advertising ..(1970), 220; Bain, Barriers to New Comp-
etition: Their Character and Consequences in Manu-
facturing Industries (1956). Note, that in rebuttal 
of the argument outlined above, advocates of unrest-
ricted advertising argue that substantial advertising 
is required to achieve economies of scale and that 
once achieved substantial benefits accrue to the 
consumer which outweigh the disadvantages enumerated. 
While it must be conceded that some concentration is 
necessary if economies of scale and distribution are 
to be achieved and that advertising in promoting 
sales facilitates concentration, it is by no means 
clear that present levels of concentration reflect a 
commitment to lower unit costs, as opposed to the 
avoidance of price and quality competition. See 
Comandor and Wilson, o~ ci~, 217-234; Bernacchi, 
'Advertising and its Discretionary Control by the 
FTC: A Need for Empirically Based Criteria', 
(1974} 52 Journal of Urban Law 223, 239. 
(29} Keltey, o~ ci~, 120; Eugene R. Beem in his chapter 
9 of this-text, entitled 'The Plight of the Consumer; 
comments that 'in addition to a baffling assortment 
of goods from which to choose, consumers are 
confronted with a myriad of competing qualities for 
most every product which they wish to buy.' 
(30) See the discussion of monopolistic competition, 
supra. 
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in such industries is characterised by competition in areas 
other than price; in particular, emphasis is placed on 
product quality advertising and conditions of sale. 
Advertising proclaims, and if possible, magnifie~ real 
differences in product quality. Similarly in oligopolistic 
markets advertising plays an important role in the masquer-
ade of product differentiation. Emphasis on price terms 
in oligopolistic situations often is avoided out of a 
desire to avoid price 'wars' and price cutting, and most 
oligopolists prefer to allocate their marketing budgets to 
persuade consumers that their products are different to 
those of competitors. As Duggan31 explains 
"By suggesting the existence of 'illusory' 
distinctions between competing brands, 
[advertising] can create a spurious heterog-
eneity .... In short, effective product 
differentiation stimulated by advertising 
can fragment a market and so facilitate the 
charging of higher than competitive prices." 
Free market theorists assert that a consumer's choice 
between competing brands of the same product will be 
determined by price and quality differences between the 
respective brands. However, advertising in promoting the 
cause of brand differentiation may create significant 
brand loyalties justifying substantially higher prices for 
a particular brand which is not appreciably different 
(31) 'The Great Soap Opera', (1978) 11 Melbourne University 
Law Review 467, 473. 
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from that of its competitors. In place of price and 
quality competition may be substituted competition in 
d t . . 32 a ver 1s1ng. 
Finally,. the assumption of perfect knowledge on the part 
of consumers is perhaps the least realistic as a consumer's 
knowledge may be imperfect for a number of reasons. While 
it is undoubtedly true that information about most goods 
and services is available as a result of sellers respond-
ing to market incentives, the nature and quality of the 
information generated is variable in the extreme; that 
is, ranging from supermarket advertising of prices and 
special buys to the 'ours - is - the - best' exhortation 
at the other end of:_:the spectrum. For example, much 
advertising conveys little factual information about 
goods or services capable of objective assessment. As 
Jordan and Rubin33 assert: 
"Much advertising is patently uninformative; 
rational consumers should not care what sort 
of breakfast cereal is eaten by famous 
baseball players, nor should they expect any 
relationship between the cleanliness of 
their clothes and the catchiness of the tune 
used to advertise a wash powder." 
(32) See Nader and Cowan, 'Claims Without Substance' 1 
in Nader (ed) 1 The Consumer and Corporate 
Accountability (1973) 1 97. 
(33) 'An Economic Analysis of the Law of False 
Advertising', (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 527 1 528-529. 
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Arguments that competitive forces generate accurate and 
detailed information about goods and services flounder 
still further when one considers the primary role of 
advertising, for example. The function of advertising from 
the point of view of the seller is to promote the sales of 
goods and services and it is obvious that sellers seldom 
will be satisfied with the mere recitation of objective 
facts about a product or service, and informational 
content of advertisements usually will be subordinated to 
the function of influencing and persuading a purchase of 
the product or service. For obvious reasons advertising 
will present the a~vantages of a particular product, and 
not the disadvantages and there is a marked reluctance on 
the part of sellers to publicise the disadvantages assoc-
iated with the products of competitors through fear of 
1 . . 34 . reta ~at~on. Therefore, the consumer does not rece~ve 
adequate information about goods and services to be in a 
'state of perfect knowledge' and the technical complexity 
and multiplicity of goods make perfect knowledge an unreal-
istic expectation for even the most educated consumer. 35 
Common law protection. 
Leaving for the moment the unrealistic nature of the 
assumptions underlying the model of perfect competition and 
its corollary of consumer sovereignty, it is suggested 
that severe reservations may be advanced to the proposition 
that the common law adequately protects consumers. As 
(34) See, for example, Green and Moore, 'Winter's 
Discontent: Market Failure and Consumer Welfare', 
(1973) 82 Yale Law Journal 903, 907. 
{35) See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising 
infra; see also, Trebilcock, 'Consumer Protection 
~n the Affluent Society', (1970) 16 McGill Law 
Journal 263, 276. 
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. 36 Cranston comments 
"A general feature of common law is that consumers 
must take the initiative to enforce their legal 
rights. The assumption is that consumers know 
their rights and are sufficiently motivated to 
press them. If they are harmed because a business 
infringes their rights, economic self interest 
will impel them to take action, including court 
action if a settlement cannot be achieved.' 
However in practice there are a number of factors impeding 
access to the courts. 37 The most obvious obstacle 
confronting a consumer is the cost of litigation. Not-
withstanding the general rule that 'costs follow the 
event',where the amount involved is small the risk of 
losing is a formidable deterrent. In addition to the 
direct expenses of litigation, must be added opportunity 
costs, that is, indirect costs incurred through time 
spent in court, consultingdawyers, travelling to and 
from court and the progressive erosion of the claim by 
. fl . 38 1n at1on. Even where direct expenses are low, due to 
legal aid or where the claim is pursued before a small 
claims tribunal, for example, the indirect costs assoc-
iated with any litigation remain. Furthermore many 
consumer disputes will involve an adversary who is no 
stranger to the legal system - for example, a finance 
company, insurance company or retailer. For the consumer, 
( 3 6 ) Op • cit., 2 3 • 
(37) See Chapter III, infra. 
(38) Phillips and Hawkins, 'Some Economic Aspects of the 
Settlement Process: A Study of Personal Injury 
Claims', (1976) 39 MLR 497. 
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on the other hand, contact with the legal system will be a 
unique experience and Galanter39 advances the theory that 
discrepancies in the relative positions of the parties 
enable the stronger of the two to exploit the passivity 
of the legal system. Repeated access by the institutional 
party facilitates themass-processing of disputes and may 
result in the achievement of economies of scale. Ob-
viously the institutional party will have financial 
resources far in excess of most individual consumer liti-
gants and the relative poverty of the individual means 
that he or she will rarely be in a position to resist an 
offer of settlement. Consumer ignorance highlights yet 
another deficiency of the common law in protecting 
consumers.
40 Consumers are often ignorant o.f their legal 
rights and remedies by which their grievances may be 
redressed. For example,a consumer's statutory right to 
cancel a door-to-door sales agreement will be of no use to 
him unless he is aware of that right's existence. 
It is also said to be a feature of certain consumer 
offences that they are complex, diffused over time and 
unpublicized. 41 For exampl~ the adverse effects of some 
food additives and drugs do not manifest themselves until 
they have been used over a period of time and where large 
numbers of the public are only affected to a small degree 
the likelihood of them aggregating to collectively 
(39} 'Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Changer, (1974} 9 Law and Society 
Review 95. 
(40) See Chapter III, infra. 
(41) Cranston 'Creeping Economism: Some Thoughts on Law 
and Economics', (1977) 4 British Journal of Law and 
Society 103, 109. 
21 
42 
complain is very small. In respect of products that 
are potentially dangerous to the consumer some pre-
market filter mechanism is essential, but the common law 
looks to the cure in the form of damages, rather than 
prevention. For these reasons, and for others that will 
become apparent below, the consumer cannot rely exclus-
ively on the common law for his or her protection. 
Given that market arrangements usually reflect im-
perfect competition to a greater or lesser extent, and 
given the limitations of the common law, it is obvious 
that some level of government intervention in the mark-
etplace is necessary. However, a significant point that 
emerges from the discussion of economic theory above is 
that, generally speaking, the more effective the compet-
ition within any nominally free enterprise market the 
better the position of consumers within it. Competition 
within an economy based upon free enterprise performs the 
vital function of ensuring that prices reflect the levels 
of supply and demand, that producers are efficient and 
profits reasonable, and that innovation, technological 
improvement and cost reduction are vigorously pursued. 43 
Dickey and Ward44 state that 
(42) See Chapter III, infra. 
(43) See generally, Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Compet · 
-ition (1971)1 esp. Chapters 20-21; Lipsey, op. cit., 
chapter 5. 
(44} 'Consumer Legislation in Socio-Economic Perspective: 
Observations from the Enactments of One State; 
(1978) 13 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 378, 381. See also Dickey and Ward, *The 
Adequacy of Australian Consumer Protection Legislation 
-Observations and Proposals from Economic Theory,r 
(1979) 14 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 133. 
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"Competition acts as a purifying agent within 
a free enterprise market; it provides an im-
personal force which purges such markets of 
inefficient businesses and with them all forms 
of anti-consumer practices, particularly the 
manipulation of the price and quality of goods 
for the sole benefit of the businesses in-
volved. Accordingly, all other things being 
equal, the best consumer legislation is that 
which creates the most favourable conditions 
under which effective competition can thrive." 
Consequently, while only a few industries' market struct-
ures approximate to the model of perfect competition, 
the purely competitive market model provides a norm 
against which less competitive markets may be evaluated45 
and a goal to which market regulations and control might 
appropriately be directed. 
The real problem facing any legislature then is to 
strike a balance between consumer protection and market 
intervention on the one hand and market freedom on the 
other. At the outset the decision of whether or not to 
intervene is complicated by the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the real level of competition in many markets and in 
determining to what extent any distortions may be cured by 
legislative intervention. 46 Free market economists are 
critical of much of the legislation passed on behalf of 
the consumer and decry regulation. For example, Clair 
W'l 47 ~ cox · argues 
(45) As Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2 ed 1977), 13, 
stresses: " •.• lack of realism, far from invalidating 
the theory, is the essential pre-condition of theory." 
(46) Cayne and Trebilcock, 'Market considerations in the 
Formulation of Consumer Protection Policy' (1973) 23 
University of Toronto Law Journal 396. 1 
(47) Public Policies Toward Busines (1966), 476-477. 
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"Regulation cannot set prices below an industry's 
costs however excessive they may be. Competition 
does so, and the high cost company is compelled 
to discover means whereby its costs can be 
reduced. Regulation does not enlarge consumption 
by setting prices at the lowest level consistent 
with a fair return. Competition has this effect. 
Regulation fails to encourage performance in the 
public interest by offering rewards and penalties. 
Competition offers both." 
Thus regulation in the eyes of free market economists is 
a pallid substitute for competition. Briefly, the arguments 
that may be ranged against government regulation are as 
follows:-
(i) Market failure doesn't automatically call for 
t . t' . t 48 h t k governmen 1nterven 1on. W1n er argues t a mar ets 
fail in varying degrees and government intervention 
cannot be justified unless the benefits exceed the 
costs. For example, it is suggested that drug 
regulation severely impedes the rate of introduction 
of new drugs and thus prevents beneficial as well as 
harmful drugs from entering the market. The danger 
of a thalidomide being marketed must be weighed 
against the danger of a penicillin being suppressed~ 9 
Furthermore, as the Molony Committee point out 
11 The consumer is the taxpayer, and we see 
small merit in creating an elaborate new 
system to assist him in one capacity, 
when he would have to pay for it in the 
other. In so far as any increased cost 
fell on industry, recoupment from the 
consumer would be no less inevitable." 50 
( 4 8) 'Economic Regulation vs G-ap:tta:!l.ism : Ralph Nader and 
Creeping Capitalism; (1973) 82 Yale Law Journal 890, 894. 
(49} Turner, The Chemical Feast (1970), 225; Winter, The 
Consumer Advocate Versus The Consumer (1972), 5. 
(50) Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection, 
op. cit para. 16. 
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This argument may be further illustrated by reference 
to the advertising industry. Advertisers argue that 
advertising promotes full employment by inducing 
high levels of consumer spending. This is said to 
be particularly crucial in a wealthy society where 
much production takes the form of luxury or semi-
luxury goods. One does not need to advertise to 
sell food to a hungry person, but advertising and 
sales promotion are essential in persuading 
consumers that they need a colour television, a 
stereo system or an automatic dishwasher. Thus it 
is argued that stability in an opulent society calls 
for extensive want creating activities - in partie-
ular, advertising - or high levels of production and 
.employment will not be sustainable. It is argued 
that Government regulation and intrusion into the 
market place by regulating advertising may have a 
detrimental effect on production and employment. For 
example, Bernard Holt, Federal Director of the 
Association of Advertising Agencie~ remarked that 
''It would not be too unkind to suggest that 
(the critics) in venting their spleen against 
advertising, they are really, whether they 
know it or not, striking out against the free 
enterprise system • • . • . Quite obviously this 
(advertising) expenditure serves our society 
through wages and prices - wages, in that mass 
produced products and readily available 
services have to be sold to the consumer for 
the economy to work at all. To be sold they 
have to be wanted. This is advertising's role 
- to make them wanted. The more goods and 
services are sold the more people are employed.n 
51 
(51) Reported in Goldring and Maher, Consumer Protection 
Law in Australia (1979), 232. 
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However the consensus of opinion among economists is 
that advertising affects the composition, more than 
it does the volume of spending, and there is a 
general reluctance to concede a close correlation 
between the volume of advertising and levels of 
output and employment. 52 It is not this writer's 
intention to become embroiled in this debate, for 
even conceding such a close correlation, it does 
not follow that misleading or deceptive advertising 
should escape regulation and modification. Never-
theless,: the point that does emerge is that careful 
assessment of the costs and benefits must be made 
before any regulation is introduced. 53 
(ii) Regulation often diminishes competition and promotes 
monopoly power. For example, a feature of many 
regulatory schemes is that control is exercised on 
the entry of new competitors into the regulated 
industry. While such entry restrictions are often 
(52) See, for example; Telser, 'Advertising and Com-
petition', (1964) Journal of Political Economy 537; 
McConnell, op, cit,, 518; Cannon, Advertising: The 
Economic ImPlications (1974), 39-62. 
(53) As Layton and Holmes, 'Consumerism: A passing 
malaise or a continuing expression of social concern~ 
comment in 46 Australian Quarterly 6, at 23-24: 
'It would seem that in assessing any programme of 
consumer protection, we must .•. seek to establish 
that particular balance between exploitation and over 
protection that yields the minimum social cost to the 
community'. 
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essential in the public interest54 some regulation 
. 55 
amounts to the tyranny of the status quo. In 
addition set prices for particular goods and services 
to ensure a predetermined rate of return for all 
firms in a regulated industry is seen as an unwelcome 
restraint on pure competition. Furthermore Green and 
Nader56 argue that this leads to 'technological 
lethargy' ie,a firm with a fixed rate of return and 
protected from outside competition due to entry 
restrictions has no incentive to be innovative. 
(iii)Another major criticism of regulation relates to the 
'processes of regulation•. 57 Delay, inflexibility 
and inadequate information for accurate decision-
making are all charges levelled at government reg-
ulatory bodies. Furthermore it is argued that 
'government by its very nature reacts to political 
pressure, rather than impartial standards' . 58 
(iv) Statutory intervention is said to be unnecessary in 
light of the self-enforcement and regulatory pro-
cedures that already exist in the commercial 
community. Business self regulation is said to enjoy 
a number of advantages over legislative control in 
. 
(54) Occupational licensing of medical practitioners and 
legal practitioners, for example. 
(55) See Chapter II, Self-Regulation, infra. 
(56) op, cit., 881. 
(57} Winter, ~ cit, 894; see also, Green and Nader, 
op. cit, 875. 
(58) Winter, op. cit., 893. 
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that it is cheap, flexible and more effective. 59 
Furthermore it is argued that businesses who 
introduce self regulatory codes are more likely to 
comply with the spirit as well as the letter of the 
code, than be resistant, as they would be to 
statutory regulation. Standards established in a 
self regulatory system can be applied in a common 
sense practical way and not in the legalistic 
technical way of legislative controls. 
For these reasons the free market advocates view market 
intervention by the government with a well developed 
scepticism. 
However the arguments for regulation are no less cogent 
and the following matters deserve mention:-
(i) Regulation when employed appropriately may correct 
various distortions in the economy and encourage 
competition. 60 Take advertising, for example. 
While accurate and informative advertising undoubtedly 
stimulates product improvement and facilitates 
price and quality comparisons, misleading and 
deceptive advertising may result in a misallocation 
of resources through expenditures on inferior goods 
(59) See Cranston, op. ci~, 61. 
{60) For example, anti-monopoly legislation; see the 
Commerce Act 1975. 
28 
or, as instanced above, by diverting trade to 
higher priced goods that differ from cheaper 
substitutes only in terms of the quality and quantity 
of advertising expended in their promotion. If 
producers spend more and more money on inflated and 
misleading advertising campaigns rather than 
concentrating on product improvement or price compet-
ition to expand their market share, the result is 
both the exploitation of the consumer and the under-
mining of serious meaningful competi t;ion. Pi tofsky61 
contends further that 
"(d)eceptive advertising if not controlled can 
eventually undermine the whole competitive 
system by reducing the extent to which con-
sumers will rely on product claims and 
descriptions." 
Viewed in this perspective, false or deceptive 
advertisers are in effect 'free riders' profiting 
from the reputation of advertisers who are accurate 
and truthful. As the consumer cannot determine 
truth from falsity from the face of an advertisement, 
the existence of some false or misleading advertising 
casts a cloud over all advertising and weakens 
consumer confidence. 
(ii) Social welfare considerations may dictate regulation 
regardless of economic factors. Promotion of 
competition may be a secondary goali e.g. when the 
safety of consumers is at stake it may be 
(61) 'Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation 
of Advertising', (1977) 90 Harvard Law Review 661, 671. 
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preferable to impose exceptionally high standards in 
respect of potentially dangerous goods even though 
this might reduce the number of firms and conseq-
uently the degree of competitiveness in the market 
due to the increased costs. 62 
(iii)The market system often fails to register all the 
costs associated with the production of certain 
goods and services. These costs are not taken into 
account by the producer because they are not internal 
to the firm. Illustrations of such costs are the 
smoke, smog, and pollution which have characterised 
the production of certain products. These costs 
which economists call •externalities• 63 are necess-
arily controlled by regulation. For example,firms 
may be forced by regulation to adopt alternative but 
more costly techniques of production that cause less 
pollution. 64 Arguments about the social costs of 
advertising also abound. Critics point to the 
environmental pollution of unsightly bill boards and 
posters, claim that the independence of the media is 
threatened, assert that advertising is an unacceptable 
f f h 1 . 1 d't' . 65 d h h orm o psyc o og1ca con 1 10n1ng an t at muc 
(62) Green and Nader,~· cih, 885; Winter, op.ci~, 895; 
Dickey and Ward, op. ci~, 382. 
(63) Lipsey, o~ ci~, 436; Samuelson, op.ci~, 453. 
( 6 4) Ibid. 
(65} Trebilcock, Loc:. cit., 271. 
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advertising offends one's common sense and tries 
the patience of society. Furthermore, Galbraith66 
asserts that 
'It will surely be agreed that whatever the 
effects of advertising its ultimate effect 
is an extremely powerful and sustained 
propaganda on the importance of goods. No 
similar case is made on behalf of artistic, 
educational and other humane achievement. ' 
To this extent advertising is said to create an im-
balance between the demand for private and public 
goods. 'On the other hand proponents of advertising 
see it as supporting national communications, 
' . h. lt f 6 7 . . . t enr1c 1ng mass cu ure , 1ncreas1ng en)oymen 
of life by increasing peoples wants and considerably 
enlivening the market place. 
(iv) Regulation may ensure ·that adequate information 
reaches the consumer about goods and services 
so as to facilitate rational choice. 68 For example, 
nutritional labelling, code dating, disclosure of 
(66) 'Economics as a system of belief~ in Wheelwright 
and Stilwell (eds), Readings in Political Economy 
Vol. 2 (1976), 37. 
(67) Collinge, Law of Marketing in Australia and New 
Zealand (1971), 208. 
(68) Green and Moore, op cit, 906; see Chapter IV, 
Statutory Control-of Advertising, infra. 
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true lending rate provisions all may improve the 
consumer's position. Given the enormous expenditure 
on advertising each year, 69 and recognising that 
70 
ultimately these costs are born by the consumer, 
the consumer is entitled to scrupulously accurate, 
fair and informative advertising and disclosure 
generally. 
(v) Business self regulation is structured on a voluntary 
basis and often such voluntary codes of conduct 
flounder as there are no means to enforce them. 71 
Furthermore business self-interest and the profit 
motive may be diametr~cally opposed to the consumer 
interest; businessmen are not likely to promote and 
support any form of regulation that infringes upon 
profits. 72 Furthermore the argument in favour of 
business self regulation is strongest in so far as 
it relates to established firms and trade associations 
(69) Advertising revenue for newspapers and periodicals in 
New Zealand during the 1976-1977 financial year was 
$80 million, while radio and television advertising 
revenues during the same period amounted to $42 
million. Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook 
1979, 340-342. 
(70) Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
(1931), 123 states that: 'In the last analysis, these 
costs born by the consumer, must be counted as selling 
costs - costs of altering his demands, rather than as 
production costs- costs of satisfying them'; see 
also Baran and Sweezy, 'The Absorption of Surplus: 
The Sales Effort' in Wheelwright:.and Stilwell (eds), 
Readings in Political Economy Vol 2 (1976), 44; 
Trebilcock, op.ci~, 278 remarks that: 'The consumer 
pays dearly for the benefit, if any, that he derives 
from being told what he wants'. 
(71} See Chapter II, infra. 
(72) Idem. 
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but many consumer complaints are directed against 
less reputable firms who may not even be partic-
ipants in a scheme of business self regulation. 73 
The above arguments in favour of legislative control 
convincingly demonstrate the need for some government 
intervention in the marketplace although the negative 
characteristics of regulation that were stressed earlier 
must always be born in mind in assessing the necessity 
for intervention. 
(3) THE BASIC OBJECTIVES 
The second fundamental question is: what should be 
the basic objectives of consumer protection legislation? 
An adequate answer to this question presupposes an 
identification of the problems facing the consumer in 
modern society. Briefly the following may be stressed: 
(i) Modern business demonstrates a capacity to sustain 
an almost unceasing flow of mass produced new goods 
due to advanced technology coupled with efficient 
research and management. However, this very 
success, while producing the reward of high living 
standards, has made the task of accurate and wise 
selection exceedingly difficult even for sophistic-
ated consumers. Compounding the problems of 
multiplicity and variety of goods is the complexity 
of many of them. A . 74 b s one wr1ter o serves: 
(73) Collinge, ~cit., 15. 
(74) Green, 'Appropriateness and Responsiveness: Can the 
Government Protect the Consumer?' (1974) 8 Journal 
of Economic Issues 309, 310;cited in Cranston, 
Consumers and the Law (1978), 2. 
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"How does an average consumer know how much 
unhealthy radiation is being emitted from 
a microwave oven or from his dentist's 
x-ray machine? Should we assume a car 
buyer can know whether his purchase's 
motor mounts will fail, or when; or 
whether tasteless and odourless carbon 
monoxide is seeping into the passenger 
compartment from the exhaust system; or 
whether the drug he purchases is effective 
or toxic?" 
As mentioned above, advertising is frequently 
unhelpful as a source of information to guide the 
consumer to a rational choice. While advertising 
does.provide the consumer with a great deal of 
information about goods and services, the quality 
of the information provided is often seriously 
deficient and even misleading and false. Market 
incentives do not lead to the disclosure of certain 
types of information, in any event, as in the 
interests of survival certain types of information 
will be avoided deliberately. For example, it would 
be mutually disadvantageous for rival cigarette 
producers to stress low tar and nicotene content 
arguments and hence unduly emphasise the health 
problem. 
(ii) Many goods and services that are marketed are sub-
standard, dangerous or worthless. A perusal of 
any Consumer 15 magazine will serve to confirm this 
allegation if personal experience does not provide 
confirmation. 
(75) Published by the Consumer Council of New Zealand, 
constituted under the Consumer Council Act 1966 . 
.. 
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(iii) Inequality in bargaining power is a further serious 
problem. The concept of freedom of contract, with 
its roots in the social, economic and political 
philosophies of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, 76 is based upon the premise that both 
parties to a contract are bargaining from a position 
of equal strength, and that each is free to accept 
or reject any term that the other might wish to 
impose in the contract. This fails to take into 
account the fact that true equality rarely exists 
and the fact that many contracts are the result of 
necessity. As Jacobsen77 describes the position of 
the consumer: 
" ... he can either accept the contract as it 
is without any changes, or refuse to become 
a party thereto. In fact very often, or 
almost always, the supplier is the only one, 
or one of few, who is in a position to supply 
the required services or the necessary goods 
- and the suggested option of the consumer is 
merely theoretical for in fact it does not 
exist." 
This inequality is also apparent when the consumer 
seeks redress. Although this writer is in agreement 
with Cranston78 when he comments that '(m)any 
businesses adopt a positive attitude to consumer 
grievances' the consumer is in a weak bargaining 
(76) See, for example: Grotius, Inleidinge, 3.1.10; John 
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Ch. II. 
(77) 'The Standard Contracts Law of Israel', (1968) 12 
Journal of Business Law 325; see also Ziegel, 'The 
Future of Canadian Consumerism', (1973) 51 Canadian 
Bar Review 191. 
(78) Op.ci~, 2. 
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position due to the disparity in knowledge and 
resources between the parties. 79 Ignorance of 
legal rights, inadequate funds and delays in court 
processes all deter consumers from litigation. 
(iv) As stressed above, the concept of absolute consumer 
sovereignty rests upon the ideal of perfect compet-
ition and, generally speaking, as competition 
declines so will the consumer's strength in the 
market place diminish. Where 'workable competit-
ion• 80 does not exist in a particular industry 
consumers may be exploited in any or all of the 
following ways: · (1) restriction of output; 
(2) exorbitant prices; (3) delay in, or prevention 
of, quality improvements; (4) quality deterioration 
or induced obsolescence in order to speed up re-
placement sales; (5) less option to consumers as to 
conditions of sale. 
(79) Supra. 
(80) 'Workable competition' has been defined as 'a sit-
uation in which there is a sufficient market rivalry 
to compel firms to produce with internal efficiency, 
to price in accordance with costs, to meet the 
consumers' demand for variety, and to strive for 
product and process improvement. Thus a workably 
competitive industry has two characteristics: 
first, the industry is reasonably efficient and 
progressive and, second, the efficiency and 
progressiveness has been achieved through impersonal 
market forces', Brunt, 'Legislation in Search of an 
objective', in Nieuwenhuysen (ed), Australian 
Trade Practices: Readings (1970), 238. See also, 
Collinge, op.ci~, 10. 
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In the light of these major problems facing the 
consumer it is suggested that the following objectives 
should be pursued:-
(a) Promotion of competition. Due to the recognised 
benefits of competitive pressures the consumer gen-
erally will be best served by legislation that seeks 
to ensure that workable competition obtains in the 
market place the word 'workable' is used advis-
edly in that 'perfect' competitiop in the vast 
majority of markets is unobtainable, and the object 
of legislation in promoting competition must be 
tempered by the realities of the market place. 
Competition may be bolstered not only by controlling 
monopolies, mergers and takeovers, but also by the 
control and regulation of unfair and unscrupulous 
trade practices which are contrary to the consumer 
interest. Control of unfair trade practices not 
only directly protects consumers from unscrupulous 
firms, but is beneficial to reputable and honest 
firms in that they are not forced to match these 
practices in order to retain their market share. 81 
Where advertising is anti-competitive, to the extent 
that it functions as a surrogate for price competition 
and to the extent that it constitutes a formidable 
barrier to entry, there is a clear need for control. 
(81) For example, purchasing decisions based upon 
misleading advertising claims lead to serious 
misallocations of resources in that trade is 
diverted away from honest traders and away 
from the 'better' product. 
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Of course, the objective of fostering workable. 
competition is not always appropriate. The consumer 
interest may dictate safety or health regulations 
that directly inhibits competition and economists 
will be quick to point out that economies of large 
scale production82 may only be obtainable if a few 
firms operate in a particular market; that is, 
industrial concentration may be better for consumers 
in that the application of sophisticated production 
techniques are conducive to lower costs of product-
ion and, consequently, lower prices to the consumer. 
(b) The quantity and quality of information that the 
consumer receives must be improved. The United 
States Special Committee on Retail Instalment Sales, 
Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury said: 
"It is fair to ask precisely what it is that 
the consumer is to be protected from. Must 
he be protected from his own lack of know-
ledge or discipline which leads him to take 
advantage of easy credit to buy things he 
does not need or cannot afford? Is he to 
be protected from the •: fringe' operator who 
may take.advantage of the ignorance and 
gullibility of the consumer to cause him to 
overbuy or pay too much?" 83 
(82) See McConnell, op,ci4, 523-524; Samuelson,~ cit~ 
25, 34, 462. 
(83) This quotation from the US Special Committee Report at 
page 9 appears in M.J. Trebilcock's article 'Consumer 
Protection in the Affluent Society' (1970) 16 McGill 
Law Journal 263. ' 
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Trebilcock84 says that it is implicit from this 
statement that the promotion of 'prudent shopping 
decisions' is a fundamental objective of consumer 
protection legislation. Before a prudent shopping 
decision can be made the consumer must be in pass-
ession of adequate information about goods and 
services available, together with information about 
the true cost if credit is available. The provision 
of adequate information can never ensure that 
'11 k . 1 h . 85 consumers w1 rna e a rat1ona c o1ce, but nev-
ertheless the absence of such information deprives 
the consumer of even the possibility of reaching a 
reasoned decision. 
In order to facilitate the attainment of this object-
ive disclosure legislation and sanctioning of 
deceptions in packaging, labelling, advertising and 
selling are necessary. Furthermore the establish-
ment of consumer agencies which provide information 
on a comparative basis to subscribers is a vital 
supplement to state disclosure requirements. 
(84) Lot:.,cit,, 264. 
(85) Cayne and Trebilcock, 'Market Considerations and 
Consumer Protection Policy~ (1973) 23 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 396, 406 comment that 
" •.• inability to utilise information will 
always subvert a disclosure requirement. The 
educational inadequacies associated with 
poverty are relevant in this context~'. 
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(c) The goods and services available in the market place 
must be of reasonable quality having regard to such 
criteria as their price and any description applied 
to them. Furthermore in the interests of health 
and safety certain categories of goods and services 
must meet minimum quality standards. For example, 
occupational licensing must ensure that a minimum 
standard of competence prevails in a given profession, 
such as dentistry, and drug regulation must prevent 
the distribution of inadequately tested and potent-
ially dangerous medicines and drugs. 
(d) Redress of certain imbalances in bargaining power. 
Jacobson86 argues that: 
" ..• it is among the duties of the legislator 
in the modern world to protect people even 
against their own folly, not to permit ex-
ploitation, and to remove any manifest 
unfairness. The protection of consumers is 
gradually becoming a recognised feature in 
modern law and it inevitably involves lim-
itations upon the doctrine of freedom of 
contract." 
Serious consideration must be accorded to proposals 
advocating that suppliers of goods and services may 
not contract out of certain quality standards and 
other normal incidents of consumer transactions 
unless in all the circumstances it is reasonable to 
do so. Particular powers to reopen extortionate 
bargains and a general doctrine of unconscionability 
will further counteract inequalities in bargaining 
power. 
(86) Op cit, 326. 
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(e) Facilitate consumer redress. Given the undeniable 
. riqhts dependency of substant1ve;on procedural rights, a 
vast body of substantive rights will not assist the 
consumer if his avenues of redress are inadequate. 
Some of the obstacles impeding access by consumers 
to the ordinary courts may be alleviated by the 
provision of legal aid or by allowing class actions 
or substituted actions. Alternatively, impediments 
associated with the ordinary courts may be by-passed 
by the creation of special courts for the resol-
ution of consumer grievances; e.g., small claims 
tribunals and market courts. It is essential that 
the consumer have ready and relatively inexpensive 
access to the courts and tribunals to obtain redress 
for legitimate complaints in relation to relatively 
minor matters. 
The law in pursuit of these objectives obviously must 
maintain a fine balance. Notwithstanding distortions in 
the market caution should be exercised lest the cost of 
the cure exceed the benefit proposed. As Atiyah87 
comments, 'Social questions cannot always be reduced to 
mercenary financial considerations' but 1'it is absurd to 
think that it is rational - even in matters of social 
policy - to buy something without paying attention to 
the price' . Consumer legislation is not enacted in a 
vacuum, but in a dynamic economic system, and it may be 
patently wrong to assume that merely because legislation 
{87) 'Consumer Protection- Time to Take Stock', (1979) 
1 Liverpool Law Review 20, 39-40. 
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has increased consumer rights vis-a-vis firms in the 
marketplace that it necessarily follows that they will be 
better off in the long term. 88 Furthermore, while the 
existence of problems and distortions in the market 
dictate regulation, this does not lead one to the irresist-
ible and inevitable conclusion that there should be 
government regulation. Industry or business self regulation 
may overcome many of the problems outlined more cheaply 
than governmental intervention and it is theoretically 
possible for the consumer's interests to be protected by 
resort to the courts, either by the consumers themselves, 
or by those sellers with superior products who see their 
market shares declining in the face of inroads based on 
inaccurate and/or deceptive marketing practices. There-
fore a balancing process must be undertaken; the costs 
and benefits of any market intervention must be weighed in 
the balance and there must be a careful evaluation of the 
various modes of redressing the problem. For those who 
regard consumer protection as being no more than a 'band 
(88) For example; the enactment of legislation subjecting 
exemption clauses to the test of reasonableness may 
encourage firms habitually employing such clauses 
to raise their prices to cover the cost of additional 
insurance (see Atiyah, ibid, 39-44); to insist on 
the suppression of advocacy in advertising in the 
name of objective recitation of facts might well 
succeed only in frustrating the whole object of 
the exercise by discouraging sellers and producers 
from advertising at all (see Winter, The Consumer 
Advocate Versus the Consumer (1972), 10). 
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aid on the malignancy of capitalism' , 89 or for those 
who see this body of law as an unwelcome departure from 
the laissez-faire approach and the underlying philosophy 
f . d' 'd 1' 90 h b 1 . t 'bl o 1n 1Vl ua 1sm, sue a a ance 1s no poss1 e. Like 
91 Cranston, this writer believes that 'social engineer-
ing' within the present private enterprise system is 
worthwhile and necessary. It is clear that the law 
should not be so favourable to the consumer that it 
encourages evasion or dereliction of the consumer's 
responsibility to protect himself, nor should the law 
ignore the necessity to protect the consumer against 
abuses which, for practical purposes, are outside his 
control. To conclude this brief outline of the ob-
jectives of consumer protection the following remark by 
Atiyah92 may be borne in mind: 
(89) Goldring, 'Consumer Protection and the Trade 
Practices Act', .(1974-75) 6 Federal Law Review 288. 
(90) Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 5. 
(91) Op. cit, 9. 
( 92) L.oc..ci t., 44. 
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" it is not necessarily the best policy 
to frame our consumer protection laws on 
the basis of the maxim, Zex proaurator 
fatuorum est - the law is the protector of 
the stupid.' 
I turn now to a consideration of the rules, legal and 
voluntary, which regulate the provision of information 
pertaining to goods and services and associated credit 
in the New Zealand economy. Naturally the scope of this 
dissertation precludes a discussion of all the objectives 
outlined above as they relate to consumer protection in 
general, but it is important to take cognisance of most 
of these general objectives in assessing the adequacy, 
need, and control of consumer information in this 
country. 
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II BUSINESS SELF-REGULATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Various professions, trade associations and other 
representative bodies in New Zealand have promulgated 
self regulatory codes of conduct, ethics and practice that 
supplement the requirements of the law. 1 Business self-
regulation possesses the potential to advance considerably 
the consumer interest and in the United Kingdom, for example, 
the Director General of Fair Trading is under a duty to 
encourage trade associations to prepare and disseminate 
codes of practice that will safeguard and promote the 
. 2 
interests of the public. A recent New Zealand Government 
3 Report recommends that a similar promotional, as well as 
a monitoring function,be accorded the Consumers' Institute. 
(1) See, for example, the Newspaper Publishers Association's 
Codes of Advertising Practice; the Pharmaceutical 
Society's Code of Ethics; the New Zealand Finance 
Houses Association (Inc) Code of Ethics and Standards 
of Conduct; the Footwear Industry Code; and Solar 
Heating Industry Code, the Direct Selling Association 
Code of Ethics; and the Real Estate Institute of New 
Zealand Code of Ethics. 
(2) Fair Trading Act 1973, s 124(3). 
(3) Report of the Working Party reviewing certain Consumer 
and Commercial Legislation, Proposals for a Selling 
Practices Act (1980), 18-20; hereinafter cited as the 
Martin Report, the Chairman of the Working Party being 
Mr H.E. Martin. 
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Self-regulation has its origins in a number of factors: 
First, businesses have sought through voluntary codes 
of conduct to demonstrate their sense of social 
responsibility and, at the same time, to promote their 
corporate image. Fortunately for the consumer not all 
businesses subscribe exclusively to the view expressed by 
Milton Friedman4 that: 
"Few trends could so thoroughly undermine 
the very foundation of our free society 
as the acceptance by corporate officials 
of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their shareholders 
as possible. This is a fundamentally 
subversive doctrine." 
This vocal and erudite campaigner for laissez faire 
economic policies regards the pursuit of profit as the 
sole responsibility of businesses and any controls, legal 
or otherwise, are perceived as superfluous and detrimental 
in light of the purging effect of market competitive ,, J 
forces. With respect to the corporate image point, codes 
attract favourable publicity for the association or industxy 
producing them because of the impression that voluntary 
consumer protection measures are being introduced. 
Seaond, the tfireat of more restrictive statutory invervent-
ion has been ct powerful inducement to some groups to adopt 
some form of self-regulation to accomrodate the consumer interest5 
(4) Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 133; cited in 
Cranston, Consumers and the Law (1978), 30. 
{5) See Page, 'Self Regulation and Codes of Practice', 
(1980) The Journal of Business Law 24, 26. 
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For example, the Code of Advertising Practice drawn up 
by the Advertising Association in Britain in the early 
1960's was done under threat of statutory control as a 
result of the work of the Molony Committee6 and the 
formation of the Press Council 7 in New Zealand in 1972 is 
another voluntary organisation whose existence is 
attributable, at least in part, to a fear of undesirable 
statutory intervention. Similarly, industry regulation 
of prescription drug advertising in Australia, which is 
embodied in a code of business practice administered 
by the Australian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
was introduced in an attempt to pre-empt the institution 
and implementation of proposed advertising regulations in 
this area. 8 An editorial in the Australian Medical Journa19 
urged support for the voluntary scheme in the following 
way: 
(6) Cranston, op.cit., 46. 
(7) A four-member council sponsored by the Newspaper 
Publishers Association and the Journalists 
Association. Generally see Burrows, News Media Law 
In New Zealand (2 ed, 1980), 418. 
(8) See Darvall, 'Self-Regulation of Advertising and the 
Consumer Interest,' (1980)8 Australian Business Law 
Review 309, 316. 
(9) (1974)2 Medical Journal of Australia 189, 190; cited 
in Darvall, ~· 
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[V]oluntary self regulation, responsibly 
administered •.•• will achieve all that 
governments should reasonably want to ask 
for in relation to pharmaceutical adver-
tising in medical journals. We strongly 
urge the Australian and State governments 
and governmental agencies to leave the 
matter alone, for the present at least•lO 
Third,some forms of business self regulation are devised 
primarily to control businesses within an industry to 
the mutual economic benefit of practitioners, and such 
self regulation may or may not be in the consumer 
interest. For example, many self regulatory codes embody 
licensing, registration or accreditation schemes whereby 
the right to carry on business or to receive certain 
benefits is dependent upon the satisfaction of criteria 
laid down in the relevant codes. For example, 
the Media Council of Australia11 administers an agency 
12 
accreditation scheme whereby advertising agents who can 
(10) To date no governmental regulation of prescription 
drug advertising has occurred in Australia; see 
Darvall, lo<..cit, 318. 
(11) This is an unincorporated voluntary association of 
seven other associations; viz; the Australian News-
papers Council; Australian Accreditation Bureau; 
Federation of Australian Commercial Broadcasters; 
Federation of Australian Commercial Television 
Stations; Australian Provincial Press Association; 
Regional Dailies of Australia Ltd; Australian 
Magazine Publishers Association. 
(12) Advertising agents are the conduits between the 
advertisers (or customers) and the media; he acts as 
an agent for the advertiser whose advertising he is 
placing; nevertheless the advertising agent in 
promoting advertising and checking material against 
standards etc. performs a valuable service for media 
proprietors and is rewarded by payment of a commission 
on space booked by him: see Re Herald & Weekly Times 
( 19 7 8 ) 1 7 ALR 2 81 1 318 • . . . .. 
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satisfy criteria as to financial structure, size and 
continuity may be accredited. The accreditation rules 
provide that all advertisements submitted to a media 
proprietor must conform with the Media Council of Australia 
Code of Ethics which are designed to encourage honesty, 
fairness and responsibility in advertising. The grant of 
accreditation carries with it certain privileges, as well 
as obligations such as the need to comply with the code 
of ethics; in particular 'only accredited agents shall be 
eligible to receive commission'. This latter rule was 
subjected to judicial scrutiny in Re Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd13 when the Trade Practices Tribunal were asked to 
review a determination of the Trade Practices Commission 
who had granted authorisation to the accreditation rules 
subject to the above rule being abandoned. The Trade 
Practices Tribunal observed that 
11 [This rule] places the advertising agent 
without the system at a significant 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
advertising agent within the system".l4 
However the Tribunal found that the accreditation scheme 
created considerable benefits to the public in, inter alia~ 
maintaining advertising standards of ethical behaviour, and 
if the rule were eliminated some large advertisers would 
have no incentive to remain in the accreditation scheme, 
and the scheme could be eroded and, ultimately, 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Ibid, 325. 
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collapse. 15 Therefore it was decided that it was in the 
consumer interest to retain the rule, notwithstanding 
its anti-competitive effect on non-accredited advertising 
agents. 
Fourth~ legislators16 have exhibited a preference for this 
form of regulation and in some areas it is extremely 
difficult to frame adequate statutory controls. 
2. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Before turning to a consideration of self regulation 
in the consumer information field, it is proposed to 
isolate some of the merits and demerits of self regulation. 
There are a number of reasons for favouring business self 
regulation over statutory. control. For one thing, business 
self regulation does not involve the consumer in any direct 
cost and conserves public resources. Furthermore a self 
regulatory system is arguably more efficient and effective 
than its statutory counterpart. Proponents of business 
self regulation point in particular to the flexibility 
inherent in such a system and argue that as guidelines in 
a self regulatory system are non-legal they may be changed 
with a minimum of disruption. For example, the Association 
(15) The accreditation scheme imposes obligations on 
accredited agents and one of the inducements to J01n 
the scheme rests in this rule; by removing the rule 
the advantages of accreditation may be outweighed by 
the restraints to which the system subjects them. 
See the judgement at pages 325-326. 
(16) See, for example; the Fair Trading Act 1973 (U.K.), 
s 124(3), and the statutory obligation to promote 
such Codes; the Martin Report, at 11. 
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of British Travel Agents Code of Practice was sub-
stantially amended only six months after promulgation 
following complaints from consumers about surcharges and 
h 1 b k . 17 ote over oo 1ng. This potential for quick revision 
and responsiveness to consumer pressure is a substantial 
factor in favour of codes of practice. 
As far as effectiveness of business self regulation 
goes, it is asserted that codes of practice may cover areas 
and practices beyond the scope of adequate statutory 
1 t . F 1 th S ' ' · · 18 regu a 1on. or examp e, e ecur1t1es Comm1ss1on, 
commenting on. a submission by the Committee of Advertising 
Practice that self regulation of financial advertising 
should be the primary tier of control with adequate 
legislative support constituting the second tier, concurred 
in the Committee's view that 'it is impossible to draft 
regulations defining lawful copy content once it is 
accepted that an advertiser should be at liberty to be 
interesting and informative i.e. an advertiser could 
circumvent any direct prohibition by 'indirect insinuation 
and suggestion•. 19 However, insofar as codes and legis-
lation employ similar terminology and concepts (such as 
'falseL, 'deceptiveF, 'misleading', etc) to categorise 
(17) See Cranston, op cit, 61. 
(18) Proposed Recommendations for Securities Regulations 
(1980), 12.3.2. 
(19) Idem. 
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prohibited conduct, it is difficult to see how self regul-
ation will succeed where legislation fails; problems of 
interpretation will exist for both inasmuch as they must 
be reduced to writing and adherence to the letter of the 
law or rule will not necessarily entail compliance with 
the spirit of the same law or rule. 
A real advantage of a number of codes, each regulat-
ing a particular industry, is that each may be formulated 
with the idiosyncratic problems of each industry in 
. d 20 m1n . Legislation, of necessity, must be more general 
in the obligations that it imposes and it may be virtually 
impossible to cover with sufficient particularity the 
problems encountered in numerous and diverse industries, 
trades and professions. Conversely with self regulation 
many practices like expeditious handling of complaints, 
delays in servicing, clarity in documentation, or periods 
for which spare parts must be available, may be dealt with 
in sufficient detail. Moreover, codes of practice may 
well be in advance of legal provisions and be more 
favourable to consumers. 21 
(20) See Marsh, 'Voluntary Codes of Practice', (1977) 
127 New Law Journal 419. 
(21) See Cranston, op.citv 34 where he observes that: 
"In some respects the codes of practice approved 
by the Office of Fair Trading are in advance 
of the law, in that they cover trade practices 
for which legal measures have been suggested but 
not yet adopted"; for example, "value" and 
"worth" claims, and mandatory price marking on 
all goods and services. 
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It is suggested22 that businesses who introduce 
self-regulatory codes are more likely to comply with the 
spirit as well as the letter of the code, whereas with 
statutory regulation the incentive is often to evade the 
law and to find loopholes. 23 This distinction is 
attributed to "businesses' interest in the proper imple-
mentation of something they have established and from 
their greater willingness to comply with peer group 
pressure than when confronted with force". 24 Finally, 
self regulatory systems may be applied in a common sense 
practical way and not in the technical way of legislative 
controls and many systems establish elaborate conciliat-
ion and arbitration procedures facilitating speedy 
resolution of consumer complaints. 25 
As against this formidable array of real and imagined 
advantages that may attach to self ·regulation, can be 
(22) See Lawson, ·'Fair Trading Codes of Practice: the 
Legal Implications", (1977) 121 The Solicitors 
Journal 5; Cranston, op.cit, 61. 
(23) See, for example, Lawson, Law of Sale and Hire Purchase 
in New Zealand (1973), 171 et seq, and the cases 
there cited involving attempts to evade the Hire 
Purchase and Credit Sales Stabilisation Regulations 
1957. 
(24) Cranston, o~cit~ 61; Mitchell, 'Codes and the 
Consumer' ,--(1976) Marketing 17. 
(25) Generally, see Cranston, op,ci~, 37-39. 
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aligned an equally extensive list of disadvantages. There 
are a number of factors that are common to many self 
regulatory systems that indicate self regulation is inf-
erior to statutory control and may in fact work against 
the consumer interest. 
Given that self regulatory codes of practice are 
often only introduced when there are threats of onerous 
governmental control there is at best a reluctant compliance 
that belies the supposed advantage of ready adherence to 
the spirit and letter of a code. Self regulation in this 
situation may have a positive economic benefit to those 
in the business as it may avert future costs by preventing 
more stringent government control and increase consumer 
confidence. Furthermore a self regulatory system may 
26 
embody all the monopoly effects of licensing. As Page 
comments 
(W)here the prov1s1on of goods or services 
or access to a facility is contingent upon 
membership of the group, it may be used to 
restrict access to the facility or group or to 
oppress the minority within it ...• • 
For example, in The Pharmaceutical Society of Great 
B •t . D. k 27 th Ph . 1 S . d r~ a~n v ~a son e armaceut1ca oc1ety passe a 
resolution, intended to be included in its code of 
ethics, to the effect that new pharmacies should be sit-
uated only on physically distinct premises and that 
trading activities of these new pharmacies in commodities 
( 2 6 ) Lo~ . cit., 2 7 . 
(27) [1970] A.C 403. 
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other than medicines and pharmaceuticals should be 
controlled severely. The Society explained that this 
measure was designed to raise the status of the profess-
ion and to promote the main responsibility of selling 
pharmaceuticals. However the House of Lords held that 
the restrictions proposed amounted to a restraint in trade 
that was unreasonable in the circumstances. Not only 
would the proposed amendment to the code of ethics limit 
competition by restricting the number of pharmacies 
attached, for example, to department stores, but it would 
severely reduce the profitability of new entrants by 
inhibiting them from selling certain goods. 
Perhaps the greatest drawback of self regulation, 
though, is that it often fails on enforcement and 
sanctions. A voluntary code of practice is only 
applicable •to members of the association promoting the 
code, who choose to accept the standards, and to remain 
28 
members'. For one thing it is unlikely that a voluntary 
code of practice will attract universal allegiance 
throughout an industry, trade or profession. For example, 
the Committee of Advertising Practice has promulgated a 
code of practice that has a significant impact on some of 
the advertising excesses that prevailed in New Zealand. 29 
Unfortunately the Committee has no control over direct 
mail solicitation or other distribution of brochures or 
circulars, nor are certain important journals represented 
on this Committee and bound by the code. Consequently 
(28) Marsh, op cit, 419. 
(29) infra. 
55 
the utility and efficacy of a voluntary code will be 
restricted through membership of the association prom-
1 . . . 30 t u gat~ng ~t. Moreover, as one wr~ter sugges s 
'(r)ogue operators are much less likely to join trade 
associations than honest and experienced traders'. 
Compounding the problem ofnon~membership is the fact that 
associations of businessmen may be reluctant to take action 
against one of their fellows and are unlikely to allocate 
31 
adequate resources to enforce codes. Even if a self 
regulatory body decides to take action against one of the 
subscribers to their code, often that body will not have 
legal powers and it will be difficult to enforce the 
sanction. It is this problem that led the Securities 
Commission 32 to conclude that '(t)he main point arising 
from our study of self regulation ... is that it requires 
reinforcement by legal rules'. Of course, if an Assoc-
iation is sufficiently well known and respected by con-
sumers the sanction of expulsion from the Association 
might amount to a sufficient incentive to abide by that 
Association's code of conduct or practice. Furthermore, 
{30) Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair 
Trading (1978), 207. 
(31) Cranston, op.citv 63. 
(32) Proposed Recommendations for Securities Regulations 
(1980) 1 12.4.4. 
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since earliest times33 the principle that no man should be 
judge in his own cause has been recognised and yet herein 
lies the very 'stuff' of self regulation and its pot-
ential failure in terms of consumer protection. As long 
as the industry sits in its own courtroom, conducts its 
own prosecution and defence, observes in the jury box 
and ruminates on the Bench, the risk of vested interests 
dictating outcomes must remain. 
Another big disadvantage of self regulation is that 
often advancing the consumer interest is diametrically 
opposed to business self-interest. Businessmen are 
unlikely to promote and support any form of regulation 
that impinges to large measure on profits, and many codes 
on closer examination most certainly do not promote the 
consumer interest. For example in the Motor Industry 
Code (UK), paragraph 3.11 states that: 
'Under the Sale of Goods Act, if the buyer 
examines the goods before the contract is 
made, there is no condition of merchantable 
quality as regards defects which that 
examination ought to reveal. Dealers should 
therefore provide all reasonable facilities 
to enable prospective customers or their 
nominees to carry out an examination of the 
car prior to sale, in order that any defects 
which ought to be revealed at the time of 
sale are made known to both parties.' 34 
' (33) See, for example, Dr Bonhams case (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 
107a; 77 E.R. 638, 646. 
(34) Cited in Marsh, op.citJ 420. 
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This rather transparent, and ineffective, 35 attempt to 
shelter behind the ruling in Thornett & Fehr v .Beer & 
Sona 36 can by no stretch of the imagination be regarded 
as a provision designed in the consumer interest. More-
over, in some areas where it is socially desirable that 
industries restrict their activities in the consumer 
interest, self regulation must fail because business self-
interest will prevail. For example, as two American 
t 37 t 1't commenta ors pu 
•rndustrial self-regulation is not 
emerge in the case of cigarettes. 
companies are not going to commit 
suicide ••.• • 
likely to 
Tobacco 
corporate 
Consequently, as a preliminary observation, one can say 
that there are areas where the consumer interest can be 
promoted by voluntary action on the part of various 
business, trade and professional associations, but the 
limitations inherent in systems of self regulation may 
necessitate legislative controls as well. 
(35) See Marsh, idem; see also Frank v Grosvenor Motor 
Auctions (P~Ltd [1960] V.R. 607, 609. 
{36) [1919] 1 K.B. 486. 
(37) Boyd and Claycamp, 'Industrial Self Regulation 
and the Public Interest', (1966) 64 Michigan 
Law Review 1239, 1253. 
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3. ADVERTISING CODES OF PRACTICE 
One of the most important self regulatory bodies in 
New Zealand is the Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) 
which was formed early in 1973. It consists of repres-
entatives from the Association of Accredited Advertising 
Agents of New Zealand Inc., the Independent Broadcasters 
Association, the Newspaper Publishers Association of New 
Zealand Inc., Radio New Zealand and Television New 
Zealand. 
The Committee of Advertising Practice has estab-
lished various codes of practice that control what can 
be said, and for some products (e.g. baldness treatment, 
slimming garments) effectively ban advertisements unless 
the advert~ser can prove that he has something that 
really does work. In an introduction to the various 
particular codes the Committee expresses its two main 
objectives as follows: 
"(a} To seek to maintain at all times and in all media 
a proper and generally acceptable standard of 
advertising and to ensure that advertising is not 
misleading either by statement or by implication; 
(b) To encourage media voluntarily to co-operate in 
any self regulation that may be necessary from 
time to time. u 
Thereafter follow a number of particular codes relating 
to the marketing of cigarettes, driving advertising, 
financial advertising, liquor advertising, people in 
advertising, petrol consumption claims, advertising for 
slimming or weight loss and youth organisations in ad-
vertising. 
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For example, the code for the marketing of cigarettes 
indicates that its primary aims are to ensure that cigar-
ette advertising will not be directed towards increasing 
the number of smokers38 or towards young people. 39 
Furthermore, cigarette advertising is not to be conducted 
on television, radio or on the cinema screen and point of 
sale and newspaper advertising in this regard is re-
stricted. 40 Health warnings are to be printed on each 
cigarette packet manufactured in New Zealand and each 
press and magazine advertisement for cigarettes shall carry 
the same warning notice. 41 An agreement has been reached 
between the Minister of Health and tobacco companies in 
New Zealand whereby the tobacco companies have agreed to 
abide by this Code and to be subject to the Committee of 
Advertising Practices decisions in implementing it. 42 
The code relating to people in advertising declares, inteP 
alia, that 'people should be portrayed in advertisements 
43 in realistic and intelligent terms'. 
The functioning of this self regulatory system 
erected by the Committee of Advertising Practice has been 
commented on by the Securities Commission44 and by the 
Working Party who compiled the Martin Report. 45 
(38) Para. 2.L 
(39) Para. 2. 2. 
( 40) Para. 3.1; 3.2; 3. 3. 
( 41) Para. 5.1; 6 .1. 
( 42) See Consumer 164, 222. 
( 43) Guideline no. l. 
(44) Proposed Recommendations for Securities Regulations 
( 19 8 0) , 12 . 4 . 3. 
t4 s) sll.DY"c''l. 
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The Securities Commission were impressed by the steps 
taken within the advertising industry itself to establish 
and maintain codes of responsible behaviour, but made a 
number of telling points concerning the system. First_, 
that some important journals, like the New Zealand Listen-
er, were not represented on the Committee and consequently 
the publishers of some of these journals would not feel 
constrained to adhere to the Code. 46 Furthermore, the 
Committee has no control over mailed advertising and 
in-store advertising and the Direct Mail Association is not 
a member of the Committee of Advertising Practice. As 
mentioned above, the efficacy of a voluntary code is 
dependent to a large measure on universal across-the-
board membership of the association promoting it. Non-
members cannot commit breaches of a code to which they do 
not subscribe. Second_, the <Commission pointed out that 
any scheme of s~lf regulation runs the risk of becoming 
a form of censorship that could operate unfairly as 
between competing interests. 47 If the media is to sit in 
judgment on the acceptability or otherwise of certain 
advertisements and this assessment is to be made by refer-
ence to its own code of practice it is inevitable that the 
charge, if not the reality, of bias will raise its head; 
that is, it must be conceded that in a self regulatory 
scheme discriminatory practices may be pursued against 
certain members or non-members. 
(46) Para. 12.4.3(a). 
(47) Para. 12.4.3(d). 
Third_, it noted that 
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the Committee itself recognises that there is a need to 
back up the self regulation by legal sanctions; that is, 
in the context of financial advertising, a statutory 
body such as the Securities Commission should have 'a 
very broad and speedy power of injunction if advertising 
or promotional material promulgated by an organisation 
ignores self regulation in a manner which either deceives 
the public or puts it at risk' • 48 One of the major 
points to emerge from a recent study of advertising 
control in the United Kingdom49 is the high percentage 
of advertisements that do not comply with the British 
Code of Advertising Practice, thus reinforcing the 
assertion that substantial legal sanctions are required. 
This need is clearly felt in New Zealand as we11. 50 
The second recent appraisal of the Committee of 
Advertising Practice scheme is contained in the Martin 
Report. 51 This Report advocates the gradual consolidation 
(48} ?ara. 12.4.3{c). 
(49) Review of the United Kingdom Self Regulatory System 
of Advertising Control - A Report by the Director-
General of Fair Trading (November 1978). 
(50) See for example: {1974) 4 Consumer Review 122; 
Consumer 114, 9; Consumer 115, 56; Consumer 117,119; 
Consumer 120, 207; Consumer 130, 167; Consumer 145,145; 
Consumer 149, 75; Consumer 154, 244; Consumer 157, 351; 
Consumer 158, 31; Consumer 163, 190; Consumer 191, 18. 
cf. Consumer 150, 114. 
{51} Supra. 
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of domestic legislation affecting consumers, 52 beginning 
with the Consumer Information Act 1969, the Merchandise 
Marks Act 1954 and the Wool Labelling Act 1949, and 
also proposed incorporation of principles of the United 
Kingdom Trade Descriptions Act 1968 so as to extend the 
definitions of advertising and labelling, thus allowing 
greater control, and updating of provisions as to labell-
ing and marking of goods, within one new Act, the Selling 
Practices Act. 53 However the main thrust of the pro-
posals is that the new Act provides for the 
11 encouragement of fair trading practices 
through self regulation, with enforce-
ment procedures relegated to a back-up 
role." 54 
Thus, the proposals envisage a two-tier system, whereby 
most consumer problems would be resolved at the business, 
trade or professional association level. A second tier 
of enforcement procedures and penalties would come into 
play where amicable resolution at the first tier level 
(52} See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising, infra. 
(53} Recent newspaper reports indicate that any new legis-
lation is likely to bear the title Trade Practices 
Act, rather than Selling Practices Act. See "The 
Press", 24 March 1981. Furthermore, there is some 
ambivalence as to whether any legislative changes 
should be modelled on the United Kingdom approach, 
as suggested in the Report, or whether the Austral-
ian approach should be preferred. See Chapter IV, 
infra. 
(54) Martin Report, page 9. 
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failed. The Martin Report suggests that the Consumers• 
Institute, a statutory body, 55 but independent and non-
governmental, be accorded the role of promoting the 
development of codes of fair practice since it is regul-
arly in touch with both consumers and the dynamics of the 
market place. The Institute only would promote the 
drafting of codes, and offer advice and assistance - it 
would have no legal power to force associations to accept 
codes, exclude certain clauses, etc. However if a code 
was to be produced as a defence in any court action, the 
Martin Report proposes that the Institute could be called 
as a witness to give its opinion as to the fairness or 
otherwise of the Code. Moreover, it is envisaged that 
the courts should have regard to codes as indicators of 
what is normal industry practice. 56 
In relation to the advertising industry, in part-
icular, the Martin Report 'heaps' praise on 'the highly 
successful operation of the Committee of Advertising 
Practice'· and categorises these codes as being of 'great 
significance' and 'an excellent model for other self 
regulatory codes of fair practice' • 57 Furthermore the 
Committee of Advertising Practice system is hailed as 
'so successful in eliminating the worst forms of misleading 
advertising that the Consumer Council has on occasions 
(55) Constituted under the authority of the Consumer 
Council Act 1966. 
(56) See the Martin Report, pages 16, 18-21. 
(57) Ibid, page 20. 
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expressed its unreserved satisfaction and approval'. 
Whether these high accolades are merited fall to be det-
ermined. 
The Martin Report summarises the advantages of self 
regulation, in general, in the following terms: 
"The proposal, advocating the promotion of codes 
of fair practice, provides distinct advantages 
for consumers, for traders, and for the 
Government: 
For consumers 
(a) Less delay, expense and frustration in 
obtaining redress, and elimination of 
legal complexities. 
(b) The codes will be developed by traders in 
consultation with the Consumers' Institute, 
thus giving consumers a say in how fair 
practices are defined. 
For traders 
(a) The marketplace will have a full say (and 
the major initiative) in setting the codes 
of practice. 
(b) Less cost and frustration, and the risk of 
damage to his reputation in Court action 
will be reduced. 
(c) Better relationships between consumers and 
traders. 
For the Government 
(a} Avoid cost and involvement by Government 
departments. 
(b) Fewer disputes where the Government becomes 
the 'meat in the sandwich' between traders 
and consumers, or between trader and trader. 
(c) A flexible system providing smoother methods 
of reviewing and updating consumer legis-
lation." 59 
(58) ldem. 
(59) See the Report, page 11. 
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As regards these advantages the following observations 
are made. There are undoubted advantages for the consumer 
in facilitating redress without court proceedings. Leg-
islative codes can only be enforced by court proceedings 
which can be costly and much more time consuming. 
Whether codes eliminate legal complexities is debatable -
as mentioned above, codes and legislation employ similar 
terminology and concepts to categorize prohibited state-
ments and conduct with the result that problems of inter-
pretation will be common to both. The 'advantager of 
consumer participation in the formation of codes of fair 
practice is by no means unique to the scheme proposed in 
the Martin Report, and the Consumers' Institute actively 
advise and influence government as to the content of leg-
islation; therefore the 'consumer voice' is no less 
evident in the legislative arena. The trader undoubtedly 
perceives advantages in a scheme that lessens the threat 
of court sanctions, and has a legitimate interest in an 
approach that reduces the risk of damage to his reputat-
ion in court. The proposals have obvious appeal to any 
government in times of economic stringency in that the role 
of government departments is played down. This, however, 
may be categorised as 'buck-passing•· masquerading as 
benevolence; the responsibility of government departments 
is reduced in favour of the Consumers' Institute, an 
independent body with the consumers' interests at heart -
but this body is powerless to force advertisers, for 
example, to include particular clauses in codes, to adopt 
codes, or to enforce them. 
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While some of these 'advantages' are open to doubt, 
a more remarkable feature of the Martin Report is that 
it, quite extraordinarily, omits to outline the negative 
features of the approach that it espouses. 60 Funda-
mental assumptions underlying the successful functioning 
of the proposed scheme are open to considerable doubt. 
For example, in the advertising context, the following 
observations may be advanced: 
(i) The assumption that the consumer knows about a code 
and his rights under it may be patently false. A 
feature of overseas codes has been their lack of 
publicity and the secrecy of complaint proceedings. 
Following criticism of this by the Office of Fair 
Trading and the government in the United Kingdom, a 
publicity campaign led to a significant increase in 
the number of complaints received by the Advertising 
Standards Association, which, as Cranston points 
out, 61 is particularly ironical because the Assoc-
iation had always trumpeted the smallness of the 
number of complaints as evidence that the self reg-
ulatory system was working satisfactorily. So 
extensive publicity is essential to a good code, and 
this is not in harmony with the cost saving advantages 
spel t out above. 
(60) Save for mention, at page 21, of the fact that not 
necessarily all members of a particular industry will 
subscribe to a voluntary code of conduct. The Martin 
Report records that "some types of advertisements are 
not directly controlled by the Committee of Advert-
ising Practice because they do not appear in newspap-
ers or magazines or on T.V. or radio. The most signif-
icant examples are letterbox leaflets and in-store 
advertisements •... " 
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(ii} The assumption is made that the offending profession-
al, business or tradesperson is covered by, or 
belongs to an:association which adheres to a code of 
practice. As we have seen there are some notable 
'non-subscribers' to the Committee of Advertising 
Practice Codes of Practice. There is no means to 
coerce such 'outsiders' into a self regulatory scheme. 
(iii) The success of such a scheme is dependent upon the 
goodwill of the members of a self regulatory body, and 
on consumer surveillance. Darva1162 cites the foll-
owing illustration: 
"The National Safety Council of Australia lodged 
a complaint with the Advertising Standards 
Council concerning an advertisement for a 
circuit breaker. The illustration complained 
of in the advertisement portrayed a child 
plunging a knife into an electric toaster. 
The Safety Council claimed that it could 
encourage children to mimic the actions with 
fatal results. The complaint was upheld by 
the Advertising Standards Council and the 
advertiser was requested to amend its copy to 
eradicate the aspects of child mimicry. The 
amended advertisement portrayed a woman 
plunging a knife into a toaster." 
Such an attitude reflects an absence of goodwill or 
sheer ignorance. 
In the absence of adequate surveillance abuses will go un-
detected and consumers have an important role in this area 
as the Consumers' Institute, 63 with a staff of approximately 
sixty persons, cannot possibly monitor the market exclus-
ively. However consumer survei'llance may be less than 
(62) Loc.ci~, 315. 
(63) The Seventeenth Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
31 December 1980, of the Consumer Council reports that 
the staff of the Institute was brought up to 60 in 1980. 
Staffing levels were as high as 78 in 1975. 
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satisfactory for a number of reasons; that is: 
(a) ignorance of the relevant code and its provisions; 
(b) unless a significant loss or failure to live up to 
expectations is involved the incentive to complain is 
absent; and, (c) certain claims are vague, subconscious 
and largely psychological and the consumer may not even 
perceive the claim, let alone contemplate complaining about 
't 64 1 • On the basis of the objections outlined earlier in 
this chapter, 65 and for the reasons just enumerated, this 
writer cannot muster the same enthusiasm for self regula-
tion as reflected in the Martin Report. 
However this is not to suggest that b."'Us writer does not recog-
nise the undoubted usefulness of the Codes of Advertising 
Practice. Such non-recognition could be challenged by 
reference to numerous specific examples where the codes 
have operated effectively. Two such examples are as 
follows: 
(i) A Rotorua mail order business advertised over a number 
of years the availability of certain slimming garments 
and tablets. 66 Most of these advertisements 
(64) For example, an image advertisement may subtlely 
promise the fulfilment of sexual or romantic imagin-
ings if the consumer purchases a particular product. 
The advertisement may transgress code requirements 
as to ethics and taste, but consumer complaint is 
unlikely in such circumstances. 
(65) See Part (2); Advantages and Disadvantages. 
(66) See Consumer 145, 292. 
69 
contained misleading and untrue claims. 67 No action 
was taken under the Consumer Information Act 196968 
but Consumer 69 asserts that rsince 1974 the Newspapers 
Publishers Association's disapproval of many of his 
ads (sic) has:\caused the volume to fall away to a 
comparative trickle' 70 The adoption of the 'Code 
for Slimming or Weight Loss" has improved the position 
of the consumer in this area considerably. The Code 
recommends that the media should not accept advertise-
ments which contain ~superlative, highly exaggerated 
or misleading claims' and rfull, authentic, and 
believable substantiation should be made before any 
claim is considered acceptable' . Furthermore the 
(67) For example, an advertisement for 'trim jeans', a 
plastic garment, read as follows: 
"The space age slenderiser .•• you are ready 
for the most astounding experience in rapid 
slenderising you have ever known •.• lose 
10 pounds in 10 days •..• " 
The Health Department reported that there was no 
scientific support whatsoever for the claims made 
for these garments. 
(68) See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising, 
infra. No prosecut1on has ever been brought under 
this Act which contains extensive consultative 
procedures. 
(70) The 'Code for Slimming or Weight Loss' was promulgated 
in August 1973; the advertisements Consumer refers to 
appeared in newspapers and magazines such as Truth, 
Sunday Times, Sunday News and Woman's Weekly during the 
period 1971 to 1977; note, that the fact that such 
advertisements were still appearing post-1973 reflects 
a weakness of voluntary codes of practice. 
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Code states, i~ier aZia, that any claim as to specific 
weight loss should be regarded as unacceptable. 
(ii) A Leopard Breweries beer advertisement featuring 
Richard Hadlee contravened a section of the Code for 
Liquor Advertising in that a section of the Code 
provides that young people should not be encouraged to 
drink liquor by an '"identifiable hero•. 71 Following 
a complaint from an anti-liquor advertising campaigner, 
the Newspaper Publishers Association advised its 
member newspapers that the advertisement contravened 
the Code and recommended that it be rejected. 72 This 
recommendation was complied with by the various member 
newspapers. 73 
These illustrations serve to demonstrate the usefulness of 
the Codes of Advertising Practice and it is clear that such 
codes have an important place in any scheme of advertising 
regulation. 
(71) See "The Press", 15 December 1981. 
(72) Idem. 
(73) See "The Press", 19 December 1981. It is worth noting 
that Leopard Breweries (i) accused the Newspaper 
Publishers Association of double standards in that 
similar advertisements using the cricketer, Glenn 
Turner, and the golfer, Simon Owen, escaped 
criticism; and (ii) stated that if the newspaper 
ban continued, the campaign would turn to other 
methods - point-of-sale advertisements, hoardings, 
and magazines. 
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4. OTHER CODES OF PRACTICE 
Brief mention must also be made of some other codes of 
practice and ethics that have bearing on the issue of 
consumer information. 
(1) NEW ZEALAND FINANCE HOUSES ASSOCIATION (INC) CODE 
OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
The New Zealand Finance Houses Association (Inc) was 
founded in 1965 with the general objectives of acting to 
promote and protect the interests of member finance com-
panies; to set and maintain high standards of ethical 
conduct and practice within the industry; to act as a 
public relations agency; and to negotiate with the Gov-
ernment and monetary authorities as representatives of the 
finance industry. 74 The Association comprises all of New 
Zealand's major finance companies75 and this feature is an 
essential pre-requisite for effective self regulation. 
In accordance with the objectives outlined above 
members have agreed to operate according to a Code of 
Ethics. Of particular significance to the consumer are 
paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Code. Paragraph 3 reads: 
'Members will explain fully to customers the cost, 
terms and contractual obligations of credit 
transactions. Written documents will be as 
simple, lucid and unambiguous as circumstances 
will permit. A member shall at all times act 
honestly and in such manner that customers are 
not misled.' 
(74) See, for example, NZ Finance Houses Association (Inc) 
Annual Report and Review of Activities 1979/1980. 
(75) That is; AA Finance Ltd; Australian Guarantee 
Corporation Ltd; Beneficial Finance Ltd; Broadlands 
Finance Ltd; Finance and Discounts Ltd; General 
Finance Ltd; Lombard (NZ) Ltd; Marac Finance Ltd; 
NZI Finance Ltd; UDC Finance Ltd (as at 31 May 1981} . 
Source: Annual Report and Review of Activities 
1980/1981. 
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and paragraph 5 states that: 
"Members will discourage commitments by 
borrowers in excess of their financial 
resources." 
As regards paragraph 3 the requirement of clarity in docu-
mentation is an example of a practice that is exceptionally 
difficult to cover by the precise wording appropriate for 
legal regulation, 76 and the paternalism inherent in para-
graph 5 is nevertheless welcome. From the point of view of 
enforcement paragraph 13 provides that disciplinary 
action may be taken against any member found to be in breach 
of the code. 77 The fact that no action has yet been taken 
against any member 78 suggests either salutary adherence to 
the code or inadequate allocation of resources to the 
enforcement of its provisions. If the latter be the case, it 
would be unfortunate for the consumer if the code were allow-
ed to descend to the level of mere window dressing and amount 
to no more than a public relations feature. 79 However it is 
probably true to say that some of the worst abuses in the 
finance industry are perpetrated by firms who do not belong 
to this volunatry association. 80 This again highlights one 
of the deficiencies in self regulatory codes of practice. 
{76) Berrie, 'Laws and Codes for Consumers', (1980) , 
Journal of .em;;_i.n~ss Law 315, 322. The Credit 
Contracts Act 1981 obviously provides for the mandat-
ory disclosure of the cost of credit and terms of the 
contract, but the intelligibility or otherwise of the 
disclosed information is, to a large extent, depend-
ent upon the goodwill of the financier. 
(77) Disciplinary provisions empower the Disciplinary Comm-
ittee of the Association to censure or expel a member. 
{78) Letter dated 4 December 1980 from K.W. Baker, 
assistant secretary of the Association. 
(79) See the Association's Annual Report and Review of 
Activities 1978/1979, page 11. 
(80) See Consumer 192, 51, and the report relating to the 
activities of Burberry Finance Ltd which is based in 
Christchurch, but has branches in five other South 
Island centres. 
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{2) PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY'S CODE OF ETHICS 
The Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand has the 
responsibility, inter alia, to promote and encourage proper 
conduct among pharmacists and to combat objectionable 
practices. 81 Pursuant to these obligations and in 
accordance with its rule making powers82 the Society 
recently83 prescribed a Code of Ethics. The preamble to 
this Code records that 
"The Code of Ethics has been prepared to enable 
pharmacists to ensure that their professional 
work is of the highest standard and is seen to 
be so by the public." 
The Code specifies a pharmacist's obligations with respect 
to the profession, the public, fellow pharmacists, and to 
medical practitioners in a comprehensive manner. For 
example, in relation to the profession, all advertising 
pertaining to a pharmacy must be 'dignified, restrained 
and such as to uphold the dignity of the profession' and 
the 'sale of contraceptives shall not be advertised 
directly'. 84 In relation to the publi~ a pharmacist is 
obliged to maintain a service adequate to the needs of the 
community that he serves, must closely supervise the carry-
ing out of any act that he delegates, and must refrain from 
supplying anything which he knows or should reasonably be 
(81) Pharmacy Act 1970, s 3(2). 
(82) lbid, s 12(c). 
(83) 20 February 1980. 
(84) Para. 2. 
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expected to realise is likely to be misused, for example. 
The requir~ment that an adequate service be maintained 
with reference to the community in which a pharmacist 
operates is an illustration of the valuable flexibility 
inherent in self regulation. 
Powerful sanctions exist to secure compliance with 
this code in that a pharmacist who has been guilty of 
professional misconduct86 or who has wilfully disobeyed 
87 
a provision of the Code, may be fined, censured, sus-
pended for up to three years or even deregistered. 88 
Furthermore the person concerned may be ordered to pay 
t d f d . . d 1 th . . 8 9 any cos s an expenses o , an 1nc1 enta to, e 1nqu1ry. 
Needless to say, the potential for rigorous enforcement 
favourably distinguishes this code from other voluntary 
codes of practice, but it is to be observed that legis-
lative backing gives the code its 'teeth'. 
(85) Para. 3. 
{ 86) Pharmacy Act 1970, s 30 (1) (b). 
{87) Ibid, s 30(1) {f). 
(88) Ibid, s 31. 
( 8 9) Ibid, s 31(2) (e). 
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(3) TRAVEL AGENTS 
An interesting example of business self regulation 
' 1 d ' th t 1 . d t 90 Th ~n New Zea an ~s e rave ~n us ry. ere are a 
number of autonomous, but inter-related, bodies active 
in this area. 
First, there is the New Zealand Institute of Travel 
(NZIT) which is a professional body formed inl968 with the 
object of promoting the educational and cultural advance-
ment of those working in the travel· ·industry. It 
encourages and assists travel agents to attain the 
Government examination qualification called the New 
Zealand Certificate in Commerce by developing a course 
in conjunction with the New Zealand Technicians 
Certification Authority which includes some commercial 
subjects and some that relate purely to the travel 
industry. 91 The NZIT also works with the Aviation and 
Tourism Industry Training Board which, since its 
inception in 1975, has been recognised as the training 
and education authority for the travel and tourism 
industry in this country. These measures are of immense 
indirect benefit to the consumer in that they promote 
competence and professionalism within the industry. 
(90) Contrast the position in New South Wales where the 
Travel Agents Act 1973 sets up a detailed 
licensing scheme for travel agents. See Goldring and 
Maher, Consumer Protection Law in Australia (1979), 
614-642. 
(91) See the Rules and Constitution of the New Zealand 
Institute of Travel. 
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Second~ the Travel Agents Association of New 
Zealand (TAANZ) comprises persons and corporations that 
sell travel and facilities of travel to the public. The 
avowed objects of this organisation include promoting 
the interests of members, stimulating the desire to 
travel and ensuring that proper ethical standards are 
maintained. There are a number of criteria for member-
ship; viz., the member must be able to provide a bond 
of $20,000, the agency must have a minimum capital of 
$5,000, must have suitable premises solely devoted to the 
operation of an agency, and the applicant must have 
satisfactory references from two other TAANZ agents and 
two accountants, bank managers or solicitors. The bond 
monies are held as security to pay for any defaults by 
the member; for example, through a failure by the agent 
to pay for travel accommodation, air fares, etc, with 
money handed over by a customer. The TAANZ has also 
arranged for an umbrella bond with an insurance company 
to provide additional blanket cover if the individual 
member's cover of $20,000 has been exhausted. 
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reason Consumer suggest that 
For this 
11 
••• if you are dealing with a travel agency 
make sure it is bonded with the TAANZ. This 
should give the traveller some cover in the 
event of the agency suddenly going out of 
business ...... 
(92) Consumer 193, 85. 
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The TAANZ also have a detailed code of practice and 
ethics which endeavours to ensure, inter alia, that all 
statements and information conveyed by members shall be 
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responsible and accurate. While a travel agent need 
not be a member of TAANZ the business advantages of member-
ship94 make things very difficult for outsiders. 
(4) GENERAL 
Other codes that merit brief mention are as follows: 
(i) The Direct Selling Association Code of Ethics which 
stipulates, among other things, that sales representatives 
95 
must clearly identify themselves and their company ; that 
(93) See the TAANZ Directory and Information Guide, and 
Constitution and Rules. Note, that the Association 
of British Travel Agents has a voluntary code of 
conduct which is much more extensive in its scope. 
See Cranston, op cit, 31; Harvey, op cit, 209. 
(94) For example, TAANZ has an agreement that facilitates 
transactions between its members and the Mo.tel 
Association of New Zealand; furthermore, the New 
Zealand Accommodation Council, a body comprising 
hotel proprietors and others engaged in the 
accommodation business, operates an accreditation 
scheme whereby financially sound travel agents may be 
accredited; accreditation makes booking of accommo-
dation easier in the sense that credit will be 
extended by the hotelier to the agent; membership 
of TAANZ virtually ensures accreditation. 
(95) See Consumer 192, 37. Electrolux agents carry 
identification cards bearing a photograph of the 
agent. 
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the consumer must be given the full name and address of 
the company so that it can be readily contacted96 ; that a 
written guarantee must be given on all products; and that 
customer complaints must be dealt with 'fully and fairly'~? 
(ii} The Footwear Industry Code, and a Code on care 
labelling drafted by the garment and textile industry, is 
designed to improve consumer information as regards these 
98 products. 
(iii) Numerous other organisations, ranging from the New 
Zealand Bankers Association and the Real Estate Institute 
99 
of New Zealand to the unlikely extreme of the Pest 
100 Control Association of New Zealand (Inc), have set up 
self regulatory schemes designed to ensure certain standards 
of ethics and skill amongst members for the protection of 
members and consumers generally. 
5. CONCLUSION 
First, self·regulation must be backed up by adequate 
legal controls for the simple reason that not all businessmen 
(96) By virture of the Door to Door Sales Act 1967, s 6, 
such disclosure in mandatory where the representative 
effects a transaction that is subject to the Act. See 
Chapter v, Disclosure of Information, infra. 
(97) Generally, see du Fresne, 11 Both Feet in the Door", 
The Listener, 5 January 1980. 
(98) See the Martin Report at page 20. 
(99) See 11 The Press", 24 June 1981. 
(100) See Consumer 165, 250. 
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will choose to belong to a particular association or group 
that promotes self ·regulation and endorses a code of ethical 
practice. Furthermore, not all members of such associations 
or groups will adhere to the self regulatory provisions and 
effective legal sanctions will support compliance with codes 
of conduct. 
Second~ there is little doubt that self regulatory schemes 
have an important role in the regulation of advertising and 
the disclosure of information. However, two specific 
observations are made regarding the Committee of Advertising 
Practice Codes and their implementation: 
(i) The implementation of the codes rests exclusively in the 
hands of the advertising industry. The presence of consumer 
representatives on the Committee might beneficially affect 
the approach of that Committee to advertising problems and 
dispel the argument that industry representatives have 'a 
limited view of what is against the consumer interest and 
should be curtailed' •101 In order that the codes of practice 
be independently enforced the Committee might well follow 
its· British counterpart and establish an Advertising 
Standards Authority staffed by a substantial number of 
persons from outside the industry. 102 
(ii) The codes of practice thus far promulgated do not cover 
(101) Cranston, op.cit, 63 
(102) The British Advertising Association has established 
an Advertising Standards Authority, a company limited 
by guarantee, to supervise the advertising code. The 
chairperson is an individual from outside the industry 
and approximately half it s members must be from 
outside the industry. 
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the whole spectrum of advertisements. No doubt, codes 
have been promulgated for those areas where abuses have 
been most apparent, but the absence of a general code 
applicable across the board is a lacuna that is easily 
remedied. 
Third~ the proposal that the Consumers' Institute be 
entrusted with the task of promoting codes of practice 
in many more businesses and industries in New Zealand has 
't tt t' 103 d h . h h' 1 s a rae 1ons, as oes t e suggest1on t at t 1s same 
body be responsible for monitoring codes of practice. 104 
However, it is submitted that more extensive power should 
be accorded to a 'watchdog' body, namely, the power to 
formally approve a code and to compel a trade group to 
include certain clauses or exclude restrictive clauses. 
This, it is recognised, goes beyond self regulation into 
the field of statutory control but it is suggested that this 
will prevent codes of practice or ethics from amounting to 
mere window dressing for the exclusive benefit of the 
promulgating members. Such a body should also have full 
investigative powers in order to effectively monitor 
1 . h . 105 comp 1ance, or ot erw1se. 
(103) 
(104) 
(105} 
See the Martin Report at page 21. , 
Idem. 
It is recommended that this 'body' be a Consumer 
Affairs Department; see Chapter VI, Conclusion, 
infra. This is not to suggest that the Consumers' 
Institute are not admirably positioned to fulfil 
this function, but a positive directory role is 
irreconcilable with the impartial and vitally 
important role that this organisation currently 
performs. 
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Fourth, codes of practice provide a useful yardstick against 
which the courts may measure parties behaviour. For example, 
where an allegedly deceptive advertisement was the subject 
of litigation, the court could refer to a relevant code of 
advertising practice as an indicative test of what is normal 
. d t t' 106 1n us ry prac 1ce. 
Finally, while business self regulation represents a 
potentially effective way to promote the consumer interest 
in some areas, care must be exercised lest the advocacy of 
self-regulation clouds its limitations. As the Director 
General of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom, Professor 
Gordon Berrie asserts: 
"There must ••... be caution over proposals 
that would mean codes becoming in part a 
substitute for law rather than a 
supplement to law ....• "107 
(106) See Page, op.ci~, 31. 
(107) ''Laws and Codes for Consumers,•· (1980) Journal of 
Business Law 315, 325. 
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III PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES 
Much of the law relating to advertising, and the 
disclosure of information generally, is the creature of 
statute with emphasis being placed on public regulation. 1 
However, remedies developed at common law and modified 
by statute exhibit a reasonable potential for the 
control of misleading or false advertising/information 
relating to goods, services and associated credit and it 
would be a mistake to consider such control to lie 
exclusively within the domain of public law. In this 
part, therefore, it is proposed to consider the nature of 
the consumers' rights of redress against an advertiser. 
It must be born in mind that the primary concern here is 
with advertising and the provision of information with 
the result that little consideration will be given to the 
terms and conditions implied into contracts for the sale 
of goods 2 or supply of services, 3 nor to the extensive 
body of law relating to tortious liability arising out of 
the sale or supply of defective goods or services. 
(1) See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising, 
infra. Even with the shift away from caveat emptor, 
caveat venditor (see Diplock LJ in Ashington 
Piggeries v Christopher Hill Ltd [197.2] 2 AC 441) the 
common law in its development to protect the consumer 
has concentrated more on the goods and services 
themselves than on the advertisements used to promote 
their sale. 
(2) See the Sale of Goods Act 1908, ss 15, 16; the 
Hire Purchase Act 1971, ss 12, 13, 14. 
(3) See, for example, Young and Marten Ltd v McManus 
Childs Ltd [1969] 1 AC 454. 
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1. CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
(1} ADVERTISEMENTS, OFFERS, AND TEru4S OF THE CONTRACT. 
The seller or supplier of goods or services may 
indicate the availability of those goods or services for 
sale or supply by means of advertising, the publication 
of catalogues or by displaying the goods on his premises. 
The general rule concerning these advertisements or 
displays is that they do not constitute offers and the 
seller is not bound to sell the articles thus advertised 
or displayed. In these situations the law regards the 
seller as making an 'invitation to treat', that is, an 
attempt to call attention to goods that he has for sale 
and the prices he expects. Thus in Grainger & Son v 
Gough 4 it was held that a wine merchant who distributed 
a catalogue of wines was not making an offer to sell the 
wines advertised, but merely inviting offers to purchase. 
Lord Herschell said: 
"The transmission of such a price list does 
not amount to an offer to supply an unlimited 
quantity of the wine described at the price 
named, so that as soon as an order is given 
there is a binding contract to supply that 
quantity. If it were so the merchant might 
find himself involved in any number of 
contractual obligations to supply wine of a 
particular description which he would be 
unable to carry out, his stock of wine of 5 that description being necessarily limited." 
Similarly, in CrawZey v R6 a shopkeeper advertised the 
(4) [1896] AC 325. 
(5) Ibid, at 334. 
(6) 1909 TS 1105. 
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sale of a particular brand of tobacco at a cheap price 
by placing a placard outside his shop. In reliance upon 
this advertisement a customer entered the shop, asked 
for a pound of tobacco, and was supplied with it. 
However,when he returned five minutes later asking for a 
further pound the shopkeeper refused to supply it, 
presumably because his stock was low and he wished to 
supply as many new customers as possible. It was held 
that there was no contract to supply the tobacco. Smith J 
held that: 
"There mere fact that a tradesman advertises 
the price at which he sells goods does not 
appear to me to be an offer to any member 
of the public to enter the shop and 
purchase goods, nor do I think that a 
contract is constituted when any member 
of the public comes in and tenders the 
price mentioned in the advertisement. It 
would lead to most extraordinary results if 
that were the correct view of the case. 
Because then, supposing a shopkeeper were 
sold out of a particular class of goods, 
thousands of members of the public might 
crowd into the shop and demand to be 
served, and each one would have a right of 
action against the proprietor for not 
performing his contract. I do not think 
those consequences follow from the mere 
advertisement of the price at which a 
tradesman sells his goods. It seems to me 
to amount simply to an announcement of his 
intention to sell at the price that he 
advertises." 7 
The same reasoning was applied to an advertisement offer-
ing bramblefinch cocks and hens. for sale, 8 and it is 
clear that the display of goods, with or without a price 
(7} Ibid, at 1108. 
(8) See Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204. 
85 
tag, does not amount to an offer, whether the display 
is in a shop window9 or on the shelves of a self-service 
store. 10 In such cases it is the consumer who makes the 
offer to purchase which, of course, the seller may 
accept or reject. 
Various arguments are adduced in support of this 
common law approach of categorising much advertising 
and displays as merely constituting invitations to treat. 
The main argument is that outlined by Lord Herschell 
above; that is, that any other approach would mean that 
a seller would be bound in contracts to all sorts of 
persons after his stocks have run out. A simple answer 
to this problem would be to imply into "offers" a term 
to the effect that 'first come, first served'' prevails, 
and when stocks run out there will be no offer open to 
11 
acceptance. A second rationale for the common law 
approach is given by Winfield12 who argues: 
"A shop is a place for bargaining, not for 
compulsory sales. Presumptively, the 
importance of the personality of the cust-
omer cannot be eliminated. If the display 
of such goods were an offer, then the shop-
keeper might be forced to contract with his 
worst enemy, his greatest trade rival, a 
reeling drunkard, or a ragged and verminous 
tramp." 
(9) Timothy v Simpson (1834) 6 C & P 499; 
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394. 
(10) Pharmaaeutiaal Soaiety of Great Britain v Boots Cash 
Chemists Ltd [1952] 2 QB 795. 
(ll) See Winfield, 'Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance', 
(1939) 55 LQR 499, 517-518; Kahn, 'Some Mysteries 
of Offer and Acceptance', (1955) 72 South African 
Law Journal 246, 251. 
(12) Ibid, 518. 
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The answer, however, may lie in the fact that a term 
can be implied into the offer, as in Dutch law, 13 
excluding such people. A third significant argument in 
favour of the rule in Gough's case14 is that the consumer 
should not get the advantage of 'price-ticket muddling; 
but in rebuttal it may be asserted that a seller should 
organise his business so that this does not occur. 15 
The above three reasons all seem to have satisfactory 
counter-arguments in support of the view that the shop-
keeper should be regarded as the person who made the offer. 
Furthermore, given that an overwhelming proportion of 
shops operate on a self-service basis today, the old 
rationale that shops are a place for "bargaining" has a 
somewhat hollow ring. It can be contended with some 
force that prospective customers' interests require that 
they should not be lured into shops which do not intend 
to do business on the advertised basis. 
However, while the common law does exhibit a marked 
reluctance to regard advertisements or displays as 
ff 16 . . . bl . . . f o ers, 1t 1s poss1 e 1n appropr1ate c1rcumstances or 
(13) See Kahn, Contract and Mercantile Law Through the 
Cases (1971), 20. 
(14) Supra. 
(15) In any event, relief may be granted in such 
circumstances pursuant to the Contractual Mistakes 
Act 1977, s 7. 
(16) See, further: R v Dawood (1976) 27 Canadian Criminal 
Cases (2d) 300 (the offer in a supermarket sale was 
held to be made by the customer at the check out 
counter); Harris v Nickerson (1873) LR 8 QB 286 
(advertisement that an auction sale will be held is 
not an offer to a person who comes to bid); Rooke 
v Dawson [1895] 1 Ch 480 (advertisement that a 
scholarship examination will be held is not an offer 
to a candidate); Montgomery Ward & Co v Johnson 95 NE 
290 (1911); O'Keefe v Lee Callan Imports Ina 262 NE 
(2d) 758; Ehrlich v Willis Music Co 113 NE (2d) 252. 
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an advertisement or display of goods with price ticket 
attached to constitute a valid offer provided the 
advertiser intended his advertisement to have that effect4 
The test whereby this intention is measured is an 
objective one and a 'deliberate promise seriously made is 
enforced irrespective of the promisor's views regarding 
his legal liability• 17 if the language used would be 
construed by a reasonable person as conveying an intention 
to create legal relations. 18 The locus classicus in this 
area is Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 19 In 1892, 
a company which manufactured a medical preparation called 
the Carbolic Smoke Ball inserted the following advertise-
ment in the Pal.Z Mall Gazette 
"ElOO reward will be paid by the Carbolic 
Smoke Ball Company to any person who 
contracts the increasing epidemic 
influenza, colds, or any disease by taking 
cold, after having used the Ball three 
times daily for two weeks according to the 
printed directions supplied with each Ball. 
ElOO is deposited with the Alliance Bank, 
Regent Street, showing our sincerity in 
the matter." 
On the strength of the advertisement, Mrs Carlill bought 
the Ball and used it as directed. After more than the 
required fortnight of use she contracted influenza and 
so claimed the ElOO reward. In an action by Carlill to 
recover the reward, the Court distinguished the case 
from the ordinary general rule for advertisements as 
stated above, and holding that there was a contract, gave 
(17) Williston on Contracts (3 ed), s 21. 
(18) See Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract 
(5 NZ ed, 1979), 94. 
(19) [18931 1 QB 256. 
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judgement for Carlill. The Court held that the 
defendant company obviously had intended their advertise-
ment to constitute a valid offer because of the express 
statement in the advertisement that money had been 
deposited as evidence of their sincerity. Furthermore, 
as Bowen LJ said: 
II if the person making the offer, expressly 
or impliedly intimates in his offer that it 
will be sufficient to act on the proposal 
without communicating acceptance of it to 
himself, performance of the condition is a 
sufficient acceptance without notification." 20 
Similarly, in Grant v Provinae of New Brunswiak21 the 
province publicized a programme whereby they promised to 
purchase surplus potatoes at a support price and to make 
payments direct to the grower. The plaintiff's consign-
ment of potatoes was rejected by the province and the 
plaintiff sued for the price. The Appeal Division of the 
New Brunswick Supreme Court held that a reasonable person 
in the position of the plaintiff would have been entitled 
to assume that if he complied with various conditions 
outlined in the programme he was entitled to sell the 
potatoes to the province and that the province was legally 
bound to purchase and pay for them. The Court held, 
therefore, that the announcement constituted an offer to 
all eligible persons and that the province was contract-
ually bound to any person who accepted the offer by 
complying with conditions specified. 
(20) Ibid, 269. 
(21) (1973) 35 DLR (3d) 141. 
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Both these illustrations are of unilateral contracts 
and as one learned writer 22 points out 
" .•• there undoubtedly lies behind these cases 
the notion that the defendant, having for his 
business purposes induced the plaintiff's 
reliance, should pay compensation ..•• 
(U)nilateral contracts have provided a useful 
technique for protective reliance under cover 
of a bargain." 23 
However, advertisements for bilateral contracts are not 
often categorised as constituting offers, and, although 
the decision in CarZiZZ's case has been described as 
'the red light over the desk of the advertising copy-
writer•,24 there is no indication of a general tendency 
by the courts to regard advertisements and other displays 
as constituting offers, as opposed to invitations to 
treat. 
Where does this leave the consumer? If the advert-
isement etc is categorised as an invitation to treat it 
usually will be the consumer who makes the offer which the 
seller may reject or accept. If the offer is accepted 
then the terms of the ensuing contract will be found in 
the direct exchanges between the parties which may or may 
not encompass the terms as reflected in the advertisement 
which acted as a catalyst to bring about the transaction. 
(22) Waddams, The Law of Contracts (1977). 
(23) Ibid, at 111-112. Further illustrations of advert-
isements of unilateral contracts where the advert-
isement has been categorised as an offer include: 
Wood v Lektrik Ltd 'The Times', 13 January 1932 
(cited in Lawson, Advertising Law (1978), 7); 
GoZdthorpe v Logan (1943) 2 DLR 519; McMahon v 
Gilberd & Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 1206. 
(24) Turner, The Shocking History of Advertising (1965), 
97. 
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However, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the 
offer that the consumer makes will be in terms of the 
invitation to treat, or advertisement. As Lord 
Goddard CJ observed in Pharmaceutical Society of Great 
Britain v Boots Cash Chemists Ltd25 'the ordinary 
principles of commonsense and of commerce must be applied 
in this matter', and where the consumer merely presents 
the goods to the seller, without more, the terms of the 
offer must be to purchase in terms of the invitation. 
This approach is greatly facilitated in respect of 
contracts for the sale of goods by description in that 
the Sale of Goods Act 1908 26 and the Hire Purchase Act 
197127 imply terms to the effect that the relevant 
product must correspond with the description. The 
phrase 'sale by description' has been interpreted very 
widely, and in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd28 
Lord Wright stated that: 
II a thing is sold by description, though 
it is specific, so long as it is sold not 
merely as the specific thing, but as a 
thing corresponding to a description." 29 
(25) Supra, at 802; see also Turner v AnquetiZ [1953] 
NZLR 952 for an example of the terms of an 
advertisement being carried forward into a contract. 
(26) s 15. 
(27) s 14 (2). 
(28) [1936] AC 85. 
(29) Ibid, at 100; see also Taylor v Combined Buyers [1924] 
NZLR 627, 633; Godley & Perry [1960] 1 WLR 9, 14; 
Finch Motors Ltd v Quin (No. 2) [1980] 2 NZLR 519. 
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In appropriate circumstances, the descriptive terms of 
the advertisement may be taken to be part of the contract 
description with the result that in contracts for the 
sale of goods there is an implied condition to the effect 
that the product complies with the description given in 
the advertisement, and in hire purchase agreements there 
is an implied term to this effect. For example, in 
Beale v Taylor 30 a private individual advertised his 
motor vehicle for sale, describing it as a 'Herald 
Convertible, white, 1961, twin carbs'. Unknown to either 
party the car was in fact the rear half of a 1961 Herald 
and the front half of an earlier model, and the seller 
was not regarded as being careless in not knowing this. 
The buyer, upon ascertaining this hermaphrodite quality, 
sought damages for breach of the implied condition as to 
description. In holding that he was so entitled Sellers 
LJ observed that: 
II the buyer, when he came along to see this 
car, was coming along to see a car as advert-
ised,that is, a car described as a 'Herald 
convertible, white, 1961'. When he came 
along he saw what ostensibly was a Herald 
convertible, white, 1961 •.. it was on this 
basis that he was making the offer and in 
the belief that the seller was advancing his 
car as that which his advertisement 
indicated." 31 
There are limitations to this approach, however, in that 
not every statement as to the attributes of a product 
form part of the contractual description and a distinction 
( 3 0) [ 19 6 7] 3 All ER 2 53. 
(31) Ibid, at 255. 
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is drawn between the statements relating to the quality 
of goods, and statements which are descriptive of the 
goods in the sense that they identify them. 32 Generally, 
it is only the latter category of statements which form 
part of the contract description, although the dividing 
line may be very fine at times.33 
Where the advertisement amounts to an offer which is 
duly accepted by the consumer, the consumer has an action 
for breach of contract where the product or service does 
not measure up to the advertised expecations. 34 Similarly, 
where the advertisement amounts to no more than an 
invitation to treat, the consumer may exercise his right 
to cancel, or alternatively, his right to claim damages, 
in respect of any term of that invitation that is incorp-
orated into the ensuing contract and that is broken. 35 
Consequently, the common law affords the consumer some 
measure of protection where the consumer enters into a 
contract with the advertiser in reliance upon an advert-
isement, whether that advertisement amounts to an offer 
or merely to an invitation to treat. 
(32) See Taylor v Combined Buyers Ltd~ supra, 639-641; 
Ashington Piggeries v Christopher Hill Ltd~ supra; 
Fineh Motors Ltd v Quin> supra. 
(33) See Armaghdown Motors Ltd v Gray Motors Ltd [1963] 
NZLR 5; Finch Motors Ltd v Quin, supra; Cotter v 
Luckie [1918] NZLR 811; Dell v Quilty [1924] NZLR 1270. 
(34) Of course, not all claims made in advertisements have 
legal effect in that certain claims may amount to no 
more than "puffery"; see infra. 
(35) See the Contractual Remedies Act 1979,ss 7, 10; 
discussed infra. 
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(2) MISREPRESENTATION 
Outside the four corners of any contract, a false or 
misleading advertisement may render the advertiser liable 
in damages and/or entitle the consumer to cancel the 
contract that he entered into in reliance upon the 
advertisement. The position in New Zealand as between 
parties to a contract is succinctly stated in the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979. Section 6 of the Act 
provides as follows: 
11 6.Damages for misrepresentation-(l)If a party 
to a contract has been induced to enter into 
it by a misrepresentation, whether innocent 
or fraudulent, made to him by or on behalf of 
another party to that contract-
(a) He shall be entitled to damages from 
that other party in the same manner 
and to the same extent as if the 
representation were a term of the 
contract that has been broken; and 
(b) He shall not, in the case of a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, or of an 
innocent misrepresentation made 
negligently, be entitled to damages 
from that other party for deceit or 
negligence in respect of that 
misrepresentation. 
(2)Notwithstanding anything in section 56 
or section 60(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1908, but subject to section 5 of this Act, 
subsection (1) of this section shall apply 
to contracts for the sale of goods." 
Furthermore, a contracting party is entitled to cancel a 
contract36 where it has been induced by a misrepresentat-
ion but only if the parties have expressly or impliedly 
(36) Generally, see the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979, s 7. 
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agreed that the truth of the representation is "essential'' 
to the representee, 37 or it is shown that the misrepres-
entation has a profound effect upon the benefit or the 
burden of the contract. 38 
This statute effected significant changes to the law 
in a number of ways, in that: 
(i) At common law, a consumer who was induced to enter 
into a contract due to the fraudulent misrepresentation 
of the seller could rescind the contract39 and/or institure 
an action in the tort of deceit for damages. 40 Section 6 
of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 abolishes the action 
for pre-contract fraudulent misrepresentation and 
provides that it is no longer possible to bring tort 
actions. 
(37} Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 7(4) (a}. 
(38) Ibid, s 7(4) (b). This provision entitles a contract-
ing party to cancel where the effect of the misrep-
resentation will be -
" (i)Substantially to reduce the benefit of 
the contract to the cancelling party; or 
(ii)Substantially to increase the burden of 
the cancelling party under the contract; or 
(iii)In relation to the cancelling party, to 
make the benefit or burden of the contract 
substantially different from that represented 
or contracted for." 
cf. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26, 70. 
(39) See Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., 241. 
(40) See Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337; Richardson v 
Silvester (1873) LR 9 QB 34. The representee 
had to prove that the representor knew that the 
statement was false, or had no belief in its 
truth, or made it recklessly, not caring whether 
it was true or false. 
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(ii) At common law, if the misrepresentation was 
innocent or negligent the remedy of rescission was 
initially the only remedy available. 41 However, by 
virtue of the decisions of the House of Lords in HedLey 
Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd42 an action in damages 
in the tort of negligence could lie where the represent-
ation was made negligently. However, in respect of 
innocent misrepresentations the representee was "faced 
with a 'take it or leave it! choice of proceeding with 
the contract uncompensated or taking the drastic step of 
rescinding". 43 The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 abol-
ishes the action for pre-contract negligent misrepresent-
ation, eliminates the possibility of bringing a tort 
action, and makes it possible to claim damages in respect 
f . t . t t. 44 o an ~nnocen m~srepresen a ~on. 
As Dawson and McLauchlan45 explain: 
"The philosophy behind [section 6] is that 
where a person has made a representation 
which induces another to contract with him, 
he should be responsible for the accuracy 
of the representation irrespective of 
fault." 
(41) See Whittington v Seale-Hayne (1900) 82 LT 49. 
(42) [1964] AC 465; see also, Esso Petroleum Co v Mardon 
[1976] 2 All ER 5; Sealand of the Paoifia v Ooean 
Cement Ltd (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 625; CapitaL Motors 
Ltd v Beecham [1975] 1 NZLR 576. 
(43) Dawson and McLauchlan, The Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 (1981), 12• note, that follow~ng R~ddiford v 
Warren (1901) 20 NZLR 572 an innocent misrepresentatio 
not a term of the contract, did not enable the person 
to whom it was made to rescind the contract if the 
contract was one for the sale of goods. 
(44) s 6. 
(45} . cit. 12. 
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An actionable misrepresentation per se gives a right to 
damages and these damages are assessed "as if the repres-
entation were a term of the contract that has been 
broken". 46 
(iii) While the right to terminate the contract where 
it has been induced by misrepresentation is retained, 
this right is severely restricted. At common law the 
right to rescind did not depend on a finding that the 
misrepresentation complained of related to a matter of 
fundamental importance or had serious consequences. 47 
(iv) Cancellation differs from rescission in that it 
operates de futuro only; at common law a party was en-
titled to rescind the contract ab initio and seek 
restitution of benefits conferred; under the Contractual 
Remedies Act a wide discretion is arrogated to the Court 
in terms of restoration of benefits, and cancellation 
does not automatically result in certain consequences 
such as recovery of monies paid over or property trans-
48 ferred pursuant to the contract. 
(46) S 6(1) (a): For the difference between the contract-
ual measure of damages, as espoused by section 6(1) 
(a), and the tortious measure, see: McGregor, 
Damages (13 ed, 1972), para 1357; Dawson and 
McLauchlan, op. cit., 26 et ~ 
(47) Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 45. These writers 
point out, however, that 'Where the misrepresentat-
ion was very trivial, the representee could be 
denied rescission on the ground tha·t the represent-
ation was immaterial, i.e., it did not induce 
the contract' . 
(48) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 9; Giles v 
Edwards (1797) 7 TR 181; Le Seur v Morang & Co 
Ltd (1910) 20 OR 594. 
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As against this brief background sketch, I turn 
now to a consideration of the position of the consumer 
vis-a-vis advertisements and other communications 
relating to goods, services and associated credit. 
(a) The remedy of damages. 
Before the consumer can recover damages pursuant to 
section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 he must 
establish: (i) that there was a misrepresentation; 
(ii) made 'by or on behalf of another party' to the 
contract, and; (iii) that the misrepresentation induced 
entry into the contract. 49 
Re (i) Misrepresentation 
The term 'misrepresentation' is not defined in the Act 
with the result that reference must be made to the common 
law where the term has been defined as a 'false statement 
of existing or past fact' . 50 When the advertisement or 
other communication makes an objective statement of fact 
which is demonstrably false it is not difficult to 
establish an actionable misrepresentation. For example, 
consider the following cases: 
(49) This "breakdown" is adopted from Dawson and 
McLauchlan, op. cit., 13-14. 
(50) See Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee; 
Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract {1967), 
para 13.3; see also Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., 
242 et seq. A detailed analysis of the mean1ng of 
misrepresentation is outside the scope of this 
dissertation; but, see also, the discussion, infra 
at 164, regarding incomplete statements and the 
proposition that suppressio veri may amount to 
suggestio falsi. 
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In Capital Motors Ltd v Beeaham51 the plaintiff purchased 
a car from the defendant motor vehicle dealer in reliance 
on a salesman's negligent misrepresentation that the car 
had not had more than two previous owners. In fact, the 
vehicle had had five previous owners and the plaintiff 
recovered damages in tort for this negligent misrepres-
entation. 52 Similarly in Cload v Ferguson an auctioneer 
published in a daily newspaper a long list of household 
goods to be auctioned by him at a specified time and 
place. Included in the list was the following: 
"A very lovely modern miniature piano, in 
Sheraton design in mahogany with 
practiano and bench to match (this is a 
modern piano costing $1000 today}." 
In fact the piano was worth much less than $1000 new and 
the piano had been purchased for $698 by the auctioneer~ 
principal. Consequently the court had no hesitation in 
holding that there had been an actionable misrepresenta-
tion. Finally reference could be made to Jarvis v Swan 
53 Tours Ltd where a consumer was awarded damages for the 
disappointment, upset and frustration he experienced when 
he discovered - contrary to statements in a brochure 
about his swiss skiing trip - that there was no welcoming 
party, that on several evenings that the bar was not open, 
that the skiing was some distance away, that there were 
no full-length skis or house party arrangements, that a 
(51} [1975] 1 NZLR 576. 
(52 ) [ 19 53 ] 1 0 WWR (N S) 4 2 6 • 
(53) [ 19 7 3] 1 QB 2 3 5 • 
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suitable yodler did not appear and that he did not 
receive the delicious Swiss cakes that had been promised 
for afternoon tea. Lord Denning MR observed that 
" •.• the statements in the brochure were 
representations or warranties. The 
breaches of them give Mr Jarvis a right 
to damages. It is not necessary to 
decide whether tney were representations 
or warranties; because, since the Mis-
representation Act 1967, there is a remedy 
in damages for misrepresentation as well 
as for breach of warranty." 54 
Similarly, if such a case were to arise in New Zealand, 
there would be no necessity to demonstrate that repres-
entations in the brochure became terms of the contract; 
section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 empowers a 
New Zealand court to award damages in respect of all mis-
representations in such circumstances, whether they be 
innocent or fraudulent, and these damages are assessed as 
if the representations were terms of the contract. The 
cases outlined above constitute a deceptively straight 
forward trilogy in that it is not difficult to establish 
an actionable misrepresentation where the advertisement 
or other communication inducing a purchase amounts to an 
objective statement of fact which turns out to be false. 55 
However, much advertising and other promotional 
material embodies vague and ambiguous claims that are not 
easily categorised as "false". Subjective statements to 
(54) Ibid, at 237. 
{55) See further Whittington v Seale-Hayne, supra; 
HaPris v Nickerson, supra, at 289. 
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the effect that products or services are the "best", 
the "greatest", or are 'stringently tested' may amount 
to commendatory exaggerations and 'a wide latitude is 
allowed to traders in extolling the qualities of the 
things they have to sell' • 56 The principle that simpZex 
commendatio non obZigat means a trader generally may 
employ exaggerated and eulogistic commendation without 
fear of becoming entrapped in the web of misrepresentat-
ion rules. The difficult question here is to determine 
when the claim goes beyond mere "puffery" and constitutes 
an actionable misrepresentation. As Burrows comments: 
"The line to be drawn is that between the 
commendatory "puff" and prOilably false and 
misleading statements; and the comment 
that 'the borderline of permissible 
assertion is not always discernible' ..• 
is surely apposite." 57 
It will be a question of degree, dependent on all the 
circumstances of the case, whether a trader exceeds 
permissible "puffing". 58 
(56) Bishop, Advertising and the Law (2 ed, 1952), 47; 
cited in Lawson, op. cit., 16. As Holmes J 
observed in Deming v Darling 20 NE 107, 108 (1889): 
'It is settled that the law does not exact good 
faith from a seller in those vague commendations of 
his wares which manifestly are open to difference 
of opinion, •.• which do not imply untrue assertions 
concerning matters of direct observation .•• and 
as to which it always has been understood, the 
world over, that such statements are to be 
distrus"ted' . 
(57) News Media Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 1980), 330. 
{58) See Easterbrook v Hopkins [1918] NZLR 428, 439 
(CA) • 
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For example: In Smith v Land and House Property 
Corporation59 the plaintiffs advertised for sale a 
property described as 'now held by a very desirable 
tenant, for an unexpired term of twenty eight years at 
:L400 per annum'. In fact the tenant was often in 
arrears with rent and one month after the defendants 
purchased the property the tenant went into liquidation 
after which the defendant refused to complete the 
contract. The Court of Appeal declined to view the 
description of the tenant in such laudatory terms as 
constituting mere puffery, and held that the advertisement 
amounted to an actionable misrepresentation. Similarly, 
in Johnson v IdeaZ Musia PubZishing 60 a newspaper advert-
isement stated that a 'well established firm wishes to 
get in communication with a reliable young man who is 
willing to invest at least one thousand dollars with 
services •.. anAl proposition for an ambitious young 
man'. This was held to constitute a misrepresentation in 
light of the precarious financial straits that the 
company was in at the time. 61 
(59) (1884) 28 Ch.D. 7 (CA). 
( 6 0 ) ( 19 21 } 2 0 0 • W. N . 3 2 6 (On t . CA) . 
(61) See also Brooke v Rounthwaite (1846) 5 Hare. 298 
(laudatory statement that timber trees are of an 
average size approaching a given number of feet not 
a mere puff); Easterbrook v Hopkins [1918] NZLR 
428 (CA) (representation that a business was a val-
uable one and a 'little gold mine' was actionable); 
Gulf OiZ Co v FTC 150 F 2d 106 (1945) (claim by a 
livestock insecticide manufacturer that the product 
'gives a cow complete protection', actionable); 
Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] l QB 229 (claim by a 
seller of a used car that it was a 'good little 
bus' was not a mere puff). 
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1 . C -t F d -t T d C ' • 62 Converse y, ~n ar&ay v e era& ra e omm~ss~on a 
weight reduction plan involving the use of a product 
called 'Ayds candy' was advertised as being easy to 
follow. The Federal Trade Commission asserted that the 
claim was deceptive but it was held that -
"What was said [is] clearly justifiable 
under those cases recognising that such 
words as "easy", "perfect" 1 "amazing" 1 
"prime", "wonderful", "excellent 11 1 are 
regarded in law as mere puffing and 
dealer's talk upon which no charge of 
misrepresentation can be based. 11 63 
Furthermore, where a decidedly run down house was 
described as 'a desirable residence for a family of 
distinction' this was held not to have any legal conseq-
64 
uences; and where land was described as 'uncommonly 
rich water meadow', where this was not the case, the 
description was categorised as mere puffery. 65 
The rule relating to "puffery 11 and the foundation to 
the maxim simplex commendatio non obligat derives from a 
desire to allow the seller a degree of latitude in 
(62} 153 F 2d 493 (1946). 
(63) Ibid, at 496. 
{64) Magennis v Fallon (1828) 2 Mol. 561 1 588. 
(65) Scott v Hansen (1828) 1 Russ & M 128; see also 
Dimmock v Hallet (1866) LR 2 Ch. App. 21 (land 
which was almost useless was described as 'very 
fertile and improvablJ); Rasch v Horne (1930) 3 
DLR 647 (estimate of value of crop was 'dealers 
talk'); Kidder Oil Co v FTC 117 F 2d 493 (1946) (a 
representation that a lubricant will enable a motor 
vehicle to operate an 'amazing distance' without 
oil escaped liability). 
103 
extolling the virtues of his product or service. It will 
be di~ficult for a consumer to persuade a court that 
"puffery" amounts to a misrepresentation and that this 
induced the contract as the seller will undoubtedly 
argue that the public will not take exaggerated and 
laudatory comments seriously. However, it is submitted 
that "puffery" must be strictly controlled66 in these 
modern times for a number of reasons; that is: 
(a) sophisticated packaging often encompasses products 
thereby rendering them less amenable to inspection and 
the consumer may place more reliance upon the hyperbole 
and exaggerated claims made in advertisements and other 
promotional material than in the days when he could rely 
more heavily on his own inspection; (b) .associated with 
this point, is the fact that the· sophistication of numer-
ous products makes it less likely that any inspection 
that is carried out will necessarily enlighten the average 
for-example, consider the average consumer 
consumer;Anspecting a colour television set or video 
cassette recorder; (c) ~he disparity in bargaining power 
between the consumer and the large retail company means 
that the consumer has the election to take a product or to 
leave it, and it is fanciful to visualise a "haggling" 
(66) Trebilcock, 'Private Law Remedies for Misleading 
Advertising', (1972) 22 University of Toronto Law· 
Journal 1, 4-5 would go further in that he contends: 
'It should never lie in the mouth of an advertiser 
to argue that a claim was a mere puff and ought not 
to have been paid attention to. He ought irrebutably 
to be presumed to have made the claim for a purpose 
and if somebody, as intended, acts on the claim, no 
matter how irrationally, the seller should be 
obliged to live with it.' 
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process regarding the price and other attributes of the 
product in question; and (d) there is a real risk that 
competition in advertising will displace real 
. . 
67 h t d d . 1 . compet1t1on w ere exaggera e an excess1ve c a1ms go 
unchecked; the honest and restrained advertiser is 
forced to resort to more laudatory and flourishing 
descriptions and claims in an endeavour to attract 
custom, and this is ultimately to his detriment68 and to 
the detriment of credibility in advertising in general. 
For these reasons it is suggested that the dictum of 
Haines J in Ranger v Herbert A. Watts {Quebec) Ltd69 is 
to be commended to a wider audience. The learned judge 
remarked: 
"It seems to me the time has arrived for an 
examination of our law upon the obligation 
of manufacturers and vendors of products to 
implement their undertaking given in the 
news media by nationwide advertising. By 
such means they stimulate reliance upon the 
safety and quality of their products •..• 
To allow a producer to evade the fair 
implication of his advertising is to permit 
him to reap a rich harvest of profit with-
out obligation to the purchaser .... 
Honesty in advertising is a concept worthy 
of re-examination." 70 
(67) "Real" competition in the sense of competition with 
regard to price, quality, quantity and other material 
attributes. See Chapter I, Introduction, supra. 
(68) Such an advertiser may lose his reputation for being 
a credible seller if manifestly exaggerated claims 
are made. 
(69) (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 395. 
(70) Ibid, 404-405. Similarly in Esso Petroleum Ltd v 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 All ER 
117, 121, Lord Simon of Glaisdale commented that 'it 
seems to me in general undesirable to allow a 
commercial promoter to claim that what he has done 
is a mere puff, not intended to create legal 
relations' • 
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Consequently, it is hoped that decisions such as Dimmock 
v HaZZett 71 and Scott v Hansen 72 would, if similar 
factual circumstances arose today, be decided the other 
way, and that the descriptions of the land would not be 
dismissed as mere puffery. 
Before leaving this appraisal of the nature of 
misrepresentations in the context of advertising and the 
disclosure of other information preparatory to sale, 
mention must be made of the fact that much advertising is 
directed at emotional or psychological needs; that is, 
appeals to an individuals need for approval, love or 
happiness. 73 Where a claim is made in respect of the 
characteristics or attributes of a product or service the 
law relating to misrepresentation may assist the consumer 
where he has entered into a contract in reliance upon 
this claim, and the claim turns out to be false. This 
distinction between truth and falsity works tolerably 
well when applied to factual elements such as the price, 
quality, and so forth, but when applied to image appeals 
it becomes largely unworkable. 74 In any event, as 
Duggan75 observes 
(71} Supra. 
(72) Supra. The statement in this case and in Dimmock's. 
case do not seem to be so obviously exaggerated and 
vague so as to preclude reliance. 
(73) See Barnes and Blakeney, 'The Regulation of Children's 
TV Advertising- The Australian Experience', (1980} 1 
Journal of Media Law and Practice 265, 273. See 
Chapter IV, Statutory Regulation of Advertising, infra. 
(74} See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising,infra 
-----· 
(75} 'Fairness in Advertising: In Pursuit of the Hidden 
Persuaders', {1978) 11 Melbourne University Law 
Review 50. 
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"In some cases, a finding that a claim is 
misleading or untruthful will result in 
nothing more than the replacement of one 
superlative with another, or of an 
alluring claim with an equally alluring 
image." 76 
Re (ii) Misrepresentation 'by or on behalf of another 
party'. 
Section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 applies 
to misrepresentations made to the consumer by or on 
behalf of another party to the contract'. Consequently, 
where the false or misleading claim emanates from the 
11 t f th 11 d 'ff' 1 . 77 se er, or an agen o e se er no 1 1cu ty ar1ses. 
However, complicated questions arise as to the seller's 
liability for advertising claims made by the manufacturer 
or some other person (such as a national distributor or 
wholesaler) who is not a contracting party. In many cases 
the contract for the sale of goods or supply of services 
or credit will not be made with the advertiser and 
clearly no claim may have been made by the seller or 
supplier in such circumstances. Can it be argued, though, 
that the claim was made on behalf of the seller or 
supplier? 
Where, for example, a retailer has approached the 
manufacturer of a particular product requesting him to run 
(76) Ibid, at 54. 
(77) Obviously, the agent must be acting within the scope 
of his authority, express, implied, or apparent. 
See Ludgater v Love (1881) 44 LT 694; Pearson & Son 
Ltd v Dublin Corporation [1907] AC 351, 354. 
Generally, see Fridman, The Law of Agency (4 ed, 
1976) 1 245-247. 
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an advertising campaign to promote the sale of that 
product, a strong argument may be made out that the 
advertising and any claims therein is on behalf of the 
retailer. Furthermore, the retailer may be liable in 
circumstances where he adopts the manufacturer's 
advertising claims, as where he draws the consumer's 
attention to the manufacturer•s advertisements or sales 
78 brochures. Trebilcock79 asserts that 
" ..• in the case where the manufacturer by 
arrangement with his distributors provides 
'blanket' advertising for his product, the 
distributors would seem clearly to have 
adopted the manufacturer's claims." 80 
However, there is a dearth of authority in this area and 
the best course of action for a consumer who has;entered 
into a contract with a seller, who is not the advertiser, 
is to take issue with the advertiser directly in respect 
of any false claim made in the advertisement. Section 6 
of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 only regulates the 
position where the representation is made 'by or on or 
behalf of another party to the contract'; consequently, 
potential tort liability for negligence or deceit remain 
vis-a-vis an advertiser who is not party to the contract 
(78) See Murray v Sperry Rand Corp (1979) 23 OR 456, 96 
DLR (3d) 113; Silverstein v R.H. Macey & Co 40 
NYS 916 (1943). 
(79) Op. cit.; see footnote 66. 
(80) Ibid, at 6. 
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1 f d 1 f . d. t 81 for the sa e o goo s or supp y o serv~ces or ere ~ . 
Furthermore, in appropriate circumstances, a collateral 
agreement between the consumer and the manufacturer may 
be established. 82 
Re (iii) The Misrepresentation must have induced the 
contract. 
Treite1 83 succinctly states the position as follows: 
"A representation has no effect if the 
person to whom it is made does not rely 
on it. A person obviously cannot claim 
relief if the representation never came 
to his notice, or if he knows the truth, 
or if he relies on his own information, 
or if he deliberately takes the risk of 
the representation turning out to be 
true. 11 84 
A case that serves as an excellent illustration is Poole 
85 
and McLennan v Nourse. The respondent advertised in a 
farming magazine that his farm of some 6300 acres was for 
sale. He also represented in the advertisement that a 
store on the farm was earning L60 per month, that a 
timber interest in a syndicate brought in LlOO per month 
and that charcoal rights brought in L80 per month. The 
appellants who had read the advertisement, and subseq-
uently had purchased the farm, alleged that they had been 
induced to buy through the fraudulent statements contain-
ed in this advertisement. Solomon JA, in delivering the 
(81) See Tortious liability, infra, at .137. · 
(82) See Collateral Contracts, infra, at 116. 
(83) Op. cit.; see also Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., 233. 
(84) Ibid, 220.It is submitted that "inducement" in the 
Act and "reliance" at common law are the same. 
( 8 5 ) 1918 AD 4 0 4 • 
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judgement of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa, stated inter aZia, that: 
" ••• the evidence shows that the title deeds, 
in which the true extent is set forth, were 
shown to the [appellants], and the written 
contract itself signed by them states that 
the farm is 'in extent 2,551 morgen'. In 
these circumstances it is hopeless to expect 
us to differ from the conclusion arrived at 
in the court below that the defendants were 
not misled by the statement in the advert-
isement on the subject." 86 
Furthermore, the learned judge observed that while the 
statements in the advertisement on the subject of the 
store, the timber and the charcoal were grossly false this 
was not the end of the matter. He stated: 
" In these circumstances if the matter 
had rested there, and if the [appellants] 
had bought the farm on the strength of 
the [respondent's] advertisement, it 
would of course not be open to question 
that they would have been fully entitled 
to repudiate the contract. But the case 
does not rest there for .•. the [appell-
ants] had paid a visit to the farm and 
remained there for over three days, during 
which time the whole position was fully 
discussed between them. The [respondent] 
alleges that at these interviews the true 
state of affairs was disclosed to the 
[appellants], and that they were complete-
ly set right with regard to the false 
statements contained in the advertisement • 
••. There was ample evidence ... to just-
ify the conclusion arrived at by the court 
below that the representations regarding 
the timber syndicate and the charcoal were 
of no importance as the [appellants] were 
placed in possession of the true facts by 
the ~espondent] before they decided to 
purchase the farm." 87 
(86) Ibid, 418-419. 
(8 7) Idem. 
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Consequently, the consumer has no cause for complaint 
where he actually knows that the representation is false 
since he cannot assert that he has been misled by the 
t t . 88 represen a 1.on. 
Moreover, the consumer cannot complain if the 
advertising claim or other pre-contract communication did 
not influence his judgement. For example, in Bird v 
Murphy 89 the plaintiff sued for rescission of a contract 
for the sale of a Mercedes Benz motor car for which he 
had paid R2600; he alleged that he had been induced to 
purchase by the fraudulent, or alternatively innocent, 
misrepresentation by the defendant that the car was a 
1957 model, whereas in fact it was an earlier 1953 model. 
However, the evidence disclosed that before even discuss-
ing the purchase of the car with the defendant he had 
'taken a fancy' to the vehicle and had decided to offer 
R2600 for it. The court held that the defendant had made 
a misrepresentation regarding the model but there was no , 
inducement shown. Similarly, where the consumer regards 
the representation as unimportant90 or relies .exclusively 
upon his own skill and judgment, 91 the consumer cannot 
(88) See also Jennings v Broughton (1854) 5 De G.M. & G 
126; Begbie v Phosphate Sewage Co (1875) LR 10 QB491. 
{89) (1963) 2 PH, A 42 (D). 
(90) See, for example, Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 AC 187, 
194. 
(91) See, for example, Attwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl. & F 
232; Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692. 
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argue successfully that the representation has 'induced' 
entry into the contract. However, the mere fact that a 
consumer has the opportunity to test the accuracy of a 
representation and does not take it does not preclude 
h . f b . . 1' f 92 1m rom o ta1n1ng re 1e . 
Finally, on the question of inducement it is clear 
that section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 does 
not require that the representation be shown to be 
materiat.~ 3 The question of inducement is a matter 
dependent upon the consumer's own state of mind, as 
opposed to "materiality" which is referable to the state 
of mind of a 'reasonable man of business•? 4 As Wells J 
remarked in Lyndon v Coventry Motors Retailers Pty Ltd95 
'a person relies on a statement in an advertisement where 
that statement induces him, 96 •.• in the manner and mode 
of a potential customer, to respond to the advertisement 
by some overt act'. Of course, if the representation is 
shown to be material, in the sense that a reasonable 
person may have been induced to enter into the contract 
in question, the consumer may more easily discharge the 
onus of demonstrating inducement. 97 It is also clear 
that the consumer is not required to show that the 
(92) See Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch.D. 1; Wiley v 
African Realty Trust Ltd 1908 T.H. 104. 
{93) See Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 24-25. 
(94) See Treitel, op. cit., 222. 
(95) (1974-75) 11 SASR 308, 313. 
(96) Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 25 comment that 'if 
a representation is of sucha nature that it would be 
likely to induce a reasonable person to enter into 
the particular contract, the court will draw the in-
ference in the absence of convincing evidence to 
the contrary from the representor~ 
112 
representation was the only inducement. 98 
Provided the consumer can establish that he was 
induced to enter into a contract for the purchase of a 
particular product or for the supply of particular 
services by a misrepresentation made by or on behalf of 
a seller or supplier, he is entitled to damages as if 
that representation were a term of the contract; that 
is, the consumer is entitled to be put in as good a 
position as if the representation had been true. 99 
(b) h d f 11 . 100 T e reme y o cance at1on. 
A consumer is entitled to cancel a contract where it 
has been induced by a misrepresentation but only if the 
contracting parties have expressly or impliedly agreed 
that the truth of the representation is essential to the 
101 
consumer, or it is shown that the representation has a 
(98) See ReyneZZ v Sprye (1851) 1 De G. M & G 656; 
Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459; 
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104, 119. 
(99) See, for example, Doyle v OZby (Ironmongers) Ltd 
[1969] 2 QB 158, 167; Stoljar, 'Normal Effective 
and Preparatory Damages in Contract', (1975) 91 
LQR 68. 
(100) This topic is dealt with at some length in Dawson 
and McLauchlan, op. cit., 45-52 who point out that 
the great majority of modern cases (i.e. post 
Redgrave v Hurd, supra) 'in which rescission for 
misrepresentation was granted concerned misrepres-
entations which would undoubtedly satisfy the 
requirements of [the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979] 1 S 7 (4) (b) • 
(101) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 7(4) (a). 
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substantial effect upon the benefit or burden of the 
contract to the consumer. 102 
Clearly the effect of this legislation is to restrict 
the circumstances in which the remedy of cancellation 
may be granted to those cases where the misrepresentation 
has a substantial impact upon the party wishing to 
cancel. Where there is express agreement as to essential 
t f t t . d'ff' lt . 103 na ure o a represen a ~on no ~ ~cu y ar~ses. As 
regards representations which are 'impliedly' essential, 
Dawson and McLauchlan suggest104 that an appropriate 
test would be: 
(102) Ibid, s 7(4) (b). Note, that where the misrepresent-
at~on comes forward as a term of the contract 
complications arise as the Sale of Goods Act 1908 
may come into play. The Contractual Remedies Act 
1979 expressly provides, in section lS(d), that 
except as provided in sections 4(2}, 6{2) and 14, 
nothing in that Act shall affect the Sale of Goods 
Act 1908. Consequently, where the misrepresentat-
ion is term of the contract for the sale of 
goods, rescission in terms of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1908 will be the appropriate remedy, and its 
availability will depend upon whether the term 
amounts to a condition or a warranty. See the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908, ss 13, 54; Finch Motors 
Ltd v Quin [1980] 2 NZLR 519. 
(103) Apart, perhaps, from a conceptual difficulty; if 
parties agree that a representation is essential 
then it will usually follow that that statement 
will be incorporated into the contract, and will 
not be a representatio~ in the strict legal 
sense at all. See Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit, 
48. 
(104) Op. cit., 48. This test is adapted from that 
enunciated by Jordan CJ in Tramways Advertising 
Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 
632, 641-642 and followed in New Zealand in 
HoZmes v Burgess [1975] 2 NZLR 311, 320. 
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"(D}oes it appear from the surrounding 
circumstances that the representation 
was of such importance to the repres-
entee that he would not have entered 
into the contract if the representation 
had not been made, and this ought to 
have been apparent to the representor." 
Such a test would work reasonably well in circumstances 
where the consumer seeks an assurance from the seller 
or supplier that a claim in an advertisement for a 
product or service is reliable, and intimates that he 
would not proceed with the transaction unless such an 
assurance is given. However, where the consumer in 
reliance upon a misrepresentation made by a seller or 
supplier in an advertisement simply enters into a 
contract for a product or service his better course of 
action, in seeking cancellation, would be to argue that 
the misrepresentation has a substantial effect. 105 The 
consumer must establish that the consequences of misrep-
resentation are such that he ought not to be held to the 
contract. Consider a recent breach of contract case 
decided pursuant to s 7(4) (b) of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979. 106 In GaZZagher v Young an agreement for the 
purchase of a dwellinghouse was in issue. The agreement 
included a warranty stating that there was no outstanding 
requirement imposed by local or government authorities in 
respect of the property which had not been disclosed to 
the purchaser. In fact, after settlement and the plaintiff 
(105) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 7(4) {b). 
(106) [High Court, Hamilton, A 116/80; 4 August 1981.] 
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taking possession, it was discovered that a number of 
improvements made by the defendant vendor failed to 
comply with, inter alia, relevant building, plumbing 
and electrical supply regulations. Greig J held that 
non-compliance with the express terms of a building 
permit and a power board inspection notice constituted 
breaches of a "stipulation" within .the language of the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and given the significant 
cost and alterations to the house that would be required 
to effect compliance, the learned judge held that 
cancellation of the contract was an appropriate remedy. 107 
Provided the consumer can demonstrate that he was 
substantially prejudiced by the misrepresentation he will 
be entitled to cancel. Clearly in cases such as 
Whittington v Seale-Hayne, 108 Smith v Land and House 
Property Corporation109 and Kenny v Fenton110 this 
remedy will be available; in cases such as Capital Motors 
Ltd v Bee~ham, 111 where the misrepresentation has a 
relatively minor effect, the consumer should be relegated 
to a claim in damages. 
(107} Ibid, at 13. 
(108} Supra. 
(109) Supra. 
(110) [1971] NZLR 1 (CA) (fraudulent misrepresentations 
as to the turnover of a business which induced the 
sale of a motel concern; actual turnover substant-
ially less thereby affecting the viability of the 
enterprise and the representee's ability to meet 
repayments) • 
{111) Supra, (negligent misrepresentation as to number of 
previous owners that a car had had;tortious measure 
of damages amounting to $100 being the difference 
between the price paid of $1400, and the market 
value of $1300, at the time of purchase). 
116 
In theory, therefore, the consumer is arrogated 
adequate remedies in respect of misrepresentations 
embodied in advertisements, etc., or communicated to him 
prior to his entry into a contract for the sale of goods 
or supply of services. In practice, these remedies may 
not be available due to the vagueness and ambiguity of 
claims in advertisements, nor feasible in that even where 
the consumer can point to a false statement of the factthe 
potentialbenefits accruing through the successful 
pursuit of his legal rights might be outweighed by the 
risks associated with failure; namely, costs in terms 
of time, effort and payment for legal representation. 
This latter point is even more poignant in respect of 
transactions involving low cost items. 112 
(3) COLLATERAL CONTRACT 
Where a consumer is induced to enter into a contract 
with a retailer by virtue of advertising emanating from a 
manufacturer it may be possible to construe a contract 
between the consumer and the manufacturer. 113 In 
(112) These matters, amongst others, will be elaborated 
upon in the Conclusion to this chapter. 
(113) Such contracts, designated 'collateral contracts', 
have been recognised for some considerable time. 
See Wedderburn, 'Collateral Contracts', [1959] 
Cambridge Law Journal 48, and the cases there 
cited. The case of Carlill v Carbolia Smoke 
Ball Co (supra) easily could be analysed in 
terms of collateral contract principles, as 
opposed to a unilateral offer basis. 
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HeiLbut Symons & Co v BuakZeton114 Lord Moulton stated: 
"It is evident, both in principle and 
on authority, that there may be a 
contract the consideration for which is 
the making of some other contract. 'If 
you will make such and such a contract I 
will give you one hundred pounds', is in 
every sense of the word a complete legal 
contract. It is collateral to the main 
contract, but each has an independent 
existence, and they do not differ in 
respect of their possessing to the full 115 the character and status of a contract." 
In appropriate circumstances the manufacturer's advertise-
ment may be regarded as amounting to an offer to warrant 
that the goods are as represented in the advertisement, 
and the consumer may accept this offer by entering into 
a contract with the retailer for the purchase of the 
particular product. For example, in Shanklin Pier Ltd 
v DeteZ Produats116 the defendant company recommended that 
the plaintiff should use their product when repainting a 
pier and assured the plaintiff that their product would 
give protection lasting for seven years. The plaintiff 
when employing contractors to do the paint work instruct-
ed them to buy and use the paint manufacturered by the 
defendants. The paint in fact lasted three months. It 
was held that, although the main contract for the sale 
of paint obviously was between the contractors and the 
defendants, there was a collateral contract between the 
( 114 ) [ 1913] AC 3 0 . 
(115) Ibid, 47; see also Coffey v Dickson [1960] NZLR 
II1"5", 1140. 
(116) [1951] 2 KB 854. 
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plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer that the paint 
would last for seven years. A case that provides an even 
better illustration is Murray v Sperry Rand Corporation.117 
A farmer was induced to purchase a harvester from a local 
dealer through, inter aZia, representations made in a sales 
brochure prepared and published by the defendant manufact-
urer. The sales brochure asserted that uhe:.machine would 
'harvest over 45 tons per hour with ease' but, in fact, the 
performance of the harvester fell drastically short of what 
had been promised. In an action against the manufacturer, 
the Supreme Court of Ontario held that the plaintiff had 
established the existence of a collateral contract. Reid J 
held that the manufacturer had, through the brochure, 
presented his case to the customer 'just as directly as he 
would if they were sitting down together to discuss the 
matter~ 118 The case, he held, was on all fours with the 
Shanklin Pier case and the defendant manufacturer was held 
liable for breach of the collateral contract containing the 
warranty as to performance. 119 
(117) (1979) 23 OR 456; (1979) 96 DLR (3d) 113. 
(118) (1979) 23 OR 456, 467. 
(119) See also Traders Finance Corporation Ltd v HaZey (1966) 
57 DLR (2d) 15 where plaintiff in the course of neg-
otiations for the purchase of three trucks was shown a 
copy of a magazine advertisement by the manufacturer, 
Ford Motor Company, which represented that the motors 
of the trucks were 'super duty engines' which after 
150,000 miles required no major repairs. The plaintiff 
succeeded in a counterclaim action a~ainst Ford Motor 
Company for breach of warranty conta~ned in the coll-
ateral contract; furthermore, in Ranger v Herbert A. 
Watts (Quebec) Ltd (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 395 a tobacco 
manufacturer was held liable to a consumer for breach 
of contract attsing out of the purchase of a packet 
of cigarettes of a brand which had been subject to 
an advertising promotion. 
119 
Another situation where the collateral contract has 
proved useful is the hire purchase financing area. 
Suppose a consumer approaches a dealer and wishes to 
acquire a chattel on hire purchase terms. The dealer in 
inducing the sale may make extravagant claims and misrep-
resentations but where the direct collection method of 
financing is employed120 the actual contract of hire 
purchase will be with the finance company, and not the 
dealer. For example, in MihaZjevic v EiffeZ Tower Motors 
Pty Ltd and General Credits Ltd121 a dealer, in order to 
induce the plaintiff to sign an offer to a credit company 
to acquire a vehicle on hire purchase terms, stated that 
the vehicle was 'in good condition'. As later events bore 
out, the vehicle was in a very defective condition. 
Gillard J held that the dealer in making the statement 
promised to the plaintiff that he would have no trouble 
from the vehicle for a reasonable period of time. Conseq-
uently there was a collateral contract between the plaint-
iff and the dealer whereby the dealer.'warranted that the 
vehicle was in a good condition. Similarly, in Andrews v 
H k . 122 d 1 ld . op ~nson a car ea er to a customer who was 1nter-
ested in a particular vehicle, 'Its a good little bus. I 
would stake my life on it. You will have no trouble with 
it'. The customer then acquired the car under a hire 
(120) That is, where the goods are sold by the dealer to 
the finance company which then lets them on hire 
purchase to the customer. The instalments or hiring 
charges are collected directly from the hirer/cust-
omer by the finance company. 
(121) [1973] VR 545. 
(122) [1957] 1 QB 229. 
120 
purchase agreement entered into with a finance company. 
It was held that the dealer's assurance was part of a 
collateral contract with the customer, who recovered 
substantial damages for breach when the car crashed 
d d f . . 123 ue to e ect1ve steer1ng. 
What then must the consumer establish in order to 
found an action based on a collateral contract? Consider 
this question in light of an advertising claim made by a 
manufacturer in respect of his product, which the consumer 
subsequently acquires from a retailer. First, the 
consumer must demonstrate that the manufacturer made a 
promise which the consumer could reasonably regard as 
b . d . h d. 124 · e1ng rna e an~mo aontra en ~. The test employed is an 
objective one, in that '(i)f an intelligent bystander 
would reasonably infer that a warranty was intended, that 
would suffice even though neither party in fact had it in 
. d' 125 m1n . Consequently, the manufacturer may not evade 
(123) See also Brown v Sheen and Richmond Car Sales Ltd 
[1950] 1 All ER 1102; Yeoman Credit Ltd v Odgers 
[1962] 1 All ER 789. Note that in New Zealand there 
is no necessity to find a collateral agreement in 
such circumstances because by virtue of section 17 
of the Hire Purchase Act 1971 such statements by a 
dealer are deemed to be made by him as agent for 
the finance company and therefore can be regarded 
as terms of the agreement concluded by the consumer 
with the finance company. 
(124} See, for example, Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland 
Sand and Silica Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170, 180. 
(125) Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, 328. 
This test was applied by Gillard J in the 
Mihaljevia case, supra, at 556. 
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liability by asserting that he never intended to create 
any legal relationship with the consumer. The question 
whether animus contrahendi exists is a question of fact 
determined objectively in the light of the whole of the 
circumstances. For example, in Murray v Sperry Rand 
Corporation126 the manufacturer argued that the sales 
brochure was not intended to persuade people to buy the 
machines described therein. However, Reid J held that 
that view was contradicted by the brochure itself. 
"Its tone is strongly promotional. It goes 
far beyond any simple intention to 
furnish specifications. It was •.• a sales 
tool. It was intended to be one and was 
used in this case as one." 127 
Second, the consumer must acquire the product in reliance 
upon the manufacturer's promise. 128 It is clear that the 
manufacturer's promise need not be the sole inducement129 
and it is submitted that reliance should be readily 
inferred in consumer sales. 130 Proof of reliance 
t d b th t . M S d C ' l31 accep e y e cour ~n urray v perry Ran orporat~on 
(126) Supra. 
(127) (1979) 23 OR 456, 465. 
(128) See, for example, WeZZs case, supra, at 180. 
(129) See cases under 'Misrepresentation', supra. 
(130) Such reliance is readily inferred in respect of 
the implied terms as to merchantable quality and 
fitness for purpose under the Sale of Goods Act 
1908, section 16, and there does not appear to be 
any logical ground for treating the manufacturer 
more favourably than the retailer; a consumer 
should be taken to rely on a manufacturer's advert-
ising claims in selecting what product he will buy. 
See, for example, Grant v Australian Knitting 
MiZZs [1936] AC 85, 99. 
(131) Supra. 
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was oral testimony by the plaintiff that he had taken the 
sales brochure home and read it over several nights 
b f b . th h t 0 c d' 't 132 e ore uy1ng e arves er. ne ana 1an wr1 er 
comments that this case may herald a relaxation of the 
strict requirements of proof of reliance in that such 
reliance was held to be established in spite of the fact 
that the plaintiff was 'sometimes unable to recall with 
accuracy, sometimes confused and sometimes self-contra-
dictory•.133 Finally, it is no bar that the advertising 
claim was made some time before the actual contract of 
sale was entered into with the retailer. 134 Provided 
the consumer can establish the joint requirements of 
animus aontrahendi and reliance he may recover damages from 
the manufacturer for breach of warranty as embodied in the 
collateral contract. 
Despite the assertion in Heilbut~ Symons & Co v 
Buakleton135 that 'collateral contracts must from their 
very nature be rare', 136 the courts have not been too 
(132) Schwartz, 'Jurisprudential Developments in Manufact-
urer's Liability for Defective Products where the 
only damage is economic loss', (1979-80) 4 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 164, 174. 
(133) Supra, at 460 (OR) . No doubt allowance was made for 
the fact that the evidence was given 10 years after 
the event. 
(134) Coffey v Diakson, supra, at 1143. Richmond J stated 
... 'I do not myself think that a verbal warranty 
need be collateral in the sense of contempraneous 
with a written contract'. 
{135) Supra. 
(136) Ibid, 47. 
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unwilling to find a collateral contract in circumstances 
where a manufacturer makes an assertion about his product 
which acts as a catalyst to bring about a transaction 
with a third party. This attitude is to be welcomed as 
it may offer the only avenue of redress in respect of 
innocent misrepresentations made by a manufacturer in his 
d t . . 137 a ver 1s1ng. Consequently the manufacturer may be 
held liable in damages caused by a false statement without 
proof of fraud or negligence. Waddams138 comments that 
these collateral contract cases 
". . . can be supported • . . as part of 
the law of products liability. The 
business supplier of a product should, 
vis-a-vis the innocent consumer, bear 
the risk of damage caused by false 
statements made in the course of 
business, just as he bears the risk of 
damage caused by defects." 139 
This writer respectfully concurs in this view. 
(137) If the misrepresentations were negligent or fraud-
ulent then the consumer may have a common law action 
in deceit or negligencei see infra.Note that the 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee in 
their Working Paper on Warranties in The Sale of 
Consumer Goods (1977), para. 19, recommend that the 
consumer should have direct recourse against a 
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of 
acceptability (see para. 14} and the manufacturer 
could be liable for 'any express statements, 
affirmations, descriptions or promises made or 
published by the manufacturer or with his express 
or implied authority known to the buyer at the time 
of the original consumer sale'. This would greatly 
improve the position of a consumer vis-a-vis a 
manufacturer. 
( 13 8 ) Op . cit . 
(139) At 260. 
124 
(4) EXCLUSION CLAUSES AND GUARANTEEs. 140 
Certain types of contractual terms which seek 
indirectly to exclude liability for pre-contract state-
ments are regulated by the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979. 141 It is by no means uncommon to find clauses to 
the following, or like effect, in contracts: 
"This document contains the whole of the 
contract between the parties hereto." 
"I acknowledge that I have inspected the 
vehicle and have relied upon such 
inspection and my own judgement in 
contracting for the same and that no 
warranties representations or promises 
have been made by you or your servants 
except those given in writing and 
endorsed hereon." 142 
Notwithstanding the presence of such clauses, a New 
Zealand court is not precluded from ascertaining the true 
state of affairs 'unless the court considers that it is 
fair and reasonable that the provision should be 
(140) A detailed consideration of this topic is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation as the topic could 
validly be the subject of a substantial book. 
Consequently, it is proposed to simply outline the 
relevant law. Note, too, that the Contracts and 
Commercial Law Reform Committee, Working Paper on 
Warranties in The Sale of Consumer Goods (1977), 
paras 16, 23, recommend that exemption clauses be 
strictly curtailed in scope and application. 
(141) s 4. 
(142) Cited in Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 36. 
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• b th t• I 143 conclus~ve etween e par ~es • Where the 
consumer has been induced to enter into a transaction 
of some magnitude with a large retail concern by misrep-
resentations made in advertisements or discussions 
preceding the sale, it is unlikely that the court will 
regard any 'merger' or 'acknowledgement' clause144 in the 
contract as being conclusive. The disparity in bargaining 
power between the average consumer and a large retail 
concern and the unlikelihood of the consumer having 
received independent legal advice prior to commitment are 
significant factors to be weighed in the balance. However, 
every case will turn on its own facts and the court may 
have regard to all the circumstances of the case in 
deciding whether it is fair and reasonable that the clause 
should be conclusive. As Wilson JA observed in Chomedy 
Aluminium Co Ltd v Belcourt Construction (Ottawa) Ltd145 
"Many exclusionary clauses ... which in 
isolation seem unfair and unreasonable 
are not so when viewed in their contract-
ual setting and may, indeed, constitute 
part of the quid pro quo for benefits 
received through hard negotiation." 146 
(143) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 4(1). In deciding 
whether a clause should be treated as conclusive or 
not the court shall have regard 'to all the circum-
stances of the case, including the subject matter 
and value of the transaction, the respective bar-
gaining strengths of the parties, and the question 
whether any party was represented or advised by a 
solicitor at the time of the negotiations or at any 
other relevant time'; cf: The Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, s 55(5) (UK); Trade Practices Act 
1974, s 68A (Australia). 
(144) Such as those outlined above. 
(145) (1979) 97 DLR (3d) 170 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
(146) Ibid, 177; see also Photo Production Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 283, 294. 
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Where a clause in a contract simply denies the existence 
of any agency or authority to make representations, the 
court does not have to apply a 'fair and reasonable test', 
b . . d' tl . h h t 't' . 147 ut may ~nqu~re ~rec y ~nto w at t e rue pos~ ~on ~s. 
It must, however, be emphasised that section 4 of 
the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 does not authorise the 
court 'to disregard true exemption clauses - clauses 
which exclude or limit liability, or the availability of 
any remedy, for misrepresentation or breach of contract' f 48 
Section 5 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 provides 
that 
"If a contract expressly provides for a remedy 
in respect of misrepresentation or repudiation 
or breach of contract or makes express prov-
ision for any of the other matters to which 
sections 6 to 10 of this Act relate, those 
sections shall have effect subject to that 
provision." 
For example, where a clause in a contract provides that 
'no misrepresentation or misdescription of the goods by 
the seller shall entitle the purchaser to cancel the 
contract or to claim compensation or damages' this clause 
would not be covered by section 4 of the Act in that it 
(147) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 4(2}; for example, 
where an attempt is made to exclude liability in 
circumstances where the sale is effected by some 
intermediary such as a salesperson. 
(148) Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 38; these 
writers make the pertinent comment that 11 (i)t is 
anomalous that s 4 enables a court to disregard 
a clause saying 'there are no representations' 
but not one saying 'no liability for 
representations'." 
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does not deny the existence of representations made in 
the pre-contractual setting. The question here, there-
fore, is whether the exclusion of all liability for mis-
representation would, pursuant to section 5 of the Act, 
exclude the application of sections 6 to 10 of the Act. 
It may be argued that on a literal reading of section 5 
the provision for no remedy would not be effective to 
contract out of liability for misrepresentation. 149 
Clearly the rationale behind the inclusion of section 5 
was that parties to a contract should be free to define 
the extent of their rights and obligations and to outline 
the consequences to be visited upon any breach of those 
bl . t' 150 o 1ga 1ons. It is submitted that if an exclusion 
clause provided that damages in respect of any misrepres-
entation were to be limited to fifty dollars and that no 
misrepresentation could ground cancellation, such a 
clause would fall within the ambit of section 5 and be 
effective to contract out of liability for misrepresent-
. . 151 
at1on; that is, a remedy in the form of compensatory 
damages has been agreed upon by the parties with an upper 
limit being imposed upon the amount recoverable. There-
fore, it would be highly anomalous if the effectiveness or 
otherwise of such clauses should turn on such fine 
distinctions; namely, the dichotomy between the situation 
where 'no remedy' is stipulated as opposed to where a 
(149) See Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 184-186. 
(150) See the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committ-
ee, Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract (1967), 
para 20; [1979] New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
77; 624. 
(151) Dawson and McLauchlan, op. cit., 186, argue that 
clauses placing a ceiling on the amount recoverable 
do not provide a remedy. This writer respectfully 
disagrees with this contention. 
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remedy in damages limited to fifty dollars is provided. 
It is submitted that on a fair, large and liberal 
interpretation152 of section 5 that section may fairly 
be said to encompass the situation where the parties 
have expressly agreed that 'no remedy' is to be given 
for misrepresentation. 
Section 5 therefore provides an escape route 
whereby the seller may protect himself against liability 
for misrepresentations made to a consumer prior to the 
conclusion of a contract for the sale of goods, whether 
those misrepresentations were made orally, embodied in 
advertising material disseminated by the seller, or 
elsewhere. What, however, is the position where the 
misrepresentation emanates from a non-contracting party, 
such as the manufacturer of the product, and the consumer 
is induced to enter into a contract with the seller on 
the basis of such misrepresentation? Two distinct 
matters fall to be considered here; namely, {i) the 
possibility or otherwise of the manufacturer relying on an 
exclusion clause contained in the contract entered into 
between the consumer and the seller; and {ii) manufact-
urers'guarantees. 
Re (i): Can the manufacturer· exclude liability for 
1 . t f d 1 t . t t. 153 f neg 1gen or rau u en m1srepresen a 1ons or or 
(152) As directed by section 5(j) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924. 
(153) These topics are discussed below under 
Tortious Remedies. 
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breach of a collateral agreement by pointing to an 
exclusionary clause embodied in the contract between 
the consumer and the seller? Where the manufacturer 
authorises the seller to act as his agent and the seller 
enters into a contract containing an exclusion clause, 
the manufacturer may be protected. Authority for this 
proposition derives from a number of shipping cases 
whereby the agency device has been employed in order to 
convert an apparent stranger to a contract into a party 
to it, thereby allowing him to take the benefit of an 
exclusion clause in that contract. 154 A common clause 
in bills of lading, which contain the shipping contract 
entered into between the shipper and carrier, 155 
purports to extend the benefit of defences and immunities 
conferred by the bill on the carrier to independent 
contractors156 employed by the carrier. Whether an 
independent contractor can claim the benefit of such a 
clause, or not, is contingent upon him satisfying the 
prerequisites for the validity of an agency argument as 
(154) See, for example, Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons 
Ltd [1962] AC 446, 474; New Zealand Shipping Co v 
Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1975] AC 154; Herrick v 
Leonard and Dingley Ltd [1975] 2 NZLR 566; Port 
Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon 
(Australia) Pty Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 257. 
(155) Generally see Gutteridge and Megrah, The Law of 
Bankers' Commercial Credits (5 ed, 1976), 90. 
(156) Such as stevedores. 
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as spelt out by Lord Reid in the Midland Silicones 
case.
157 Lord Reid stated: 
"I can see a possibility of success of the 
agency argument if (first) the bill of 
lading makes it clear that the stevedore 
is intended to be protected by the provis-
ions in it which limit liability, 
(secondly) the bill of lading makes it 
clear that the carrier, in addition to 
contracting for these provisions on his own 
behalf, is also contracting as agent for 
the stevedore that these provisions should 
apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) the 
carrier has authority from the stevedore to 
do that, or perhaps later ratification by 
the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) 
that any difficulties about consideration 
moving from the stevedore were overcome." 
In New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A.M. Satterthwaite & Co 
.Ltd158 goods sold by an English exporter were shipped to a 
New Zealand buyer in Wellington. The goods were damaged 
in the course of unloading due to the negligence of the 
stevedores, and the New Zealand buyer brought an action 
in tort against them for the negligent damage of the 
goods. The stevedores sought to shelter behind an exempt-
ion clause contained in the bill of lading which excluded 
any liability on the part of independent contractors 
employed by the carrier. The major issue was whether the 
fourth pre-requisite as outlined by Lord Reid was satis-
fied. The court reasoned that the clause was to be 
(157)_Supra, at 474; 
( 15 8 ) [ 19 7 5 ] AC 15 4 • 
(footnote 154) . 
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regarded as an offer of exemption by the buyer 
which was accepted by the stevedores when they 
commenced the unloading of the goods; the 
consideration was the performance of the service 
of offloading the goods for the benefit of the 
buyer. Atiyah159 contends that in these 
circumstances the use of exemption clauses is 
often commercially desirable. 
"The point is that goods consigned by 
sea are almost invariably insured, 
and the relations between the carrier 
and the owner are anyhow largely 
regulated by international convent-
ions. If the stevedore is not 
entitled to be protected against 
liability for negligence, stevedore 
firms will have to insure against 
that liability, and hence charge 
more for their services." 160 
There can be little doubt that the decisions in New 
Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A.M. Satterth~aite & Co 
(159} An Introduction to the Law of Contract 
(3 ed, 1981). 
(160) Ibid, 280. 
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d 161 . k d d . 'I td162 d th Lt ~ Herr~c v Leonar an D&ng&ey L an e 
k d . 163 d . th Port Jac son Steve or&ng case accor w~ 
commercial realities and it appears perfectly fair 
and reasonable that the straightjacket of privity 
should be circumvented in these circumstances. The 
courts, however, have demonstrated a commendable 
reluctance to extend the benefit of an exemption 
clause to a third party where the result of such an 
extension would be to deprive the contracting 
party of a remedy in damages in respect of personal 
injuries~ 64 Consequently, it could be thought 
(161) Supra. 
(162) Supra. 
(163) Supra. 
(164) See, for example, Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 
QB 158i Gore v Van Der Lann [1967] 2 QB 
3li cited in Atiyah, op. cit., 279-280. 
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likely that outside the commercial arena, 165 strict 
adherence to the principle espoused in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co v Selfridge & Co Ltd166 would 
largely negative the possibility of a manufacturer 
relying on an exclusion clause embodied in a 
contract between a seller and the consumer. However, 
sweeping reform proposed in the Contracts (Privity) 
Bill 1981 may have significant impact in this area. 
Clause 4 of the Bill reads: 
"Where a promise contained in a deed or 
a contract confers or purports to confer 
a benefit on a person who is not a party 
to the deed or contract ... the promisor 
shall be under an obligation, enforceable 
at the suit of that person, to perform 
that promise." 
'Benefit' is defined in clause 2 as including 'any 
advantage, any immunity and any limitation or other 
qualification of rights or obligations', with the 
result that clause 4 presumably covers the conferring 
' 
of a benefit on a third party by way of exclusion of 
(165) The Privy Council emphasised, in Satterthwaite's 
case, that the contract was of a commercial 
character, for business reasons of profit, 
whereas the normal consumer transaction does 
not reflect the same considerations. 
(166) [1913] AC 847. 
1 . b'l't 167 ~a ~ ~ y. 
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This being the case, the way is open for 
a manufacturer {by arrangement with the various retailers 
that he supplies) to evade liability for any pre-contract 
misrepresentation through the simple expedient of in-
corporating a suitable exemption clause in the standard 
form contract of sale form used by the retailers 
concerned. 
Re (ii): Manufacturers' guarantees. The consumer 
may select goods which will be supplied with a guarantee, 
not from the seller, but from the manufacturer. A 
typical guarantee will promise that goods {or services) 
are of a certain quality and that if they are not, the 
manufacturer will take certain steps to remedy any defect, 
replace the goods or refund any money paid. 168 However, 
such guarantees often purport to exclude or restrict 
certain legal rights which might otherwise exist against 
the manufacturer giving the guarantee. What, for 
example, would be the effect of a clause in a guarantee 
which provided that 'it is a term of the guarantee that 
(167) It is interesting to note that a similar device is 
employed in bills of lading; that is, the shipper 
of goods undertakes that he will not sue third 
parties; this undertaking being part of a binding 
contract between the shipper and carrier, can be 
enforced by the carrier, who can therefore protect 
those third parties. See The EZbe Maru [1978] 1 . 
Lloyd's Rep 206; Atiyah, op. cit., 281. 
(168) See Cusine, 'Manufacturers' Guarantees and the Un-
fair Contract Terms Act', {1980) 2 The Juridical 
Review 185. The undertaking to replace or repair 
~oods usually is subject to the product being used 
~n accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, 
the goods being returned to the manufacturer, and 
the defect being brought to the manufacturer's 
attention within a prescribed time period. See, for 
example, the guarantee given by Black and Decker 
(NZ) Ltd in respect of the power tools manufactured 
by that company. 
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no action shall be brought to enforce any oral promises 
or representations made by the manufacturer and the 
consumer waives all rights which he might otherwise have 
in respect of any such oral promises or representat-
ions'?169 In general, the legal effect of such an 
exclusion clause contained in a guarantee will depend on 
whether there is a contract between the consumer and the 
manufacturer. In exceptional circumstances there might 
be an express contract between the manufacturer and the 
consumer where, for example, the consumer having purchased 
the goods then enters into a separate contract with the 
manufacturer for the maintenance of the goods and that 
maintenance agreement could contain some form of 
guarantee. 170 However, in the usual case it will be a 
matter of construction as towhether there is a contract. 
When a consumer knows about a guarantee beforehand a 
collateral contract may be formed with the manufacturer, 
(169) In the United Kingdom such a clause would fall foul 
of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in that a term 
excluding or restricting liability for misrepres-
entation may be adjudged 'unreasonable'; see 
section 8 of that Act. Similarly, in the United 
States a court may refuse to give effect to a 
guarantee which purports to take away the consumer's 
rights to sue for breach of warranty, etc; see 
Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors 32 NJ 358. The 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, 
Working Paper on Warranties in the Sale of Consumer 
Goods (1977), para 23k, recommends that express 
guarantees given by manufacturers or other suppliers 
of goods should not exclude or limit the express or 
implied warranties otherwise created by law or the 
buyers right to claim damages etc. 
{170) See Mickelburgh, Consumer Protection (1979), 234. 
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the consideration for which is entering into the main 
contract with the retailer. 171 Guarantees are normally 
framed in such a way as to evidence an intention to create 
legal relations and this will facilitate a finding that an 
offer was made which the consumer accepted when contract-
ing with the retailer. However, where the consumer is not 
aware of the existence or contents of a guarantee at the 
time of purchase then the aforementioned argument must 
collapse. 172 In this situation it may be argued that the 
consumer subsequently accepts the offer as represented by 
the guarantee when he, for example, sends off the guarantee 
card to the manufacturer. The difficulty here is in find-
ing consideration as it is well established that past con-
sideration is insufficient to support a contract. It has 
been suggested that the goodwill, information etc.which 
the manufacturer gets when the consumer sends off the 
guarantee card is a benefit which constitutes the consid-
eration.173 There being a complete absence of authority 
on the subject of guarantees174 their legal effect remains 
a matter for speculation and determination from basic 
principles of contract law; however, it is as well to 
bear in mind that a manufacturer may exclude potential 
liability for misrepresentations in advertisements by 
including an appropriate exclusion clause in his guarantee. 
(171} 
(172) 
See Collateral Contracts, supra. 
See R V Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227, 241; 
op. cit., 26. A person cannot accept an 
which he is ignorant. 
Treitel, 
offer of 
(173) See Rees, 'Legal Effect of Manufacturer's 
Guarantees', (1960) 104 Solicitors Journal 879. 
(174) See the comments of Cusine, op. cit., 185. 
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2. TORTIOUS REMEDIES 
{1} NEGLIGENCE 
t . d b 175 1' b'l't f 1' t . As men ~one a ave ~a ~ ~ y or neg ~gen m~s-
representations made to the consumer by or on behalf of 
another contracting party fall to be determined by 
reference to the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 176 
However, where a negligent misstatement is made in an 
advertisement or other communication emanating from a 
manufacturer {or some other third party such as a national 
distributor or wholesaler) that persons potential tort 
liability for negligence remains. 
Ever since the famous decision in Donoghue v 
177 Stevenson personal injury and damage to property have 
been compensatable in a negligence action against a 
manufacturer of a defective product. 178 In that locus 
classicus in the law of torts, Lord Atkin observed: 
11 A manufacturer of products, which he sells 
in such a form as to show that he intends 
them to reach the ultimate consumer in the 
form in which they left him with no reason-
able possibility of intermediate examinat-
ion, and with the knowledge that the 
absence of reasonable care in the prepara-
tion and putting up of the products will 
(175) .S~.Apra, at 107. 
(176) s 6. 
{ 17 7 ) [ 19 3 2] AC 56 2 . 
(178) Of course, the Accident Compensation Act 1972, 
section 5(1), excludes the possibility of claims 
for damages for personal injury or death being 
brought in New Zealand independently of the Act. 
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result in an injury to the consumer's 
life or property, owes a duty to that 
consumer to take that reasonable 
care." 179 
Similarly, there has been little ,difficulty180 in allowing 
recovery for physical loss in the case of negligent 
misstatements. For example, in Watson v Buckley and 
Oshorne 181 a distributor extensively advertised a hair dye 
in the Hairdressers' Weekly Journal in the following 
terms 
"Mark your next hair dye order 'Melereon' 
the safe harmless hair dye ... [this 
preparation] has no ifs or buts; is a 
hair dye that will not harm the most 
sensitive skin, the hair dye that 
positively needs no preliminary tests." 
The advertisement was shown by a professional hairdresser 
to the plaintiff who, in reliance thereon, requested the 
hairdresser to use it on his hair. However, the hair dye 
contained an excessive quantity of acid from which the 
plaintiff contracted dermatitis. Stable J held the 
distributor liable in negligence for the plaintiff's 
injuries. The learned judge held: 
(179) Ibid, at 599. See, for example, Grant v Australian 
Kn~tting Mills [1936] AC 85; Cathcart v Hull [1963] 
NZLR 333; Diamante Soaiedad De Transportes SA v Todd 
Oil Burners Ltd [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 179. Note 
that this dissertation is concerned with false or 
misleading advertising and other misstatements in-
ducing the purchase of goods etc with the result. 
that only peripheral consideration will be given to 
that vast body of tort law which has developed to 
impose liability on manufacturers and distributors 
of defective products. 
(180) See the reservations expressed by Asquith LJ in 
Candler v Crane Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164, 
for example. 
(181) [1940] 1 All ER 174. 
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"Last, but by no means least, this commodity, 
of which they knew singularly little, and in 
connection with which they had taken no 
steps whatever to ensure that the deliveries 
of the commodity were in accordance with the 
stipulated article, was put out to the trade 
and to the world as being the hair dye 
which, in contradistinction to every other 
hair dye, was absolutely safe and harmless, 
could not harm the most sensitive skin, and 
positively needed no preliminary tests •••• 
That, in my judgement, was carelessness. 
Before committing their name to such an 
assertion to all and sundry, they should 
have taken far greater care to ensure that 
that assertion was based on solid ground ... 182 
However, for a considerable time the law clung to a 
distinction between negligent statements which result in 
danger to life, to limb, to health and property, and 
misstatements which did not have such physical effects. 183 
In the landmark case of Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v HetZer 
184 
and Partners Ltd the House of Lords recognised that 
such a distinction was illogica1185 and determined that in 
(182) Ibid, 181. See also Lambert v LastopZex Chemicals 
Co Ltd (1971} 25 DLR (3d) 121 (Supreme Court of 
Canada) ;Lem v Barotto Sports Ltd (1976) 69 DLR (3d) 
276; Labrecque v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1977) 78 
DLR (3d) 289; Clayton v Woodman & Sons Ltd [1962] 2 
QB 533. 
(183) See, for example, the remarks of Cohen LJ in Candler 
v Crane Christmas & Co, supra, 197. By categorising 
the cost of making dangerous products safe as 
physical damage, such preventive loss has been held 
recoverable in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
Canada. See, for example, Bowen v Paramount Builders 
(Hamilton} Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 394, 414; Anns v Merton 
London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 760; Fuller v 
Ford Motor Co (1979) 94 DLR (3d) 127. 
(184) 
(185) 
[1964] AC 465. 
See, for example, the speech of Lord Morris (at 496); 
In the recent case of Junior Books Ltd v The Veitchi 
Co Ltd, "The Times" 17 July 1982, Lord Roskill 
pointed out that 'it was sometimes overlooked that 
virtually all damage, including physical damage, 
was in one sense economic since it was compensated 
by an award in damages'. 
140 
appropriate circumstances damages in respect of economic 
or financial loss could be recovered for negligent 
misstatements. The House of Lords were willing to import 
a duty of care in 
"all those relationships where it is plain 
that the party seeking information or 
advice was trusting the other to exercise 
such a degree of care as the circumstances 
required, where it was reasonable for him 
to do that, and where the other gave inform-
ation or advice when he knew or ought to 
have known that the inquirer was relying 
on him." 186 
The appellants in this case had a contract with a company 
called Easipower Ltd but had doubts as to the creditworth-
iness of this company. Consequently they asked their 
bankers to get in touch with the respondents, who were 
Easipower's bankers, and to inquire into Easipower~s 
financial position. The respondents provided favourable 
information 'in confidence' and 'without liability'. 
Easipower Ltd subsequently went into liquidation and the 
appellant~, who had acted in reliance upon the information 
received, sustained considerable financial losses. It is 
clear from the speeches in the House of Lords that a duty 
to be careful arises from an undertaking, express or 
implied, by a person to give information or advice, even 
though gratuitous, provided a special relationship between 
the parties exists. However, in an action to recover 
damages in negligence from the respondents it was held 
(186) Ibid, 486 (per Lord Reid). 
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that even if the bankers owed a duty of care to the 
187 
appellants, the respondents in this case had 
expressly disclaimed responsibility and so could not be 
held liable. 
The question that arises in the context of this 
dissertation is as follows: Where a manufacturer (or 
some other party such as a national distributor or whole-
saler) has made negligent misstatements in advertising or 
other material disseminated by him and the consumer has 
been induced in reliance thereon to enter into a contract 
with a retailer, can the consumer recover damages from 
the manufacturer for economic or financial loss? Or as 
Cane188 puts it: 
" ..•. (T)he manufacturer may by his advertis-
ing and representations as to the quality 
of the product create certain expectations 
in the consumer as to its quality. Why· 
should he not be liable for the disappoint-
ment of these expectations on the basis of 
some sort of liability for misstatements. 
If the misstatements were intentional then 
an action in deceit would be a real poss-
ibilityl89 .•• If the misstatement were 
negligent then some extension of Hedley 
Byrne principles would be needed to meet 
the case." 
The consumer in his endeavours to secure compensation from 
a manufacturer in such circumstances would have to surmount 
formidable obstacles. 
(187) Lords Morris and Hodson throught that a banker in 
such circumstances only owed a duty to be honest as 
distinct from being careful; ibid, 504, 513. 
(188) 'Physical Loss, Economic Loss and Products 
Liability', (1979) 95 LQR 117, 139. 
(189) See the discussion on Deceit, infra. 
142 
First, the consumer must establish that there is 
a 'special relationship' between the parties; that is, 
on Hedley Byrne principles it is not every careless 
statement causing economic loss that will attract 
liability. In Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co 
Ltd v Evatt190 the nature of this special relationship 
was discussed and the majority of the Privy Council191 
were of the opinion that liability on Hedley Byrne 
principles should attach only to persons who are in the 
business of supplying information or advice or let it be 
known that they claim to possess the necessary skill to 
so inform or advise. Lords Morris and Reid dissented in 
.that they thought it was undesirable to limit the scope 
of the duty in this fashion and felt that a legal duty 
to take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances 
of the case should arise where advice is given on a 
business occasion or in the course of the adviser's 
b . t' 't' 192 usLness ac ~v~ ~es. In this case a policyholder in 
the appellant insurance company sought its advice as to 
the financial position ofanother company which was owned 
by the appellant. The appellant carelessly gave fav-
ourable information which resulted in the policyholder 
losing money. The appellant washeld not liable, in 
that the majority of the Privy Council refused to accept 
(190) [1971] AC 793. 
(191) Ibid, 806 (per Lord Diplock). 
(192) Ibid, 811. 
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that the mere giving of careless advice, even with 
knowledge that the inquirer intends to rely on it, 
gives rise to liability. 
Heuston and Chambers193 criticise this decision for 
they argue that 'it is very difficult to see how ~ 
company can authorise the giving of such advice except 
as part of its business activities', and in subsequent 
decisions a more liberal approach has been adopted as to 
what constitutes a sufficiently proximate relationship. 
For example, in the recent case of Shaddock (L) & 
Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Counciz 194 the 
majority of the High Court of Australia clearly were 
·opposed to confining liability for negligent misstate-
ments causing economic loss to those cases falling within 
the ambit of the rule proposed in Evatt's case. Gibbs CJ 
stated that 
II I find it difficult to see why, in 
principle, the duty should be limited to 
persons whose business or profession 
includes giving the sort of advice or 
information sought and to persons claiming 
to have the same skill and competence as 
those carrying on such a business or 
profession, and why it should not extend 
to persons who, on a serious occasion, 
give considered advice or information 
(193) Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (18 ed, 
1981), 195. 
(194) (1981) 36 ALR 385. 
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concerning a business or professional 
transaction." 195 
Similarly, Evatt's case has not been supported in sub-
1 . h d . . 196 h 't h b t d sequent Eng 1s ec1s1ons w ere 1 as een accep e 
that where a person who, being possessed of special 
knowledge or means of knowledge, undertakes to impart 
information to another, and is aware that the other will 
act in reliance upon that information, that person is not 
in a different position from a person who brings, or 
professes to bring, professional skill or knowledge into 
the provision of such information. Smillie197 points out 
that the strictures imposed in Evatt's case on the applic-
action of Hedley Byrne principles have been evaded on 
numerous occasions in New Zealand198 and it may be that a 
(195) Ibid, 391-392; see also the judgements of Murphy J 
('it409); Mason J (at 404-405); and Aicken J (at 410); 
compare the judgement of Stephen J (at 396-398). 
(196) See, for example, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon 
[1976] QB 801; Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v 
A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd [1978] 1 QB 574. 
(197) 'Liability for Negligent Misstatements; Continuing 
Uncertainy', (1976) 3 Otago Law Review 513. 
(198) See, for example, Day v Ost [1973] 2 NZLR 835 (imput-
ation of a financial interest to the adviser bringing 
the case within the formula suggested by Lord Diplock 
in Evatt's case (at 809) that the normal requirements 
for a( ;duty may not have to be satisfied in such circ-
umstances); Bernadine Fisheries Ltd v Allan [High 
Court, Christchurch, 15 April 1975; A 132/70] (very 
wide view taken as to when, in terms of Evatt's case, 
a person practising one of ·the traditional professiom 
'is carrying" on the profession •·· of giving advice); 
Capital Motors Ltd v·Beeaham [1975] 1 NZLR 577 (this 
wide approach applied to businessmen who were not 
engaged in the practice of the traditional professions 
ie, to a motor vehicle dealer); Bowen v Paramount 
Builders Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 394 (classification of 
economic loss consequential on physical damage, as 
physical); cf. Plummer-Allinson v Spencer L. Avery 
Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 254 (restrictive literal interpret-
ation of the majority in Evatt's case); Gartside v 
Sheffield Young & Ellis [High Court, Auckland, 15 
September 1981; A 438/80]. 
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New Zealand court would be prepared to hold that a 
manufac.turer in extolling the virtues of his product is 
in the business of supplying information or at least 
lets it be known that he possesses the necessary skill to 
so inform. 
Even if the consumer satisfies the court that the 
restrictive approach in Evatt's case does not exclude a 
manufacturer from the range of defendants who may be 
liable on Hedley Byrne principles, the consumer must 
demonstrate that he falls within the class of potential 
plaintiffs. Is there, therefore, a sufficiently proximate 
relationship between a manufacturer and a consumer such 
that in the reasonable contemplation of the manufacturer 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to 
. 199 
the consumer. In Anns v Merton London Borough CouneiZ, 
Lord Wilberforce outlined a two stage inquiry necessary to 
establish that a duty of care arises, namely: 
"First one has to ask whether, as between the 
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage,there is a sufficient relat-
ionship of proximity or neighbourhood such 
that, in the reasonable contemplation of the 
former, carelessness on his part may be likely 
to cause damage to the latter, in which case a 
prima faeie duty of care arises. Secondly, if 
the first question is answered affirmatively, 
it is necessary to consider whether there are 
any considerations which ought to negative, or 
to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or 
the class of persons to whom it is owed or 
the damages to which a breach may give rise." 
( 19 9 } [ 19 7 8 ] AC 7 2 8 I 7 51-7 52 • 
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200 In Scott Group Ltd v McFarZane the respondent 
chartered accountant prepared company accounts for a 
public company, John Duthie Holdings Ltd. In reliance 
upon these accounts, the appellants formulated a take-
over bid. The appellants sued the respondents for 
negligence 'in the examination and audit by them of the 
consolidated accounts' claiming damages representing the 
amount paid in excess of the alleged value of the shares. 
Richmond P declined to accept the appellants argument in 
that he held that cases upholding liability of accountants 
or auditors to third parties all involved a greater degree 
of proximity between the parties than mere foreseeability 
of reliance. 201 Mere foreseeability of the general 
possibility of a take-over bid was not sufficient to 
give rise to a 'special relationship'. However, Woodhouse 
J, in adopting the statement of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v 
M t d h '7 202 'd d h er on Lon on Boroug Counc~v, cons1 ere t at the 
accountants owed a duty 'to those persons whom they can 
reasonably foresee will need to use and rely upon [the 
company accounts] when dealing with the company or its 
members in significant matters affecting the company 
(200) [1978} 1 NZLR 553. See also J.E.B. Fasteners Ltd v 
Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289. 
(201) That is; Haig v Bamford, Hagan, Wicken and Gibson 
(1976) 3 WWR 331; Ultramares Corporation v Touche 
255 NY 170 (1931); Dimond Manufacturing Co Ltd 
V Hamilton [1969] NZLR 609. 
(202) Supra. 
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assets and business' . 203 Cooke J. while emphasising 
that he was not just applying a simple test of forsee-
ability of reliance, considered that there was a suffic-
ient degree of proximity to give rise to a prima facie 
duty of care as the evidence disclosed 'a plain risk of 
a take-over and the virtual certainty that in such an 
event the accounts would be relied upon by an offeror' •204 
Johnston205 comments that in practice 'Woodhouse J's 
reasonable forseeability and Cooke J's probability or 
likelihood of reliance may .•• cover much the same ground' 
because Woodhouse J attached some significance to the fact 
that it was a take-over transaction where reliance on the 
accounts was to be expected. That writer further contends 
that the 'robust view' adopted by Woodhouse and Cooke JJ 
in this case towards the special relationship concept 
espoused in Evatt's case is significan~ for if a similar 
attitude is taken in relation to other aspects of the 
special relationship concept when they arise for consider-
ation,Evatt's case should not prove the brake on develop-
ment which some cases have assumed it to be. 206 
(203) Ibid, 575. 
(204) Ibid, 582. 
(205) 'Negligent misstatement - Auditors Liability to 
Third Parties for Careless Report on Company's 
Annual Accounts', (1978) 8 NZULR 175, 181. 
(206) Ibid, 187. See also Barrett v Dalgety New Zealand 
~[1979] NZ Recent Law 199; 
Rutherford v Attorney-General [1976] 1 NZLR 403, 
where a similar 'robust' approach is adopted. 
148 
If a simple test of forseeability of reliance 
vis-a-vis a manufacturer's liability for negligent 
misstatements causing economic loss to a consumer were 
applied there would be no difficulty in establishing a 
prima facie duty of care. A manufacturer in publishing 
advertisements about his product intends to promote the 
sal~ of the product and statements made in the advertise-
ments are designed to achieve this object; he must con-
template and forsee as a very real possibility that 
careless misstatements would result in economic loss to 
consumers who in reliance thereon are induced to purchase 
the product which does not come up to advertised expect-
.ations. However, it is submitted that on the present 
state of authority the chances of a consumer recovering 
damages are highly unlikely, for the following reasons: 
{i) The overwhelming majority of cases are concerned with 
situations where the adviser has given information or 
advice to some readily identifiable person of which the 
adviser is, or ought to be, aware. 207 To hold a manufact-
urer liable for negligent missatements causing economic 
(207) Todd, 'Negligence, Economic Loss and the Ambit of 
the Duty of Care', (1980) 1 Canterbury Law Review 
29, 32 points out that" •.• there has in fact been 
direct contact, or at least contact through an 
agent, in most of the reported cases. For 
example, bankers and persons enquiring as to the 
credit of customers, estate agents and prospective 
purchasers of land, parties to pre-contractual 
negotiations and professional persons and their 
clients have all been held to constitute 
relationships giving rise to a duty of care". 
See also the comments of Mason J in Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge 'Willemstad' 
(1977) 11 ALR 227, 274-275. 
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loss where he was able to forsee loss to consumers in 
general entails the risk of liability to an indeterminate 
number of persons, and to recognise such liability could 
208 
well open the floodgates. 
(ii) The majority view in Evatt's case may be against the 
imposition of liability in such circumstances, and until 
such time as the House of Lords makes a definitive 
pronouncement to the contrary, 209 or the Privy Council 
itself departs from its previous position, New Zealand 
courts are constrained by rules of precedent to adhere to 
this restrictive approach210 - notwithstanding attempts 
made to evade the case. 
(iii) The leading case in New Zealand on liability to 
. 211 third parties, that is, Seott Group Ltd v MeFarlane, 
does not offer much comfort to the consumer. Even 
Woodhouse J who applied a test of reasonable forseeability 
(208) Relevant to policy considerations; see (iv), infra. 
(209) Where a Privy Council decision and subsequent dec-
ision of the House of Lords are in conflict, a New 
Zealand court may follow the House of Lords 
decision 'where the House of Lords has made it 
plain and in what respects error arose in the 
earlier case so that it would seem wholly unlikely 
that there could be any reversion to the earlier 
decision'; per Cleary J in Corbett v Soeial 
Seeurity Commission [1962] NZLR 878, 915 (CA) .. 
(210) English courts and the High Court of Australia are 
not so constrained. See, for example, Esso Petroleum 
Co Ltd v Mardon, supra; Howard Marine and Dredging Co 
Ltd v A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd, supra; 
Shaddoek (L) & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City 
Couneil, supra. 
(211) Supra. 
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thought that a line could be drawn between the appellant 
in that case and an investor who relied upon 'some 
newspaper or stock exchange' reference to the company's 
accounts. 212 
(iv) Furthermore, even if the consumer satisfies the court 
that there is a sufficient relationship of proximity, 
policy considerations may dictate that no liability is 
. d 213 1mpose • 
One policy argument is that by restricting liability to 
that class of persons identified in the majority judgement 
in Evatt's case, liability is restricted to those who are 
best able to afford it. However, in Shaddoek's oase~ 
Mason J stated: 
"There are several reasons why this policy 
consideration should not be regarded as 
paramount. In the first place, it denies 
a remedy to those who sustain serious loss 
at the hands of those who are not members 
of the class and whose conduct is neglig-
ent. Secondly, it ignores the availabil-
ity of insurance as a protection against 
liability. Thirdly, there is no logic in 
excluding from the class of persons liable 
for negligent misstatement persons who, 
(212) Supra,. at 575. 
{213) Lord Wilberforce observed that even if there is a 
prima facie duty of care 'it is necessary to consider 
whether there are any considerations which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the·duty 
or the class of persons to whom it is owed or the 
damages to which a breach of it may give rise' Anns 
v Merton London Borough Couneil~ s~pra, at 751-752; 
see also Junior Books Ltd v The Veitahi Co Ltd "The 
Times", 17 July 1982; Mount Albert Borough Couneil 
v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234 (CA). In both these 
cases the House of Lords and New Zealand Court of 
Appeal, respectively,proceeded on the basis that the 
principles outlined by Lord Wilberforce-were the 
best guide to a court faced with determining the 
existence or otherwise of a duty of care. 
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though they may not exercise skill and 
competence, assume responsibility to 
give advice or information to others 
on serious matters which may occasion 
loss or damage. Finally, the rule, 
recently established by CaZtex Oil 
(Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge 'Wittemstad' 
..• , is that economic loss, not conseq-
uential upon property damage, may be 
recoverable from those whose negligence 
occasions it." 214 
It is submitted, with respect, that these reasons are 
compelling and convincing ones if "justice" to the 
consumer is the sole consideration. In particular, a 
manufacturer is in an excellent position to distribute 
any loss through the pricing of his products; or, 
alternatively, may add the cost of any additional insur-
ance cover to his present product costs, and price the 
product accordingly. His liability in respect of direct 
economic loss215 would be for a forseeable determinate 
sum; namely, the costs of repair or replacement. The 
position as regards consequential economic loss216 is 
(214) Supra, at 405. 
(215) Smillie, 'Liability of Builders, Manufacturers and 
Vendors for Negligence' (1978) 8 NZULR 109, 117, 
defines direct economic loss as 'the out of pocket 
loss or loss of bargain to the purchaser caused by 
the defect causing damage to the product itself or 
rendering the product unfit for its normal 
intended purposes'. 
(216) Smillie, ibid, 117, defines consequential economic 
loss as including 'all other indirect loss such as 
loss of profits from inability to use the defective 
product'. For example, the consumer may have to 
bear the cost of alternative transport while 
defects in his vehicle are rectified. 
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less clearcut in that the calculation of amount involved 
would be impossible; however, this is not to suggest 
that no insurance could be effected in respect of such 
loss, but developments in the area of professional 
indemnity insurance point to the type of difficulties 
involved. 217 While insurance may provide the answer for 
the manufacturer, caution must be exercised lest the cost 
of the remedy exceed the benefit of the cure. In return 
for an action to recover economic loss in respect of 
negligent misstatements inducing the purchase of safe but 
defective products, the consumer body in general will have 
to pay more for products and there may, therefore, be 
.cogent economic considerations dictating that liability 
should be negatived. A second policy consideration to be 
weighed in the balance is that outlined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron 
Works Ltd~ 218 where Ritchie J, delivering judgement for 
the majority said: 
(217) Chiefly, the difficulty is ascertaining the 
degree of risk involved. See Sutton, Insurance 
Law in Australia and New Zealand (1980), 66-67. 
Due to the difficulty in assessing the risk, 
premiums payable in respect of professional 
indemnity insurance are high, and the same 
consideration could dictate heavy premiums in 
respect of insurance by manufacturers 
against consequential economic loss. 
(218) (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 530. 
II 
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the liability for the cost of 
repairing damage to the defective article 
itself and for the economic loss flowing 
directly from the negligence is akin to 
liability under the terms of an express 
or implied warranty of fitness and as it 
is contractual in origin cannot be 
enforced against the manufacturer by a 
stranger to the contract." 219 
That is, damages for inferior quality should be recoverable 
only in contract as between the immediate parties220 
because the true extent of the loss depends upon the 
nature of the agreement reached between the parties to the 
sale. 221 As Todd222 mentions 'this is fundamentally the 
same argument that prevailed in Winterbottom v Wright 223 
in the context of physical harm and which was decisively 
overturned in Donoghue v Stevenson t and recent decisions224 
imposing concurrent duties in contract and tort support 
the contention that the fact that goods are produced 
pursuant to a contract between a manufacturer and retailer, 
for example, does not exclude the possibility of the same 
production giving rise to tortious obligations owed to the 
consumer. In any event recent developments suggest that 
( 219) Ibid, 541. 
(220) That is, manufacturer and retailer, retailer and 
consumer, respectively. 
(221) See Smillie, 'Liability of Builders, Manufacturers 
and Vendors for Negligence', loc. cit. , 117-118; see 
also Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [High 
Court, Auckland, 15 September 1981; A 438/80], at 
pages 24-27. 
(222) Op. cit., 50. 
{223) (1842) 10 M & W 109. 
(224) See, for example, Batty v Metropolitan Property Real-
isations Ltd [1978] QB 554; Ross v Caunters [1979] 3 
All ER 580; cf. MaaLaren Mayaroft & Co v Fletaher 
Development Co Ltd [1973] 2 NZLR 100 (CA); Marlborough 
Properties Ltd v Marlborough Fibre Glass Ltd [1981] 
1 NZLR 464 (CA); Sutton and Mulgan, 'Contract and 
Tort' (19801 NZLJ 366. 
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the trend is to make manufacturer s liable in contract 
for breach of the traditional implied warranties in 
contracts for the sale of goods225 and if this develop-
ment is mirrored in New Zealand226 difficulties associated 
with establishing liability for negligent misstatement 
causing economic loss may be obviated. 
Finally, it may be argued that attributing liability 
to a manufacturer for negligent misstatement inducing 
the purchase of 'safe but. shoddy• 227 goods could expose 
the manufacturer to liability 'in an indeterminate amount 
for an·indeterminate time to an indeterminate class•. 228 
As regards 'indeterminate amount' it has already been 
mentioned that in respect of direct economic loss liabil-
ity is for a forseeable determinate sum (namely, the 
costs of repair or replacement) and it is only in respect 
of consequential economic loss that this consideration may 
carry much weight. However, in consumer transactions this 
229 
consequential economic loss is not likely to be great 
(225) See, for example, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust-
ralia}, s 74; the Consumer Products Warranties Act 
1978 (Saskatchewan}, s 16; see brief discussion, 
infra, at 156-158. 
(226) See Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, 
Working Paper on Warranties in the Sale of Consumer 
Goods (1977); see brief discussion, infra, at 156-158. 
(227) This expression was used by the English and Scottish 
Law Reform Commission in their report on Liability 
for Defective Products, (1977, Cmnd 6831). The 
phrase 'safe but shoddy' was used to refer to goods 
which fail to meet the consumers' reasonable expect-
ations; that is, those that cause purely economic 
losses. 
(228) Per Cardozo CJ in UZtramares Corpn v Touche, Niven 
and Co 174 NE 441 (1931). 
(229) See Tobin, 'Products Liability: Recovery of 
Economic Loss', (1970) 4 NZULR 36, 43. 
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and the general requirement that such loss be 
reasonably forseeable and be the direct consequence of a 
failure in the duty of care provides a ready check to 
b . d 1 . 230 urgeon1ng amages c a1ms. As regards the 'indeter-
minate time' argument, the nature of the manufacturer's 
own assertions will dictate this issue. If the manu-
facturer negligently advertises that his product will 
'last for at least five years' he cannot be heard to 
complain if defects arise within this period and he is 
held liable to pay damages in respect of his negligent 
misstatement. Of course, as time elapses, so does the 
difficulty increase for a consumer to demonstrate that 
.responsibility for the defect rests with the manufacturer 
and is not attributable to some intervening cause. 231 
Finally, on the question of liability to an 'indeterminate 
class', Todd232 observes 
"Multiple liability can and does occur in 
the case of dangerous products and that 
has never been seen as a reason for 
denying liability. Nor should it in the 
case of shoddy goods. ' 
However, policy considerations may dictate that where loss 
of expec~tions is at stake, as opposed to consumer safety, 
no liability should be imposed. It seems clear that the 
(230) See, for example, the comments of Edmund Davies LJ 
(as he then was) in Spartan SteeZ and AZZoys Ltd v 
Martin and Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27, 45. 
(231) See, for example, PhiZZips v ChrysZer Corporation of 
Canada Ltd and Roxburgh Motors Ltd (1962) 32 DLR 
(2d) 347. 
( 2 3 2 ) Op . cit . I 51. 
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consumer's safety must be the paramount concern and his 
economic welfare is of secondary importance. 
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the 
prospects of a consumer recovering damages for economic 
or financial loss from a manufacturer where he has been 
induced to enter into a contract with a retailer in 
reliance on negligent misstatements made by the manufact-
urer in advertising etc, are very poor. The obstacle that 
there be a sufficient relationship of proximity appears 
insurmountable at the present time in New Zealand, and 
policy considerations may dictate that even if this . , 
obstacle is overcome through a liberal approach as to what 
constitutes the desired 'special relationship', that 
liability be denied. However, it is worth mentioning that 
recent developments making manufacturers subject to the 
traditional implied warranties in contracts for the sale 
of goods233 may go a considerable distance towards allev-
iating the plight of consumers. For example, the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, 234 rather than making manufacturers of 
consumer products liable in tort, deems manufacturers to 
give to consumers of their products an implied undertaking 
that the goods correspond with their description or sample, 
(233) See the Sale of Goods Act 1908, ss 15, 16; the . 
Hire Purchase Act 1971, ss 12-14. 
(234) As amended by the Trade Practices Amendment Act 
1978 (Australia) . 
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and are of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose 
for which they are required. 235 There are no limitat-
ions imposed on the type of losses a consumer may recover 
from a manufacturer236 with the result that damages for 
economic loss may be recoverable. A similar approach is 
adopted in the Consumer Products Warranties Act 1978 in 
Saskatchewan237 and the Contracts and Commercial Law 
238 Reform Committee of New Zealand have suggested that 
manufacturers should be directly accountable to consumers 
of goods by reference to a standard of 'ordinary accept-
ability•239 and suggest that a warranty of such accept-
ability should be implied by statute into all consumer 
.sales. Consequently, the consumer who purchases goods 
tnat are not acceptabl;e by reference to 'any statement, 
description or promise applied to them' may bring an 
(235} See section 74. 
{236) See, however, section 74L concerning non-consumer 
goods. 
(237) See Romero, 'The Consumer Products Warranties Act', 
(1978-79) 43 Saskatchewan Law Review 81. 
(238) Working Paper on Warranties in the Sale of 
Consumer Goods (1977). 
(239) The Committee suggest (at 13) that 'Goods should 
be acceptable in accordance with the new Act if 
they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for 
which goods of that kind are commonly bought as 
it is reasonable to expect having regard to any 
statement, description or promise applied to them, 
their age, the presence of defects of which, at 
the time of the sale, the buyer had actual know-
ledge, and all other relevant circumstances includ-
ing the price at which they were sold'. (The 
underlining is my own.) 
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action against the manufacturer whose advertising 
claims have created an undeservedly high level of 
expectation in respect of the product. Consideration 
of implied terms in contracts for the sale of goods lies 
outside the ambit of this dissertation, but it must be 
born in mind that legislative acceptance of the Comm-
ittee's recommendations will facilitate greatly consumer 
redress vis-a-vis the manufacturer. 
(2} DECEIT 
Where a manufacturer (or some other person such as 
a national distributor} knowingly makes a false repres-
entation as regards his goods to a consumer with the 
intent that he should enter into a contract for the 
purchase of those goods from a retailer, and the consumer 
acting in reliance upon the representation suffers 
damage, the manufacturer may be liable to the consumer in 
the tort of deceit. 240 Lord Maugham241 identifies four 
main ingredients of this tort: (1) There must be a false 
representation of fact; (2) The representation must be 
made with the knowledge of its falsity; (3) It must be 
(240) See Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51; Derry v Peek 
(1889} 14 App Cas 337; Public Trustee v Guardian 
Trust and Executors Co (NZ) Ltd [1939] NZLR 613 
(CA}; Heuston and Chambers, op. cit., 365; 
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (11 ed, 1979), 246. 
(241) Bradford Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All 
ER 205, 211. 
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made with the intention that it should be acted upon by 
the consumer, or by a class of persons which includes 
the consumer, in the manner which resulted in damage to 
him; (4) It must be proved that the consumer has acted 
upon the false statement, and has sustained damage by 
so doing. 
First~ the consumer must prove a false representat-
ion of fact. As the discussion of misrepresentation in 
the context of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 revealed, 
this may be a difficult task. Where the representation 
amounts to mere puffery or exaggeration, unaccompanied by 
any particular or definite statement of fact, such a 
representation obviously will not ground an action in 
d . 242 . h th f d . . . ece1t. G1ven t at e purpose o a vert1s1ng 1s to 
promote the sale of goods and services, the advertiser in 
the overwhelming majority of cases will concentrate on the 
positive features of the product or service. However, 
many consumer complaints will relate to what was not 
pointed out in an advertisement; namely, the negative 
characteristics of the product or service. The general 
rule here is: '.No mere silence. will ground the ac.tion of 
·deceit~. 243 However, this rule is subject to certain 
qualifications. For instance, although a statement may 
contain nothing actually false, it may be 'such a partial 
.(242) See supra, at pages 97-106. 
(243) Arkwright v NewboZd (1881) 17 Ch. D. 301, 318. 
(244) See supra, at pages 97-106. 
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and fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withhold-
ing of that which is not stated makes that which is 
stated absolutely false' • 244 In Awaroa Holdings Ltd v 
Commercial Securities and Finance Ltd245 the defendant 
company produced a brochure in respect of a shopping 
arcade which it had constructed and indicated in this 
brochure, amongst other things, that there were 11 sub-
leases granted by the defendant in respect of shops in 
the arcade at the rentals set out in the brochure. The 
plaintiff in reliance upon this representation and others 
purchased the leasehold interest in this arcade. After 
settlement the plaintiff discovered that 7 out of the 11 
.tenants had made an arrangement to pay only half the legal 
rental. In granting rescission of the contract on the 
ground of fraud, Perry J observed that the omission to 
state this qualification in respect of rental actually 
payable made that which was stated absolutely false. 
Consequently, the advertiser, in extolling the virtues of 
a product or service, must be mindful of the proposition 
that a suppressio veri may amount to a suggestio falsi 
which will ground an action in deceit. 
(244) Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377, 403; per Lord 
Cairns. Similarly in Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] 
AC 240, 250 Lord Macnaghten said: 'Everybody 
knows that sometimes half a truth is no better 
than a downright falsehood'. 
(245) [1976] 1 NZLR 19. 
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Second, the consumer must prove that the statement 
was made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessl~ 
"Fraud is proved when it is shown that a 
false representation has been made 
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its 
truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether 
it be true or false." 246 
The test therefore is a subjective one; that is, whether 
the maker of the statement had an honest belief in the 
truth of the statement complained of. 247 Where it is 
argued that the statement was made recklessly it must be 
shown that, without knowing whether his statement is true 
or false, the maker was consciously indifferent whether 
it was true or false. 248 Negligence, no matter how gross, 
can never in itself constitute fraud, although it may 
evidence an absence of an honest belief in the truth of 
249 the statement. 
{246) Derry v Peek, supra, 374; per Lord Herschell. 
{247) In AkerhieZm v De Mare [1959] AC 789, 805, Lord 
Jenkins, delivering the judgement of the Privy 
Council, stated: 'The question is not whether the 
defendant in any given case honestly believed the 
representation to be true in the sense assigned to 
it by the court on an objective consideration or 
its truth or falsity, but whether he honestly 
believed the representation to be true in the sense 
in which he understood it albeit errone·ously when 
it was made'. (The emphasis is my own.) 
(248) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, op. cit, 253; 
Armstrong v Strain [1951] 1 TLR 856, 871; 
Redican v Nesbitt (1924) 1 DLR 536. 
(249) Derry v Peek,supra,275; R v Myers 1948 (1) SA 375 
(AD) where Greenberg JA (at 384) remarked that 
'the maxim culpa lata dolo aeguiparatur cannot be 
applied on the question of absence of honest belief'. 
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Third~ the false statement must be made with intent 
that the consumer should act in reliance on it in the 
manner in which he did. 250 Satisfaction of this 
requirement should not occasion any difficulty in the 
advertising context as it is abundantly clear that the 
very purpose of advertising is to promote sales; there-
fore, if a consumer acting in reliance upon a false 
statement in an advertisement goes out and purchases the 
advertised product or service, it would seem that this 
requirement is fulfilled. 251 The advertiser may not 
escape liability by arguing that the consumer was foolish 
or negligent to rely upon the misrepresentation or had an 
opportunity to verify the accuracy or otherwise of any 
claim made. 252 Where a representation is capable of 
bearing two meanings, one of which is true and the other 
false, the consumer must show that he acted upon it in 
the sense in which it was false and that the advertiser 
intended it to be understood in this sense. 253 As 
(250) In Tait v Wicht (1890) 7 SC 158, 174, De Villiers 
CJ stated that: 'A mere lie, which is foolishly 
acted upon by others to whom it is addressed, does 
not constitute a fraud, in the legal sense of the 
term, unless the utterer intended or must from the 
mode and circumstances in which he uttered it, be 
presumed to have intended that it should be acted 
upon'. 
(251) Generally, see Andrews v Mockford [1896] 1 QB372· 
(actionable fraudulent misrepresentation may be 
made to the public at large); Comme~cial Banking 
Co v Brown (1972} 126 CLR 337 (plaintiff need not 
have been aimed at as a specific individual). 
(252) Nocton v Ashburton [1914] AC 932, 962; 
Centra~ Railway of Venezuala v Kisch (1867) LR 
2 HL 99. 
(253) Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 499, 472; 
Akerhielm v De Mare~ supra, 805. 
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Williams254 contends 
"~... (H) owever reasonable the [consumer]. 
v.;ras in attaching the untrue meaning to the 
[advertiser's] statement, if the [advert-
iser] did not intend his words to be taken 
in that sense, there is no deceit because 
there is no guilty mind." 255 
It is submitted, therefore, that Perry J 256 was incorrect 
in contending that 'what the representor professes to 
have meant or intended when making (a statement) is wholly 
immaterial'. However, where the meaning placed by the 
advertiser on the representation is so far removed from 
the natural, customary and ordinary meaning of the words 
used, the advertiser would be hard pressed to persuade a 
.court that he honestly understood the representation to 
b h . 1 . d b h' 257 ear t e mean1ng c a1me y 1m. 
Fourth~ the consumer must prove that he has suffered 
damage in consequence of acting upon the statement. 
Provided the consumer can prove that he was influenced by 
the advertisement in entering into a contract with a 
t '1 1' f . 258 re a1 er or supp 1er o serv1ces, he may recover for 
his 'out of pocket' loss259 and, in appropriate circum-
t h . t' 1 1 260 s ances, 1s consequen 1a oss. 
(254) 'Language and the Law', (1945) 61 LQR 384. 
(255) Ibid., 392. 
(256) Awaroa Holdings Ltd v Commercial Securities and 
Finance Ltd~ supra, 31. 
(257) Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187, 201; 
Akerhielm v De Mare~ supra, 805. 
(258) MacLeay v Tait [1906] AC 24; Horwood v Statesman 
Publishing Co Ltd (1929) 1 41 LT 54, 58. 
{259} See, for example, Canavan v Wright [1957] NZLR 790; 
New Zealand Refrigerating Co Ltd v Scott [1969] 
NZLR 30. 
(260} See, for example, Mull.ett v Mason (1866} LR 1 CP 559; 
Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; 
Foster v Public Trustee [1975] 1 NZLR 26. 
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It is submitted that this tort remedy is of limi·ted 
use to consumers for two reasons in particular. First, 
the consumer is faced with the difficulty of pointing to 
an unambiguous statement of fact in an advertisement (or, 
for that matter any other communication) that is false. 
A characteristic feature of much advertising is its 
ambiguity and vagueness and this, coupled with the 
latitude allowable for "puffing" and exaggeration makes 
it very difficult to 'pin down' false statements of fact. 
Much advertising through imagery and psychological appeals 
will simply create a favourable impression in respect of a 
particular product or service that will encourage the 
.purchase thereof. Second, the majority 1of consumers would 
be hard pressed to establish the element of scienter and 
even gross negligence will not suffice unless it can be 
shown that the advertiser was consciously indifferent to 
the truth. 
(3) BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY 
Where a statutory duty is imposed upon a person and 
that duty is broken an action in tort may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be brought by a person who is injured 
261 thereby. Before turning to a consideration of the 
relevant legislation in the area of advertising and 
(261) Generally, see Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, op. cit., 
154; Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, ~ 
cit., Flem~ng, The Law of Torts (5 ed, 1977), 122; 
Fricke, 'The Juridical Nature of the Action upon the 
Statute', (1960) 76 LQR 240; Williams, 'The Effect 
of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort', (1960) 
23 MLR 233. 
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disclosure of information in New Zealand, it is proposed 
to outline the elements that must be present before such 
a breach may found a civil action. To entitle a person to 
sue for breach of a statutory duty he must show that (1) 
the intention of Parliament in creating the duty was to 
give such a right of action; (2) he was one of the persons 
for whose benefit the duty was imposed; (3) the damage was 
of the kind contemplated by the statute; (4) the defendant 
is guilty of a breach of his statutory obligation; and (5) 
the defendant's breach has caused the damage. 
First., it must be shown that the statute \vas intended 
to give a right of action. Where the statute addresses 
itself to this question no difficulty arises, 262 but the 
majority of statutes are silent on this issue and a court 
must ascertain the intention of Parliament. 263 A 
(262) For example, the Consumer Safety Act 1978 (UK), s 6, 
gives purchasers a civil cause of action for breach 
of the duties which that Act imposes (see Plummer, 
'Products Liability in Britain' (1980) 9 Anglo-Ameri-
can Law Review 65, 75)1 conversely, the Broadcasting 
Act 1976 {NZ), ss 24(4), 95(2), expressly state that 
the Broadcasting Corporation and private broadcasting 
corporations may not be sued in the courts for non-
compliance with statutory standards. 
(263} This is no easy task and the courts may well be purs-
uing 'the will o' the wisp of a non-existing legislat-
ive intention' in many cases. See the New Zealand 
'warrant of fitness' cases; namely, Dromorne Linen 
Co v Ward [1963] NZLR 614; Berret v Smith [19651 
NZLR 460; Fenton v Scottys Car Sa'les Ltd [1968] ·NZLR 
460; Automobi'le Centre (Aucktand) Ltd v Facer [1974] 
2 NZLR 767. The two earlier decisions came to the 
conclusion that a traffic regulation (requiring a 
motor vehicle vendor to deliver a warrant of fitness 
issued not more than 30 days before the date of deliv-
ery of the vehicle to a purchaser) was designed for 
the special protection of the purchaser of a motor car; 
conversely in the later cases the courts denied an 
intention 'to fasten a measure of consumer protection 
on to a piece of delegated legislation concerned 
essentially with road safety'; per Woodhouse J in 
Fenton's case, at 932; see also Maceachern v Pukekohe 
Borough [1965] NZLR 330,332; Lonrho Ltd v Shell Pet-
ro'leum Co Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 456 (HL). 
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number of points may be made: 
(i} Where a duty is imposed by statute but no sanction of 
any kind provided, it may be presumed that the leg-
islature intended it to be enforceable by an ordinary 
civil action. As Lord Simonds observed in Cutler v 
Wandsworth Stadium Ltd: 264 'For, if it were not so, 
the statute would be but a pious aspiration'. 
(ii} Conversely, the fact that a statute prescribes a 
special remedy for the enforcement ofa duty is a 
strong indication that the legislature intended the 
specia~ ·remedy to be the only remedy. 265 Consequentl~ 
in Cape Central Railways v Nothling266 it was held 
that, there being no duty on railway companies at 
common law to fence their lines, the only remedy for 
breach of the statutory duty imposed on them to erect 
and keep in good repair fences along the lines, was 
the special remedy prescribed by the statute; namely, 
(264) [1949] AC 398, 407. See also Pease 'l.' Eltham Borough 
[1962] NZLR 437, 439. 
(265) No inference can be drawn from the fact that the duty 
is enforceable by ordinary criminal proceedings 
because nearly every statute contains a provision to 
that effect. See McKerron, The Law of Delict (7 ed, 
1971), 276, n 3. 
(266} (1889) 8 SC 25 (cited in McKerron, s.Mfvc!\, 276); 
see also Attorney General v Birkenhead Borough 
[1968] NZLR 383, 389. 
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an action at the suit of the Attorney General for 
a penalty of f5 per day for every day during which 
their lines remained insufficiently fe~ced. 267 
(iii) Another vitally important consideration is whether 
the statutory duty is owed primarily to the state and 
public at large, or primarily to the individual or 
class of individuals and only incidentally to the 
d 1 . 268 1 . state an genera commun1ty. For examp e, 1n 
Buckley v La Reserve 269 the plaintiff became ill 
after eating escargots at the defendant's restaurant 
and there was evidence suggesting that the escargots 
were not fit for human consumption. As the plaintiff 
was not in a contractual relationship with the 
defendant, being a guest of a third person who had 
paid for the meal, she could not argue that there was 
a breach of the implied condition as to fitness for 
purpose etc. Rather, she s ought to recover damages 
(267) See also Atkinson v Newcastle and Gateshead Water-
works Co (1877) 2 Ex D. 441; Groves v Wimborne 
[1898] 2 QB 402. 
(268) See, for example, O'Connor v Bray Ltd [1937] 56 CLR 
464, 468 (HCA); Darling Island Stevedoring and 
Lighteridge Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36; 
Solomons v R. Gertstein Ltd [1954] 2 QB 243; cf. 
Phillips v Brittania Hygienic Laundry Co [1923] 2 KB 
832,84l;Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd~ supra, 
462-465. 
(269) [1959] Crim. L. Rev. 451; discussed by Goldring 
and Richardson, 'Liability of Manufacturers for 
Defective Goods', (1977) 51 ALJ 127, 135. 
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from the restauranteur in tort, alleging that he had 
breached his statutory duty in supplying such food. 
However, the court held thatthe statute in question 
was designed to protect the public as a whole rather 
th t . 1 mb. f 't 270 th 1 an any par ~cu ar me er o ~ . Never e ess, 
it must not be assumed that the mere determination 
that a duty was imposed for the benefit of the public 
at large, rather than for the benefit of a particular 
class of the community, gives rise to an irresistible 
inference that no private right of action lies. 271 It 
is always a question of construction of the particular 
statute and the whole Act must be considered. 
(iv) Finally, a court may weigh in the balance the adequacy 
or otherwise of existing common law remedies. 272 
Strictly speaking this should be irrelevant as the 
task of the court is to construe the intention of the 
legislature as expressed in the statute but, as 
Williams 273 'the courts still profess to argues, 
(270) Similar conclusions regarding statutory duties under 
Food and Drug legislation have been reached in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa; see, for example, 
Square v Model Farm Dairy Co [1939] 2 KB 365; 
RaZZ 'v SneZZ & Co Ltd [1940] NPD 314. 
(271) See, for example, the comments of Atkin LJ in 
Phillips v Brittania Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd, 
supra, at 841-842. 
(272) Per Atkin LJ, loc cit; Square v Model Farm Dairy Co, 
supra, MaCaZZ v AbeZesz [1976] QB585; see also 
Fenton v Saottys Car Sales Ltd [1968] NZLR 929, 931. 
(273) Op. cit •• See footnote 261. 
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construe the statute in order to arrive at a 
conclusion whether the legislature intended to 
confer a private right of action'; policy consider-
ations are given full vent in this area which 
accounts for the 'surprising diversity of 
outcome•. 274 
As many commentators275 have pointed out, the task of 
construing legislative intent is fraught with difficulty 
and the only feasible way in which such difficulty may be 
avoided is for Parliament to expressly state what its 
intention is when it creates a statutory duty. 
Second, the plaintiff must show that he was one of 
the persons for whose benefit the duty was imposed, that 
is, the statute must recognise the class of plaintiff. 
For example, in Hartley v Mayoh and co 216 the widow of a 
fireman, who was electrocuted on factory premises while 
fighting a fire, failed in her action against the occupier 
for breach of certain duties owed under statutory regul-
ations. The regulations, which had been breached, were 
for the benefit of 'persons employed' by the occupier 
(274) At 244. 
(275) See Williams, op. cit., 244; Winfield & Jolowicz 
on Tort, op. c~t., 155-156; Salmond and Heuston 
on the Law of Torts, op. cit., 230; Fricke,~· 
c~t., 256. 
(276) [1954] 1 QB 383. 
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and the deceased was not a member of that class. 
Similarly, a duty imposed on railways to close gates at 
level crossings was construed as intending to benefit 
roadusers only and not an engine driver in a passing 
train. 277 
Third, the damage must be of the kind contemplated 
by the statute. Thus, where statutory regulations 
provided that sheep carried as deck cargo should be 
surrounded by proper pens, and owing to the absence of 
such pens a plaintiff's sheep were washed overboard, it 
was held that the plaintiff could not recover because 
the purpose of this requirement was to prevent the spread 
of contagious diseases and not to safeguard animals 
against the perils of the sea. 278 Similarly, the 
statute must recognise the manner of injury; for 
example, in Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd219 section 
14(1) of the Factories Act 1937, which provided that 
'every dangerous part of any machinery .•• shall be securely 
fenced', fell to be construed. The plaintiff was injured 
by some metal pieces that flew out of some machinery, and 
the House of Lords decided by a majority that the 
(277) Knapp v Railway Executive [1949] 2 All ER 508; 
see also Farmer v Robinson Gold Mining Co 1917 AD 
501; Paulsen v CPR (1963) 37 DLR 217. 
(278) Garris v Scott (1874) LR 9 Ex 125. 
(279) [1962] AC 367; see also Sparrow v Fairey Aviation 
Co Ltd [1964] AC 1019. 
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duty imposed by section 14(1) was designed to prevent 
injury to workmen by their coming into contact with 
moving parts of the machinery and not to prevent injury 
through fragments flying out of the machine; that is, 
the object of the provision was 'to keep the worker out, 
not to keep the machine or its product in•. 280 However, 
as Lord Reid observed in Donaghey v Boulton & Paul Ltd: 281 
"It is one thing to say that, ifthe damage 
suffered is of a kind totally different 
from that which it is the object of the 
regulation to prevent, there is no civil 
liability. It is quite a different thing, 
however, to say that civil liability is 
excluded because the damage, though 
precisely of the kind which the regulation 
was designed to prevent, happened in a way 
not contemplated by the maker of the 
regulation. " 
With respect, this is a compelling argument and it is to be 
hoped that where the manner whereby the damage is inflicted 
is not contemplated by the statute, that this will not 
preclude a right of action for breach of statutory duty in 
282 
respect of such damage. 
(280} Nicholls v F. Austin (Leyton) Ltd [1946] AC 493, 
505; per Lord Simonds. 
(281) [1968] AC 1, 26. The object of a statute was to 
prevent men working on a roof from falling to the 
ground, and it was held immaterial that the plaintiff 
was injured by falling through a hole in the roof 
rather than by falling through fragile roofing 
material. 
(282) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, op. cit., 160 cites 
Grant v National Coal Board [1958] AC 649; 
Gatehouse v John Summers & Sons Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 742; 
Littler v G.L. Moore (Contractors) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 
1241; Mcinally v Frank B. Price & Co Ltd 1971 SLT 
43; Donaghey's case itself, as evidencing a less 
restrictive approach than that apparent in Garris's 
case and Close's case. 
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Fourth, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
is in breach of the statutory obligation imposed upon him. 
It is a question of construction whether the liability is 
absolute, or depends upon wrongful intent or negligence 
on the part of the defendant, 283 and it must be further 
shown that the defendants conduct 'came within the sphere 
of application of the statute or regulation•. 284 
Finally, the breach of duty must have caused the 
damage to the plainti~f. Thus in MaWilZiams v Sir William 
Arrol and Co Ltd285 a widow failed to recover damages for 
her husband's death, which she alleged was caused by his 
employers' failure to provide him with a safety belt; the 
·husband, who was a steel erector, was killed as a result 
of falling from a steel tower which he was assisting in 
building in the employers' shipyard. Although the 
employer was under a statutory duty to provide such a 
safety belt, the court held that they were not liable to 
the widow because the evidence disclosed that the prob-
abilities were that he would not have worn the belt even 
if one had been provided. Consequently, the widow could 
(283) See, for example, John Summers & Sons Ltd v Frost 
[1955] AC 740; Galashiels Gas Co v Millar 
[1949] AC 275. 
(284) See Chipahase v British Titan Produats Co 
[ 19 56 ] 1 QB 5 4 5 . 
(285) [1962] 1 WLR 295. As to the damages recoverable 
for breach of a statutory duty see Harris v 
Lombard NZ Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 161, 168. 
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not discharge the burden of proving the causal 
connection between the breach and the damage. Furthermore, 
if it can be shown that it is solely the plaintiff's own 
conduct which puts the defendant in breach of the 
statute, the latter is not liable. 286 
Where a plaintiff can prove that the aforementioned 
elements are present a successful action £or breach of 
statutory duty may be instituted, and it is against this 
background that some of the major statutes relating to 
advertising in New Zealand fall to be assessed. 
287 No statute relating to advertising in New Zealand 
expressly confers a right of action in respect of a breach 
of an advertising provision, and, apart from the Broad-
casting Act 1976 which expressly denies the possibility 
of any civil action being brought in respect o:f any 
breach of certain standards in that,Act, 288 ' the 
(286) See, for example, Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies 
L~d [1959] 1 All ER 414. 
(287) For a full discussion of these statutes, see 
Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising, 
infra.Note that the Merchandise Marks Act 1954 
permits a consumer to recover damages for any loss 
he suffers as a result of a false trade description; 
that is, section 20 of that Act implies a warranty 
that a seller's trade description :of his goods are 
true; a trade description may be given in an advert-
isement; sees 12(1) (d). 
(288) See sections 24(4) and 95(2}; sections 24(1) and 
95(1} direct that the Broadcasting Corporation and 
private broadcasting stations must have regard to 
certain standards mentioned in those subsections, 
and the Corporation and private stations must also 
comply with programme rules prepared and promulgated 
by the Broadcasting Rules Committee; see sections 
25, 26, 91 and the discussion, infra. 
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statutes are silent on the question of whether a private 
right of action is allowed. Consequently, the question 
in most cases is one as to the intention of the legis-
lature in creating the duty and as Woodhouse J observed 
in Fenton v Saottys Car Sales Ltd289 
"(t)he central problem ..• is that usually 
there is no explicit evidence of the 
Legislature's intention one way or the 
other; and all attempts by the Courts to 
formulate a rule which might enable that 
intention to be discovered on a basis of 
consistent principle have been unsuccess-
ful." 
Consider the following statutes: 
(i) The Consumer Information Act 1969. This statute 
contains provisions proscribing advertisements that 
contain express or implied representations as to the 
nature, quality and price etc. of any goods or services 
that are false or misleading in a material respect. 290 
Does a breach of these advertising provisions entitle a 
consumer who has acted in reliance thereon to institute 
an action for breach of this statutory duty? It is 
submitted that no such private right of action lies. 
Although the Act may be viewed as 'a measure of consumer 
protection•, 291 the Act contemplates that prosecution in 
respect of any breach shall be a measure of last resort. 
(289) Supra, at 931. 
(290) See sections 9(4) and 10(2). 
(291) The phrase employed by Woodhouse J in Fenton v 
Saottys Car Sales Ltd, supra, 932. 
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Extensive consultative procedures are built into the Act 
and no prosecution can be commenced without the leave 
of the Examiner of Commercial Practices; before giving 
leave to prosecute, the Examiner must consult with the 
offender and endeavour to negotiate an agreement with him 
to ensure that the offence will not be repeated. It is 
contemplated that a prosecution will only take place if 
the offender refuses to negotiate, or enter into an 
292 
agreement, or fails to comply with an agreement. 
Only in exceptional circumstances may there be a prosec-
ution without negotiation, and then only with the leave 
293 
of the Minister of Trade and Industry. The Legislature, 
therefore, has made it abundantly plain that compliance 
with the provisions of the Act is to be sought through 
'negotiation rather than prosecution•. 294 ·consequently, 
to allow a consumer to sue an advertiser in respect of an 
alleged breach of statutory duty would be to negate the 
very essence of this legislation; while the Examiner would 
have to embark on the contorted road of consultation, the 
consumer could institute an action directly thereby by-
passing the consultative procedures. Therefore it is 
suggested that Lord Tenterton's statement in Doe d. 
R h t B 'd 2 95 . . h 1 oa es er v r~ ges ~s appos~te ere; name y: 
(292) See section 19. 
(293) See section 20. 
(294) See Burrows, News Media Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 
1980) 1 326. 
{ 2 9 5 ) ( 18 31 ) 1 B & Ad 8 4 7 , 8 5 9 . 
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where an Act creates an obligation, 
and enforces the performance in a specified 
manner, we take it to be a general rule that 
performance cannot be enforced in any other 
manner." 
(ii) The Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981~ 96 
These statutes prohibit any advertisement that is false, 
or is likely to deceive or mislead any person with regard 
to the nature, quality, strength, purity, composition, 
origin, age or effects etc of any food (or ingredient 
thereof), medicine or medical device. 297 Non compliance 
is an offence under the respective statutes rendering the 
offender liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
3 months or a substantial fine. 298 Under the now 
repealed299 Food and Drugs Act 1969 consultation and 
negotiation procedures akin to those outlined in the 
Consumer Information Act 1969 were incorporated in the 
300 Act; consequently an argument along the lines 
advanced in respect of the Consumer Information Act 1969 
could be made out in the case of the Food and Drug Act 
1969. However, both the Food Act 1981 and the Medicines 
Act 1981 have abandoned the mandatory consultative 
(296) These Acts are to come into force on a date to be 
appointed by the Governor-General by Order in 
Council; for purposes of this dissertation it is 
assumed that the relevant commencement dates have 
passed. · 
(297) See the Food Act 1981, s 11(1)~) i the Medicines Act 
1981, s 57(1 )(f). 
(298) Food Act 1981, s 11(3); Medicines Act 19811 s 78. 
(299) See the Medicines Act 1981, s 115. 
(300) Food and Drug Act 1969, s 34. 
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procedures of their predecessor in this field, and 
offences of strict liability are created. 301 Is there, 
in addition to the penal sanction, an intention to confer 
a private right of action in respect of a breach of the : 
advertising provisions? Reference to decisions of the 
courts in other jurisdictions in respect of cases 
decided under food and drug legislation would not assist 
the consumer. For example in Square v Model Farm Dairy 
co 302 a father purchased some adultered milk and his 
family suffered injuries after consuming the milk. The 
injured parties sought to establish civil causes of 
action for breach of the Food and Drugs (Adulteration) 
.Act 1928 (UK) which provided, inter atia~ that '(n)o 
person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any 
article of food •.. which is not of the nature, or not of 
the substance, or not of the quality of the article 
demanded by the purchaser'. The court held that it was 
not Parliamen~s intention to give a private right of 
action in respect of any breach of this statutory duty. 
Similarly in HatZ v SneZZ & Co Ltd303 it was held that a 
breach of duty imposed by public health and food and 
drugs legislation not to sell adulterated food, did not 
give a right of action to a person injured thereby, since 
(301) See the Food Act 1981, s 30; the Medicines Act 
1981, s 80. 
(302) [1939] 2 KB 365. 
(303) 1940 NPD 314. 
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the legislation in question was not passed in the 
interests of individual persons but for the benefit and 
protection of the public at large. As mentioned .earlier 
this approach was adopted in Australia in BuakZey v La 
Reserve 304 and it is suggested that a similar attitude 
would be adopted in New Zealand in respect of the 
advertising provisions in the Food Act 1981 and the 
Medicines Act 1981 for the following reasons: (a) Reading 
305 the statutes as a whole it is plain that these statutes 
are designed to achieve certain minimum quality standards 
in respect of preparation and sale of food, medicines and 
medical devices in the interests of the community at 
.large; (b) Both statutes are designed to 'consolidate and 
amend• 306 the law relating to manufacture, sale and 
supply of these products and of major significance here 
is the abandonment of the consultative procedures embodied 
in the Food and Drugs Act 1969; Parliament therefore 
intends that any contravention may be prosecuted immediate-
ly and that the prosecution need not prove that the defend-
ant intended to commit the offence. It may be argued that 
Parliament in directing its attention to the question of 
enforcement of food and drugs legislation has made specific 
(304) Supra. 
(305) As Fair J observed in United Insurance Co Ltd v R 
[1938] NZLR 885, 913: 'It is well established 
that the object of an Act can best be ascertained 
by a consideration of the provision to be con-
strued in conjunction with the whole of the 
provisions of the Act'. 
{306) See the Preambles to the respective statutes. 
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provision for criminal prosecution and its failure 
to provide for a civil right of redress in respect of any 
breach of statutory duty carries with it an inference 
that such a right was not intended; (c) Adequate common 
law remedies exist for the protection of a consumer of 
an adulterated food or medicine and where such purchase 
has bee·n induced by misleading advertising claims recourse 
may be had to the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 or the 
tortious actions for deceit and negligent misstatements. 
(iii) The Credit Contracts Act 1981. This Act provides 
that 
"No credit advertisement shall contain any 
information sound image or other matter, 
that is likely to deceive or mislead a 
reasonable person with regard to any part-
icular that is material to the provision 
of credit." 307 
Any person contravening this provision is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $5000. 308 Does 
a breathof this advertising provision give a consumer who 
has acted on a misleading advertisement and thereby 
suffered damage any private right of recourse? Once 
again it is submitted that this question must be answered 
in the negative. Consider L~e case of Jordan v Montgomery 
Ward & Co. 309 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
(307) s 35. 
(308) s 38. 
(309) 442 F 2d 78 (1971). 
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had violated the credit advertising provisions of the 
'Truth in Lending Act' and sought to recover damages 
in respect of this breach of statutory duty. The court 
held that he could not recover on this basis. It was 
noted that of the three chapters of the Act, two explicit-
ly provided for private civil actions and that only the 
chapter on credit advertising did not. The court thought 
that this omission was deliberate and concluded: 
"It is well established that courts may not 
enlar9e by construction the language of a 
clear and unambiguous statute." 310 
It is submitted that this reasoning is pertinent in the 
case of the Credit Contracts Act 1981. A New Zealand 
court is empowered to reopen an oppressive credit 
contract311 and penalties are prescribed in respect of 
non-compliance with the mandatory disclosure provisions; 
namely, a credit contract may not be enforced by any 
person other than the debtor until such time as the re-
quisite disclosure.is effected, 312 and the liability of 
the debtor for all or part of the total cost of the 
d . b . . h d 313 ere 1t may e ext1ngu1s e . This clear allocation of 
remedies in respect of oppressive credit contracts or 
(3HJ) At 82. 
(311) See sections 9-14. 
(312) See section 24. 
(313) See sections 25-28. 
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failure to comply with the mandatory disclosure provisions 
carries with it an irresistible inference that no private 
right of action exists in respect of a breach of the 
advertising provision. 
(iv) The Animal Remedies Act 1967 and the Pesticides Act 
1979. Both these statutes are concerned primarily with 
agricultural products and may conveniently be considered 
together. The Animal Remedies Act 1967 establishes a 
'screening' procedure in respect of advertisements for 
animal remedies whereby copies of any advertisement must 
be submitted to an Animal Remedies Board for this body's 
approval before publication. 314 An advertisement must 
be approved in the form submitted unless some false, 
inaccurate, misleading, or exaggerated claim is made in 
respect of any preventive or remedial property of the 
remedy. 315 Even where an advertisement has been 
approved, the Board may require that the advertisement be 
re-submitted for approval on the ground that some claim 
appears to be false, etc. in the light of discoveries made 
or experience gained since the advertisement was apprcived~16 
Any person who wilfully causes an advertisement to be 
published in contravention of these provisions commits an 
offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of 
(314) s 41(1). 
(315) s 41(2). 
(316) s 41(4}. 
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up to $400. The Pesticides Act 1979 arrogates a 
surveillance function to a Pesticides Board and empowers . 
the Board to direct any advertiser of a pesticide to omit 
or modify any inaccurate or misleading statement in an 
advertisement 'in such manner as the Board may direct•. 317 
Failure to comply with such a direction is an offence 
punishable by a fine not exceeding $500. 318 It is 
submitted (with monotonous regularity) that no action for 
breach of statutory duty may be founded on these advert-
ising provisions. The Legislature has through these 
provisions created a special surveillance procedure and 
empowered the respective Boards to exclude misleading or 
deceptive advertising claims; a prosecution is perceived 
as a means to ensure compliance with the respective 
Board's wishes, rather than as a direct means to punish 
those advertisers who disseminate and propound misleading 
information as regards their products. As with the 
Consumer Information Act 1969, to permit the consumer to 
institute a private action in respect of an alleged breach 
of the advertising provisions would be to deny the 
advertiser the chance of recanting which the statutes 
expressly afford. 
(317) s 40(4). 
(318) s 40(5). 
In conclusion it is submitted that this position 
is most unsatisfactory for two main reasons: 
(a) If the consumer were afforded a right of action in 
respect of any breach of an advertising duty that induced 
him to enter into a contract for the purchase of the 
advertised commodity or service, the efficacy of these 
provisions would be greatly enhanced. No prosecution 
has ever been brought under the Consumer Information Act 
1969, 319 for example, and the Examiner of Commercial 
Practices and his delegates in the Department of Trade 
and Industry cannot mount an effective surveillance 
campaign over all advertisements for goods and services. 
Indeed the Examiner has expressly denied that his role 
'entails the policing of the market place' and has stated 
that exclusive reliance is placed on consumers and 
organisations such as the Consumers' Institute, the 
National Council of Women and the Housewives League to 
bring abuses to the attention of the Examiner. 320 In 
the absence of a private right of redress based on a 
breach of statutory duty the motivation to complain is 
considerably reduced for all except the most dedicated 
consumer advocate who is aware of the obligations 
encompassed in the relevant statutes. 
(319) In part, of course, this must be attributable to the 
consultative approach resolving matters out of 
court. 
(320) Correspondence with the Office of the Examiner of 
Commercial Practices, letter dated 12 July 1982. 
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(b) It is totally undesirable that the position regarding 
private rights of redress should be so unpredictable. 
As Williams321 contends 
"In effect the judge can do what he likes, 
and then select one of the conflicting 
principles stated by his predecessors in 
order to justify his position." 
The courts are often faced with the task of seeking the 
unexpressed intention of Parliament and in many cases 
this may be a pursuit of a non-existent intention. As 
Lord du Parcq mentioned in Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium 
Ltd322 these difficulties could be eliminated if 
Parliament explicitly stated its intention whenever it 
created a statutory duty. 
(4) DEFAMATION 
What, it may be asked, is the position where an 
advertisement in respect of goods, services and associated 
credit tends to lower a consumer 'in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally or tends to 
make them shun and avoid him'?323 
( 3 21 ) Op. cit . , 2 4 6 . 
(322) [1949] AC 398, 410. 
(323) Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, op. cit., 274~ see 
also Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, ~ 
cit., 516; Lawson, Advertis1ng Law (1978), 69; 
the Defamation Act 1954; Pannam, 'Unauthorised Use 
of Names and Photographs in Advertisements', (1966) 
40 ALJ 4. This topic is canvassed in some detail 
by Lawson and Pannam and it is proposed for this 
reason to simply outline the relevant law in this 
area. 
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This question has arisen frequently in the 
context of unauthorised endorsements. In the famous 
324 
case of TolZey v J.S. Pry and Sons Ltd the 
plaintiff, who was a renowned amateur golfer, was 
pictured on a poster with a slab of chocolate 
manufactured by the defendants protruding from his 
pocket. He was accompanied by a comic caddy dancing 
with another carton of Fry's chocolate in his hand 
who, in doggerel verse, compared the excellence of 
the chocolate with the excellence of the plaintiff's 
stroke. The plaintiff alleged an innuendo that the 
defendants insinuated that he had consented to the use 
of his portrait in the advertisement for gain, thus 
imperilling his status as an amateur golfer. Evidence 
was given that an amateur golfer might, in such 
circumstances, be called upon to resign from any 
reputable club. The House of Lords held that the 
advertisement was defamatory and that the plaintiff 
could recover. Numerous other cases exist in which 
defamation actions have successfully been brought in 
respect of the use of a person's name or likeness in 
(324) [1931] AC 333. 
186 
h d t f d t . 325 t e en orsemen o a pro uc or serv1ce. In all 
these cases the plaintiff has been successful because 
the use has involved an injury to his reputation and it 
is clear that if such an injury cannot be demonstrated 
then no action in defamation will lie. Pannam326 
observes that the ordinary individual may be hard 
pressed to demonstrate that his reputation has been 
injured through the unauthorised publication of his name 
or photograph in an advertisement for 'an ordinary 
individual is not lowered in the esteem of his fellows 
if it is thought that he receives a fee from an 
d , t I 327 a vert1semen . For this reason, the law of 
(325) See, for example, Pryce & Son Ltd v Pioneer Press 
Ltd (1925) 42 TLR 29 (political poster carrying an 
innuendo that the printers had been guilty of a 
breach of faith or carelessness in their business); 
Rutherford v Turf Publishers Ltd 'The Times', 30 
October 1925 (circular advised that professional 
footballer would give advice on football pool 
entries although Football Association rules prohib-
ited this); Plumb v Jeyes Sanitary Compounds Ltd 
'The Times', 15 April 1937 (use of photograph of ex-
policeman in an advertisement for the cure of sore 
feet implying that his feet smelt and that he had 
received remuneration); Griffiths v Eansor Hosiery 
Co Ltd 'The Times', 10 December 1935 (professional 
model's head and shoulders superimposed on another 
woman's legs in stocking advertisement carrying the 
implication that she had consented to, and received 
remuneration for, being photographed in an indecent 
manner); Mazatti v Acme Products Ltd (1930) 4 DLR 
601 (private person described as using and praising 
a patent medicine for the cure of headaches, dizzy 
spells, insomnia and constipation); Stockwell v 
Kellogg Company of Great Britain 'The Times' 31 July 
1973 (settlement approved on basis that a photograph 
of a single girl used in an advertisement aimed at 
'pregnant mums' was defamatory). 
(326) Op. cit.; see footnote 323. 
(327) At 5. 
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defamation is of limited assistance to the consumer 
where his endorsement is employed without his consent. 328 
However, as Pannam329 points out: 
"The photograph or information which is 
conuained in the advertisement may have 
originated in a breach of contract or 
of confidence. If this is .the case, 
then there will be a remedy by way of 
damages or injunction." 330 
Similarly, where the use of another's name exposes him to 
the risk of litigation, then that use may be restrained on 
331 the basis of the principle espoused in Routh v Webster. 
Consequently, the limitations inherent in the law of def-
amation as a means to restrain the unauthorised use of en-
dorsements in advertisements and other promotional mater-
ial are redressed by the existence of other supplementary 
measures. 
(328) See however, Mazatti v Acme Products Ltd, supra, 
Stockwell v Kellogg Company of Great Brita~n,supra; 
Pannam, op. cit., 5. 
(329) Loc. cit.,5. 
(330) See, for example, Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 
Ch D 345; Stedall v Houghton (1901) 18 TLR 126; 
Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302. Consequently a photo-
grapher may be restrained from using a photograph of 
his client for advertising purposes if there is an 
implied term in the contract under which the photo-
graphs were taken that all prints from the negative 
were for the sole use of the customer; furthermore,a 
court may restrain the publication of information or 
a photograph which involves the violation of a 
confidence. 
(331) (1847) 10 Beav. 561. See also Walter v Ashton [1902] 
2 Ch 282; Burchell v Wilde [1900] 1 Ch 551; Lawson, 
op. cit., 81-84. In Walter's case the court restrain-
ed the further publication of advertisements for 
bicycles described as 'The Times Bicycles'. At this 
time 'The Times' newspaper had a special instalment 
plan for the purchase of 'The Times Altas', etc. 
Byrne J held (at 295) 'that there was such a reason-
able probability of 'The Times' being exposed to 
litigation, and possibly of being made responsible 
had they not taken steps to disconnect their name 
from the advertisements or circulars' that an 
injunction could properly be granted. 
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(5) INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD AND PASSING OFF 
Injurious falsehood encompasses false and malicious 
statements affecting the reputation of another's 
business, as distinct from his personal reputation, in 
which case the matter falls to be determined according 
to the law of defamation. 332 Another form of misrep-
resentation concerning the business of another is the 
tort of passing-off which protects a plaintiff's trade 
reputation and name from being utilised by another, who 
by 'passing-off' his goods as being those of the plaint-
iff acquires the benefit of the latter's good name and 
reputation. 333 While these devices are designed 
primarily to protect the interests of those engaged in 
business there is a spin-off or indirect benefit to 
consumers in that misleading and deceptive business 
practices may be proscribed. Consequently it is proposed 
to outline briefly the scope of these torts. 
As regards injurious falsehood the plaintiff must 
prove that the statements complained of were untrue and 
h t h d 1 . . 1 334 h f . t a t ey were rna e rna 1c1ous y. T e De amat1on Act 
(332) See Fleming, op. cit., 695; Salmond and Heuston 
on the Law of Torts, op. cit., 375. 
{333) Fleming, op. cit., 700; Salmond and Heuston on the 
Law of Torts, op. cit., 378; Winfield & Jolowicz 
on Tort, op. cit., 506. 
{334) See footnote 332 and the cases cited in those texts; 
for example, RoyaZ Baking Powder Co v Wright 
Crossley & Co {1901) 18 RPC 95, 99. See also 
Custom GZass Boats Ltd v SaZthouse Brothers Ltd 
[1976] 1 NZLR 36, 49. 
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1954 relieves a plaintiff of the necessity to prove 
. 1 d 335 f 't. ff' . t ' 'f th d spec1a amage or 1 1s su 1c1en 1 e wor s upon 
which the action is founded are calculated to cause 
pecuniary damage to the plaintiff. 336 In this context 
"malice" seems to mean some dishonest or improper 
motive. 337 Consequently, it would be sufficient for a 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew the statement 
to be false, or, at any rate, that he had no honest belief 
in its truth. 338 But an honest belief in an unfounded 
339 
claim will not sustain an action for injurious falsehood, 
nor will mere carelessness340 (as opposed to a reckless-
ness or conscious indifference to the truth). 341 An 
(335) That is, at common law the plaintiff must prove 
actual damage; for example the plaintiff would 
have to show that disparaging statements 
concerning his goods lowered the price obtainable 
for the goods or made it impossible to dispose of 
them. See Malaahy v Soper (1836) 3 Bing NC 371. 
(336) Defamation Act 1954, s 5(1). 
(337) London Ferro-Conarete Co v Justiaz (1958) 68 RPC 
261, 265; Loudon v Ryder [1953] Ch 423, 428. 
(338) Joyae v Motor Surveys Ltd [1948] Ch 423. 
( 339) Loudon v Ryder, supra; Joyae v Motor Surveys Ltd, 
supra; Serville v Constanae [1954] 1 WLR 487. 
( 34 0) Balden v Shorter [1933] Ch 427. 
( 341) Clarke v Meigher (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 617. 
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excellent illustration is afforded by the case of 
De Beers Abrasive Produats Ltd v International General 
Eleatria Co of New York. 342 The plaintiffs manufactured 
and ·marketed a natural diamond abrasive under the 
trademark 'Debdust' which was used for cutting concrete. 
The defendants circulated amongst the international trade 
market a pamphlet which purported to be a report of 
laboratory experiments which had been carried out for the 
purpose of comparing the performance and qualities of 
their abrasive made from synthetic diamonds with those of 
the competing 'Debdust' product. The pamphlet contained 
statements which reflected adversely on the 'Debdust' 
product and plaintiffs sought damages for the slander of 
their goods. The defendants sought an order striking out 
the statement of claim on the ground~ inter aZia~ ·that it 
disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Counsel for the 
defendants urged, in particular, that the contents of the 
pamphlet amounted to no more than a glorified statement 
that their product was superior, and that 'every trader 
is entitled, as of right, to claim that his product is 
the best product of that kind in the world' • 34 3 However, 
Walton J held that if a trader elected to denigrate the 
goods of his rival, the test to be applied was whether a 
reasonable man would take the claim as being a serious 
claim or not. Where the claim is dressed up in the form 
(342) [1975] 2 All ER 599. 
(343) Ibid., 604. 
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of scientifically provable fact, the claim could not be 
regarded as mere puffery. Consequently, where a trader 
makes disparaging and untrue remarks about a rival's 
goods through dishonest or improper motives, his state-
ments are actionable. The consumer derives an indirect 
benefit through the curtailment of this misinformation 
that could induce the purchase of inferior goods or 
services. 
It is also an actionable wrong to represent ones 
goods or services as those of another thereby cashing in 
on the latter's good name and reputation. This tort was 
considered recently in Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v 
Allied Foods Co Ltd. 344 The plaintiff bread manufacturer 
sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defend-
ant bread manufacturer from using a similar design and 
layout on polyethylene bread bags which the plaintiff had 
used for a considerable period of time in advertising and 
marketing his product. Vautier J held that before an 
action for passing-off could be sustained in this context: 
"There must ••. be what amounts to a repres-
entation by the defendant that his product 
is that of the plaintiff. This must be of 
such a nature or in such a manner as to 
cause the defendant's product to be confused 
with that marketed by the plaintiff so that 
the plaintiff suffers damage as a result." 345 
(344) [High Court, Auckland, 7 April 1982; A 240/82]; 
see also Erven Warnink BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) 
Ltd U979] 2 All ER 927 (HL). 
(345) At 12. 
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The learned judge also pointed to two further 
pre-requisites: 
"That is, the disputed product or design 
or get-up must have become distinctive 
for goods or services of the plaintiff 
in the sense that the use by the plaint-
iff of the name or mark or get-up is 
regarded as proof by a substantial 
number of members of the public or trade 
of the product as one coming from the 
plaintiff and, secondly, that the 
defendant must in the course of the trade 
have used a similar get-up or mark in the 
way that it is likely or calculated to 
deceive and thus cause confusion and 
injury, actual or probable, to the good-
will of the plaintiff." 346 
Applying these criteria to the facts, Vautier J found 
that the adoption by the defendant of the plaintiff's 
distinctive gingham styled patterns carried with it 'a 
reasonable likelihood of confusion amongst a substantial 
347 
number of persons' and granted the interlocutory relief 
sought. It is interesting to note that in determining 
the "confusion" issue Vautier J held that regard must be 
had to 'the average prudent person with proper eyesight 
d bl h . ,348 d 1' 1 d an reasona e appre ens1on an re 1ance was p ace , 
inter alia> on the affidavits of two housewives who 
deposed to the effect that they had mistaken the defend-
ant's loaf for the plaintiff's. This demonstrates the 
{346) At 13. 
{347) See Hannaford & Burton Ltd v Polaroid Corporation 
[1976] 2 NZLR 14, 18 (PC). 
{348) Adopting the words of Haslam J in Hansells (NZ) 
Ltd v Baillie [1967] NZLR 774, 783. 
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incidental benefits which accrue to a consumer through 
the successful institution of a passing-off action in 
that this confusion is ended. 
Illustrations abound of cases where the tort of 
passing-off has protected a plaintiff's trade reputation 
3..19 
and name from being utilised by another person. • No 
intent to deceive need be proved350 and the real question 
in every case is whether the particular name,mark or 
"get-up" associates the goods so closely with the plaint-
iff that it is misleading for anyone else to adopt or 
copy it". While the precise scope of this tort still falls 
to be determined it is clear that no protection is 
·afforded a person who does not have a commercially sale-
able reputation in terms of this tort. As Pannam351 
observes 
"John Citizen can be pressed into unwilling 
service for a toothpaste but not Bill 
Well-Known." 
Before leaving this topic it must be mentioned that a 
trader is afforded additional protection in that:-
(349) See, for example, White Hudson & Co Ltd v Asian 
Organisation Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1466 (PC); Lee Kar 
Chao v Lee Lian Choon [1967] 1 AC 602 (PC); 
Australian Marketing Development Pty Ltd v 
Australian Interstate Marketing Pty Ltd [1972] V~ 219; 
Erven Warnink BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, supra. 
(350) Spalding & Bros v A.W. Gamage Ltd (1915) 84 
LJ Ch 449, 450. 
( 3 51 ) Op • cit. I 8 • 
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(i) The registration of his name or distinctive mark and 
. h d 352 . h d h 1 . certa1n ot er wor s g1ves t e tra er t e exc us1ve 
right to use the narne,mark or words in connection with the 
goods in respect of which it has been registered. 353 That 
right is deemed to be infringed by any person other than 
the trader who uses it or one so closely resembling it as 
to deceive or cause confusion. 354 
(ii} An original design may be registered under the 
Designs Act 1953 with the result that copyright in that 
design is reserved to the registered proprietor for a 
period of five years, which may be extended by further 
. d f f' t . f f' ~ 355 per1o s o 1ve years up o a max1mum o liteen years. 
Any person who, without the licence of the registered 
proprietor, uses the design in connection with any 
article infringes the copyright in the design and may 
be liable to damages or to give an account of his profits 
obtained by virtue o£ the infringement as well as an 
injunction to restrain further infringement. 356 
(352) See the Trade Marks Act 1953, s 14. 
(353) Ibid, s 8. 
(354) Idem. 
(355) Designs Act 1953, ss 11, 12. 
(356) See Garrow and Gray, Law of Personal Property (1968), 
349. 
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These measures afford alternative grounds of relief 
to a trader who has registered his name, distinctive 
mark or design in terms of the relevant statutory 
schemes and it is only in respect of unregistered marks 
etc. that exclusive reliance will have to be placed 
on the tort of passing-off. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
Although the consumer is accorded a comprehensive and 
diverse bundle of rights by statute and at common law it 
is abundantly clear that the real measure of benefit 
conferred lies in the ease of implementation of these 
rights, or otherwise; that is, given the dependence of 
substantive rights on procedural rights satisfactory 
access and the availability of relief are essential 
components in consumer protection. As one writer has 
expressed it 
11 
••• the most benevolent legal doctrines are 
of no use to a consumer if he cannot get 
into court to take advantage of them." 357 
For a variety of reasons consumer access to the legal 
system has been found wanting. In Justiae Out of Reaah358 
the United Kingdom Consumer Council reported that 
'consumers with sound legal claims are not having them 
adjudicated'. Similarly in David Caplowitz's study The 
359 Poor Pay More he reveals that the majority of indiv-
iduals do not think of law and lawyers as a source of 
assistance for consumer protection. 
(357) Trebilcock, 'Private Law Remedies for Misleading 
Advertising•, (1972) 22 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 1, 11. 
(358) H.M.S.O., July 1970, at page 17. 
(359) First published in 1967; see Chapter 12. 
197 
Chief among the factors inhibiting access to the 
courts is the cost factor. Litigation will often involve 
costs and risks that far outweigh the amount at stake 
and as Mr Justice Douglas of the US Supreme Court once 
reported • [I]t takes no great understanding of the 
mysteries of high finance to make obvious the futility of 
spending a thousand dollars in order to get a thousand 
dollars 1 360 Even allowing for a successful outcome 
and the rule that costs follow the event there is no 
guarantee that all costs will be recovered from the 
loser, and in this computation no allowance is made of 
the opportunity costs incurred through expenditure of 
·time and effort associated with the litigation. Duggan361 
makes the additional cogent observation that while the 
costs following the event rule is something of a 
npalliative", the fact that the rule also requires an 
unsuccessful consumer litigant to pay the opponent's 
costs nullifies the impact of reducing the risks in 
litigation. Furthermore, the very smallness of many 
consumer claims make it financially unfeasible and 
impractical to pursue the claim - this, notwithstanding 
the fact that the aggregate of all such claims relating 
to a particular harm might be substantial. 
(360) (1934) 47 Harvard Law Review 565, 567. 
(361) 'Consumer Redress and the Legal System', 
1979 AULSA Conference Paper, 1, 2. 
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Other deterrents and obstacles include the 
complexity of procedure, the reluctance of solicitors to 
undertake consumer litigation362 and the advantages that 
. . t. 1 d . 363 an 1nst1tu 1ona a versary enJoys. With respect to 
this last point the 'mass processing of disputes may make 
the prosecution even of very small claims economically 
viable• 364 and such a litigant is obviously better able 
to bear the risk of losing. Finally, consumer ignorance 
means that they very often do not take the initiative to 
enforce their legal rights. 
· (a) Small Claims Tribunals 
Some of the difficulties and problems outlined above 
can be met by the establishment of low cost forums for 
the settlement of disputes. Recognition of this has led 
to the establishment of a small claims tribunal infra-
structure in New Zealand by the Small Claims Tribunals 
Act 1976, and there are now tribunals in most of the 
major centres. 365 The establishing Act is smpported 
by statutory regulations entitled the Small Claims 
Tribunal Rules 1977, issued on 30 May 1977. 
(362) Justice Out of Reach, op. cit., 10; Ellinger, 
'Small Claims Tribunals' (1977} 5 Australian 
Business Law Review 1. 
{363) See Galanter, 'Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change', 
(1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95. 
{364) Duggan, op. cit., 3. 
(365) That is, Christchurch, Auckland, New Plymouth, 
Rotorua, Invercargill, Gisborne, Wellington, 
Hamilton, Lower Hutt and Dunedin. 
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The Tribunals are set up as special divisions of 
selected District Court~366 and, in contrast to their 
Australian counterparts, 367 are not separate entities 
with registries and staff of their own. Each tribunal 
is presided over by a referee, 368 appointed from the 
ranks of barristers and solicitors of the High Court with 
at least 3 years experience and other specially suitable 
369 persons, or by a District Court Judge exercising the 
jurisdiction of a Tribuna1. 370 
The primary function of the tribunal is to endeavour 
to achieve a settlement between the parties to a 
d1. spute , 3 71 that 1' s, · 1 · t · · th · b · t · conc1 1a 10n 1s e pr1mary o JeC 1ve 
with adjudication an essential but secondary aim. Where 
adjudication is necessary the Tribunal is directed to 
" ... determine the dispute according to the 
substantial merits and justice of the case, 
and in doing so shall have regard to the 
law but shall not be bound to give effect 
to strict legal rights or obligations or to 
legal forms or technicalities." 372 
(366) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 4(3). 
(367) Cf. Small Claims Tribunals Act 1974-1975 of 
Victoria, ss 3, 13; Small Claims Tribunals 
Act 1973-1975 of Queensland, ss 11, 15; 
Small Claims Tribunals Act 1974-1975 of 
Western Australia, ss 11, 15. 
(368) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976 (NZ), s 5. 
( 36 9) Ibid, s 7. 
(370) Ibid, s 2. 
(371) Ibid, s 15(1). 
(372) Ibid, s 15(4). 
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Furthermore, in s 15{5) of the Act the Tribunal is 
empowered to disregard certain exemption clauses. As 
one writer373 has expressed it, 'the object of these 
provisions is to facilitate the determination of small 
claims on the basis of common sense instead of in reliance 
on the common law'. Moreover, the Tribunal is allowed 
to receive and take account of such evidence as it 
thinks fit, whether or not such evidence would be 
admissible in a court of law. 374 The Tribunal is also 
empowered to seek out, on its own initiative, further 
. f . 375 . . t' t k 1n ormat1on, may appo1nt an 1nves 1gator o rna e 
detailed inquiries on any matter, 376 and may adopt such 
·procedure as it best considers suited to the ends of 
. t' 377 JUS J.Ce. Therefore it is clear that the legislature 
has aimed at achieving the maximum level of informality 
commensurate with efficiency and the more active role 
attributed the tribunal, although at odds with the 
traditional adversary system approach, may counteract any 
deficiencies in presentation or informational deficiencies. 
The original Small Claims Tribunal Bill, introduced 
in 1975, gave the tribunals jurisdiction over claims of up 
to $500 in amount in contract and quasi contract between 
a 'consumer' and a 'trader•. 378 The restriction of 
(373) Ellinger, op. cit., 121, 125. 
(374) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 26(3). 
(375) Ibid, s 26(2). 
(376) Ibid, s 27. 
(377) Ibid, s 30. 
(378) Small Claims Tribunal Bill 1975,cl 2. 
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jurisdiction to claims as between consumer and trader 
clearly demonstrated that the legislature's intention 
' . t'379 was to create a consumer gr1evance cour • However, 
a number of alterations were effected before the Bill 
was passed, the most notable being the abandonment of the 
consumer/trader requirement, and the addition of a 
jurisdiction to entertain actions in tort 'for damage to 
property resulting from negligence in the use, care or 
control of a motor vehicle•. 380 
The abandonment of the consumer/trader requirement 
marks a significant departure from the Australian approach. 
The Australian Acts, speaking in general terms, define a 
· "consumer•• as a natural person who acquires goods and 
services otherwise than in the course of business, and a 
"traderr• as a person in the business of supplying goods 
and services or who regularly so holds himself out as so 
1 . 381 supp y1ng. In Queensland and Western Australia the 
term "trader" has a wider meaning than in Victoria and 
embraces the lessor of a dwelling house. Of great 
significance though, is the fact that in all these states 
actions can only be brought by consumers. Duggan382 
explains the rationale as follows: 
(379) Hammond, 'Small Claims Legislation in New Zealand', 
(1977) NZLJ 306, 307. 
(380) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 9. 
(381) Victoria, s 2; Queensland, s 4; Western Australia, 
s 4. 
{ 3 8 2 ) Op • cit. , 14 . 
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"This limitation was imposed, perhaps at 
the risk of creating the appearance of 
a pro-consumer bias in the tribunals, 
because early experience with small 
claims tribunals in Canada and the United 
States had indicated that with open access 
they rapidly degenerated into debt 
collection agencies, up to 90 per cent 
of actions being brought by traders and 
creditors against consumers." 
In recognition of this adverse development overseas the 
New Zealand legislature incorporated a safeguard, in that 
s 10 provides that the tribunal does not have jurisdict-
ion to hear small claims for a debt or for a liquidated 
demand, unless the claimant either satisfies the 
Registrar that 'the claim, or part thereof, is in 
dispute' or establishes that 'the claim is in the nature 
of a counterclaim by a respondent against a claimant'. 
Consequently the Small Claims Tribunals may not be 
employed as debt collection forums unless the consumer 
disputes payment. 
The institution of proceedings before a Tribunal is 
. h f d d . . 383 stra1g t orwar an 1nexpens1ve. The claimant need 
only fill out a claim form giving the particulars of his 
claim and file it, with a fee of $4.00, with the 
Registrar of the District Court. The Registrar will give 
the claimant any assistance requested in filling out the 
form, and subsequently will advise both claimant and 
(383) See 'Settling Disputes Simply -Small Claims 
Tribunals', Department of Justice leaflet. 
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and respondent of the time and place of the hearing. 
In the event of the parties coming to a settlement after 
a claim has been lodged, the claimant simply advises the 
Registrar in writing that he wishes to withdraw. The 
hearing itself is very informal and in accordance with 
this informality and a desire to keep costs down, 
barristers and solicitors and other persons regularly 
engaged in advocacy work before other types of tribunals 
may not appear in a representative capacity before Small 
ClaJ.·ms TrJ.'bunals. 384 Th R f h 11 e e eree may, owever, a ow 
representation by some other person in special circum-
stances, provided that person has personal knowledge of 
the case and authority to bind the claimant; for 
example a representative may be appointed ~or a minor or 
h d . d 385 an J.cappe person. Hearings are heard in private 
and the confidential nature of proceedings are thought to 
386 be less inhibiting to claimants and respondents. 
The Tribunal may make seven types of order: 387 the 
claim may be dismissed; payment of money required; work 
ordered to be performed; a declaration of non-liability 
made; specific chattels ordered to be delivered; harsh 
or unconscionable agreements varied or set aside; and, 
(384) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, ss 24(2), 24(5). 
(385) Ibid, s 24 (2); s 24 (3)d. 
(386) Ibid, s 25; see 'Justice for Four Dollars', 
Consumers Institute Teaching Notes 99, February 
1978 1 at page 2. 
(387) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 16. 
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agreements which have been induced by fraud, misrep-
resentation or mistake may be varied or set aside. 
Under s 29 the Tribunal is prevented from ordering that 
costs be awarded against a party unless that party's 
claim is frivolous or vexatious. 388 
The Act also makes provision for transfers, 
rehearings and appeals. Proceedings may be transferred 
from the Tribunal to the District Court on the applicat-
ion of either party or of the Tribunals own motion in a 
389 proper case; for example, the Tribunal may decide that 
the matter would be better resolved before the District 
Court. Proceedings commenced in a District Court, that 
·has a Small elaims Tribunal as a division of it, must be 
transferred to the Tribunal if the defendant so requests 
in his notice of intention to defend, and in every other 
case proceedings may be transferred on the application 
of either party or of a District Court Judge or 
R • t 1 t' 39Q eg1s rar s own mo 10n. 
The Act allows for rehearings where a party has not 
complied with an order, where the Tribunal has decided a 
case in the absence of one of the parties, and whenever 
the initial proceedings do not culminate in a settlement. 
An appeal to the District Court is possible only on the 
(388) Ibid, s 29. 
(389) Ibid, s 22. 
(390) Ibid, s 23. 
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grounds that the hearing or an investigator's inquiry 
called for by the Tribunal were carried out unfairly 
and prejudicially affected the outcome of the proceed-
ings. 391 There is no provision for an appea 1 o.n error 
in law, 392 so subject to the Tribunal's power to rehear 
cases and its duty of observing the principles of 
natural justice, a Tribunal's orders are final. 
The flexibility inherent in the Small Claims 
'b 1' t d' d t . t' 1 393 Tr~ una s power o 1sregar cer a1n exemp 1on c auses 
and to determine an issue according to the merits without 
strict regard to legal rights 394 is a considerable 
advantage. However, this approach may lead to counter-
·vailing uncertainty. Hammond395 cites the example of an 
insurance contract exempting the insurer from liability 
where the loss is facilitated through the insured's 
negligence and the fact that the outcome of such a 
dispute will depend on the idiosyncracies of the partic-
396 
ular referee. As Hammond says 
(391} 
(39:2) 
(393) 
(394) 
(395) 
(396} 
"The difficulty is that under an "open" 
system there is no objective controlling 
standard provided by the law or by the 
parties themselves (in the form of a 
contract} and necessarily personal 
opinion must weigh heavily as to the 
rights and wrongs of this sort of 
situation." 
Ibid, ss 32, 33. 
Ibid, s 34. 
Ibid, s 15(5). 
Ibid, s 15 ( 4) . 
OE· cit., 309. 
Ibid, 310. 
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While there is no denying this potential difficulty, 
the necessity for cheap and informal resolut ion of 
disputes dictates that this risk of uncertainty must be 
run. Furthermore, in granting this discretion, the 
legislature has insisted that the substantial merits and 
justice of the case should prevail and that regard be had 
to the law - given the experience demanded of referees 
and the constraints of these dual criteria it is most 
unlikely that a 'palm tree' inconsistency will become the 
order of the day. 397 
In accordance with the desire to promote informality 
and to restrict costs no legal representation is permitted 
before the New Zealand tribunals. A big disadvantage 
associated with this is that a new generation of 'para 
lawyers• 398 may arise; that is, in the situation where a 
business has on its staff one person who appears in all 
its small claims, this representative is likely by 
experience to gain enough expertise to give him or her an 
399 
advantage over an untrained adversary. Under the 
Australian legislation the individual concerned could 
apply for the appointment of a legal representative to 
offset this disadvantage, but at the same time the door is 
opened to general appointment.of counsel in disputes 
against businesses. An alternative solution to this 
(397) See also Frame, •small Claims Tribunals', (1982) 
NZLJ 250, 256. 
(398) Trebilcock, op. cit., 16. 
(399) Ellinger, op. cit., 126. 
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imbalance would be to restrict representatives of 
litigants in small claims to a recitation of their 
version of the facts but to disallow them the right to 
examine or cross examine witnesses, or to advance legal 
argument400 - these latter functions would be the sole 
prerogative of the referee. It is undoubtedly true that 
if the right to legal representation is granted the 
question of costs raises its head and the viability of 
401 
many small claims, currently lodged, becomes debatable. 
Not only are lawyers excluded in the interests of 
informality, but the traditional adversary system is 
abandoned in favour of the continental inquisitorial 
approach with the referee fulfilling a much more active 
role. Furthermore, the tribunals '.may receive and take 
into account any relevant evidence or information whether 
or not the same would normally be admissible in a Court 
of Law• 402 and 'may adopt such procedure as it thinks 
best suited to the ends of justice•. 403 While these 
major departures from the traditional common law approach 
h h 'f' d 404 405 . ave orr~ ~e some commentators, Ison po~nts out 
(400) Trebilcock, op. cit., 16. 
(401) Jason Lofts, a former Honours student in this 
Faculty of Law,examined 250 claims heard by the 
Christchurch Small Claims Tribunal in 1979; over-
one-third of the claims lodged by consumers (non-
business claimants} were for less than $100. 
(402) Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976, s 26(3). 
(403) Ibid, s 30. 
(404) See, for example, Hammond, op. cit., 310; Lord 
Hailsham, The Door Wherein I Went {1975}, 276. 
( 4 0 5 ) Op • cit . , 2 7 • 
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that the small claims referee must adopt a more 
"iconoclastic" approach than his superiors in the 
adversary system notwithstanding the risks associated 
with the abandonment of tried and tested common law 
procedural safeguards. Formal rules of procedure are 
incompatible with the objective of informality, rules 
relating to hearsay and opinion evidence would stifle 
much lay testimony, and the absence of legal represent-
ation imposes a burden on the referee to examine and 
solicit information. 
Undoubtedly the Small Claims Tribunals fulfil a 
vital function in the cheap resolution of disputes and 
the steadily increasing number of claims and expansion in 
the number and location of tribunals testify to the 
popularity and necessity of such forums. Overseas 
experience that such tribunals degenerate into glorified 
debt collection agencies406 is precluded to a large 
extent in New Zealand by section 10 of the Small Claims 
Tribunals Act 1976 407 and as Frame408 observes 
"By far the most frequent situation pits 
an individual against another individual 
and, indeed, individuals pursue organ-
isations more frequently than organis-
ations pursue individuals." 
(406) See Consumer Council, Justice Out of Reach (1970), 
Ch 8; Frame, op. cit., 256. 
(407) Namely, that the claim for the debt be in dispute. 
(408) Op. cit., 256. 
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If the trend in the future is reversed and organisations, 
businesses, etc. constitute an inordinately large 
percentage of all claimants, a possible solution would be 
to allow businesses access, but subject to the recognition 
that different categories of litigants have different 
capacities to function within the legal system, and 
therefore the rules should not be designed to treat all 
l 'k 409 a 1. e. For example, Ison suggests that: 
"No judgement should be entered against a 
non-business litigant until both: 
(i) he has been given a list of possible 
defences to the particular type of 
claim and (unless there is some 
urgency) usually given seven days to 
consider; and 
(ii} the judge has made a sufficient inquiry 
into the facts, including a personal 
discussion with the defendant, to 
satisfy himself that there is no 
defence. 11 410 
The alternative solution of preventing business litigants 
from suing altogether raises the inevitable charge of 
consumer bias, and businesses are likely to have little 
respect for a tribunal to which they are denied access 
except as defendants. 411 
Consequently the establishment of small claims 
tribunals goes a long way towards resolving problems of 
consumer access to the legal system and will assist the 
consumer who in reliance upon false or misleading 
(409) Ison, 'Small Claims', (1972) 35 MLR 18, 29. 
(410) Idem. 
(411) Turner, 'Small Claims in England: Some Recent 
Developments', (1974) 48 ALJ 345, 348. 
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advertising claims and other inaccurate information is 
induced to purchase goods or services. However, small 
claims tribunals are by no means the complete and 
ultimate solution even for small claims. For example, 
where there are a large number of small claims all 
involving substantially the same question, to require 
each claimant to approach a tribunal over the issue is 
simply wasteful of everyone's resources; and small 
claims tribunals only have jurisdiction (at present) in 
respect of claims in contract and quasi contract and 
therefore are only of assistance in respect of contractual 
heads of liability discussed earlier - jurisdiction in 
respect of tortious claims is restricted to damage to 
property resulting from negligence associated with the 
use, care or control of motor vehicles. 
(b) Representative and Class Actions 
Provision for the institution of representative 
actions already exists in New Zealand in that Rule 79 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Where there are numerous persons having 
the same interest in an action, one or 
more of them may sue or be sued, or may 
be authorised by the Court or a Judge to 
defend in such an action on behalf of or 
for the benefit of all persons so 
interested." 
Therefore, the question may be posed: What are the 
requirements and prospects for success if a consumer 
wishes to sue, on behalf of himself and all other consum-
ers, an advertiser who through a misleading advertising 
campaign has prejudiced the whole class of consumers by 
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inducing the purchase of inferior merchandise or 
services? And, what remedies, if any, are available? 
An important starting point is the case of DUke of 
Bedfo ~d v E77 ~s. 412 I 'd . th 1  v&v n cons1 er1ng e ana ogous 
English rule Lord MacNaghten laid down the following test: 
"In considering whether a representative 
action is maintainable you have to 
consider what is common to the class, 
not what differentiates the cases of 
individual members •.• given a common 
interest and a common grievance, a 
representative suit was in order if the 
relief sought was in its nature benefic-
ial to all whom the plaintiff proposed 
to represent." 413 
The plaintiffs were stallholders at Covent Garden Market 
who belonged to a class of growers who sold their produce 
at the market. A statute fixed the rental payable by 
stallholders at the market, and six of these stallholders/ 
growers sued the Duke of Bedford in a representative 
action on behalf of themselves and all other members of 
the class seeking a declaration that the Duke of Bedford, 
the owner of the market, had been charging more than the 
statutory rent and an injunction restraining the Duke from 
doing any act contrary to the rights so declared. A 
procedural objection to the effect that the case was not 
suitable for a representative action as the growers could 
not be identified (numbering many thousands all over the 
country) was overruled by the House of Lords. 
( 412 ) [ 19 0 1] AC 1 ( HL) . 
(413) Ibid, 7-8. 
The Law 
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Lords held that there was an interest common to the 
class; namely, the interpretation of the statute 
f . . th t 414 1x1ng e ren • 
Another vitally important case is Markt and Co Ltd 
v Knight Steamship Co Ltd. 415 During the Russo-Japanese 
war 45 traders shipped goods on a vessel owned by the 
defendant company. A Russian cruiser sank the ship 
because it contained contraband, and two traders on 
behalf of themselves and the other traders brought a 
representative action claiming damages against the 
shipping company for the loss of their goods. They 
relied on the Duke of Bedford case and claimed that there 
was a common interest existing among the class of 
traders because there was an implied term in each contract 
of shipment that the ship would not carry contraband. 
Vaughan Williams and Fletcher Moulton LJJ held that there 
was no interest which was common to the class as each 
claim stemmed from separate contracts of shipment. The 
action could not therefore proceed as a representative 
action and Fletcher Moulton LJ added that as damages were 
personal relief only they could not be claimed in a 
representative action. 
(414) See als~ Taff ~iZway v Amalgamated Soaiety [1901] 
AC 442. 
(415) [1910] 2 KB 1021. 
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Although it was the opinion of only one member 
of that court that damages could not be recovered in a 
representative action, this view has been endorsed and 
416 . 417 418 followed in England, Austral1a and New Zealand. 
This decision has restricted considerably the usefulness 
of a representative action through the narrow test of 
what constitutes a common interest and through the 
preclusion of damages as being an appropriate form of 
relief in a representative action. 419 
However, in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd420 Vinelott J pointed out that in Markt's 
case there was nothing in the writs which indicated that 
the bills of lading were identical or that the goods 
subject to the various bills of lading were of the same 
class 'either in kind or in relation to the rules of warf 
.under which the same article may be contraband or not 
according to its destination'; 421 and, the form of relief 
asked, that is, damages, 'might have precluded the 
defendants from establishing in a subsequent action by a 
member of the class represented a defence (for instance, 
(416) See The Supreme Court Practice (1973}, Part I, 198. 
(417) See the Au~alian Law Reform Commission Discussion 
Paper No 11, Access to the Courts - II Class 
Actions, at page 8. 
(418} See Take Kerekere v Cameron [1920] NZLR 302. 
(419) Cf. The Position in the United States of America; 
see, infra, 216-218. 
(420) [1979]3 AllER 507. 
(421) Ibid, 515; referring to the judgement of Vaughan 
Williams LJ in Markt's case (at 1026). 
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estoppel) which otherwise would have been available to 
him'. 422 Vinelott J 423 held that a representative 
action could be brought by a plaintiff, suing on behalf 
of himself and all other members of a class, where each 
member alleges a separate action in tort, provided three 
conditions are fulfilled. First, no order can properly 
be made in representative action if it will have the 
effect of conferring on any member of the class a right 
he could not have claimed in a separate action, or of 
barring a defence which a defendant could have raised in 
such a _separate action 
"Normally, therefore, if not invariably the 
only relief that will be capable of being 
obtained by the plaintiff in his represent-
ative capacity will be declaratory relief, 
though, of course, he may join with it a 
personaL aZaim for damages. 11 424 
Second, there must be an interest shared by all members 
of the class; that is, in the tort context 'there must 
be a common ingredient in the cause of action of each 
member Of that Class '. 425 Th' d th t t b 1r , e cour mus e 
satisfied that it is for the benefit of the class that the 
plaintiff be permitted to sue in a representative capacity. 
What then are the prospects for success if a consumer 
wishes to sue an advertiser on behalf of himself and all 
other consumers? First, it may be difficult to point to a 
(422) Ibid, 516. 
(423) Ibid, 520. 
(424) Idem; the emphasis is my own; cf. Emi Reaords Ltd 
V Riley [1981] 2 All ER 838, 841. 
(425) Idem. 
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sufficient common interest. They may all have acted in 
reliance upon a particular misleading statement made in 
an advertising campaign when purchasing the advertised 
product or service but the actual contracts for the 
purchase of the product or service may vary enormously 
from one retailer or supplier to the next. However, on 
the test propounded by Vinelott J it may be that there is 
a common ingredient in the cause of action of each 
consumer where every member of that class has a separate 
cause of action in contract or tort. Clearly, no award 
of damages for the class as a whole could be made426 but 
the court could make a declaratory order upon which 
·individual members could rely in their subsequent indiv-
427 idual actions for damages. However, it would take a 
co~mitted or foolish consumer to undertake such a 
representative action due to rules as to costs; the 
unsuccessful litigant usually will be responsible for his 
successful opponents' costs and, save where prior 
arrangement as to cost sharing is made, the consumer can-
not recover costs from any other member of the class. 428 
(426) Authority is against such an award in a representat-
ive action and, in any event, such an award may have 
the effect of conferring a right on a member of the 
class that he would not have had in a separate 
action; that is, the defendant may be able to raise 
defences under the individual contracts with the· 
respective retailers or suppliers. 
(427) See the Prudential Assurance Co case, supra, 520. 
(428) Obviously a consumer in pursuit of his action would 
incur costs anyway, but additional expense would be 
incurred in the preparation and pursuit of 
representative arguments. 
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The representative action is the weak and impov-
erished relative of the class action which has developed 
in the United States and which has be~n adopted in 
. h . . d' t' 429 var1ous ot er JUr1s 1c 1ons. · While the class action 
and the representative action essentially seek the same 
objective of allowing representatives of a class to sue 
on behalf of the whole class there are significant 
differences. 430 As Duggan notes: 
" ... whereas the principle of res ;judioata 
will preclude any class member relitigating 
an issue already determined in a class 
action, issues determined in a representative 
action may be relitigated by persons other 
than the original plaintiff. The doctrine 
of stare deoisis will usually operate to 
protect defendants from a succession of 
identical suits, but will not necessarily 
stand in the way of a subsequent plaintiff 
who has fresh argumen~to present or a 
better approach to the presentation of 
arguments previously canvassed." 
Furthermore, a plaintiff may recover damages on behalf of 
himself and the class and the court may compute the 
damages due to the class without hearing individual 
claims; these damages are then distributable to each 
(429) See, for example, the Combines Investigation Act 
1977 (Canada); Miller, 'Of Frankenstein 
Monsters and Shining Knights; Myth, Reality 
and Class Action Problem', (1979) 29 Harvard 
Law Review 664; Williams, 'Consumer Class 
Actions in Canada- Some Proposals for Reform', 
(1975} 13 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1. 
(430) AULSA Paper, at page 11; see footnote 361. 
431 
member of the class. 
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For example, in State of West 
V ' . . Pf' C 4 32 ( 1. d t. f 6 0 t' ~rg~n~a v ~zer o a canso 1 a 1on o some ac 1ons 
known as the 'Anti-Biotics cases') various states and 
municipalities recovered $120 million from a numer of 
pharmaceutical companies for violations of the United 
States anti-trust laws relating to price-fixing. Of this 
amount, $37 million was made available to meet the claims 
of individual consumers who had been prejudiced, and the 
balance was paid to the states and municipalities rep-
resented to be used on public health facilities. 433 A 
detailed consideration of class actions is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation but it is worth noting that 
(i) the device exhibits considerable potential to 
recompense the general body of consumers for misleading 
(431) Trebilcock, op. cit., 27 comments that 'because of 
the smallness of individual claims (in many cases), 
the difficulty of notifying unidentified members of 
a class of their rights, and the difficulty of 
proving an individual's claim to damages, only a 
very small percentage of the members of the class 
may come forward and seek recovery'. This matter 
is resolved by applying the so-called 'cy-pres 
doctrine' whereby the court will direct the 
distribution of unclaimed damages in a way which as 
nearly as possible compensates the calss of persons 
aggrieved. For example, in Market St. Ry. Co v 
Railroad Commission (1946) 171 P 2d 875 illegal 
overcharges in respect of railway fares was in 
issue; the court directed that any unclaimed 
balance of the total illegal overcharge had to be 
applied to the improvement of the railway 
company's facilities for the benefit of all users·. 
(432) 404 us 871. 
(433) See also Bebchick v Public Utilities 318 F 2d 187; 
Daar v Yellow Cab Co 433 P 2d 732; 
Chastain v British Columbia Power and Hydro 
Authority (1973) 2 WWR 481. 
218 
advertising campaigns causing them to act to their 
detriment; and (ii} the Ministerial Working Party 
reviewing certain Consumer and Commercial Legislation434 
has alluded to this device as a potential means to 
facilitate redress on the basis that 'those who make 
false claims may do so to such a material degree that 
it approaches fraudulent deception'. 
(c) Legal Aid 
The problem of accessibility may also be countered 
by the provision of legal aid in respect of the pursuit 
f . '1 1 . 435 t h f. . 1 o c1v1 c a1ms. However, a present t e 1nanc1a 
conditions in order to qualify for legal aid436 are such 
that services provided by legal aid are only available 
to the comparatively poor. This in itself is no bad 
thing, but this indicates its limited role as a solution. 
to problems of accessibility. Furthermore, a civil legal 
aid survey of Department of Justice files showed that 
93.5 percent of all applications arise from domestic 
proceedings in the District Court, the predominent use of 
the scheme being to enforce maintenance obligations of 
lf b f . . . 437 we are ene 1c1ar1es. Short of a massive increase 
in the qualification limits for civil legal aid, at 
enormous expense to the taxpayer, legal aid will be 
(434) Proposals for a Selling Practices Act (1980), at 
page 16. 
(435) See the Legal Aid Act 1969; Legal Aid Regulations 
1970. 
(436) Legal Aid Act 1969, ss 17, 19; Legal Aid 
Regulations 1970, reg. 10. 
(437) See 'The Press', 24 September 1981. 
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confined to a relatively small percentage of the 
community. 
In conclusion, it is reiterated that while the 
' 
consumer may be arrogated a substantial bundle of rights 
by statute and at common law, the real measure of the 
effective benefit is dependent upon the ease, or 
otherwise, with which these rights may be implemented. 
The establishment of small claims tribunals, the 
extension of the representative action device and of 
civil legal aid are examples of ways whereby redress may 
be facilitated. None of these measures, however, touch 
upon a really significant problem; that is, ig~orance 
of legal rights. Thus, for example, the effectiveness of 
a small claims tribunal infrastructure for the resolution 
of disputes involving small claims depends to a large 
extent on publicity and comprehensive community legal 
education. Overseas studies indicate that ignorance of 
legal rights and available relief is particularly 
prevalent among the lower income groups, and two 
Victorian studies point to a predominantly middle class 
usage of that Australian state's Small Claims Tribunals! 38 
Therefore a consumer education programme should be 
(438) See Duggan, op. cit., 16 (n56). 
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directed primarily at the lower income groups in an 
endeavour to increase awareness of rights available 
under modern consumer legislation and of the available 
remedies. Information is available to the consumer at 
present in such publications as Consumer magazine, the 
Consumers Institute booklet, Consumer in Law: Your 
rights in the marketplace~ and the Department of Justice 
pamphlet Settling Disputes Simply - SmaZZ Claims 
Tribunals. The former two publications may suffer from 
the limitation of having an essentially middle class 
readership, but the widespread distribution of the 
Justice Department's pamphlet in Post Offices and other 
public buildings would create a greater awareness among 
the lower income groups of this relatively new and 
inexpensive means of redress. 
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IV. STATUTORY CONTROL OF ADVERTISING 
The importance of advertising in the economic framework, 
recognition of the fact that only an adequately informed 
consumer is capable of making a rational and optimum choice 
as between competing alternatives, and the need to protect 
the consumer from exaggerated, anq sometimes dangerous, 
claims, has led successive legislatures to enact numerous 
d d . t t t f th t 1 f d t' . 1 an 1verse s a u es or e con ro o a ver 1s1ng. In 
general terms these statutes endeavour to ensure:-
(i) that advertisements are not misleading 
or deceptive; and, to a much lesser extent, 
(ii) that the consumer is given sufficient 
information about competing goods and services 
so as to facilitate a rational choice. 
In pursuit of these objectives various approaches are 
adopted and it is proposed in this part to identify and 
discuss the statutory controls as they apply in relation to 
particular subject matters (e.g. credit, goods, food, 
medicines and medical devices etc.) as opposed to giving 
a 'statute by statute' commentary. 
(1) For example, current statutes concerned with advertising 
to a greater or lesser extent include the Stock Foods 
Act 1946, the Merchandise Marks Act 1954, the Animal 
Remedies Act 1967, the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
the Dangerous Goods Act 1974, the Pesticides Act 1979, 
the Toxic Substances Act 1979J the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981, the Food Act 1981, the Flags, Emblems and 
Names Protection Act 1981, and the Medicines Act 1981. 
Although some of these later statutes are not yet in 
force, or fully in force, it is assumed for purposes 
of this dissertation that the relevant commencement 
dates have arrived. 
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1. CREDIT ADVERTISEMENTS 
A very broad definition of 'credit advertisement' is 
given in the Credit Contracts Act 1981 in that any 
information, sound, image or other matter that is 
communicated to the public by whatever means and that 
notifies or implies the availability of credit, falls 
within the scope of this definition. 2 
The theory that a credit purchaser becomes hypnotised 
by a product or service to the extent that he is less 
concerned with the financial particularsthan a cash 
purchaser carried sufficient weight with the Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee for them to recommend 
that special provision be made for misleading credit 
advertisements. 3 such advertisements must not contain 
•.. any information, sound, image or other 
matter, that is likely to deceive or mislead a 
reasonable person with regard to any particular 
that is material to the provision of credit. 4 
(2) s 34. Dugdale, The Credit Contracts Act 1981, (1981), 64 
comments that • [t]he use of the word "public" in 
this definition may cause the same difficulties of 
interpretation as has its use in the definition of 
"prospectus" in the Companies Acts. It is arguable 
that an invitation addressed to a coterie of friends 
or existing customers would not be caught by this 
definition because it was not communicated to the 
public •. 
(3) Credit Contracts Report, February 1977, para 10.06. 
The Committee comments that a credit purchaser develops 
a 'psychological commitment upon seeing the product 
or upon discovery that the product is available at 
some shop on terms which the purchaser can meet'. 
(4) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 35. 
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The crucial phrase is 'likely to deceive or mislead' but 
nowhere is this phrase or the pivotal terms 'deceive' or 
'·mislead' defined in the Act. However, assistance can be 
obtained by consulting the recognised dictionaries to 
ascertain the plain meaning of the terms and by considering 
the various judicial pronouncements on the terms in other 
statutory contexts. 
In CRW Pty Ltd v Sneddon 5 the New South Wales 
Industrial Commission upheld a conviction under section 32 
of the Consumer Protection Act 1969 (NSW) in that an 
advertisement carried in the Sydney Daily Mirror for the 
sale of a motor car on credit terms was misleading IDn a 
material particular. The advertisement read, inter alia, 
'A number of people will buy New Valiant .•••. and pay no 
interest'. The advertisement did not sufficiently disclose 
the nature of the proposed credit transactions envisaged, 
nor did the advertisement reveal that the transactions 
referred to in the advertisement were not generally 
available, but only were available in certain special 
circumstances to persons who passed a 'credit worthiness 
test'. The majority of the Commission adopted the 
Oxford Eng~ish Dictionary definition of the term 'mislead' 
and concluded that an advertisement is misleading if it is 
capable of leading people into error. The words in the 
advertisement had to be interpreted on 'the natural meaning 
they would convey as a matter of ordinary English, ,G and 
(5) {1972) 72 AR 17. 
( 6 ) llif!, 19 • 
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whilst many members of the public may be familiar with 
financial operations and the requirements of creditworthiness, 
the advertisement as a whole could have led some-people to 
believe that finance would be available to any applicant. 
Thus in the view of the Commission capacity to lead people 
"into error" is sufficient; there is no requirement that 
the advertisement cause actual deception. The High Court 
of Australia came to a similar conclusion in Hornsby 
Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information 
Centre Pty Ltd7 where section 52(1) of the Trade Practices 
8 Act 1974 fell to be construed. This section provides that 
a corporation shall not 'engage in conduct that is misleading 
or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive'. Murphy J 
held9 that 
•.• conduct is deceptive or misleading if 
it has a capacity or tendency to mislead 
or deceive. 
This approach corresponds to that adopted in the United 
States. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 191410 provides, 
inter alia, that 'unfair methods of competition in commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce' are 
unlawful. 11 In PEP Boys- Manny, Moe and Jaak Ina. v FTc12 
. ( 7 ) ( 19 7 8 ) 18 ALR 6 3 9 • 
(8) As amended by the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977. 
(9) at 651. 
(10) As amended by the Wheeler-Lea Trade Commission Act of 
1938. 
(11) s 5. 
(12) 122 F 2d 158 (1949). 
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it was held that a breach of this provision had occurred 
where a company took an extensively advertised and well-
known brand name, that is, Remington, and adopted it as a 
brand name for its radio receiving sets, as the natural and 
probable result was that purchasers may have been deceived 
into purchasing a radio which in normal circumstances 
they may not have elected to buy. Proof of actual 
deception was not required as it was sufficient that the 
conduct could have deceived purchasers into believing that 
the radios were in some way associated with the well-known 
Remington brand. 
Similarly, it is submitted, there is no requirement of 
actual deception under section 35 of the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 and that it is the potentiality of the credit 
advertisement to deceive or mislead that is relevant. 
This outcome, however, must be "likely" and as McMullin J 
pointed out in Transport Ministry v Simmonds 13 the meaning 
to be accorded to the word "likely" will vary according to 
the context in which it is used. But the learned judge 
did state that 
An event which is likely may be an event 
which is probable but it may also be an 
event which, .while not probable, could· 
well happen. But:J.J- t must be more than a 
bare possibility. 
The next question that must be asked is whether any 
intention to deceive or mislead is required. Under 
{13) [1973] 1 NZLR 359 {case involving breach of Civil 
Aviation Regulations). 
{14) Ibid at 363; see also Dunning v United Liverpool 
Hospitals' Board of Governors [1973] 2 AllER 454 
where the word 11 1ikely" was interpreted as meaning 
"may or may w.ell". 
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section 52(1) of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 
there is no requirement that the perpetrator of the 
conduct have an intention to deceive or mislead. 15 As 
the authors of a leading text16 on consumer protection 
point out: 
The underlying rationale of the strict 
liability view is that section 52 is concerned 
solely with the real and potential impact of 
commercial conduct and not with the state of 
mind of the person engaging in that conduct.l7 
It is submitted that section 38 of the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 should be similarly viewed as creating an offence 
of strict liability in respect of misleading credit 
advertisements. Notwithstanding the presumption in 
favour of the requirement of mens rea, 18 the words employed 
in the statute and the subject matter with which it deals 
point to strict liability. The mere fact that the statute 
employs no such word as 'knowingly' or other word 
positively identifying mens rea obviously does not lead 
one to the irresistible conclusion that mens rea is NOT 
needed. However, strict liability is strongly suggested 
where, as here, a statute provides that if a particular 
(15) Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty. Ltd. v 
Sydney Building Information Centre Pty. Ltd., supra, 
647_, 651. 
(16) Goldring and Maher, Consumer Protection Law in 
Australia (1979) • 
(17) Ibid, 199; see also Gimbel Bros Ina. v FTC, 116F 2d 
578, 579, where a similar rationale is advanced 
vis-a-vis the United States legislation. 
(18) See, for example, Sherras v De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918; 
cf Hobbs v Winchester Corpn [1910] 2 KB 471. 
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event occurs then in such a case the perpetrator is 
guilty of an offence. 19 Furthermore, where the enactment 
creating the offence is basically regulatory, that is, it 
regulates the way in which a lawful activity is practised, 
there will be a tendency to regard any offences created by 
it as being ones of strict liability. 20 Moreover, it is 
clear that the size of the penalty to which a person is 
liable should he be convicted, and the stigma attached to 
such a conviction, will be relevant consideratiornto which 
a court will have regard in deciding whether strict liab-
ility is imposed. It is suggested that the fact that no 
period of imprisonment may be imposed in respect of a 
contravention of section 35 of the Credit Contracts Act 
1981 more than outweighs the fact that a fine of fairly 
substantial proportions may be levied iri this regard. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is surely the 
effect on the consumer that is all important, rather than 
the intent with which the act or conduct was perpetrated. 
(19) For example: Police v Taylor [1965] NZLR 87 (Impound-
ing Act 1955, s 33; where stock is found on the road 
the owner is liable and subject to a fine); Helleman 
v Collector of Customs [1966] NZLR 705 (Customs Act 
1913, s 216; if a ship comes into New Zealand waters 
with a concealed place for smuggling the master and 
owner shall be liable to a penalty); Marine Dept v 
Skegg Foods [1974] 2 NZLR 646 (Shipping and Seaman 
Act 1952; if there is a failure to comply with the 
Act the owner or master of a ship shall each be 
deemed to commit an offence). 
(20) For example: Fisheries Inspectors v Wareham [1974] 
2 NZLR 639 (selling of undersized cra~ish a strict 
liability penalty); Marine Dept v Skeggs Foods supra 
(taking a fishing boat to sea without a duly 
certified master a strict liability offence); 
R v St. Margareta Trust [1958] 2 All ER 289 (where 
the offence was one of breaching credit control 
regulations l . 
228 
consequently it is submitted that in the determination of 
whether or not a credit advertisement is 'likely to 
deceive or mislead' under section 35 the intention of the 
person whom the advertisement states or implies is the 
person from or through whom credit may be obtained, is 
irrelevant. 21 
Logically any inquiry into whether a particular credit 
advertisement is likely to deceive or mislead must have as 
its focal point the intended audience of that communication. 
A strict view as to the composition of that audience is 
adopted in Australia and the United States. For example, 
in CRW Pty Ltd v Sneddon22 it was held that: 
The bread is cast on very wide waters. The 
advertiser must be assumed to know that the 
readers will include both the shrewd and 
the ingenuous, the educated and uneducated, 
and the experienced and inexperienced in 
commercial transactions. He is not entitled 
to assume that the reader will be able to 
supply for himself, or (often) herself, 
omitted facts or to resolve ambiguities. An 
advertisement may be misleading even though 
it fails to deceive more wary readers. 23 
(21) For example: R v Strawbridge [1970] NZLR 909; Sweet 
v Parsley [1970] AC 132; cf Poliae v Rowles [1974] 2 
NZLR 756. Note, however, that this strict liability 
is qualified in two situations in that the proviso to 
section 38 states that a person who had no knowledge 
of the credit advertisement before it was made or who 
took all reasonable steps to prevent the dissemination 
of the advertisement, shall not be convicted under 
this section. As Dugdale, op. cit. 66 asserts: " ••. the 
prosecution need do no more than identify the defend-
ant as the creditor referred to in the contravening 
advertisement and the onus then passes to the defend-
ant to demonstrate that one or other of the provisions 
in the proviso are applicable". 
(22) Supra. 
(23) At 28: see also Parish v World Series Criaket Pty. 
Ltd . ( 19 7 7 ) 16 ALR 1 7 2 , 1 7 9 • 
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Similarly in Florence Manufacturing v J;C. Dowd co 24 it 
was held that the advertisement must be looked at from 
the perspective of potential impact on 'the ignorant, the 
unthinking and the credulous who in making purchases do 
not stop to analyse but are governed by appearance and 
1 • • 1 25 genera 1mpress1ons However, the New Zealand 
legislature has taken a much more lenient view in that the 
question as to whether a credit advertisement is 'likely 
to deceive or mislead' must be assessed as against the 
standard of the reasonable person. This standard was 
26 applie~ in Burch (New Plymouth) Ltd v Hughes where an 
advertisement for a food called 'Excello Lemon Cheese 
.·Spread' that appeared in the New Zealand Grocers' Review 
fell to be considered. Margarine, instead of butter as 
prescribed under a regulation made pursuant to the then 
Food and Drugs Act 1947, had been used in the preparation 
of this food. Was the description of the food, as a lemon 
cheese spread 'likely to deceive' a purchaser with respect 
to the properties of this food? 27 It was argued on 
behalf of the appellant company who marketed the spread 
that 'likely to deceive' must be assessed by reference to 
the "ordinary grocer", but this contention was rejected. 
Smith J held that the test 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
( 2 7) 
178 F 73 (1910). 
,L\t 75; see also, Millstein, 1The FTC and False 
Advertising' (1964) 64 Columbia L Rev 439; FTC v 
Standard Education Society 302 us 112 (1937). 
[1950] NZLR 423. 
See the Food and Drug Act 1947, s 9 (1} (c). 
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... is whether the statement was "likely" 
to deceive an ordinary reasonable person 
with respect to the properties of the food. 
For the application of this test I think 
the Court must attribute to the ordinary 
reasonable person a knowledge of the re-
quirements of [the regulation], and, in 
particular, in the present case, a know-
ledge that the standard for lemon cheese 
requires butter as an ingredient, and 
excludes margarine. 28 
Notwithstanding that certain grocers and other informed 
shoppers might not be likely to be deceived, Smith J had 
no hesitation in concluding that the advertisement was 
likely to deceive an ordinary reasonable person, with full 
knowledge of the legal requirements, as to the properties 
of the food. 
However it would not be enough if an advertisement had 
the potentiality to effect an individual whose comprehen-
sion and level of understanding and sophistication fell 
beneath the hypothetical level of understanding embraced 
by a reasonable person. If a credit advertisement is 
merely likely to deceive the gullible or ignorant then no 
offence is committed. No doubt Atiyah29 would approve 
for .that learned writer does not think that the best 
policy is to frame laws on the basis of the maxim, Lex 
proaurator fatuorum est~ but it is to be hoped that the New 
Zealand courts in assessing the level of comprehension of 
a reasonable person will assume that this hypothetical 
person has a limited understanding of financial matters, in 
that the effectiveness of section 34 as a curb on mislead-
ing advertising is dependent upon this assumption. 
(28) At 426. 
(29) 'Consumer Protection- Time to Take Stock', (1979) 1 
Liverpool Law Review 20, 44. 
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Finally, it is not every credit advertisement that is 
'likely to deceive or mislead' that is caught by section 
35, but only those advertisements which have that effect 
upon a reasonable person 'with regard to any particular 
h • • 1 t th • • f d • I 30 t at 1s mater1a o e prov1s1on o ere 1t . That 
materiality is to be assessed by reference to the reason-
able person or consumer is infinitely preferable to the 
position that currently prevails vis-a-vis disclosure of 
31 
material facts in the insurance context, in that there 
may be a substantial divergence of opinion as to what 
would be considered material as between a reasonable 
consumer and a reasonable financier. Jf'.or example in CRW 
Pty Ltd. v Sneddon 32 the Commission had to consider 
whether the advertisement was 'misleading' in 'a material 
particular'. Defence arguments that the type of financing 
involved was not relevant were rejected and the Commission 
accepted the view that the actual method of financing 
could be of vital concern to many purchasers. Therefore 
the Commission held33 that if a person 
(30) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 35. 
(31) For example in Avon House Ltd v Cornhi t Z Insurance Co 
Ltd [unreported, Christchurch 11 December 1980], 
Somers J stated (at 31) that ' ... a particular is 
material when it would affect the mind of a prudent 
insurer either in deciding whether to take the risk 
on the terms of the policy or in fixing the premium'. 
See the criticism of this test in Tarr, 'The Duty of 
Disclosure in Insurance Contracts', 1981 NZLJ 250. 
(32) Supra. 
(33) Supra, at 19. 
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••. asserts that the transaction will be of 
one kind and it is of a totally different 
kind this is enough to make the advertise-
ment not only misleading but misleading in 
a material particular. 
34 Finally, it is respectfully submitted that Dugdale is 
correct when he suggests that section 35 is wide enough 
to encompass a suppressio veri amounting to a suggestio 
falsi; that is, a deception consequent upon an omission 
that makes statements literally true, give an impression 
that is inaccurate. 
While the Credit Contracts Act 1981 proscribes mis-
leading advertising it does not set out to achieve full 
and comprehensive disclosure of information in credit 
advertisements. Disclosure of financial particulars such 
as the interest rate and other charges in such advertise-
ments would not only promote 'shopping for credit' but 
would have a highly beneficial competitive effect. 35 
However, notwithstanding these obvious advantages, any 
statutory requirement of disclosure of certain particulars 
in credit advertisements is fraught with complications. 
For one thing, mandatory rate disclosure in credit advert-
isements would place an unduly heavy burden upon financiers 
in that it would enjoin flexibility. Financiers must be 
able to vary their interest rates and other charges 
(34) Op. cit. 65; see R v Lord Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 422; 
R-v Birsahirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586. 
(35) See for example, Goode, Consumer Credit (1978), 59. 
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according to the circumstances of each transaction; e.g. 
the estimated risk, the size of the loan required, 
whether it is to be secured or unsecured, the period, the 
category of goods for which finance is to be provided and 
so on. For this reason mandatory rate disclosure in all 
credit advertisements is inappropriate given that it would 
be likely to deceive or mislead prospective debtors if the 
advertised rate were not the rate at which transactions 
were actually consummated. Flexibility could be introduced 
by permitting financiers, whose rates vary according to 
the factors outlined above, to advertise a range of rates. 
However, the danger with this approach is that considerable 
.scope for abuse is introduced in that the prospective 
debtor could be lured by the quotation of a relatively low 
rate at the lower end of the scale and then subjected to 
pressure· to consummate a transaction at the upper end of 
the scale. 
Under the moneylenders legislation36 severe restrict-
ions were imposed on a moneylender's right to advertise 
his business in that the content of such advertisements 
were strictly delineated. In addition to disclosing his 
registered name, the information permitted to be given in 
an advertisement was limited to a statement of the 
registered address at which he carried on business as a 
moneylender, his telegraphic address and telephone number, 
a statement that he lent money with or without security 
and of the highest and lowest sums he was prepared to lend, 
(36) Moneylenders Act 1908; Moneylenders Amendment Act 
1933. 
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the classes of security he was willing to accept, and the 
date when his business was first established. 37 If in 
any advertisement he stated the interest terms upon which 
he was willing to lend he had to state the rate in terms 
of a rate per cent per annum. 38 These provisions were 
designed to prevent prospective debtors from being lured 
into burdensome loan contracts by attractive advertise-
ments offering easy terms. However, there was nothing to 
stop moneylenders extolling the virtues of credit in 
general terms39 and there is no sound justification to 
single out moneylenders for this special consideration. 
Under the Hire Purchase Act 197140 it was required that 
if an advertisement contained an amount that is expressed 
to be the deposit payable on certain goods, then that 
advertisement had to also state the cash price. 
In relation to the content of credit advertisements 
the legislature has opted for a compromise between the 
extremes of mandatory disclosures of certain particulars 
such as the interest rate, other charges and the cash 
price of property or services, on the one hand, and the 
absolute prohibition against the disclosure of these 
particulars, on the other. Therefore, where an advert-
isement contains no indication of the interest rate or 
other charges at which credit may be provided, there is no 
(37) Moneylenders Amendment Act 1933, s 7. 
(38) Ibid., s 7(5). 
(39) See the Broadcasting Tribunal Decision No 11/81 
regarding the Broadlands Finance Ltd advertisement. 
(40) s 41. 
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obligation upon the financier to disclose the finance 
rate in that advertisement. 41 Where such an indication 
of the interest rate or other charges is incorporated in 
a credit advertisement, then the finance rate must be 
displayed with equal prominence and be described as such 
provided it is capable of calculation at the time of the 
. . f h d t. t t th bl . 4 2 h commun1cat1on o t e a ver 1semen o e pu 1c; w ere 
the finance rate cannot be calculated at that time the 
advertisement must state th~ amounts or rates of all 
components of the cost of credit. 43 Similarly, any 
advertisement that gives the deposit payable in respect of 
d f d d . 't' f t 44 a e erre payment 1spos1 10n o proper y or services 
must also stipulate the cash price of the property or 
services, and describe it as such. 45 Given that there 
are "varying degrees of specificity in financial advert-
ising"46 the approach adopted in the Credit ContractsAct 
1981 appears to offer the best possible solution. While 
many loans, for example, are subject to widely fluctuating 
interest rates and other charges dependant upon the 
(41) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 36 (as amended by the 
Credit Contracts Amendment Act 1982, s 5). The 
finance rate is defined in section 6 of the Act as 
meaning the rate that expresses the total cost of 
credit as a percentage per annum of the amount of 
credit. 
(42} s 36 (1) (a). 
( 4 3) s 36(1} (b). 
( 44) Such as a hire purchase agreement. 
(45) s 37; cf Hire Purchase Act 1971 s 41. 
(46) Goode, op. cit., 51. 
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prospective debtor's particular financial circumstances, 
loans by banks are normally available at a known rate to 
all customers - there is no question of varying the rate 
according to the degree of risk as, either, the customer 
is considered creditworthy enough to qualify for a loan 
at a going rate, or, he is refused the loan altogether. 
There is no sound reason to preclude such a lender from 
advertising its standard rate or rates, but at the same 
time it is not equitable, nor indeed practicable, to 
require similar disclosure by other lenders whose rates 
are variable. 
2. ADVERTISING OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
It is proposed to consider statutory control of 
advertising in this vital area under the following heads: 
1) Statements as to description; 
2) Statements of Price; 
3) Testimonial Advertisements; and, 
4) M. 11 . . 47 1sce aneous Prov1s1ons 
(1) STATEMENTS AS TO DESCRIPTION 
(a) Goods and services generally 
At the forefront in this area is the Consumer Informa-
tion Act 1969 under which "goods 11 are defined as meaning 
•any article or product of any kind or class that is 
intended for sale to any person for use or consumption• 
(47)See Burrows, News Media Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 
1980}, Ch.lO. 
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and services are specifically incorporated under this 
umbrella. 48 
i) Section 9(4) of this Act provides that 
No person shall publish or cause to be 
published ..• any advertisement that 
contains an express or implied repres-
entation relating to the nature, suit-
ability, quality, strength, composition, 
origin, age, or effects of any goods if 
he knows or ought to know that the 
representation is false or misleading in 
a material respect. 
This section, unlike its counterpart in the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981, 49 is not one of strict liability and 
'knowledge' must be either proved or imputed. As far as 
proving actual knowledge is concerned the test is 
subjective, but the objective test of the reasonable 
person is applicable to the question of imputed knowledge. 
Given that exaggeration is not by any means uncommon in 
the advertising arena the provision may be difficult to 
apply. As Burrows50 suggests 
The line to be drawn is that between the 
commendatory "puff 11 and provably false 
and misleading statements; and the 
comment that "the borderline of permiss-
ible assertion is not always discernible", 51 
although originally made in a slightly 
different context, is surely opposite. 
(48) S 2. Note that for certain purposes this definition 
is restricted; for example, s 9(7) of the Act (as 
amended by the Medicines Act 1981, s 112) provides 
that s 9 subsections (1) to (4) do not apply to any 
food, medicine or medical device; and s 9(5) does 
not apply to any medicine or medical device. 
(49) S 35; see also the Food Act 1981, s 11(1) (f) and 
the Medicines Act 1981, s 57 (1) (f). 
(50) Op. cit. 330. 
(51) Citing Anson, Law of Contract (24 ed 1975), 229. 
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Often a claim will go beyond mere puffery and constitute 
real deception - the difficulty lies in determining the 
dividing line. It seems clear that in the United States 
a more stringent view is being adopted in that what would 
have been regarded as subjective opinion and legitimate 
puffery in the past is now being categorised as real 
d t . 52 ecep J.On. For example, in Colgate-Palmolive Co v 
FTc53 a television advertisement designed to demonstrate 
the moisturizing qualities of 'Palmolive Rapid Shave' 
involved the shaving of simulated sandpaper i.e. a 
"mock-up" of sand on plexiglass. The Federal Trade 
Commission alleged that the advertisement was deceptive 
-in that, in fact, sandpaper could only be shaved after 
a lengthy period of soaking. Colgate-Palmolive's argument 
in rebuttal was to the effect that the advertisement was 
merely fanciful exaggeration and puffery. However, it was 
held that the demonstration puffery was inconsistent with 
the prevalent judicial and administrative policy of 
restricting, rather than expanding, so-called puffing. 
Similarly, in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of 
Customs and Exaise, 54 Lord Simon of Glaisdale commented 
that 
(52) See Aaker, 'Deceptive Advertising Issues', in 
Consumerism: Search for the Consumer Interest 
(1971} ed. by Aaker and Day. 
(53) 310 F 2d 89 (1962). 
(54} [1976] 1 AllER 117. 
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... it seems to me in general 
undesirable to allow a commercial 
promoter to claim that what he has 
done is a mere puff, not intended to 
create legal relationsT 55 
Furthermore in Ranger v Herbert A. Watts (Quebec) Ltd56 
Haines J observed that 
'It seems to me the time has arrived 
for an examination of our law upon 
the obligation of manufacturers and 
vendors of products to implement their 
undertaking given in the news media by 
nationwide advertising. By such means 
they stimulate reliance upon the safety 
and quality of their products •... To 
allow a producer to evade the fair 
implication of his advertising is to 
permit him to reap a rich harvest of 
profit without obligation to the pur-
chaser . . . . ' 
Consequently a statement will cease to be a "puff" and 
become a representation when it assumes the guise of a 
credible statement of fact and it is to be hoped that 
"puffing" will be more strictly controlled than in years 
b 57 gone y. Due presumably to the fact that the Consumer 
Information Act directs, inter aZia, that no prosecution 
shall be brought unless there has first been an approach 
by the Examiner of Commercial Practices or his delegates, 
and an attempt made to negotiate a settlement58 there is 
no case law on section 9(4) of the Act, and its ambit and 
mode of application remains a matter for speculation. 
(55) Ibid., at 121. 
(56) [1970] 10 DLR {3d) 395, 404-405. 
(57) See Chapter III, supra. 
(58) See s 19; note however that the Minister of Trade 
and Industry may authorise immediate prosecution; 
see s 2 0. 
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ii) Where any packaged goods59 are required to have 
any "prescribed particular" shown on the label, it is an 
offence to publish or cause to be published any advert-
isement which includes a statement which contradicts or 
is inconsistent with the prescribed particular. 60 By 
'prescribed particular• the Act is referring to the 
numerous items which can, by regulations made under the 
Act, be required to be shown on the labels of various 
kinds of goods; for example, the ingredients of 
particular goods, the date on which the goods were 
packaged, the date by which the contents should be used, 
and so on. 61 While the Act does not require that 
advertisements incorporate "prescribed particulars", and 
merely enjoins advertisements from contradicting such 
particulars, the Act doe·s provide that if a visual 
advertisement contains a descriptive term relating to 
quantity, any prescribed particular relating to quantity 
must also be included in the advertisement and be of 
1 . . th th d . . 62 equa prom1nence w1 e escr1pt1ve term. 
(59) As defined in the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 2. 
(60) Ibid., s 9(1). 
(61) Ibid., s 5. 
(62) Ibid., s 9 (3). 
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(b) Food 
Food being such an important item on any consumer's 
shopping list, accounting for approximately twenty per 
cent of an average New Zealand family's disposable income, 
has been at the forefront of consumer products for which 
the most sophisticated forms of distribution and marketing 
have evolved. Not surprisingly, therefore, the marketing 
of food has been the subject of statutory regulation since 
the earliest times and the legislature recently passed the 
Food Act 1981 to 'consolidate and amend the law relating 
to the ·sale of food•. 63 'Food' is widely defined in the 
Act as meaning 'anything that is used or represented for 
use as food or drink for human beings' and includes 
ingredients of any food or drink, anything that is 
intended to be mixed with or added to any food or drink, 
and, interestingly enough, chewing gum is one of the items 
meriting special inclusion. 64 The Act endeavours to 
regulate food advertisements in the following ways: 
i) It is an offence to publish or cause to be 
published any advertisement relating or likely to cause 
any person to believe that it relates to a food that is 
'false, or likely to deceive a purchaser, with regard to 
the nature, quality, strength, purity, composition, 
origin, age or effects df the food' . 65 
(63) See the Preamble to the Act. 
(64) s 2. 
(65) s 11 (1) (f). 
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This provision covers much the same ground as the 
equivalent provision in the Consumer Information Act 
1969 66 - however, there is one vital difference in that 
it is unnecessary under the Food Act 1981 for the 
prosecution to prove that the defendant knew or ought to 
have known that the advertisement was false or likely to 
deceive any person. The Food Act stipulates that in any 
prosecution it shall not be necessary for the prosecution 
to prove that the defendant intended to commit the 
offence. 67 In imposing this strict liability for 
offences under the Act or the regulations, the Act 
nevertheless provides a good defence for a defendant if 
.he proves first, that he did not intend to commit any 
offence against the Act or any regulation made under the 
Act and secondly, that he took all reasonable steps to 
ensure that there was compliance with the Act or any 
Regulations. 6 8 The position under the Food Act 1981 is 
the same as that which prevailed under the Food and Drugs 
Act 196969 and in Dept of HeaZth v City Dairy Ltd70 
Bisson J accepted that while the test of 'all reasonable 
steps' was a 'stringent one• 71 a breach of a regulation 
did not ipso facto mean that a defendant had failed to 
(66} s 9(4). 
(67) s 30 (1). 
(68) 830(2). 
(69) s 31. 
(70) High Court, New Plymouth, 29 February 1980. 
(71) See the unreported judgement of Cooke J in Coca-Cola 
Bottlers (Wellington) Ltd v Comber (High Court, 
Wellington, 22 May, 1975). 
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take all reasonable steps to ensure compliance. A 
defendant had to prove on a balance of probabilities that 
he had not intended to commit the breach and had taken all 
reasonable steps to comply with the Act or the Regulations. 
The expression 11 likely to deceive" has been considered 
72 . 73 
above, and as Burrows points out the expression is 
well known in trade-mark law and has been interpreted to 
cover words 'which involve a misleading allusion or a 
suggestion of that which is not strictly true, as well as 
words which contain a gross palpable falsehood' • 74 
Similarly it is clear that a failure to disclose .. 
pertinent information about a food may render an advert-
isement open to the charge that it is false or likely to 
deceive the ordinary person. 75 
ii) It is also an offence to publish or cause to be 
published any advertisement relating or likely to cause 
any person to believe that it relates to a food which 
either (a) qualifies or is contrary to any particulars 
which regulations require to be marked on the food or 
package containing it; or (b) is prohibited by such 
regulations from being marked on the food or package 
' 
containing the food; or (c) omits from the name or 
description of the food any words required to be included 
(72} Supra at 223-225. 
(73} Op. cit. 332. 
(74) Eno v Dunn (1890} 15 AC 252. 
(75) See Royal Baking Powder Co v FTC 281 F 744 (1922): 
baking powder company passed off one of its products 
as another of its well-established products by 
omitting to reveal changes in the composition of 
its latter product. 
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in the name or description; or {d) fails to make any 
statement required by any such regulations to be made in 
an advertisement for that food; or, (e) makes a 
statement which is prohibited by such regulation in the 
advertisement of that food. 76 If the advertisement is 
shown on television or otherwise in a transitory manner 
on a screen, such as in a cinema, it is not sufficient 
that any words required to be incorporated in the 
advertisement are flashed on the screen. The words must 
be "exposed in clearly legible lettering for a length of 
time sufficient to enable them to be read by the 
d • • 11 77 or ~nary v~ewer • 
The advertising offences described above can only be 
committed by a person who wishes to promote the sale of a 
food who publishes or causes the advertisement to be 
published on his own account or as the servant or agent 
of the person seeking to promote a sale. 78 Such a 
servant or agent is liable as if he had personally 
committed the offence unless he proves that the offence 
was committed without his knowledge and that he took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the 
offence. 79 
(76) s 11 {1). 
(77) s 11{2). 
{78) s 11 (1). 
(79) s 29. 
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c) Medicines, medical devices and methods of 
t.re.a tmen t 
The Medicines Act 1981 contains detailed provisions80 
to regulate any medical advertisement which is defined as 
meaning 
an advertisement relating; or likely to 
cause a person to believe that it relates, 
to any medicine or medical device or any 
ingredient or component thereof, or to 
any method of treatment. 81 
'Medicine' receives an extended definition in the Act82 and 
the inclusion of the expression 'medical device' and 
'method.of treatment' in the definition of a medical 
advertisement means that such things as bandages, surgical 
garments, preparations for curing baldness, bust develop-
ers, and body development courses are included. 83 
i) It is an offence to publish or cause to be 
published any medical advertisement that is false, or is 
likely to mislead any other person, with regard to the 
nature, quality, strength, purity, composition, origin, 
age, uses or effects of medicines or medical devices or 
components thereof. 84 This provision is almost identical 
to the one contained in the Food Act 198185 apart from the 
fact that the word "deceive 11 is used in the latter Act 
whereas "mislead" is used in the Medicines Act; and 
furthermore, that it is an offence under the Medicines Act 
1981 to publish a false or misleading advertisement with 
(80) See ss 56-62. 
(81) S 56. See also Telford v Shaw [1944] NZLR 481. 
(82) s 3. 
(83) Sees 3 (definition of medical device); s 56 (defin-
ition of method of treatment); Burrows, op. cit., 335. 
(84) s 57(1) (f). 
(85) s 11 (1) (f). 
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regard to the "uses" of medicines, medical devices or 
components thereof. To obviate any difficulties in 
determination, section 57(3) of the Medicines Act 1981 
declares that a medical advertisement is likely to 
mislead a person with regard to the uses or effects of 
medicines, medical devices or the components thereof if 
it is likely to mislead with regard to the purposes for 
which they can or cannot be used with reasonable 
safety, or in relation to the effects that such medicines, 
medical devices or components thereof produce or are 
intended to produce. 
ii) No person may publish or cause to be published 
any medical advertisement relating to medicines or 
medical devices that either - (a) qualifies or is 
contrary to any particulars which regulations require to 
be marked on or attached to the medicine or medical 
device; or (b) is prohibited by such regulations from 
being marked on or attached to the product; or (c) omits 
from the name or description of the product any words 
required to be included in the name or description; or 
(d) fails to make any statement required to be made in 
any such advertisement; or (e) makes a statement 
prohibited by the regulations; or (f) suggests that the 
medicine or medical device cannot harm any person or that 
the product is not habit forming. 86 As with the Food 
Act 1981~ 7 if the advertisement is shown on television 
(86) s 57 (1). 
(87) s 11(2). 
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or on film any words that a regulation directs should 
be incorporated in the advertisement must be clearly 
legible and appear for sufficient time for an ordinary 
viewer, ,to read them. 88 
iii) A medical advertisement must not directly or 
by implication claim that the medicine, medical device 
or method of treatment advertised will prevent~ 
aZZeviate or cure any of certain specified diseases or 
physiological conditions. 89 A long list of diseases and 
physiological conditions is given in the First Schedule 
of the ·Act and included in the list are alcoholism, 
baldness, arteriosclerosis, cancer, tuberculosis and 
sexual impotence. As Burrows90 comments (in relation to 
the equivalent provision in the Food and Drug Act 1969, 
viz. s 10 (1) (d}) : 
Some of these diseases or disorders are 
regarded as being incurable, some as 
being curable only by operation or 
skilled medical attention, some as being 
curable only by drugs which should not 
be self administered. In any event most 
of the diseases are of too serious a 
nature to allow sufferers themselves to 
experiment with patent medicines. 
The inclusion of certain physiological conditions, such 
as baldness, on the list demonstrates the legislature 1 s 
concern for the type of quack remedies that are advertised. 
For example, notwithstanding the Newspaper Publishers 
Association 1 s recommendation that advertisements for 
(88) s 57 (2). 
(89) S 58(1) (a). See McFarZane Laboratories Ltd v Dept 
of Heatth [1978] 1 NZLR 861 for a consideration of 
the equivalent provision under the now repealed 
Food and Drugs Act 1969. 
( 9 0 ) Op • cit . 3 3 6 • 
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91 baldness cures not be accepted, 'Ma Evans' Baldness 
cure' was extensively advertised in New Zealand in 1980. 
As Consumer 92 point out the most frequent type of 
baldness - common male pattern baldness - has no known 
cure, is often hereditary, and the only proven way around 
the problem is to get a surgical transplant. In this 
area, the consumer, who in reliance upon such an 
advertisement purchases such a baldness cure, will only 
lose his money. The same could be said for other quack 
medicines said to alleviate sexual impotence or for 
methods of treatment or medical devices said to solve the 
problem of under-developed busts - but misleading advert-
·ising in this area can have serious consequences. For 
example, a person on the strength of an advertisement 
suggesting that a medicine can cure cancer might delay 
getting normal medical treatment until his condition is 
beyond orthodox treatment. Unfortunately, due to a 
phenomenon described by the medical profession as the 
'placebo effect' people may get a physchological boost 
simply by having faith in the medicine itself and delay 
treatment until their health has deteriorated 
irretrievably. 
iv) An advertisement must not directly or by 
implication claim, indicate or suggest that the medicine, 
medical device or method of treatment advertised will 
prevent or aure any of certain specified diseases or 
(91) See Self Regulation, supra. 
(92) No 176, September 1980, pp244-245. 
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h . 1 . 1 d't' 93 p ys1o og1ca con 1 1ons. By implication it is 
permissible to assert that the medicine, medical.device 
or method of treatment will alleviate the problem. The 
diseases and physiological conditions subject to this 
control are specified in Part II of the First Schedule 
to the Act and include the common cold, impaired hearing, 
obesity and influenza. Consequently it is permissible 
for an advertisement to assert that certain tablets will 
provide relief from the symptoms of colds or influenza, 
or that certain appetite suppressants will assist a person 
in his/her programme to reduce weight. 
It should however be noted that in any prosecution 
where it is alleged that an advertisement claimed, 
indicated or suggested that the medicine, medical device 
or method of treatment could prevent or cure any disease 
or physiological condition, such a charge may be 
successfully rebutted if a defendant proves that the 
matter claimed,indicated or suggested in the advertisement 
is tirue. 94 This defence is also good for an advertise-
ment suggesting that the relevant product will alleviate 
a disease or physiological condition specified in Part I 
of the First Schedule. 95 
v) No medical advertisement must directly or by 
implication claim, indicate or suggest that the medicine, 
medical device or method of treatment is "a panacea or 
infallible". 96 
(93) S58(l)(b). 
(94) s 58(3). 
(95) Idem. 
(96) S58{l)(c). 
It would not be an offence to claim that 
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'Brand x asprin cures headaches' but an advertisement 
to the effect that 'Brand x asprin cures headaches in 
every case' would infringe the above provision, in that 
there would be a clear intimation of infallibility. 
Certain advertisements are exempt from the strict 
controls imposed by the provisions which have been 
discussed above. For example, it is permissible to 
advertise that a medicine, medical device or method of 
treatment is infallible, provided the advertisement is 
distributed only to persons having professional 
expertise in the fields of medicine, nursing or 
97 pharmacy. Persons having such expertise are suff-
, iciently informed and knowledgeable to objectively 
assess the accuracy or otherwise of such claims and 
consequently the necessity for state intervention 
disappears. As with the Food Act 198198 the prosecution 
need not prove that the defendant intended to commit any 
offence against the Act or the regulations, but a 
defendant may escape liability by expressly negativing 
such an intention and by proving that all reasonable 
t 1 . . d t 99 s eps to ensure comp 1ance were carr1e ou • 
Finally, it should be mentioned that in the case of 
medicines that are "controlled drugs" within the meaning 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, the requirements under 
the Medicines Act 1981 are additional to those imposed 
(97) See s 60. 
{98) s 30 (1). 
(99) s 80. 
100 
under the former Act. 
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By the Misuse of Drugs 
Regulations 1977 it is an offence to publish otherwise 
than to practitioners and pharmacists any advertisement 
promoting the sale of a 'controlled drug'. Controlled 
drugs are those specified in the Schedule to the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1975 and include the commonly known 
narcotics and cannabis. 
d) Agricultural Products 
Given that New Zealand's economic welfare is to a 
large extent dependant upon a healthy agricultural 
sector,· it is not surprising to discover that the 
advertising of agricultural products is subject to 
statutory regulation. 
i) The Animal Remedies Act 1967 regulates, inter 
aZia~ the marketing of drugs, medicines, remedies and other 
therapeutic substances used for treating and preventing 
animal diseases. An Animal Remedies Board has been 
constituted and amongst its functions is the approval of 
advertisements. 101 It is illegal to advertise an 
'animal remedy• 102 unless the advertisement has been 
approved by the Board. Therefore any person wishing to 
advertise an animal remedy must submit copies of the 
advertisement to the Board who must approve the 
advertisement in the form submitted 
(100) See the Medicines Act 1981, s 109. 
(101) s 41. 
(102) See s 2 for the definition of this term. 
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.•• unless some false, inaccurate, 
misleading, or exaggerated claim, 
is made in respect of any preventive 103 
or remedial property of the remedy ..• 
If any changes are contemplated in respect of an approved 
advertisement the advertisement must be resubmitted to 
th B d f "t 'd t" 104 d . h e oar or ~ s cons~ era ~on an ~n any event t e 
Board may change its mind and of its own motion require 
an advertisement to be re-submitted. 105 Animal remedies 
must be licensed under the Act106 and an advertisement 
for an animal remedy must state the license number of 
107 the remedy. A fine of up to $400 may be imposed upon 
a person who "wilfully" publishes an illegal advertisement 
unlike the other statutes considered above mens rea is 
. d 108 requ~re . 
The approach adopted under the Animal Remedies Act 
1967 has considerable merit in that the screening 
procedures involved in the allocation of a licence109 
mean that doubtful products are barred from the market and 
only proven remedies may be marketed and be the subject of 
advertising. 
(103) s 41 (2). 
(104) s 41(3}. 
(105) s 41(4). 
The Board, being cognisant of detailed 
(106) See ss 18-35. 
(107) s 41 (6). 
(108} See, for example, R v Sheppard [1980] 3 All ER 899 (HL). 
(109) See, for example, Wadestown Farms Ltd v Economics 
Laboratories (NZ) Ltd [High Court, Hamilton, 16 
November 1979]; per McMullin J. 
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information relating to the properties and testing of the 
product, are in a good position to assess whether any 
potential advertisement in respect of a licensed remedy 
is accurate and truthful. 
ii) The Pesticides Act 1979 regulates the sale and 
use of pesticides and like the Animal Remedies Act 1967 a 
Pesticides Board is set up with similar powers to those 
employed by the Animal Remedies Board. 110 However, while 
th t .. d A t .d h t t• .d lll h 11 b e Pes 1c1 es c prov1 es t a no pes 1c1 e s a e 
sold unless it is first registered, 112 there is no require 
-ment that advertisements in respect of registered pestic-
ides be submitted to the Board for approval prior to their 
publication. Rather, the Pesticides Board exercises a 
watchdog role and may direct that any inaccurate or mis-
leading statement in an advertisement for a pesticide be 
omitted or modified according to the Board's wishes. 113 
An advertisement for a pesticide must contain no further 
reference to the registration of a pesticide beyond the 
114 fact that it has been registered under the Act. However, 
where a pesticide has been registered for restricted 
uses,
115 
every advertisement must state that fact and must 
incorporate any other statement that the Board may 
direct. 116 Where a pesticide has been granted an experi-
mental use permit117 this does not entitle the permit 
(110) Pesticides Act 1979, ss 12-20. 
(111) "Pesticide" is widely defined in s 2. 
(112) s 21. 
(113) s 30(4). 
(114) s 40{1). 
(115) See s 24. 
(116) s 40(2). 
(117) See s 25. 
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holder or any other person to advertise such a .product; 
it would be clearly undesirable for an untested or 
118 prototype product to be marketed. 
Failure to comply with the advertising provisions in 
the Pesticides Act 1979 renders the proprietor or 
vendor of the pesticide liable to a fine of up to $500 -
section 40(5) creates offences of strict liability in 
respect of any contraventions of subsections (1} to (4) of 
section 40, subject to the defence of "reasonable excuse" 
being available to any defendant who is alleged to have 
contravened subsection 4, i.e., failed to omit or modify 
a statement in an advertisement in accordance with the 
·Board's directions. The powers of the Pesticides Board 
are rather less than those enjoyed by the Animal Remedies 
Board in the field of advertising in that advertisements 
do not have to be approved prior to publication. However, 
the fact that the Pesticides Board may refuse registration 
to a pesticide, having regard to such criteria as the 
nature or quantity of any ingredients of the pesticide 
and its effects on the health and safety of human beings, 
livestock and environment, 119 means that there is control 
exercised at the pre-marketing stage over the entry of new 
products on to the market. Furthermore, detailed 
information must accompany any application for registrat-
ion120 and therefore the Board is well placed to exercise 
(118) s 40 (3). 
(119) See ss 27, 24. 
(120) s 22. 
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its watchdog role and to assess advertising in respect 
of any pesticide which it has registered. 
iii) The Stock Foods Act 1946 provides that a vendor 
commits an offence if he publishes or causes to be 
published any advertisement containing a false or mis-
leading statement purporting to indicate the nature, 
quality, purity or composition of stock food if the 
statement would be materially prejudicial to a purchaser 
of the stock food. 121 This is a strict liability offence 
punishable by a fine of up to $100. 122 
e) General 
The Merchandise Marks Act 1954 contains provisions of 
general application in the field of products advertising. 
"Goods" are widely defined in this Act as meaning "anything 
which is the subject of trade, manufacture or 
merchandise" 123 and a number of provisions are directed at 
the marketing of such goods. 
i} It is illegal to use any word, mark or sign likely 
to mislead any person as to the real or actual manufacturer 
124 
of goods or the place where goods were made. The 
branding of goods as being of "English ~anufacture" when in 
fact they were made in Australia, obviously are words 
'l'k 1 t . 1 d' 'th' th mb't f h' . . 125 1 e Y 0 m1S ea W1 1n e a 1 0 t 1S prOV1S10n. 
(121) s 22. 
(122) s 19. 
(123) s 2. 
(124) S 9 (1} {g). See also s 9 (1) (f) which provides that it 
is an offence to falsely represent that goods 
offered for sale were made in New Zealand. 
(125) See Barnet Glass Rubber Co Ltd v McDonald [1922] 
NZLR 767. 
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Marks and signs have been used since the earliest 
times126 and it is clearly in the consumer interest that 
no deception occur in this area in that this would lead 
to a distortion in competition. 
ii) It is illegal to apply a false trade description 
to goods, whether in an advertisement or anywhere,~else. 127 
Trade descriptions caught by the Act may be given 
expressly or by implication; for instance, by displaying 
raincoats accompanied by a photograph of a wearer 
weathering a downpour without getting wet, thus 
indicating that the coats are really rain, and not only 
128 
showerproof. The term "trade description 11 is defined 
·in section 2(1) to encompass any description, statement 
h . d' t' 129 t f . or ot er 1n 1ca 1on as o any one or more o a ser1es 
of listed criteria. The criteria specified include the 
number, quantity, measure or weight of any goods, their 
standard of quality, the mode and place of manufacture as 
well as the composition of the goods. 'False frade 
' description' is defined as meaning a trade description 
which by reason of anything contained therein or omitted 
therefrom is false or misleading in a material respect as 
regards the goods to which it is applied or in connection 
(126) Marks identifying wines by year, vineyard and quality 
were known in Egypt in the twenty-fifth century BC., 
as were proprietary names of alcoholic drinks, 
impressed on jar stoppers, such as "The Joy Bringer" 
and "Draught of Heaven". SeeM. Grant, The 
Ancient Mediterranean, .(1969). 
(127) s 9 (1) (d). 
(128) s 2(1). 
(129) See also s 10 where it is emphasised that the provis-
ions of the Act relating to the application of false 
trade descriptions extends to the application to such 
goods of figures, words, or marks or combination 
thereof, and to the application to goods of any 
'false name or initial or any person, etc'. 
2-57 
with which it is used, and includes every alteration of a 
trade description whether by way of addition, effacement 
or otherwise which makes the description false or 
misleading in a material respect. 130 Similar legislation 
exists in the United Kingdom131 and Australia132 and 
illustrations abound of cases involving false trade 
descriptions. For example in Sandeman v Gotd133 it was 
held to be a false trade description to describe as "port" 
what was in fact Tarragona wine, and in Kat v Diment134 
the term "non-brewed vinegar" was held to be false when 
applied to a solution of acetic acid and caramel. In 
Commissioner of Trade and Customs v R. BetZ and Co Ltd135 
boxes of matches stamped with the words "R. Bell & Co Ltd, 
New Zealand" were held to bear a false trade description 
in that the matches were made in London. Similarly it is 
an offence to apply a trade description that is false and 
(130) s 2 (1). 
(131) Trade Descriptions Act 1968, repealing the 
Merchandise Marks Acts 1887-1953. 
(132) For example: Consumer PDotection Act 1969 (NSW); 
Consumer Affairs Act 1970-1973 (Qld); Goods (Trade 
Descriptions) Act 1935 (South Australia}; Goods 
(Trade Descriptions) Act 1971-1972 (Tasmania); 
Consumer Protection Act 1972 (Victoria); Trade 
Description and False Advertisements Act 1939-1973 
(WA). 
( 13 3 ) [ 19 2 4 ] 1 KB 1 0 7 • 
( 13 4 ) [ 19 51 ] 1 KB 3 4 • 
(135) (1901) 19 NZLR 813. 
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misleading as to the type of process used in producing 
the goods, and there is clear infringement of this 
provision if machine-made cigarettes are described as 
being hand-made. 136 In relation to the composition of 
goods, examples include misdescriptions such as 'natural 
mineral water•,· a mixture of cotton and linen described 
as linen and artificial silk stockings described as 
silk. 137 Similarly in British Gas Corporation v 
Lubboak138 a Gas Board brochure stated, with regard to 
gas cookers offered for sale, that 'Ignition is by hand-
held battery torch supplied with the cooker'. This was 
held to be a trade description relating to the composition 
.of goods, and therefore an offence was committed when a 
cooker in a modified North Sea gas version was sold 
without a torch, despite a notice that specifications 
might be changed without notice. 139 
It is a defence for a person, accused of breaching 
one or more of the provisions outlined in (i) and (ii) 
above, to prove that he acted without an intent to 
defraud. 140 
(136) See Kirsherboim v Salmon & Gluakstein Ltd (1898) 2 
QB 19. 
(137) See O'Keefe The Law Relating to Trade Descriptions 
49. 
(138) [1974] 1 All ER 188. 
(139) See also, inter alia, Eva v Southern Motors Box 
Hill Pty Ltd (19~15 ALR 428 (false representation 
that Holden Sedan was of a particular standard) ; 
Sherrat v Geralds The Ameriaan Jewellers Ltd (1970) 
114 Sol Jo 147 (a 'diver's watch' described as 
waterproof is not one which fills with water after 
being immersed in a bowl of water for a short time). 
(140) See R v Smillie [1956] NZLR 269 (criminal breach of 
trust); Re Day-Nite Carriers Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 172 
(Companies Act 1955, s 320); R v Miller [1955] 
NZLR 1038, 1048. 
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iii) It is an offence under the Merchandise Marks 
Act 1954 'to distribute by way of advertisement' any 
imported goods to which there is applied -
1) any name or trademark signifying a 
New Zealand manufacturer, dealer or 
trader; or, 
2) the name of any place or district in 
New Zealand; or 
3) any words which would be likely to 
associate the goods with New Zealand -
unless the particulars outlined above are accompanied by 
. d' . f th . . f h d 141 h' .. an ~n ~cat~on o e or~g~n o t e goo s. T ~s prov~s~on 
is designed to avoid confusion and to eliminate deceptive 
practices, e.g. by the simple expedient of affixing or 
incorporating a well known local name to a foreign 
product the average viewer of an advertisement for the 
product may assume that it was locally produced. The 
Act also empowers the Governor-General by Order in 
Council to direct that certain goods bear a statement as 
to their origin, 142 and it is an offence to advertise 
such goods without such an indication of origin. 143 It is 
a defence for a person to prove that he took all reasonable 
precautions to avoid committing an offence, and had no 
idea that the goods were such as required an indication as 
to the country of origin; sucha person must also 
cooperate with the prosecution if so required by giving 
( 141) s s 4, 7. 
(142) S 3. See, for example, the Clothing Marking Order 
1956; the Dry Cell Batteries Marking Order 1957; 
the Footwear Marking Order 1955. 
( 14 3} s 7. 
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all possible information with respect to the persons 
144 from whom he obtained the goods. Alternatively the 
accused may escape liability by proving that he had 
otherwise "acted innocently". 145 
(2) STATEMENTS AS TO PRICE 
Price is frequently the single most important factor 
in economic decision making and the maintenance and 
encouragement of price competition is essential to the 
success of a free enterprise economic system. 146 Price 
information is provided to the public primarily through 
advertising and this information, particularly in these 
inflationary times, facilitates shopping for the best buy 
in that consumers are able to compare prices of identical 
or similar goods and services and effect purchases at the 
best possible prices. In this area "bargain advertising" 
has long been recognised as an effective merchandising 
principle and comparative price advertising - the 
comparison of an item's selling price with a higher, 
"recommended", "manufacturer's", "lis't". or former price-
is currently the most popular retail application of that 
concept. 147 Supermarket chains and discount stores, 
(144) S 7 (5} (a). 
(145) S 7(5} (b); see also Stone v Burn [1911] 1 KB 927; 
Christie v Cooper [1900] 2 QB 522. 
(146) Recognition of this is reflected in the Commerce Act 
1975 (ss 27, 28) whereby collective pricing agree-
ments and individual resale price maintenance 
arrangements are prohibited. 
(147) See Consumer 185, pp 179-181. Comparison with a 
"suggested retail price" is the most common form of 
presentation in New Zealand. Other terms used are 
"Normal Retail Price", "Usual Price", "List Price" 
or "Wholesale Price". 
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amongst others, employ comparative price advertising 
continuously, thereby gaining a reputation among 
consumers as a source of savings whilst at the same time 
increasing their market share. There are undoubted 
benefits associated with such advertising as retail 
148 
competition is stimulated and prices are kept down. 
However, other retailers who stress customer service and 
whose prices must be correspondingly higher, criticize 
comparative price advertising in that inordinate emphasis 
is placed on price to the detriment of other important 
considerations. Furthermore it is asserted that much 
comparative price advertising is deceptive in that the 
advertiser's price is often compared to an advertised 
reference price that is wholly fictitious or inflated, or 
which is subjectively produced and bears no relation to 
existing market prices. 149 It may also be suggested that 
offers based on recommended prices are a potential source 
of consumer confusion, since consumers do not necessarily 
comprehend what recommended prices are and cannot there-
fore determine the exact savings advertised. 
t . d 1' 150 h f f As men ~one ear ~er, t e success o any ree 
enterprise economic system depends upon free and open 
competition among sellers on the one hand and bargaining 
between sellers and informed buyers on the other, whose 
complex interactions in the market place create natural 
(148) See Carlisle, 'Practical Problems Arising from the 
Price Marking (Bargain Offers) Order 1979 1 , (1979) 
129 New LJ 815. 
(149) See, for example, the views of the U.K. Committee on 
Consumer Protection (Final Report, 1963) (Cmnd 1781), 
para 588. 
(150) See Chapter I, Introduction, supra. 
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checks and balances on economic excesses and an efficient 
distribution of goods and services. In theory, 
competition should correct the misuse of price comparison 
data, since consumers will soon learn that a particular 
advertiser's published comparative prices are not a 
reliable measure of advertised bargains and take their 
business elsewhere. However, this presupposes a perfectly 
competitive market with informed consumers which is far 
from the truth of the matter, and, in fact, the lure of 
the bargain, together with uneducated and sometimes 
uncritical consumer purchasing habits, may give a 
competitive advantage to the unscrupulous advertiser -
.at least in the short term. This, coupled with the vital 
importance of uprice" in economic decision making, has 
necessitated legislative intervention. 
The Consumer Information Act 1969 contains several 
provisions regulating statements of price in advertise-
ments for goods. As mentioned earlier151 the Act defines 
"goods" in very broad terms and "services" fall within 
this umbrella. Consequently the provisions relating to 
price advertising regulate most advertisements in the news 
152 
media or elsewhere, leaving aside those advertisements 
for the sale of houses and land, or interests therein. 153 
The Act provides as follows: 
(151) See above: Consumer Information Act 1969, s 2(1). 
(152) Advertisements in the news media and those 
11 (b)rought to the notice of the public in any other 
manner whatsoever" are covered; see the Consumer 
Information Act 1969, s 2{1). 
(153) See Burrows, op. cit., 327. 
i) 
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"No person shall publish or cause 
to be published any advertisement that 
contains any express or implied 
representation relating to the price of 
any goods, if he knows or ought to know 
that the representation is false or mis-
leading in a material particular." 154 
This provision undoubtedly covers outright mis-statements 
of the price, as well as false or misleading comparative 
price advertisements. Consequently, the provision will 
catch deceptive practices whereby direct or implicit 
representations are made that certain prices are the usual 
or regular prices of particular goods or services when in 
fact such amounts are in excess of the prices at which 
such goods or services are usually and regularly sold at 
retail. Similarly, where the advertised reference price 
is wholly fictitious there will have been non-compliance 
with section 10(2). However, this provision overlooks a 
major problem in respect of recommended prices - the 
"phoney" recommended price. While it is clear that a 
retailer breaches the above provision if he indicates 
falsely that goods are for sale at less than, say, the 
manufacturer's recommended price, there is nothing to 
prevent a manufacturer from recommending an unduly high 
price. Similarly,in the United Kingdom,the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968155 proscribes such practices as 
making false comparisons with a manufacturer's or 
producer's recommended price, but there too there is 
(154) 810(2). 
(155) s 11(1) (a). 
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nothing to prevent a manufacturer or producer setting 
an artificially high recommended price which retailers 
f t h d t . . th . 11' . 156 may re er o w en a ver 1s1ng e1r se 1ng pr1ces. 
The Price Marking {Bargain Offers) Order was introduced 
in 1979 in an endeavour, inter alia, to augment this 
provision in the Trade Descriptions Act, but so far as 
recommended prices are concerned, the order has had 
little or no effect. Originally it was proposed that all 
comparisons with a recommended price by a person who 
supplies goods at retail or who supplies services be 
prohibited; however, before the principal order took 
effect, an amendment was effected with the result that so 
long as a price has been recommended by a person acting 
in the course of a business, that price may be used as a 
basis for comparison. 157 
However, as regards section 10(2), it is suggested 
that the provision is wide enough to deal with another 
deceptive practice involving pricing behaviour; that is, 
where representations, not directly concerned with the 
"existence" or "amounts" of price reductions, deal with 
ancillary questions such as where, when and how to obtain 
the benefit of the reduction, or the reason for the 
reduction, and these representations are false or mis-
leading as :to some material matter. 
(156) See Carlisle; supra, note 148; Oughton, '1 Restrict-
ing the control of price indications', [1982} 
LMCLQ 117. 
(157) Idem. 
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'(ii) It is an offence expressly or implicitly to 
represent in an advertisement that goods areavailable for 
sale below 'the normal, usual or price rate' unless the 
advertiser has, at the time when the goods would first be 
available for sale, a reasonable quantity for sale at the 
reduced rate. 158 The provision is directed at the pract-
ice of 'bait advertising', a long standing device whereby 
goods are advertised at attractive bargain prices being 
goods which the advertiser does not in fact intend to 
sell in more than minimal quantities, if at all. As 
Mussehl159 explains: 
q Basically a seller seeks to attract 
customers by advertising a product, which 
he does not intend to sell, at an 
extremely low price. When a customer 
responds to the ad,. bhe. seller discourages 
him from purchasing the "bait" and instead 
tries to 11 switch" him to a higher priced, 
more profitable item ...• Since customers 
are psychologically prepared to spend 
their money once they're inside a store, 
it is merely another step for the salesman 
to convince them to purchase a "better" 
product than the one advertised, but at a 
higher price. '1 
This problem of bait advertising is particularly acute as 
regards supermarket advertising of "specials". Once 
consumers enter a supermarket because its advertisements 
suggest that it has the best "specials" for the week, 
they will usually complete their shopping even if some· 
of the specials are not available,because of the incon-
venience of going elsewhere. Studies conducted in the 
(158) Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10(3). 
(159) 'The Neighbourhood Consumer Centre' (1972) 47 
Notre Dame Lawyer, 1093, 1099. 
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United States160 reveal high unavailability percentages 
for advertised items with supermarkets generally 
claiming that this unavailability is the result of 
'sporadic and unpredictable factors beyond their 
contro1•. 161 Similarly the unavailability of "specials" 
is by no means uncommon in New Zealand162 and the 
attitude taken by the different supermarkets varies 
enormously ranging from providing a "raincheck" 163 
through to no policy at all. 
Section 10(3) of the Consumer Information Act 1969 
endeavours to curtail the worst abuses associated with 
bait advertising by stipulating that a 'reasonable 
quantity' of goods must be available at the advertised 
reduced price. If the seller has less than a reasonable 
quantity he can only escape liability by specifying how 
many items he has available for sale at that reduced 
. 164 1 1 . . . . . pr1ce. Comparab e eg1slat1on ex1sts 1n Austral1a in 
(160) See, for example, Verkuil, 'Developments in the 
Regulation of Supermarket Advertising Practices: 
An Empirical Analysis' (1973) 48 New York 
University LR 395; Boies and Verkuil, 'Regulation 
of Supermarket Advertising Practices' {1972) 60 
Georgetown LJ 1195. 
(161) Verkuil, supra, at 405. 
(162) See Consumer 185, at page 180. 
(163) As Consumer 185 explains (at page 181) 'The term 
'rain check' derives from American football. There 
is a chit issued to ticket holders entitling them 
to free admission on a later date if the game they 
have paid to see is postponed due to the weather. 
It is now applied to a voucher, issued by a 
supermarket, which entitles a customer to purchase 
'specialled' goods at a later date at the advert-
ised price'. Unfortunately not all supermarkets 
adopt this laudatory practice. 
(164) s 10(3). 
267 
that section 56 of the Trade Practices Act 1974165 enjoins 
a corporation from advertising the supply of goods or 
services at a special price, unless the corporation 
intends to offer to supply at that price for a reasonable 
period and has reasonable quantities available; what is 
reasonable will depend upon the nature of the market in 
which the corporation carries on business and the nature 
of the advertisement. This provision was subjected to 
judicial scrutiny in 'the recent case of Reardon v Morley 
Ford Pty Ltd. 166 The defendant who was a dealer in 
Ford motor cars advertised, in conjunction with other 
dealers, the availability for sale of a particular Ford 
motor car at '$6,600 plus on-road costs and delivery 
fees'. A prospective purchaser on calling at the 
defendant's showrooms was advised that there was only one 
vehicle available at the relevant price, but that it had 
already been sold subject to the confirmation of finance. 
In holding that the provisions of section 56 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 had been breached, Smithers J held that: 
''so far as quantities were concerned there 
can be no doubt thatthe required quantity 
would have extended to multiple vehicles 
of the specified kind. And, in this case, 
if the will to supply had been present, 
the defendant could have met a demand for 
at least 30 or 40 vehicles~ 167 
Smithers J emphasised that while there is no objection.to 
a seller endeavouring to dissuade a prospective customer 
(165) As amended by the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977, 
s 29. 
(166) (1981) 33 ALR 417 (FCA). 
(167) Ibid, at 422. 
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from entering into the advertised deal by demonstrating, 
for example, the advantages of an alternative purchase, 
the seller must have reasonable quantities of the 
advertised goods available for sale. 168 
Similarly, while the New Zealand legislation, as 
encapsulated in section 10(3), does not seek to overcome 
the problem of unavailability, it endeavours to ensure 
that reasonable stocks of the advertised goods are 
available, and, if not, that consumers are not misled in 
that they are forewarned that limited stocks are available. 
Furthermore, where the reduced price per unit of the goods 
is more than $30 the advertisement must state the number 
of units available at that reduced price, no matter how 
many items are available. 1 6 9 
(iii) It is also an offence to publish or cause to be 
published any advertisement that contains an express or 
implied representation suggesting that a price advantage· 
will be gained by a purchaser by virtue of the size of a 
package or the quantity of goods in a package, unless 
there is in fact a price advantage. 170 Therefore where 
expressions such as 'Economy Size' or 'buy the larger 
Family Size and Save' are used, there must be some genuine 
saving to the purchaser in buying that size, as opposed 
(168) Idem. 
(169) S 10(4). A perusal of mailbox advertising brochures 
and pamphlets reveals that this provision is 
conspicuously ignored. 
(170) s 10(5). 
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to some other size. As Burrows171 indicates, the use of 
the word 11 package" suggests that this provision is 
confined to goods other than services; however, where 
service firms represent that a saving is attainable in 
respect of larger contracts there must be a genuine 
saving to the consumer otherwise there could be a breach 
of section 10(2), assuming of course that the service 
firm knew or ought to have known that sucha representation 
was false or misleading. 
(iv) Finally, the Act172 stipulates that sales at 'cost 
price' must be sales at a price which is the same as, or 
less than, the amount which the seller paid to purchase 
·the goods and have them delivered to his premises. 
The Consumer Information Act 1969 contains, therefore, 
very powerful and far reaching provisions for the control 
of statements of price in advertisements and infringements 
of these provisions are offences punishable by fines of up 
to $500. 173 However, no prosecution may be commenced 
without the leave of the Examiner of Commercial Practices174 
or his delegates. 175 The Examiner or his delegates are 
under a statutory obligation to negotiate with the alleged 
offender in an endeavour to secure compliance176 and it 
is only in exceptional cases that a prosecution is 
(171) Op. cit. 328. 
(172) Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10 ( 6) • 
(173) s 18. 
(174) s 19. 
(175) s 16. 
(176) s 19. 
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permitted in the absence of prior consultation and 
negotiation. 177 The fact that there has been no 
prosecution under the Act in the 13 years that it has been 
in existence does cast doubt on the efficacy of its 
provisions and the validity of the consultation provisions. 
Given that advertisements relating to price are likely to 
be changed at regular intervals, by the time an agreement 
has been negotiated with an offender that person is ready 
to withdraw the advertisement, or amend it, in any event. 
The Commerce Act 1975 also contains provisions 
relatin-g to price advertising. It is an offence to make a 
false or misleading statement as to whether any price has 
or has not been fixed or approved under the Act; or to 
make a false or misleading statement or any material 
omission in a statement purporting to state the effect of 
a price order or special approvali or to refer to any 
maximum price fixed or approved under the Act in such 
t t t th t . t . t th . . 1 7 8 erms as o sugges a ~ ~s no e max1mum pr1ce. 
The Commerce Act 1975 makes provision for a 'Positive 
List' to be drawn up by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
of all goods that are subject to price contro1179 and the 
Secretary of Trade and Industry is accorded a wide 
discretion to fix maximum and minimum prices for any goods 
(177) s 20. 
(178) s 113. 
(179) s 82. 
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d • d • h I • t • • I 18 0 an serv~ces enumerate ~n t e Pos~ ~ve L~st • 
Any person who offers to sell goods or services at a 
price that is not in conformity with a price order 
commits an offence. 181 
(3) TESTIMONIAL ADVERTISEMENTS 
Advertisers frequently make use of the personal 
attributes or the commercial reputation of third parties 
in extolling their goods and services, and in Victorian 
times there was a prolific, and sometimes unauthorised, 
use of ·the names and faces of the famous. 182 Due to 
the potential impact of false or misleading testimonial 
advertising the legislature has enacted numerous 
provisions designed to curb its excesses. 
(i) The Consumer Information Act 1969 provides that no 
person shall publish an advertisement which contains a 
representation to the effect that goods have been 
approved, endorsed or recommended by any person or 
organisation that members of the public might reasonably 
expect are technically qualified to give an authoritative 
opinion, unless the person or organisation is so qualified, 
183 
and has in fact said that it approves the goods. 
(180) Ss 89, 90. 
(181) See Hazelwood v Riahardson [1948] NZLR 1205 (mens rea 
essential under analogous provision in the Control---
of the Prices Act 1947}; Stoak v Challies [1954] 
NZLR 437; O'Keefe, The Commerce Act 1975 (1976), 
105. 
(182) See Lawson, Advertising Law (1978}, 65. 
(183) s 9(5). 
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For purposes of this provision, goods includes services 
b d . 1 d d. . d. 1 d . 184 ut oes not 1nc u e any me 1c1ne or me 1ca ev1ce. 
This provision is not without its difficulties for, as 
Lawson suggests, 185 the expression 'technically qualified' 
has some grey areas. Who is technically qualified to extol 
the virtues of an after-shave lotion? Members of the 
public who use it; or barbers only? It is clear that 
this provision is not designed to catch advertisements 
such as the one where Colin "Pinetree" Meads endorses 
tanalised fence posts, nor advertisements of the type 
where q bearded Ray Wolff testifies to the desirability 
of disposable razors. However, where a particular 
commodity or service is endorsed by a person or 
organisation that the public expects to be technically 
qualified to speak on the commodity or service, that 
person or organisation must be so qualified to speak and 
must have consented to the endorsement. 
Similarly, in Australia, section 53(c) and section 
53(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 outlaws false 
representations to the effect that goods, services or 
corporations have sponsorship, approval, or affiliation 
that they do not have. Consequently it would be an 
offence for an advertiser to falsely represent that its 
mobile electric welding machines had a State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria certificate of suitability; 186 
(184) S 9(7); as amended by the Medicines Act 1981, s 112. 
(185) 'Protection of the Consumer in New Zealand - Some 
Recent Developments', 1973 Otago University LR 49,55. 
, (186} Larmer v Power Machinery Pty Ltd (1977) 14 ALR 243. 
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or for a service station to falsely represent that it 
was a 'Royal Automobile Association' service station 
when it was not. 187 False testimonial advertisements 
ar~ also prohibited in the United Kingdom in that the 
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 incorporates within the 
meaning of the term 'trade description' any indication of 
approval by any person or conformity with an approved 
type.l88 Consequently the Act would catch false claims 
to the effect that certain encyclopaedias were 'approved' 
by a well known educational institution, or that an 
article complies with a British Standard, when this is 
189 
not the case. 
Statutory intervention is essential to prevent 
consumers being misled by false testimonial advertisements, 
and common law remedies exist for the protection of 
persons or organisations whose endorsement is applied to 
goods or services without their consent. For example, 
in appropriate circumstances an action for defamation may 
be successful, 190 or the tort of passing off may inhibit 
(187) Royal Automobile Association of South Australia 
(Ina) v Hanaoak [1939] SASR 60. 
(188) ·s 2 (1) (g). 
(189) See Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection and 
Fair Trading (1978), 242. 
(190) See, for example, TolZey v Fry [1931] AC 333; 
Mazatti v Aame Products Ltd (1930) 4 DLR 601; 
generally, see Chapter III, supra. 
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the use of unauthorised endorsements. 191 However, the 
efficacy of these common law remedies varies enormously192 
and, in any event, such remedies will not assist the many 
customers who may have purchased the product or entered 
into a service contract on the strength of such an 
endorsement. Consequently the publication of an 
advertisement that infringes section 9(5) is an offence 
punishable by a fine, 193 with the proviso that, once 
again, breaches of the provision are to be dealt with by 
negotiation rather than prosecution. 
(ii) Under the Medicines Act 1981 it is an offence to 
claim, either directly or by implication that a medicine, 
medical device, a method of treatment, is recommended by 
a medical practitioner, dentist, nurse, pharmacist or 
other "health" professional or person engaged in study or 
research in any of those areas. 194 Similarly, an 
offence is committed where it is suggested or indicated 
that the medicine, medical device or method of treatment 
advertised has beneficially affected the health of any 
(191) See, for example, Hornsby Information Centre Pty Ltd 
v Sydney Building Information Centre Pty Ltd (1978) 
18 ALR 639; Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd 
(1960} 60 SR (NSW) 576; Klissers Farmhouse 
Bakeries Ltd v Allied Foods Company Ltd [High 
Court, Auckland, 7 April 1982]; generally, see 
Chapter III, supra. 
{192) See. Chapter III, supra. 
(193) s 18 (2). 
(194) S 58(1) (c) ii; see also, section 2 for the 
definition of "practitioner". 
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195 person or group of persons. The former provision, 
as was its predecessor in the Food and Drug Act 1969, 
is designed to prevent the suggestion that an expert has 
recommended the product, even if that be the truth of 
the matter. Therefore, medical endorsements, including 
the use of the terms "doctors" or "chemists 11 , abbreviated 
professional qualifications or testimonials such as 
'endorsed by leading physicians and surgeons', are 
prohibited. The latter provision casts an even wider net 
in the sense that no testimonial advertisement may claim, 
indicate or suggest that the medicine, medical device or 
method of treatment has beneficially affected the health 
or any person. However, there is nothing to prevent an 
advertiser from claiming or indicating that 200,000 New 
Zealanders ~ a particular medicine - provided, of 
course, this is true. It is clear though, that the 
practice whereby letters are published from satisfied 
users (whether real or fictitious) of a medical product, 
is outlawed. 
{iii) No advertisement in respect of an animal remedy 
shall, expressly or by implication, state that the remedy 
is approved by the Animal Remedies Board or the Department 
f A . lt 196 o grJ.cu ure. The prohibition contained in the 
Police Offences Act 1927 against the publication of any 
advertisement using the term "Ruakuran in connection 
(195) S 58 (1) (c) iii. 
(196) Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 41(6); as amended 
by the Animal Remedies Amendment Act 1969, s 10. 
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197 
with specified types of agricultural products, is not 
reproduced in the Summary Offences Act 1981, which 
repeals the former Act, but the Flags, Emblems and Names 
Protection Act 1981 stipulates that every person who;,uses 
the name of this world renowned agricultural research 
station in connection with any business or trade or 
occupation commits an offence, unless such use is 
authorised. 198 
(iv) Finally, there are a number of particular rules 
designed to prohibit the use of other endorsements. 
a) Royal or Government Patronage. Lawson199 
comments that 
"rn days gone by, Queen Victoria was 
frequently depicted in the press as 
extolling the virtues of a well 
known meat extract. 11 
Today self regulatory practices on the part of the 
advertising industry coupled with legislative intervention 
have severely curtailed the use of the words such as 
"Royal" or "Government" in the advertising context. The 
Commercial Use of Royal Photographs Rules 1962 restrict 
the circumstances in which royal photographs may be used 
f d t . . . th d. 200 d . . or a ver 1s1ng purposes 1n e me 1a, an 1t 1s an 
offence to use publicly in connection with any business, 
trade or occupation any word or statement suggesting 
(197) S 22A. 
(198) s 20. 
(199) 'Royalty, Advertising and the Law', 1972 NZLJ 371. 
(200) See Lawson Ibid~ 371-372; Burrows op. cit., 353-354. 
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Royal or government patronage. 201 Similarly it is an 
offence to publish or cause to be published any advert-
isement that is likely to cause any person to believe, 
contrary to the fact, that the advertiser supplies goods 
or services to a government department or is carrying out 
work for such a department. 202 Furthermore by virtue of 
the Trade Marks Act 1953203 it is not possible to 
register a trademark that would suggest Royal or govern-
ment patronage, thus preventing the possibility of a 
prominently displayed trademark in the form of coat of 
arms, or heraldic emblem, conveying the impression of 
Royal or governmental endorsement. The prohibitions 
outlined above obviously do not apply where Royal or 
governmental consent is given, as the case may be. 204 
(b) Consumer Council and Consumers' Institute 
The Consumer Council Act 1966 renders everyone liable 
to a fine of two hundred dollars who publishes or causes 
to be published any advertisement which states that the 
Consumer Council or Consumer s' Institute has approved 
. 1 d . 205 part1cu ar goo s or serv1ces. The Council's functions, 
(201) Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981, s 14. 
(202) Ibid., s 15. 
(203) S 21; as amended by the Flags, Emblems and 
Names Protection Act 1981, s 27(1). 
(204) Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981, 
s 14(4) (a); Trade Marks Act 1953, s 21(1). 
(205) s 36. 
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as defined in the Act, 206 are 'to protect and promote 
the interests of consumers of goods or services by 
whatever lawful means appear to it expedient, and by so 
doing to encourage the improvement and development of 
industry and commerce'. Most of the Council's functions 
are carried out by the Consumers' Institute and the 
Institute, as a very important part of its work, tests 
and reports on the quality and price of various products 
and services. Given that a favourable report vis-a-vis 
a particular product or service would carry considerable 
weight _if used for advertising or promotional purposes, 
it was recognised that such use had to be controlled. 
Rather than run the risk of findings being distorted or 
used out of context or in a misleading fashion, 207 the 
Act imposes a 'blanket ban' upon the use of such findings· 
or the suggested approval by the Institute or Council in 
advertisements or other promotions. Given that the 
Council and the Consumers' Institute can only properly 
fulfil their functions if they maintain and foster a 
reputation of absolute impartiality, this approach is the 
only feasible one to adopt. 
(c) Various other organisations, names and 
associations may not be exploited for advertising purposes 
in the absence of the express permission of the body or 
person in question. 208 For example, it is an offence 
(206) See s 16; and ss 14-22. 
(207) For an example of this, see Consumer 84, page 121 
(an advertisement for a Britax Star-rider car seat 
falsely stated that the Consumers' Institute 
approved this product) • 
(208) See the Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 
1981, ss 16-20. 
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punishable by a fine of up to $500 to publicly use the 
word "D. S. I. R." in connection with any business, trade 
. 1 h t . 1 th . d 209 or occupat~on un ess t a use ~s express y au or~se . 
It is similarly an offence to suggest that ones product 
has other kinds of patronage or endorsement, for instance, 
by the United Nations, 210 the Girl Guides' Association211 
h f t t . 212 or t e House o Represen a ~ves. 
The power of testimonial advertisements and 
endorsements to influence the average consumer's purchas-
ing decisions make regulation in this area unavoidable. 
Where a- particular product is advertised as having the 
approval of the Consumers' Institute, or as having 
-passed rigorous D.S.I.R. tests, for example, and this is 
nottrue or is misleading, substantial distortions in 
purchasing patterns may result; that is, a substantial 
number of purchasers may buy the advertised product in 
preference to some other product that may be intrinsic-
ally better and/or safer and competition will be harmed 
severely. Therefore, extensive control in this area is 
not only desirable, but essential. 
(209) Ibid., ss 20 (3), 24. 
(210) Ibid., s 16. 
{211) Ibid., s 19. 
(212) Ibid. I s 14. 
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(4) MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
In addition to the general constraints imposed by 
the statutes discussed above, 213 a number of specific 
controls regulate advertising in particular industries, 
areas, and occupations. 
i) Certain regulations dictate that advertisements 
may not suggest that consumers may contract with 
advertisers on terms and conditions that would contravene 
the regulations. For example: 
a) The Hire Purchase and Credit Sales Stabilisation 
Regulat.ions 1957, enacted pursuant to the Ec.onomic 
Stabilisation Act 1948, were introduced to restrict the 
availability of credit as a means to control inflation. 214 
In pursuit of this objective the Regulations require 
certain minimum deposits and maximum periods of credit 
where certain goods are disposed of an instalment terms, 
and the amount owing must be paid by approximately equal 
. t 1 t t . t 1 1 . t 1 215 ~ns a men s a approx~ma e y equa ~n erva s. At 
present, minimum deposit percentages and maximum period 
of credit requirements are stipulated for new and 
secondhand motor cars and motor cycles216 and it would be 
(213) See, in particular, the provisions of the Consumer 
Information Act 1969 covering goods and services. 
(214) See Motor Mart Ltd v Webb [1958] NZLR 773, 778 where 
Turner J stated that the Regulations were 'introduced 
as a restriction of banking credit and are primarily 
Treasury Regulations concerned with the quantity of 
currency in circulation'. See also, Credit Serviae 
Investments Ltd v Carroll [1973] NZLR 246. 
(215) See the Schedules to the Regulations. 
(216) Regs 2(1), 6, and the Second Schedule. 
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an offence to suggest in an advertisement that new 
motor vehicles, for example, could be purchased on hire 
purchase terms with a deposit of less than the minimum 
required under the Regulations, viz., 60 per cent. No 
advertisement may offer, either directly or implicitly, 
nor create the impression that the court regards as 
likely, that goods are obtainable on terms and conditions 
that, if made the subject of the contract, would 
contravene the Regulations. 217 These Regulations being 
f 1 h t . t t d t . tl 218 o a pena c arac er, are ~n erpre e very s r~c y. 
b) Similarly, no advertisement may convey the 
impression that it offers possession of a car on terms and 
conditions that, if made the subject of a contract, would 
constitute a hiring agreement in contravention of the 
Economic Stabilisation (Motor Car Hiring) Regulations 
1971. 219 These regulations contain detailed rules that 
inter aZia, limit the duration of hiring agreements, 220 
prohibit the hiring of vehicles where more than five 
years has elapsed since the date of first registration221 
and proscribe a mini~·bum advance rental. 222 
(217) Reg 7. 
(218) See, for example, Ha~ke s Bay Credit Corpn Ltd v 
OffiaiaZ Assignee [1964] NZLR 154, 157; Quality. 
Auto Sales Ltd v Singsam [1975] 1 NZLR 251. 
(219) Reg 7. 
( 2 2 0) Reg 3 ( 2) • 
(221) Reg 3 (1). 
(222) Reg 5 (1). 
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The impact of these regulations, from the 
consumer's point of view, is minimal. Numerous attempts, 
223 both lawful and unlawful, are made to avoid and evade 
these provisions and the outcome of some of these succ-
essful attempts may leave the consumer in a less than 
satisfactory position. For example, Regulation 6 of the 
Hire Purchase and Credit Sales Stabilisation Regulations 
1957 prohibits a seller or lender from making a loan on 
the security of goods in excess of the maximum loan 
value. Obviously, if a vendor could provide cash for a 
purcha~er to buy the goods and then secure the loan by 
taking a mortgage over the goods the minimum deposit 
-requirements of the regulations could be evaded with 
impunity. However, it is by no means uncommon to see 
advertisements for the sale of motor vehicles that 
s~ggest that no deposit is payable. A person who is 
unable to meet the minimum deposit requirements under the 
Hire Purchase and Credit Sales Stabilisation Regulations 
1957 is encouraged to enter into a chattel mortgage agree-
ment in respect of other goods that he owns, or may be 
persuaded to take out a second mortgage on his house. As 
224 . Consumer po1nt out 
(223) See for example, Luhrs v Baird Investments Ltd £+958] 
NZLR 663 (inflation of a trade-in price); Credit 
Service Investments Ltd v QuarteZ [1970] NZLR 933 
(lease with provision for auction sale); Credit 
Serviae Investments Ltd v Evans [19741 2 NZLR 683 
(lease with verbal understanding that ownership 
would be given). 
(224) Consumer 184, pp l43-145. 
u 
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In this way, the law can force the sort 
of people who most need the protection 
given by the Hire Purchase Act into a 
kind of finance contract that ~ives 
them very inferior protection. ' 
ii) A number of statutory provisions and regulations 
restrict and define the manner and extent to which certain 
. b d . . . d 225 serv~ces may e a vert~se . 
a) Certain occupations and professions may only 
be pursued by persons who are duly licensed and/or 
registered in terms of the legislation governing that 
occupation or profession. For example, the Motor Vehicle 
Dealers Act 1975 provides that every p~rson who carries 
on business as a motor vehicle dealer must be licensed226 
and the Psychologists Act 1981 provides that only suitably 
. 227 qualified persons may be registered under the Act. 
Licensing and registration schemes have numerous and 
diverse objectives in mind228 but it is a common objective 
of most schemes to ensure that only suitably qualified 
persons of good character pursue that occupation or 
profession. 
(225) See Burrows, op. cit. 342. 
(226) s 7. See also the Wine Makers Act 1981, s 3; 
the Real Estate Agents Act 1976, s 16. 
(227) The Veterinary Surgeons Act 1957, s 11; Medical 
Practitioners Act 1968, s 18; Law Practitioners 
Act 1955, ss 14, 16, 23. 
(228) See Chirnberg, Essex and Kruger, Occupational 
Licensing Practices and Policies (1973); 
Gellhorn, 'The Ab~se of Occupation Licensing' 
(1976) 44 University of Chicago Law Review 6. 
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Due to the range and complexity of certain services 
and products the consumer is unlikely to make an 
informed choice when purchasing - how, for example, 
is a consumer to assess the quality of different 
medical practitioners or plumbers? The truth of the 
matter is that a consumer, unless he possesses expertise 
in that particular field, cannot make an informed 
choice as he lacks the necessary experience and training 
to make an objective evaluation or assessment. 
Therefore, the consumer attaches no little significance 
to the fact that Joe Bloggs has been registered or 
licensed as a medical practitioner, lawyer, plumber or 
real estate agent as the case may be. The assumption 
often made is that occupational licensing ensures that 
the practitioner will have passed some examinations, has 
some experience and is a suitable person for the conduct 
of that occupation. Given this potential reliance, it 
is important that persons not holding the relevant 
qualifications should be prevented from advertising 
themselves as being so qualified. Consequently, persons 
may not describe themselves as being "licensed" or 
"registered 11 unless this is true, 229 nor may persons 
describe themselves as belonging to a particular profess-
ion or institute unless they are so entitled. 230 The 
Summary Offences Act 1981 states that it is an offence 
(229) See for example, the Valuers Act 1948, s 42; the 
Surveyors Act 1966, s 39. 
(230) See for example, the Architects Act 1963, s 53; 
Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, s 26; Real Estate 
Agents Act 1976, s 69; Surveyors Act 1966, s 40. 
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for anyone to use in connection with his occupation 
any words or initials indicating, contrary to the fact, 
that he has a qualification of a university or other 
such institution, or is a member of such institution. 231 
The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that he 
is entitled to use the words or initials in question. 232 
b) While most professions have their own 
"in-house" rules relating to the content of advertisements, 
their size, and so on, the breach of which may result in 
disciplinary proceedings against the offending member, 
there are regulations ~vhich create punishable offences in 
respect of such breaches. For example, the Dentists 
Advertising Regulations 1970 imposes constraints on the 
type, content, size and frequency of any advertisement by 
a dentist and similar limitations apply to advertisements 
bl . h d b . . 233 pu ~s e y any opt~c~an. 
c) Persons pursuing certain occupations or offering 
certain services may be required to give certain informat-
ion in any advertisement. For example under the Real 
Estate Agents Act 1976 and the Motor Vehicle Dealers 
Act 1975234 licensed motor vehicle dealers and 
real estate agents, respectively, must give the 
information in all advertisements issued by them that 
they are licensed. Similarly, the Child Care Centre 
{231) s 20 (1). 
(232) s 20 (2). 
(233) Under the Practising Opticians Regulations 1942. 
See Burrows, op. cit., 343. 
(234) Ss 55, 53. 
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Regulations 1960 provide that all such centres must be 
registered and provision is made for various classes of 
registration. In any advertisement for a centre the 
class of registration applicable to it, or the class 
of registration to which it is not entitled must be 
. 235 gJ.ven. 
d) Section 48B of the Commerce Act 1975 makes it 
an offence to publish a false statement about the 
profitability, risk, or other material aspect of any 
business activity that is represe~ted to be one that is 
carried on at home, or involves the selling of goods 
other than by a wholesaler or retailer, or the sale of 
services by a person other than a person who is to 
supply the services. 
(iii) Finally, outdoor and aerial advertising are 
subject to particular controls in that: (a) local 
authorities are empowered to make bylaws to regulate, 
control or prohibit the display or continuance of display 
of 'posters, placards, handbills, writings, pictures, 
or devices for advertising or other purposes' 236 and, 
(235) See reg 33(b); Burrows, op. cit. 349. 
(236) See the Local Government Act 1974, s 684,paragraph 
15; see also the Transport Act 1962, s 77(rr) 
(regulations may be made prohibiting or restricting 
the use of reflective material on signs, hoardings, 
and similar structures used for advertising 
purposes in such a position that they are likely 
to reflect the lights of motor vehilces on any 
road); the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, 
ss 92-93. 
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(b) no aircraft may be used for the towing of any 
banner or other object except in accordance with 
such procedures and under such conditions as may 
be prescribed by the Director of the Civil Aviation 
237 Division of the Ministry of Transport. 
(237) See the Civil Aviation Regulations 1953, reg. 
43(2). Pursuant to this regulation the 
Director of Civil Aviation has prescribed condit-
ions for towing banners etc in Civil Aviation 
Safety Order Number 9, Part 1, section 5. This. 
section does not deal with what is displayed on 
any banner etc and is directed exclusively at 
safety considerations; such as, the competence 
of the pilot, the times and height at which such 
towing operations may be undertaken, and the 
power of the aircraft. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) APPROACHES TO STATUTORY CONTROL 
Different approaches to statutory control of 
advertising are embraced by the statutes which have been 
considered. It is proposed to consider these approaches in 
isolation in an endeavour to assess their effectiveness, or 
otherwise. 
(a) The Consultative Approach 
The Consumer Information Act 1969, which adopts this 
approach, has been described by R.J. Smithies, the Director 
of the Consumers' Institute as being a 'toothless laughing 
238 
stock'. This allegation is one of some substance in 
that no prosecution has ever been brought under the Act in 
spite of the fact that a significant number of complaints 
239 
are lodged annually. Even if it is argued that this 
number of complaints is not a sufficiently notable number 
and that, therefore, there is an extremely high level of 
voluntary compliance with the provisions of the Consumer 
Information Act 1969, it is suggested that a more cynical 
(238) 'Comment on Advertising', Unpublished Paper (1978); 
see also Consumer 145, 295. 
(239) The number of complaints made on average per year over 
the past three years are as follows: 
Advertising (s 9) 141 
Price representations {s 10) 59 
Source: Letter dated 12 July 1982 from J.H. Stothard, 
Office of the Examiner of Commercial Practices. 
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and, sadly, accurate evaluation would be that many of the 
provisions are ignored by less scrupulous advertisers, or 
are ignored by advertisers who are ignorant of their 
existence, and that these breaches go largely undetected 
d . h d 240 an unpunJ.s e • 
One of the main reasons why no prosecution has ever 
been brought under the Act is that the Act directs that 
extensive and laborious consultative procedures be pursued 
before a prosecution is brought; that is, section 19(1) states 
that no prosecution may be brought without the leave of the 
Examiner. While the Minister of Trade and Industry may 
authorise an immediate prosecution for an offence under the 
Cons~er Information Act 1969241 such authorisation has never 
been granted and the normal procedure is that enshrined in 
section 19 of the Act which requires extensive consultation 
before leave to prosecute an alleged offence may be given. 
Consider the following hypothetical case. 
( 2 40) 
(2 41) 
Individual x complains to the local office of the 
Department of Trade and Industry alleging that a 
particular advertisement is misleading. The 
complainant would then be referred to the Consumer 
Services and Commercial Practices Division of the 
Department. This Division would then investigate 
the complaint to establish whether it was prima facie 
justified. If it was then investigators would then go 
to the advertiser concerned and in appropriate 
circumstances ask the advertiser to justify the 
advertisement. If they found that a breach of the 
Act warranted prosecution the matter would be 
See, for 
Consumer 
Consumer 
Consumer 
Consumer 
example, Consumer 163,190; Consumer 158, 31; 
157,351; Consumer 154,244; Consumer 145,292; 
130,167; Consumer 120, 20?; Consumer 117,119, 
115, 56; Consumer 114,9; Consumer 102,351; 
Review 4, 123. 
----------------
S-20(1). 
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referred to the Head Office in Wellington for 
their decision. Before any leave to prosecute may 
be given the following procedures must be 
adopted, viz: 
i) A notice in writing must be served on the alleged 
offender informing him of the alleged offence and 
the facts alleged to constitute the offence and 
inviting him to make his views known regarding the 
alleged offence. The alleged offender must be given 
at least 14 days to reply. 
ii) If the advertiser admits the offence and states 
that he is prepared to confer with the Examiner the 
Examiner must serve on that person a notice inviting 
him to confer with the Examiner with a view to 
entering into an agreement whereby the consequences of 
the offence in the future will be avoided. Once again, 
the advertiser must be given at least 14 days to 
prepare for this meeting. 
iii) If the advertiser agrees to confer with the 
Examiner, the Examiner may only give leave for a 
prosecution to be commenced if - a satisfactory 
agreement cannot be entered into; or, there has been 
undue delay in entering into an agreement and an 
agreement is not entered into within 14 days after 
the Examiner has served a written notice of his 
intention to give leave for the commencement of a 
prosecution; or, the Examiner decides that in all 
the circumstances the person should be prosecuted. 242 
Therefore the minimum time span between the date of 
publication and commencement of any prosecution will 
be 28 days ~lus time for investigation and consultation. 
As Maclean2 3 suggests, a more realistic time span 
for this would be 5 months. 
Two consequences derive from these inordinate delays -
(a) By the time all these consultative procedures have 
been completed the advertiser may well have withdrawn or 
be prepared to withdraw the offending advertisement in any 
event. 
(242) See the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 19. 
(243) The Consumer and the Control of Advertising, Unpublished 
LL.M Thesis, University of Auckland, 1976, at pages 
89-90. This writer points out that: "The statutory 
notices required to be given total 28 days and between 
the giving of the first notice and the giving of the 
second statutory notice negotiations that amount to 
undue delay must have taken place. The minimum time 
therefore between publication and prosecution must be 
in excess of four weeks and would probably realistically 
be in excess of five months." 
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(ii) An advertising campaign will affect a consumer and 
his behaviour beyond the life of a campaign. For example, 
a misleading claim about a particular product may create an 
impression in a consumer's mind about that product, and 
thereafter successive advertisements, even if they do not 
contain the misleading claims, may trigger a conscious or 
subconscious memory of the favourable but misleading claim. 
Furthermore a false or misleading campaign may lead to the 
appropriation of some market share which the false advertiser 
may retain for a considerable time, as where a deceptive 
claim reinforces or creates a particular brand loyalty. 
While consultation is a commendable ideal it is 
submitted that the Consumer Information Act 1969 is unduly 
restrictive in specifying that, save with the Minister's 
consent, no prosecution shall be brought without the leave 
of the Examiner who, in turn, is obliged to follow the 
laborious procedure outlined in the Act before giving his 
consent. A discretion should be given to the Examiner to 
commence a prosecution immediately if he considers an 
immediate prosecution is justified or necessary. Furthermore, 
something must be done about the residual impact of false 
or deceptive advertising claims. The Examiner may, in any 
agreement entered into with the advertiser, 
244 
mitigate the consequences of the offence 
. t f t. d t. . 245 scope ex1s s or correc 1ve a ver 1s1ng 
( 2 4 4) s 19 ( 3) • 
(245) Infra, at 314 et seq. 
endeavour to 
and considerable 
i.e. affirmative 
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disclosure of facts which had been misrepresented in prior 
advertising may be required. However, if the advertiser 
refuses to agree to such a measure the only avenue open to 
the Examiner is to permit a prosecution in respect of the 
offence. 246 
Finally, the absence of large numbers of complaints 
alleging breaches of the advertising provisions is 
indicative of consumer ignorance and/or apathy, and the 
Department of Trade and Industry, being charged with the 
administration of so many statutes and regulations, 247 cannot 
possibly mount an effective surveillance of advertising. 
Therefore, a vast number of advertisements that infringe 
the provisions of the Consumer Information Act 1969 are never 
questioned. The solution may lie in the establishment of a 
Consumer Affairs Department which would be more attuned to 
consumer legislation and have the time to devote to ensure 
its implementation; or, in affording the consumer a right 
of action to recover damages for any loss that he suffers 
as a result of any breach of the Act's advertising 
provisions. It is interesting to note that the consultative 
procedures as embodied in the Food and Drug Act 1969 have 
been abandoned in the Food Act 1981 and the Medicines 
Act 198l,respectively. 
(246) S 19 (5) (c) (i). 
{247) For a breakdown of the extensive responsibilities of 
the Department refer to any recent Report of the 
Department of Trade and Industry to the House of 
Representatives. 
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(b) Pre-publication surveillance or vetting 
As mentioned above, the Animal Remedies Act 1967 
establishes an Animal Remedies Board that exercises control 
over the manufacture, importation, sale, advertising claims 
and use of animal remedies, ensures that chemicals may be 
safely used and are efficient, and issues licen~es to 
manufacturers of proven effective products. Each manufacturer 
gives the Board information about the effectiveness of his own 
product and this information must be substantiated. Usually, 
local and overseas laboratory and field trial results will be 
cited, and these are often backed up by local production -
response and toxicity trials. No advertisement in respect of 
an animal remedy may be published unless prior approval of 
the advertisement has been obtained from the Animal Remedies 
Board. 248 The Board, being in possession of detailed 
information regarding the product, is in an excellent position 
to evaluate the advertising claims, and may decline approval 
if any false, inaccurate, misleading or exaggerated claim 
is made. 
This approach has considerable advantages in t~at 
consumers are not exposed to misleading or deceptive claims 
and advertisers have the security of knowing that the 
advertisement has the approval of an independent and expert 
b d 249 0 y. The extension of this approach of pre-publication 
(248) S.41(1). 
(249) An analQgous approach is adopted in Israel under the 
Standard Contract Law 1964 (5724). A system is set up 
whereby restrictive standard form contracts may be 
submitted voluntarily to an administrative tribunal for 
vetting. If the tribunal approves the standard form 
contract that contract is not generally reviewable by 
the Courts, who under the same Act, are given extensive 
powers to invalidate unfair dispositions. See Deutch, 
Unfair Contracts (1977], 245. 
294 
surveillance or vetting of advertisements to all 
advertisements would be ideal, but totally impractical. 
The number of people required to implement an across-the-
board monitoring function would be astronomical and the 
associated expense would be prohibitive. However, as a 
compromise consideration could be given to the idea of 
advertisement substantiation. 
In the United States the Federal Trade Commission has 
initiated an advertisement substantiation programme in an 
attempt to ensure the existence of a reasonable basis for 
d t ... 1 . 250 Th . d . a ver 1s1ng c a1ms. e programme requ1res a vert1sers 
to prepare substantiation for their claims prior to 
dissemination and to produce this documentation at the FTC's 
request. 
Which advertisers are required to provide substantiation 
depends on a number of policy considerations including 
..... advertising dollar volume, advertising 
to sales ratios, industry size, industry 
concentration, consumer vulnerability and 
the degree of investment the consumer will 
make in the advertised product."251 
The FTC has emphasised that substantiation will generally 
only be required of 'major advertising themes which appear 
to be the most suspect and to have the greatest impact on 
b d ' ' ' 252 uyer ec1s1ons .. 
(250) See 36 Fed.Reg.s.l2,058 (1971). See also Notes, "The FTC 
Ad Substantiation Program", (1973} 61 The Georgetown 
Law Journal 1427. In Australia, the Report of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on The p·rices of Household Soaps 
and Detergents (1974),para 142, has recommended that a 
s1m1lar programme be established and developed to help 
combat unsubstantiated claims prevalent in the 
Australian Soaps and Detergent Industry. 
(251) 'The FTC Ad Substantiation Program', ibid, 1435. 
(252) 2 Trade Reg Rep, s.7573, at 12, 181-3 (FTC 1974). 
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The aim of this substantiation programme is twofold: 
that is, (i) it enables the FTC to evaluate the data supplied 
and facilitates the detection of unsubstantiated clatmsr and, 
(ii) data supplied may be made public thereby assisting 
consumers to make a rational choice as between competing 
1 . 253 c a~ms. 
In respect of the first objective, if the submitted 
documentation is unsatisfactory the FTC has power to 
declare the unsubstantiated advertisement to constitute an 
unfair and deceptive act within the meaning of section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 254 Removal of the 
unsubstantiated advertisement from circulation with, or 
without, the additional sanction of an order of corrective 
advertising might follow. 
The test that the FTC has adopted in relation to 
substantiation is that any product claim must rest upon a 
'reasonable basis'. Thus in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. 255 
the respondent company's claim that their Super Sport Wide 
oval tyres 'corner better, run cooler and stop 2·5~ quicker' 
was challenged by the FTC. The respondent company supplied 
data and tests that showed these tyres did stop 25% quicker 
in exceptionally icy road conditions, but no tests were 
performed on other types of road surfaces that could be called 
(253) Duggan, 'Fairness in Advertising: In Pursuit of the 
Hidden Persuaders'~ (1977-78)11 Melbourne University 
Law Review 50, 72. 
( 2 54) l~e.T"¥l~~ 
(255) 3 Trade Reg. Rep. s 20,112, s 20,069 (FTC 1972). 
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normal driving conditions. Thus, the issue was whether the 
respondent company's tests, limited to icy road circumstances, 
was an adequate scientific test substantiating a generalised 
claim of 25% better stopping capability. The FTC concluded 
that the respondent's limited test did not amount to a 
reasonable basis to substantiate the claim made in the 
.d t' t 256 a ver J.semen • 
Failure to provide adequate data exposes the 
advertiser to the charge that his advertising is unfair and 
deceptive and, as such, is in breach of section 5. 257 
The second objective of advertising substantiation 
rests upon the rationale that access to adequate information 
is a pre-requisite for a competitive market and rational 
consumer choices. The Commission has enumerated a number of 
policy considerations that will determine its decision 
whether or not to make data supplied available for public 
inspection; namely, (i) whether public disclosure can assist 
competing claims; (ii) whether the public's need is being met 
voluntarily by advertisers; (iii) whether public disclosure 
can enhance competition; (iv) whether the knowledge that 
such information will be made public will encourage 
advertisers to actually substantiate their claims by testing 
(256} See also Pfizer Inc. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. s 20,056; 
City InvestJ.hg Co. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. s 20,451, 
K Mart Enterprises Inc. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. s.20,661. 
(257) Federal Trade Commission Act (supra). 
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before making them; and (v) whether the Commission's 
limited ability to detect section 5 violations because of 
its limited resources, can be expanded by public 
disclosure of this information. 258 
One of the major advantages of this programme is that 
't th f f A D 259 1 ' ~ reverses e onus o proo • s uggan exp a~ns 
"Complaints will be substantiated against 
advertisers unless they can establish, in 
documentation submitted in response to 
Commission orders, that the claims in issue 
were supported by competent and reliable 
scientific tests." 
The reliability of advertising may be enhanced if 
advertisers are compelled to ascertain in advance the 
accuracy of their intended claims. Furthermore the programme 
makes available a vast quantity of comparative information 
to consumers who avail themselves of the opportunity 
provided to inspect data submitted to the Commission. 
However, critics of the substantiation programme 
maintain that the data submitted is often too technical for 
. . b th c . . 260 consumer rev~ew, or even rev~ew y e omm~ss~on. 
To remedy this problem the Commission announced in 1972 
that all substantiation documentation must be submitted with 
'plain language summaries'. Opponents of the programme also 
argue that it will cause a shift away from informative 
advertising to advertising using bland platitudes and 'puffs' 
which avoids saying anything in essence, thus evading the 
(258) 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971). 
(259) 6p.cit. 73. 
(260) 'The FTC and Substantiation Program', op.cit.1 1437. 
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advertisement substantiation requirement. This argument 
may be countered by saying that the consumer is better off 
without any information about a product than he is with 
misleading or possibly false information, 261 but this 
argument in rebuttal is too simplistic. The costs and 
benefits of any programme or device to control misleading 
advertising must be balanced,. and it may well be that the 
costs of substantiation outweigh the benefits of disclosure. 
As one writer argues 
11 [V]igorous enforcement of [advertisement 
substantiation] might have less of a preclusive 
·effect on false and deceptive advertising, which 
is already prohibited, than on truthful claims 
that are too expensive to substantiate".262 
Moreover, the success of the second objective of the 
advertisement substantiation programme, namely, the 
dissemination of detailed product information, depends on a 
significant number of consumers inspecting data that the 
Commission makes available. However this has not been the 
experience in the United States and the costs associated with 
the search will usually outweigh potential benefits in 
f 1 . 263 respect o ow cost 1tems. 
It may well be that advertisement substantiation amounts 
to 'an appealing idea of uncertain value•, 264 but it is 
nevertheless an idea that merits some attention in New 
Zealand. 
(261) Ibid, 1439. 
(262) Pitofsky, op.cit. 683. 
{263) Duggan, 'The Great Soap Opera' {1978)11 Melbourne 
University Law Review 467, 497. 
(264) Pitofsky, op.cit. 683. 
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(c) Strict Liability v Proof of Fault 
The Medicines Act 1981 and the Food Act 1981 create 
offences of strict liability in respect of breaches of 
th d t . . . . . th t' A 265 e a ver 1s1ng prov1s1ons 1n e respec 1ve cts. 
The predecessor of these Acts, the Food and Drugs Act 1969, 
also made an offence against the provisions of the Act one 
of strict liability but that Act made prosecution a measure 
of last resort, and provided that the normal procedure 
should be consultation and negotiation between the 
offender and the examiner from the Department of 
Health. 266 While this "buffer" of consultation is not 
reproduced in either the Food Act 1981 or the Medicines 
Act 1981 it is submitted that the weaknesses associated 
with consultative procedures, as evidenced by the 
ineffectiveness of the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
coupled with the potential harm to consumers of 
misrepresenting the qualities or purposes of certain foods 
and medicines, justify a strict liability approach in this 
area with immediate prosecution of any offence. 
Conversely the Consumer Information Act 1969 does 
not make it clear whether or not section 18, which makes 
it an offence to act in contravention of or fail to comply 
with any provision of the Act or the regulations made 
pursuant to the Act, imposes strict liability or not. In 
(265) Food Act 1981, ss 11(3), 30; Medicines Act 1981, 
ss 57(4), 58(2), 80. 
(266} Food and Drug Act 1969, s 34. 
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light of this uncertainty the Courts could adopt the 
approach of the House of Lords in Sweet v ParsZey 261 
and resolve the issue in favour of any defendant; that 
is, that a court should be reluctant to conclude that an 
offence is one of strict liability in the absence of good 
reason f:or so concluding and in the absence of clear 
. f h . t t b p l' t 268 express~on o sue ~n en y ar ~amen . The Animal 
Remedies Act 1967, section 41(7), provides that only a 
person who "wilfully publishes" an advertisement in 
contravention of the advertising provision may be 
convicted. The term "wilfully" has been less than 
consistently interpreted269 but it is submitted that in 
.this context it must be taken to import a requirement of 
mens rea. This is a' not unreasonable attitude to adopt 
in circumstances where the advertiser has had to submit 
his advertisement for appraisal prior to publication; a 
departure from the approved version would be difficult to 
explain. 
A compromise is achieved in the Merchandise Marks 
Act 1954 in that mens rea is required but the onus of 
Proof ;s reversed. 270 • It · f th ff d t • ~s or e o en er o prove 
(267) [1970] AC 132. 
(268} Ibid, 149; see also R v Strawbridge [1970] NZLR 909; 
PoZice v Creedon [1976] l NZLR 571 (McCarthy P at 
573-575, and Cooke J, at 585-586, stress that in a 
case of uncertainty the presumption in favour of 
mens rea should apply); R v City of Sault Marie 
(1978) 85 DLR (3d} 161; Ministry of Transport v 
Burnett& Motors Ltd [1980] NZLR 51, 58. 
(269) See Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (4 ed, 1978} at 
pages 104-105, and the cases there cited. 
{270) s 9. 
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that he acted without "intent to defraud" if he wishes to 
escape liability. Similarly a defendant may escape 
prosecution for an offence under the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 by proving that he or his servant had no knowledge 
of the advertisement before it was made or that he took 
11 t abl 'bl t t 't d' . t' 271 a s eps reason y poss~ e o preven ~ s ~ssem~na ~on. 
The Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981 also excuse 
any person who can prove that he did not intend to commit 
an offence and took all reasonable steps to ensure 
1 . 272 comp ~ance. 
Gordon Berrie, the Director General of Fair Trading 
273 in the United Kingdom, commented recently that 
"Much of consumer protection legislation 
creates strict liability offences and it 
can seem unfair for a trader to be 
convicted for an offence when no intent 
or recklessness on his part has been proved". 
While this is undoubtedly true, strict liability does ensure 
that there is high standard of compliance and that it is not 
impossible for a prosecution to establish a case. Acts 
{271) s 38. 
(272) See, ss 30, 80 respectively. It is interesting to note 
that this approach is mirrored to a certain extent 
in cases involving other regulatory offences; for 
example, in R v City of Sault Ste Marie~ supra, the 
City had been charged with polluting a river contr~ry 
to the provisions of the Ontario Water Resources 
Act 1970. The City accepted that there had been a 
discharge but sought to deny liability claiming that 
it was the fault of an independent contractor. The 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a defence of 
absence of fault was available in respect of a strict 
liability offence, with the onus being upon the 
defendant to establish such absence on a balance of 
probabilities. Generally see Cato, 'Strict 
Liability and the Half-Way House', [19811 NZLJ 294. 
(2 73) 'Laws and Codes for Consumers', [19 80] Journal of 
Business Law 315, 320. 
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such as the Food Act 1981, the Medicines Act 1981 and the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981 strike the ideal compromise in 
that the offender may escape liability by negativing 
intent or recklessness and yet the onus is not on the 
prosecution to demonstrate the existence of such elements. 
(2) INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF ADVERTISEMENTS 
Advertising has as it s primary objective the promotion 
of sales in respect of goods and services and therefore 
information that is transmitted in any advertisement must, 
of necessity, be in harmony with this objective. It would 
not be in the interests of a cigarette manufacturer to 
impart information relating to alleged health dangers 
arising out of smoking unless, of course, he chose to 
emphasise that the low tar properties of his brand of 
cigarettes minimised those health risks. This serves to 
highlight the following points about advertising and 
informational content; namely, (i) the information that 
is given is not likely to be anything other than partisan 
in nature; (ii) while advertisements may be said to 
persuade and inform it is clear that the latter 
objective is subordinated to the former, and; 
(iii) information that is given is incomplete and 
selective. Furthermore, very little information is 
capable of verification by reference to any kind of 
objective criteria. 
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As Trebilcock explains 274 
"Today, I am encouraged to buy my breakfast 
cereal because it "snaps, crackles and pops", 
my coke because it is "the real thing", my 
floor cleaner because it is a "white tornado", 
my Buick because it is "something we believe 
in." 
Given the premise that the existence of adequately informed 
consumers is a pre-requisite for workable competition275 
what can be done about the content of advertisements? 
The Statutory provisions discussed above have as 
their main thrust the control of misleading and deceptive 
advertisements and very little attempt it made to bolster 
the informational content of advertisements. This is not 
to suggest that no attempt has been made in this direction. 
For example, in the Credit Contracts Act 1981 the 
legislature has opted for a compromise in that an 
advertiser is obliged to disclose the finance rate in any 
advertisement that indicates the rate of interest or other 
charges, but where he is silent as to the rate of interest 
or these other charges there is no requirement that he give 
the finance rate. 276 That the Legislature stopped short 
of compelling advertisers to incorporate the finance rate 
in all advertisements demonstrates the type of difficulty 
inherent in any policy of mandatory disclosure; that is, 
it is not possible to give the finance rate in certain 
(274) 'Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society' (1970) 
16 McGill LJ 263, 282. 
(275) See Introduction, supra. 
(276) S 36 (as amended by the Credit Contracts Amendment 
Act 1982, s 5). 
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circumstances as where the computation of this rate 
depends upon the particular debtor and his credit 
worthiness. Other examples of compulsory disclosure of 
information in advertisements include: (i) disclosure of 
the true name of the advertiser in any medical 
advertisement, 277 (ii) the disclosure of the fact that a 
pesticide has been registered in any advertisement for 
such a product2 ~ 8 and, (iii) an advertisement for an animal 
278A 
remedy must give the Licence number of the remedy. 
Furthermore, as I shall discuss, mandatory disclosure has 
f d t t t 1 t 'd th d t' . 279 oun s a u ory approva ou s1 e e a ver 1s1ng arena. 
Mandatory disclosure of information in advertisements 
runs into several obstacles. Not only are there 
complications of the type encountered with disclosure of 
the finance rate in credit advertisements, namely, that it 
is impossible to frame provisions that cover the myriad of 
diverse circumstances that exist, but it may be 
practically impossible for an advertiser to effect full 
disclosure of required information. Given that an average 
television advertisement is of 30 seconds duration, an 
advertiser would be hard pressed to give any "hard" 
information in that time. Furthermore, the disclosure of 
{277) Medicines Act 1981, s 59. 
(278) Pesticides Act 1979, s 40(2). 
(278A)Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 41(6}. 
(279) Infra. For example in mandatory disclosure of the 
terms of a credit contract, in packaging and 
labelling legislation and under the Motor Vehicle 
Dealers Act 1975. 
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information must be in a form that renders it intelligible 
to the average consumer and the provision of detailed 
scientific data and information about tests is not likely 
to improve the perception of the hypothetical reasonable 
person. It has been suggested that these complications 
may be overcome if disclosure is confined to 'information 
directly contrary to a factual impression conveyed by an 
advertisement •.. when it is likely to affect the consumption 
decisions of a substantial number of 280 persons'. As 
1 k d 281 . h' f '1 t t k . B a eney an Barnes po1nt out t 1s a1 s o a e 1nto 
account the fact that obligatory amplification of 
information contained in advertisements would be of little 
benefit where image advertising is concerned and where 
emulation of an exciting life style is the main selling 
point. Notwithstanding these complications the following 
approaches towards improving the informational content of 
advertisements merit some mention. 
(a) Free counter-advertising 
Turning yet again to the United States, the Federal 
C . t' c . . 282 . th 11 d ommun1ca 1ons omm1ss1on recogn1ses e so-ca e 
"fairness" doctrine whereby broadcasters are under a duty to 
broadcast issues of public importance, and to broadcast 
(280) Note, 'Fairness and Unfairness in TV Product 
Advertising', (1978) 76 Michigan LR 498, 526. 
(281) 'Advertising Regulation in Australia: An Evaluation', 
[19 82] Adelaide LR 2 9, 32. 
(282) The Communications Act 1934, 47 USC 301, consolidated 
regulatory control of 'communications by wire and 
radio' under the Federal Communications Commission. 
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conflicting views on th . 283 ese 1ssues. The doctrine thus 
incorporates the dual concepts of required and balanced 
presentation. In 1946 the applicability of the doctrine 
to commercial advertising was considered in In Re Sam 
M • 2 84 . 1 . d. t . ' f 1 t arr~s~ a case 1nvo v1ng a ra 10 s at1on s re usa o 
sell commercial time for the broadcasting of advertisements 
advocating abstinence from alcohol. 
The Commission stated: 
"Difference concerning the relative merits of one 
product over another does not usually divide the 
community by raising basic and important social, 
economic or political issues. But it must be 
recognised that under some circumstances it may 
well do so ••• [and] .•. this controversy .•. may 
assume the proportions of a controverted issue 
of public importance. The fact that the 
occasion for the controversy happens to be the 
advertising of a product cannot serve to diminish 
the duty of the broadcaster to treat it as such 
as an issue".285 
In Banzhaf v Fcc286 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia ruled that because cigarette 
smoking poses a pervasive health hazard, radio and television 
stations must provide reasonable time to anti-smoking 
organisations to publicise their viewpoints. 
(283) See Simmons, 'Commercial Advertising and the Fairness 
Doctrine: The New FCC Policy in Perspective' (1975) 75 
Columbia LR 1083, 1086; Notes, 'The Fairness Doctrine 
and Access to Reply to Product Commercials', (1976) 
51 Indiana LJ 756. 
(284) 11 FCC 197 (1946}. 
(285) Ibid, 198-199. 
(286) (1968) 405 F 2d 1082. 
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The Federal Communications Committee demonstrated 
considerable reluctance in extending the 'fairness' doctrine 
. h f' ld f d d . . 287 h d . ~n t e ~e o pro uct a vert~s~ng, owever, an ~n 
1974 the Commission ruled that simple product promotion is 
no longer subject to the fairness doctrine unless the 
advertisement affirmatively discusses a controversial 
public issue. 288 The Commission presented four reasons for 
this conclusion. First, it was thought more appropriate for 
the legislature to determine whether products are dangerous 
to health or otherwise detrimental to the public interest, 
and to take appropriate steps to publicise their findings 
or restrict distribution of those products. Second, the 
Commission thought that extensive application of the 
fairness doctrine to product commercials would have 
disastrous economic consequences for broadcasting; for 
example, 'valuable free time would have to be given up for 
rebuttal programming• 289 and the cost of advertising might 
. . d abl h f d t. . t. 290 . ~ncrease cons~ er y to cover t e ree a ver ~s~ng ~me. 
(287) For example, in In Re Friends of the Earth (1971) 449 
F 2d 1164 the Commission dismissed a fairness doctrine 
complaint alleging a failure to present balanced 
coverage of air pollution caused by large 
combustion engines, and endeavoured t~distinguish 
the Banzhaf case. The Court held tha~;~wo situations 
were indistinguishable. See Simmons, lo~.cit. 1096. 
(288) Federal Communications Commission, 'Fairness Doctrine 
and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report 
Regarding Handling of Public Issues', 39 Fed Reg 26,372 
{1974). 
( 2 89) Simmons, lac • ..£.!!. , 1110. 
(290) Trebilcock, 'Private Law Remedies for Misleading 
Advertising', (1972)22 University of Toronto LJ 1,30, 
comments that counter-advertising would double 'the 
advertising component in the cost structure of products 
because, presumably, the media would need to double the 
advertiser's bill in order to pay for the other side's 
air time. Thus the consumer would end up having to foot 
greatly increased advertising costs'. 
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Thus the FCC suggested that by applying the fairness 
doctrine to standard product and service advertisements it 
would infringe unnecessarily upon a broadcaster's 
constitutional freedom of speech. Fourth, the application 
of the fairness doctrine to product advertising was not going 
to contribute much to the underlying issue, i.e., issues of 
public importance to consumers merit full discussion and not 
short counter-advertising imposed by the fairness doctrine. 
Undoubtedly counter-advertising possesses the 
potential to enhance the informational content of 
advertisements, but in the end result the consumer will pay 
heavily for this information. For example, if the New 
Zealand media were under a statutory obligation to provide 
free counter-advertising where controversial issues of 
public importance are raised by commercial advertising 
their rates of advertising would rise rapidly to cover 
this "free" air time. Advertisers would undoubtedly pass 
these increased costs on to the consumer via increased 
prices. Even where counter-advertising is paid for by the 
advertiser who disagrees with the original advertiser these 
costs will fall on the consumer where that counter-
advertiser is in the business of selling goods and services 
as such additional costs will be reflected in the prices 
that he sets for consumers of his products or services. 
Thus, counter-advertising is not an attractive remedy for 
informational deficiencies in advertising - there is no 
such thing as "free" counter-advertising from the 
consumer's point of view. 
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(b) Promulgation of Information Standards 
Even accepting the difficulties inherent in 
legislating for informational content there is considerable 
room for improvement. For example: 
(1) Price information. Some advertisements do not 
indicate the price for which advertised products may be 
purchased. It would be of considerable benefit to consumers 
and no great imposition on advertisers if mandatory 
disclosure of the price in all advertisements for goods was 
required. Such a rule in relation to services would be 
the 
unworkable in most cases in that;type of job involved may 
dictate the price. The rule could, however, be extended to 
mandatory disclosure of 11 hourly rates" in respect of the 
provision of services. 
Furthermore, where comparative price advertising is 
employed there is much scope for clarification. The 
reference price, whether it is described as the "normal", 
"usual", 11 suggested retail price" or "manufacturers 
recommended price", is too often fictitious or 
unrealistically inflated so as to create the impression of 
an apparently generous reduction. Therefore it is 
recommended that comparative price advertising be 
restricted in the following ways: 
(i) That no price comparisons be permitted with a 
recommended or suggested retail price by a person who 
supplies goods at retail or who supplies services. 
Standard supermarket advertising practice in New Zealand 
is to use suggested retail prices as reference prices and 
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while many of these suggested retail prices are genuine 
attempts to set a market price, it is abundantly clear that 
many supermarkets never charge, nor contemplate charging, 
anything like the suggested retail price for certain lines 
of goods, and this artificially high price is simply used 
to create the impression of substantial savings. Given 
that it would be impossible to determine which recommended 
or suggested retail prices are genuine, the only recourse is 
to prohibit the use of such, or similar, recommended prices 
in comparative price advertisements. 
(ii) Advertised reductions below "usual" or "normal" 
prices must be genuine. At present, the Consumer Information 
Act 1969 would catch any false indications that goods are 
being supplied at or below a previous price, or at a price 
1 h . . b . f. d 291 f ess t an a prev~ous pr~ce y a spec~ ~e amount; or 
example, where the normal price is a product of the 
d . I • • t' 292 H th . th' t a vert~ser s ~mag~na ~on. owever, ere ~s no ~ng o 
prevent an advertiser who owns two or more retail outlets 
from indicating a reduced price in retail outlet A when 
the higher price in fact obtained in outlet B, which may 
not only be a considerable distance away but may also be 
. h '1 . 11 h. h 29 3 ~n an area w ere reta~ marg1ns are norma y 1g er. 
This position could be regulated by requiring (i} that 
the "usual" or "normal" price be the price that prevailed 
(291) Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10(2}. 
(292) See Consumer 190, 335 for an example of misleading 
price 11 reductions" on sewing machines. 
(293) See Lawson, Advertising Law (1978), 246. 
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generally, or if this is not the case, the advertiser 
should be under an obligation to disclose the locality 
where the price did obtain; and (ii) the price must have 
prevailed for a reasonable time. It is submitted that the 
adoption of provisions to the above effect would improve 
both the quality and quantity of information relating to 
prices and that this would have a beneficial impact on 
competition. 
(2) Information relating to product quality. There 
is extensive use of product safety standards in New Zealand, 
so the question arises: Why isn't there like provision for 
product information standards? For example, in respect of 
a motor vehicle an advertiser might be placed under an 
obligation to incorporate certain particulars in the 
advertisement for such a product; such as, the price, the 
vehicle's fuel consumption, the nature and brief details 
of any manufacturer's warranty, and certain safety 
information; e.g. whether rear seat belts are fitted etc. 
294 Palmer suggested in 1975 that a Products Safety 
Commission be established charged with the responsibility 
of administering a Products Safety Act. Primary functions 
of this Commission would be to formulate products safety 
standards and products information standards. 295 As regards 
products safety standards, consumers are well served in 
New Zealand already in that the Standards Association, an 
(294) 'Dangerous Products and the Consumer in New Zealand', 
[1975] NZLJ 366. 
( 2 9 5 ) Ibid , 3 7 8- 3 7 9 . 
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independent organisation established under the Standards 
Act 1965, has promulgated or endorsed over 2,400 standards 
. l d d ' 296 Wh'l f t . for part1cu ar pro ucts or es1gns. 1 e sa e y 1s 
the dominating consideration in the preparation of New 
Zealand standards, a New Zealand standard also has 
reference to factors such as performance, quality, 
durability, origin or composition and before a standard is 
established a detailed study by a project committee of 
experts is conducted and ample opportunity is afforded 
for comment by the public and interested groups on a draft 
297 that is prepared. 
While this writer would not be in favour of the 
. . f d s f . . 29 8 . t . creat1on o a Pro ucts a ety Comm1ss1on, 1 1s 
recommended that a Consumer Affairs Department assume 
responsibility, inter alia, for the establishment of product 
information standards to be prescribed by regulation. This 
Department would have access to the extensive information of, 
and tests conducted by, the Standards Association and would 
be in a good position to order that certain performance and 
safety information be incorporated in any advertisement for 
(296) 'The 2400 - plus technical standards may be product 
specifications such as those for electrical 
appli ances, Christmas tree lights, safety footwear, 
aluminium windows or PVC pipe; they may be in the form 
of safety requirements for power mowers or plants .for 
mechanical refrigeration etc', see Standards, (Vol. 27, 
No. 7) at page 10. 
(297) See Mansell, 'The Use of Standards in New Zealand Law', 
(1980)10 Victoria University of Wellington LR 333, 334. 
(298) The main reason being that I am of the opinion that a 
move should be made away from fragmentation of control 
in the consumer protection field. Rather than create 
another regulatory body I am in favour of the 
establishment of a Consumer Affairs Department with 
overall control and responsibility fo+ consumer 
protection. See Chapter VI, Conclusion, infra. 
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specified products. Furthermore, where any standard exists 
in respect of a particular product a person advertising 
the supply of such goods at retail should be under an 
obligation to disclose whether the product meets the New 
299 Zealand Standard for such a product. Provision of more 
information relating to quality would promote competition 
and considerable incentive for improvement would be 
engendered amongst manufacturers whose products did not 
meet the relevant New Zealand Standard for the product 
concerned. 300 
In· conclusion, therefore, it is suggested that the 
informational content of advertisements may be improved by 
the promulgation of information standards. Recognising 
that the provision of too much information is self defeating 
and impractical, emphasis should be placed on mandatory 
disclosure of accurate price information and on 
dissemination of salient details relating to quality and 
(299) Certain standards have legal effect, of course,in that 
they are incorporated in statutes and regulations and 
marketing of sub-standard products may be prohibitedf 
e.g. protective helmets for motor cyclists,safety glass 
for motor vehicles and car seat belts are all required 
to comply with standard specifications under the 
Traffic Regulations 1976. Furthermore, the various 
statutes and subordinate legislation governing 
packaging and labelling prescribe that certain 
information be contained on packages and labels of 
miscellaneous goods, and these goods must meet 
certain product standards. See Chapter V, Disclosure 
of Information, infra. 
(300) The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia), s 63(2), 
provides that information standards as are reasonably 
necessary to give persons using goods accurate 
information as to the quantity, quality, nature or 
value of goods may be established. Civil and criminal 
liability may be imposed on any person who supplies 
goods without the designated product information. 
Generally, see Blakeney and Barnes, lot:,. cit. , 45-46. 
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performance. As regards the disclosure of information 
relating to quality and performance, regulations would 
have to be on a product by product basis, in that it would 
be impossible to draft regulations of sufficient 
specificity that would cover the range of products on the 
market. 
(3) CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING 
No discussion of statutory regulation of advertising 
would be complete without a consideration of corrective 
advertising. In the United States the Federal Trade 
Commission is the primary government regulator of 
advertising and its authority is derived from section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 301 which reads in part: 
"Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are declared 
unlawful". 
Under this vague standard the Commission is given a great 
latitude to select a strategy of regulation that it 
considers would most effectively prevent deceptive 
advertising and the resulting harm to consumers and 
distortions in competition. The primary Federal Trade 
302 Commission (FTC) remedy is a cease and desist order; 
that is, when the Commission, as a result of an 
(301) 15 USC 45 (1970), as amended 15 USC 45 (Supp.IV, 1974) 
(302) Federal Trade Commission Act, s 45(b). 
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investigation has reason to believe that any advertiser 
is using an unfair or deceptive act or practice in 
commerce, it will first attempt to induce the advertiser 
to voluntarily enter into a consent order to cease and 
desist the illegal practice; 303 if the FTC is unable to 
obtain a consent order it then files a complaint which is 
heard by an administrative law judge who must file a 
decision within 90 days of the receipt of all evidence. 304 
Corrective advertising is a remedy whereby an 
advertiser found to have engaged in false, misleading or 
unfair advertising would be required not only to cease and 
desist from such practices in the future, but also to 
disclose the facts which had been misrepresented in the prior 
advertising; that is, a corrective advertisement consists of 
an acknowledgement that previous advertisements were 
deceptive and endeavours to correct the misconceptions they 
created. 305 Two major reasons are said to underliecorrective 
advertising, namely; 
i) An advertising campaign will affect the consumer 
and his behaviour beyond the life of the campaign. Thus the 
traditional cease and desist order which amounts to a 
direction to 'go and sin no more' is ineffective in 
completely eliminating the deception. For example, a 
(303) Ibid; see also Cox, Fellmeth and Schulz, 'The Nader 
Report' on the Federal Trade Commission (1969) ,39-43. 
(304) Ibid. From this decision either party may appeal to 
the Full Commission, and respondent may appeal further 
to the Court of Appeals, and from there either party 
may petition the United States Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari. 
(305) See for example: Pitofsky, 'Beyond Nader: Consumer 
Protection and the Regulation of Advertising' (1977) 
90 Harvard Law Review 661, 692. 
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misleading claim in respect of a product may create an 
impression in the consumer's mind about that product and 
thereafter successive advertisements, even if they do not 
contain the misleading claims, may trigger a conscious or 
sub-conscious memory of the favourable but misleading 
claim. Consequently one of the primary functions of 
corrective advertising is to dissipate the adverse effects 
of false or misleading advertising by alerting the consumer 
that he has been acting on erroneous information in the 
hope that his future practices will not be influenced by 
h d . d . 306 t e ecept1ve a vert1sement. 
ii) A false or misleading advertising campaign may 
result in the appropriation of some market share which 
the false advertiser will most likely retain until such 
time as consumers are informed of the misinformation upon 
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which they based their decisions to purchase. For 
example the development of brand loyalties may be 
influenced by a deceptive claim and for several years the 
advertiser may reap the benefits and continued sales 
based on the initial deception. 
Consequently corrective advertising aims to eliminate 
the influences of deceptive claims from future consumer 
behaviour and seeks 'to deprive illegal advertisers of the 
unlawful fruits of their violations ..• ' . 308 
(306) Ibid, 696. 
(307) Thain, 'Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases' 
(1973) 19 New York Law Forum 1, 18. 
(308) Pitofsky, lo,c. cit. 696. 
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Corrective advertising as a remedy has been sparingly 
used and although it was first mooted in 1969 309 , it was 
only in 1975 310 that the Commission finally imposed the 
remedy in a litigated case. 311 This reticence sterns from 
the .restricted view as to when the remedy may 
appropriately be employed. As the FTC explained in 
Warner-Lambert Co. 312 
11 [I]f a deceptive advertisement has played a 
substantial .~ole in creating or reinforcing 
in the public's mind a false and material 
belief which lives on after the false 
advertising ceases, there is clear and 
continuing injury to competition and to the 
consuming public as consumers continue to 
make purchasing decisions based on the false 
belief. Since this injury cannot be averted 
by merely requiring respondent to cease 
disseminating the advertisement, we may 
appropriately order respondent to take 
affirmative action designed to terminate the 
otherwis.e continuing ill effects of the 
advertisement.313 
The following factors may be identified as necessary 
prerequisites for the order of corrective advertising: 
i} The advertisement complained of must have residual 
. 0 . 7 c 314 th d t h d 1mpact. In Sun ~~ o. e respon en company s owe an 
advertisement in which a car fueled with "Sunoco 260" petrol 
(309) Campbell Soup Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade 
Reg Rep 19; 261; 21421 (FTC 1970). 
(310) Warner Lambert Co. [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade· 
Reg Rep 21,066 (FTC 1975). 
{311} Numerous corrective advertising orders have been 
issued as part of consent orders. See for example, 
Thain, fo~. cit., 2-17. 
(312) Op. ~· 
(313) Underlining is mine. 
(314) 3 Trade Reg Rep 20, 658 (FTC 1974). 
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pulled a freight train weighing over 100 tons. The 
representation was made that "Sunoco" alone could provide 
such high performance because its 260 brand is the 
'world's highest octane gasoline'. While the Administrative 
Law Judge found it deceptive to advertise the octane rating 
as indicative of power, he saw no residual injury upon which 
the corrective advertising order could be predicated. His 
reasoning was t~at since the energy crisis began 'power is 
no longer the theme of gasoline promotions' and motorists 
no longer associate octane with power, or even consider it 
. t t 315 1mpor an_ . Furthermore, it was held that the burden of 
proof is on the FTC to demonstrate the existence of a 
residual effect - no easy task! 
ii) The advertisement must be false, misleading or 
316 deceptive in a material respect. As Pitofsky suggests 
"[A] corrective message for an insignificant 
fraud (for example, that a car gets only 
twenty four miles per gallon rather than the 
claimed twenty five) or for a false claim of 
marginal significance in most consumers' 
purchasing decisions (e.g. domestic origin 
claims or testimonials by celebrities who do 
not use the product) would impair rather than 
assist a consumers ability to make purchasing 
decisions". 
Furthermore it is doubtful whether corrective advertising 
is an appropriate remedy where only a small number of the 
population is deceived. 317 In Fei l v FTC another remedy., 
(315) Idem. 
( 31 p) Lee.. cit. 6 9 8 . 
(317) 285 F 2d 879 {9th Cir. 1960). 
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affirmative disclosure, was ordered in circumstances where 
the Commission had only to show that three per cent of the 
audience were deceived and in Chartes of the Ritz 
Distributors Corp. v FTc 318 it was held that the FTC is 
empowered to protect the 'ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous', regardless of their numbers. However, in the 
case of corrective advertising the advertiser could argue 
strongly that (a) he should not be forced to confess past 
illegal acts in the advertising media where only a small 
number of consumers have been deceived, as this might cause 
him to lose sales to those who were not originally deceived, 
and; (b) that a corrective message designed to clear up 
the misconceptions of a few is more likely to be confusing 
and useless to the majority. This question awaits final 
. . 
resolution but it may be that the courts will require 
deception in a more material respect, that is, either in 
the nature of the deception itself, or in the number of 
consumers deceived before corrective advertising is 
ordered. Other significant factors influencing the order 
of corrective advertising are succinctly enumerated by 
Thain319 in the following terms: 
"(F)actors to be considered include whether 
the claims are such that consumers cannot 
determine the honesty of the representations 
by themselves (e.g. nutritional, efficacy, or 
safety claims; the size and characteristics of 
the audience; the sales volume and market 
positions of the advertiser; the kind of 
product advertised; the blatancy of the 
deception; and the potential danger to the 
health and safety of the consumer)." 
( 318) 14 3 F 2 d 6 7 6 ( 2 d Ci r . 19 4 4) • 
(319) lo~. cit. 24. 
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The type and content of corrective advertising 
orders may vary greatly, but generally advertisers are 
obliged, either (a) to discontinue advertising for a 
period of time, usually one year, or; {b) to disseminate 
a corrective message that accounts for a stipulated 
percentage of the advertiser's budget for a period of one 
year. 32° For example, in ITT ContinentaZ Baking Co. 321 the 
respondent company was obliged to allocate twenty-five 
percent of advertising expenditures for each medium in 
each market for one year to the dissemination of the 
. d . w b 322 correct1ve message, an 1n arner-Lam ert Co. an even 
more stringent requirement, that the respondent include a 
corrective message in all product advertising until it 
had expended an amount equal to its average annual 
advertising budget over a ten year period, was imposed. 
Provision also exists in Australia for affirmative 
disclosure and corrective advertising in that Section 80A 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 empowers the Federal Court 
of Australia on the application of the Trade Practices 
Commission or the Minister of Business and Consumer Affairs 
to order a person who has contravened the consumer 
protection provisions of the Act to publish corrective 
advertisements or to make affirmative disclosures. 
However the Federal Court has not yet made any orders 
(320) Pitofsky, lo~.cit. 700. 
(321) 3 Trade Reg. Rep 19, 681 
(322) Supra. 
32~ 
under s.80A and its comments in Trade Praatiaes 
Commission v Annand & Thompson Pty Ltd~ 323 in which an 
application for an order was refused, suggest that the 
remedy may be limited to circumstances much like those 
outlined above in the consideration of this remedy in 
the United States. 324 Fisher J suggested that 
" .•. (T)here is no justification for making an 
order under that section unless there is 
reason to believe that the respondent has 
engaged on a number of occasions in the 
relevant conduct, which conduct in each 
instance is misleading or deceptive without 
being substantially dependent on the 
circumstances of the occasion. Alternatively 
an order under s.80A is appropriate if a 
uniform course of conduct, whether by way of 
advertising or use of documents, or otherwise, 
has occurred. Moreover, there must be 
evidence from which it can be inferred that 
it is likely that a number of people have 
been misled-or deceived and are likely to 
be unaware of such ... deception or of their 
remedies." 
325 Furthermore Blakeney points out that the utility of 
orders under section 80A is severely circumscribed by the 
statutory limit of $50,000 on the amount of corrective 
advertising that may be ordered in relation to any one 
contravention or group of contraventions. As that writer 
suggests that amount would be expended in paying for one 
sixty second prime-time commercial and therefore it is 
difficult to see how such orders could effectively counter 
the residual effects of long term misleading advertising 
. 326 
campa~gns. 
(323) (1979) 25 ALR 91. 
(324) 'Affirmative Disclosure and Corrective Advertising 
Orders under Section BOA of the Trade Practices Act 1 
1974', (1978) 10 Cornm L Ass Bull 63. 
( 325) Ibid, 115. 
( 32 6) Idem. 
32 2 
No provision exists in New Zealand law whereby 
affirmative disclosure or corrective advertising may be 
d d A t . d 1' 327 th E ' f C ' 1 or ere . s men ~one ear ~er, e xam~ner o ommerc~a 
Practices, in negotiating an agreement with a person who has 
breached one or other of the advertising provision of the 
Consumer Information Act 1969, may endeavour to persuade the 
offender to publish corrective advertisements to mitigate the 
consequences of the offence. 328 However the Examiner could not 
compel the offender to effect such disclosure and everything 
hinges upon agreement. Thus it is suggested that 
consideration be given to the adoption of the corrective 
advertising remedy in New Zealand for the following reasons: 
1) Corrective advertising is a powerful remedy and 
properly developed can fulfil a vital role in 
dispelling any misconceptions that might remain in the 
minds of consumers and in combatting anti-competitive 
effects of misleading advertising; and, 
2) It amounts to a powerful deterrent. The very 
presence of the corrective advertising sanction in 
the statute books will make advertisers more cautious 
. h . . f th . d t. . 1 . 329 ~n t e compos~t~on o e~r a ver ~s~ng c a~ms. 
{327) Supra, at 288-290. 
(328) See s 19 (3). 
(329) For a criticism of the corrective advertising remedy, 
see Dyer and Kuehl, 'The Corrective Advertising 
Remedy of the FTC', (1974)1 Journal of Marketing 48. 
Generally see Cornfeld, 'A New Approach to an Old 
Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal 
Trade Commission' (1976)61 Iowa Law Review 693. 
323 
( .4 ) CONSOLIDATION 
L 330 . d' . t 1 t' f aux 1n 1scuss1ng governmen regu a 1on o 
advertising in Canada states that 
"the scattering of legislation ... in a broad 
variety of enactments which are primarily 
directed at matters other than advertising 
and for which the advertising provisions 
are merely incidental suggests that the 
enforcement will be equally scattered and 
somewhat piecemeal". 
The Report of the Ministerial Working Party reviewing certain 
consumer and commercial legislation in New Zealand, entitled 
Proposals for a Selling Practices Act~ is also critical of 
the high level of fragmentation of consumer legislation in 
this country, and the Working Party recommend that consumer 
legislation be consolidated so as to make it more 
intelligible and accessible to the consumer and trader 
l 'k 331 a 1 e. 
What then is the case for consolidation? First, it 
is undoubtedly true that the distribution of advertising 
provisions in a large number of Acts renders them less 
accessible than would be the case, for example, if they 
were all embraced in an advertising code. 
Second, these provisions are administered by a 
332 
number of different departments which means that no 
(330) "Deceptive Advertising, the Law and the Canadian 
Consumer", in Studies in Canadian Business Law (1971), 
ed. by Fridman, 218-219. 
(331) Proposals for ·a Selling Practices Act, 8 July 1980, 
page 7. 
(332) For example: the Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 
1981 (Department of Health); the Animal Remedies Act 
1967 and Pesticides Act 1979 (Dept. of Agriculture and 
Fisheries); the Consumer Information Act 1969 and the 
Merchandise Marks Act 1954 (Dept. of Trade and 
Industry); Credit Contracts Act 1981 (Dept. of Justice). 
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cohesive policy regarding enforcement can be pursued. 
Furthermore, the Department of Trade and Industry does 
not have the time nor the resources to implement 
adequately the provisions of the Consumer Information 
Act 1969. 
Third, the penalties vis-a-vis non-compliance vary 
greatly and this demonstrates the need for rationalisation. 
For example, a person who knowingly contravenes a 
provision of the Consumer Information Act 1969 is liable 
333 to a fine of up to $500, whereas a person who similarly 
contravenes a provision of the Food Act 1981 when 
advertising a food faces a fine of $3000 or a term of 
. . . f 3 th 334 Lrnpr1sonment o man s. 
However, while there is a need for rationalisation 
it is also clear that consolidation only works up to a 
point. Some statutes regulate activities in very 
specialised areas and it is appropriate that the 
government department employing persons with expertise 
in those areas should have responsibility for the 
administration of statutes falling within their field of 
competence. Therefore it is suggested that the Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries is the appropriate department 
to oversee the Animal Remedies Act 1967 and the Pesticides 
Act 1979 and the incorporation of the advertising provisions 
(333) s 18 (2). 
(334) s 11(3}. 
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of these enactments in an Advertising Code is likely to 
derogate from, rather than improve upon, the status quo. 
The same could be said for the Food Act 1981 and the 
Medicines Act 1981 - the Health Department is best placed 
to oversee regulation in this area. 
334A There is room though, as the Working Party suggests, 
for the consolidation of the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
the Merchandise Marks Act 1954 and the Wool Labelling 
Act 1949 335 into a single Trade Descript~ons Act. 336 To 
this, I would add that certain provisions of the Weights 
and Measures Act 1925 relating to the display of net 
. h d f d b . d 337 we1g t an measures o any goo s, e 1ncorporate • 
Although the Consumer Information Act 1969 supplements and 
in some respects duplicates the existing provisions of the 
Weights and Measures Act 1925 and the Merchandise Marks 
Act 1954 no reference is made in the Act to either of these 
earlier statutes. The Working Party recommend that this 
consolidating legislation be along the lines of the 
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK) and there would be much 
to commend such an approach in that one Act would cover 
labelling, marking, and trade descriptions involved in 
all transactions. 
(334A)Proposals for a Selling Practices Act, 8 July 1980. 
(335) This Act will be considered below in Chapter V, 
Disclosure of Information, infra. 
(336) Proposals for a Selling Practices Act, op.cit., p. 7. 
(337) For a discussion of this Act, see Chapter V, 
Disclosure of Information, infra. 
(338) See Consumer Protection: Final Report, HMSO, 1962 
(Cmnd 1781) [Chairman of the Committee: J.T. Molony], 
para 586, and Part V of the Report for a criticism of 
the United Kingdom Merchandise Marks Acts 1887-1953. 
These Acts were repealed by the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1968. 
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However, this writer is very sceptical of the 
emphasis that the Working Party suggests should be placed 
on self regulation in the implementation of this 
legislation339 and would further submit that such 
consolidation is only a partial solution. Far more 
important than any consolidation is the establishment of a 
Consumer Affairs Department with overall responsibility 
for the regulation and implementation of consumer 
protection legislation. No matter how fragmented 
consumer protection laws may be, provided a well trained 
and motivated Department with adequate resources exists 
these laws will be enforced and will not be abrogated by 
disuse. 
(5) UNFAIR ADVERTISING 
"It has been recognised that most advertisements 
operate on two levels. They have an informative 
content which brings to the attention of the 
potential buyer the type of commodity or service 
for sale, its quality, serviceability, usefulness 
and price. There is, in addition, a persuasive 
element in the advertising message which is 
directed to the transformation of latent wants 
on the part of an individual into effective 
demand for a good or service and which 
encourages a decision to purchase".340 
Clearly the statutes that have been considered above outlaw 
advertising claims that are misleading and/or deceptive, 
and these legal controls extend to advertisements that in 
(339) For reasons elaborated upon in Chapter II, Business 
Self Regulation, supra. 
(340) Duggan, 'Fairness in Advertising: In Pursuit of the 
Hidden Persuaders', (1978)11 Melbourne University 
Law Review SO. 
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their endeavours to persuade, in fact, deceive. What, 
however, of advertisements that are neither misleading 
nor deceptive but may be categorized as unfair? 
There is no recognised all-embracing definition of 
"unfair advertising" but the United States Supreme Court, 
. h 1 d. f c & h . 341 1n t e ea 1ng case o FT v Sperry Huto ~nson Co.~ 
cited with the approval the criteria developed by the 
Federal Trade Commission to proscribe business and 
advertising practices which, although not "false or 
deceptive", were "unfair". These criteria are: 
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily 
having been previously considered unlawful 
.•. is within at least the penumbra of some 
common-law, statutory, or other 
established concept of fairness; (2) whether 
it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unsqrupulous; (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or 
competitors or other businessmen) ". 342 
In particular the following advertising technique could be 
categorised as "unfair11 ; that is, psychological advertising 
which seeks 'to condition consumers at an unconscious level 
to associate brands and products with the satisfaction of 
1 t d h 1 . d d . f 34 3 unre a e uman ong1ngs an es1res • Illustrations 
(341) 405 us 233 (1972) ~ 
(342) Ibid, 244. 
(343) Reed, 'The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising . 
and the need for FTC regulationr, (1975) 13 ABLJ 171, 
183; Duggan, op. cit., 64 equates psychological 
advertising with persuasive image appeals which 
induce purchase by appealing to the consumer's 
'susceptibilities and subconscious drives'; Isaacs, 
'Psychological Advertising: A New Area in FTC 
Regulation', (1977) Wisconsin Law Review 1097, 1098 
defines it thus: '(A)dvertisements which are meant 
to affect the subconscious needs and desires of 
the (consumers)'. 
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abound of such advertising and the following examples 
will serve to highlight the issues. 
i) The "Pluravit" advertisement. The television 
advertisement for this product carries the slogan "Tired, 
listless, lacking energy? You need Pluravit" and it pictures 
an overworked businessman and uninspiring father who is 
transformed by the consumption of the manufacturer's 
product. The unconditioned stimulus (fear appeal} evokes 
the response (anxiety, insecurity over being a better 
employee and family man) . The unconditioned stimulus is 
paired with the conditioned stimulus (Pluravit) and also 
k h ( . I. . t ) 34 4 evo es t e response anx~ety ~nsecur~ y • After 
repeated trials (showing of the Pluravit advertisement) 
the patience of the advertiser is rewarded when the father 
goes to the pharmacist, sees Pluravit and decides to buy 
it in preference to other brands of vitamin supplement. 
Consciously, it is unlikely that he considers he will be a 
better father because of more vitamins, and, rationally, he 
would reply to an inquisitive bystander that one vitamin 
supplement is much the same as any other. Unconsciously, 
however, the presentation of the conditioned stimulus 
(344) The terminology employed is that used in any Psychology 
textbook. Pavlov's classical conditionin~ experiments 
by which he conditioned his dog to salivate upon the 
sounding of a buzzer are well known. By presentation 
of the food (unconditioned stimulus} to the dog he 
caused the dog to salivate (response). Then by 
associating the presentation of food (unconditioned 
stimulus) with the sound of the buzzer (conditioned 
stimulus) he aqain elicited salivation (response). 
After numerous repetitions of this pairing process, 
Pavlov discovered he could elicit salivation (response) 
by the presentation of the buzzer (conditioned 
stimulus} alone. 
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elicits a response which changes his perception of 
Pluravit subtely, though sufficiently, to influence his 
choice of vitamin tablets. 
345 ii) An Auckland University Management Paper 
reports that a practical experiment was conducted in six 
supermarkets in suburban Auckland. In-store promotions 
featured "fat-free" Anchor milk powder using different 
levels of "fear arousal" in advertisements selling the 
product. The fear utilised was the fear of being over-
weight. Results indicated that fear arousal increased 
sales of the product, with the low fear poster being more 
effective than the high fear depiction. 346 Such market 
findings, namely, that a mild fear of being overweight 
induces purchases of non-fat products, uncover the 
subconscious make-up of the consumer and the appropriate 
image to be associated with the product. 
347 As Reed contends 
"the persuasion or influence deriving from a 
great deal of TV advertising is arguably due 
to the largely unconscious, subliminal effects 
resulting from the classical conditioning 
practice of pairing the advertiser's product 
with the dramatized and fictional satisfaction 
of human needs for love, sex, approval etc.". 
(345) Fear in the Market Place: A Study of anxiety arousal in 
persuasive communication (1979) , Working Paper 
(No.2), Department of Management Studies, University 
of Auckland. 
(346} The low fear poster depicts a "jovial" fat man 
consuming cake and surrounded by a table loaded with 
high calorie foodstuffs. The poster bears the message 
"Don • t you Join The Overweight Club". The high fear 
poster depicts an enormously fat woman carrying a loaded 
shopping bag; her face is blanked out and the message 
reads "Don't put your face in this picture!" 
( 34 7) lBc:.. cit. at 180. See also, Vaughn, 'How Advertising 
Works: A Planning Model', (1980) 20 Journal of 
Advertising Resources 27, 28. 
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iii) Another illustration of overt psychological 
advertising would be the recent Lion Brewery advertising 
campaign for "10 Beer". Pictorially, a nubile blond female 
drools semi-naked over a young rugby-jerseyed male. The 
female model holds the advertiser~ product and the 
accompanying slogan reads: "I just scored a '10!" The 
association of beer with sexual performance and sporting 
prowess is inescapable. 
iv) More insiduous is covert psychological advertising 
or "subliminal advertising 11 ; that is, 11 advertising in the 
cinema, etc., directed to the subconscious, shown too 
• dl d b • fl k • • • II 34 8 rap1 y, an r1e y to rna e a consc1ous 1mpress1on 
This type of advertising first came to the public's 
attention in 1957 following a well publicized experiment 
conducted in New Jersey in the United States; that is, the 
· 11 d v· · t 349 so-ca e leary exper1rnen . The messages "Drink 
Coca-Cola" and "Hungry? Eat Popcorn" were flashed on the 
movie screen for l/3000th of a second every five seconds 
during a Kim Novak film called "Picnic". During six weeks 
of testing, involving 45,669 patrons, lobby sales of 
(348) This definition is from Chambers Twentieth Century 
Dictionary (1977); see also Key, Media Sexploitation 
(1976) 2, 7. 
(349) See Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967); see Chapter II, 
11 Tampering with the Unconscious 11 , where the famous 
Vicary experiment is discussed. 
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popcorn increased 57% and sales of coca-cola went up 18%. 
Such subliminal advertising is not confined to the cinema 
1 . . b t d d' d . 350 or te ev1s1on screen, ut ex en s to ra 10 a vert1sements 
and printed advertisements. 351 
The above examples serve to illustrate the nature of 
psychological advertising techniques, both overt and 
352 . . 
covert, but the guest1on that arises is whether such 
advertising techniques need to be curtailed? For one thing, 
are they effective? 
There is little doubt that overt psychological 
advertising techniques are successful in promoting the sales 
of goods and services. While it is conceded that 
expensive consumer items such as motor vehicles and 
television sets may be beyond the scope of overt 
h 1 . 1 d. . . 35 3 . t . . d 1 t d th t psyc o og1ca con 1t1on1ng, 1 1s w1 e y accep e a 
purchases of routine products such as food, beverages and 
other household items may be influenced to a significant 
354 degree. . . 355 h . One Amer1can wr1ter asserts t at, 1n 
(350} Subliminals over the radio involves sub-audial or 
whispered words; that is, broadcast so faintly in 
volume so as not to be consciously heard. See Key, 
op. cit. , 10 8. 
( 351) A technique of "embedding", whereby emotionally loaded 
words or pictures are inserted into the background of 
advertisements, is employed. See Key, The Clam-Plate 
Orgy (1980) 1 99. 
(352) Overt psychological advertising falls into the genus 
of consciously perceived persuasion, whereas persuasion 
which the consumer does not consciously perceive may be 
termed covert psychological advertising. 
(353) Reed,loc:. cit., 174; Vaughn, lo<::... cit. 28; Foxall, 
Consumer Behaviour: A Practical Guide (1980), 193. 
( 354) Idem. 
( 355) Kozyris 1 ''Advertising Intrusion: Assault on the Senses, 
Trespass On the Mind - A Remedy Through Separation' , 
(1975} 36 Ohio State Law Journal 299 1 323. 
332 
particular, television viewers are a captive audience and 
the consumer would require 'the talent of Houdini coupled 
with the patience of Job' to escape the persuasive effects 
of much psychological advertising. 356 Even if a consumer 
possesses the requisite attributes to escape, it is argued 
that the advertiser may bypass parents' intellectual 
defences to the commercials themselves by directing 
advertisements at children,"thereby creating "miniature 
' 1 ' 1 ' ' • 1 11 357 scream1ng sa esmen, parrot1ng te ev1s1on commercla s • 
The case for subliminal advertising is less convincing. 
Subseque~t field studies have failed to replicate the Vicary 
. 1' d ab 358 d . 359 t exper1ment out 1ne ove an D1xon commen s as 
follows: 
"To allay the anxiety of those who fear 
commercial exploitation of subliminal 
perception, there is little evidence to 
suggest and strong arguments against the 
possibility of seriously manipulating 
drives or drive oriented behaviour by 
subliminal stimulation."360 
(356) Cf: Bauer, 'Limits of Persuasion', (1958) 36 Harvard 
Business Review 105, 110. 
(357) Note, 'Can't get Enough of That Sugar Crisp: The First 
Amendment Right to Advertise to Children" (1979) 
54 New York University Law Review 561, 582. 
(358) See, for example, De Fleur and Petranoff, 'A televised 
test of subliminal persuasion', (1959) 23 Public 
Opinion Quarterly 168; McConnell, Cutler and McNeill, 
'Subliminal Stimulation: An Overview', (1958) 13 
American Psychiatrist 229. 
(359) Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy 
(1980} 1 178. 
(360) See also: Subliminal Communicaton, Institute of 
Practitioners in Advertising (London, 1958), at 5; 
Oshikawa, 'Learning and Behaviour without Awareness: 
Their Implications to Consumer behaviour and Sovereignty", 
(1970) 12 California Management Review 61, 68; McConnell, 
Cutler and McNeill, lo·c. cit., 235. 
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Nevertheless, such advertising is used extensively 361 
and the results of research into subliminal techniques are 
1 . 362 not cone us1ve. Given that overt psychological 
advertising is effective, and that subliminal advertising 
may be effective, controls over such advertising would not 
amount to "hollow thunder". In this writer's view control 
is desirable as psychological manipulation is no less 
obnoxious than the more obvious misleading claims as to 
the nature, quality, quantity and price of any goods and 
services. Furthermore, as discussed in the introductory 
chapter,.where a purchasing decision is irrational there 
is a risk that a misallocation of resources will result and 
in the stead of true competition is substituted 
competition in advertising. 
What then is the current position in New Zealand? 
The statutes that have been considered all have as their 
primary objective the control of misleading and/or deceptive 
advertisements and this approach is ill-suited to the 
regulation of psychological appeals. Regulation of 
deception confines itself to the intrinsic and material 
(361) See, for example; Key, Media Sexploitation, supra, 
at 108. A New Zealand 1llustration is the Lion 
Breweries '10 Beer' advertisement previously 
mentioned. Overtly, the advertisement is sexist, ?nd 
covertly, the letters s, E, X, are skilfully embedded 
in the woman's legs, the glass of beer and elsewhere. 
See 'Canta' 2, Vol. 52, 9 March 1982, at page 2. 
(362) See, for example; Key,ibid; Silverman, 'Psychoanalytic 
Theory', (1976) 31 American Psychiatrist 621; 
Hawkins, 'The Effects of Subliminal Stimulation on 
Drive Level and Brand Preference' (1970) 7 Journal of 
Marketing Research 323. 
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characteristics of the good or service, and the main 
enquiry relates to whether the claim is true or false. 
This works reasonably well when applied to factual 
elements such as price, quality, quantity and so on, but 
when applied to image appeals it becomes 'not only 
unworkable but irrelevant'. 363 364 As Barnes and Blakeney 
observe 
"Advertising which appeals to emotional or 
psychological needs, affects consumers' 
perceptions of the advertised product rather 
than their beliefs about them. The factual 
enquiry relevant in a consideration of 
deceptiveness is not appropriate to assess 
appeals to (a consumer's) need for approval, 
love or happiness". 
Moreoever, the conspicuous failure of legislation such 
as the Consumer Information Act 1969, to counter 
effectively deceptive advertising claims relating to the 
intrinsic properties of goods and services, renders 
the prospect of successful control of non-tangible claims 
occasioned by image advertising, through the devices of 
such legislation, most unlikely. However, this is not to 
suggest that no controls exist. Consider the following: 
(a) The Broadcasting Rules 
The Broadcasting Corporation in New Zealand is a 
statutory corporation charged, inter alia, with the 
(363) Duggan, op. cit., 54. 
(364) 'The Regulation of Children's TV Advertising - The 
Australian Experience', (1980) 1 Journal of Media 
Law and Practice 265, 273. 
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responsibilities for maintaining, in its programmes and 
their presentation, standards which will be generally 
abl . h 't 365 I t' 1 d accept e 1n t e cornmun1 y. n par 1cu ar, regar 
must be had to 'the observance of standards of good taste 
366 
and decency', and statutory standards outlined in the 
Broadcasting Act 1976 are supplemented by programme rules 
prepared and promulgated by the Brpadcasting Rules Committee 
of the Corporation. 367 Both the Corporation and private 
368 
radio stations must comply with these programme rules 
and provision is made in these rules for the control of 
psychological and unfair advertising. For example, the 
following rules have been promulgated: 
i) Advertisements must observe high standards of 
ethics, propriety and good taste; they must not be 
likely to damage the physical, mental or moral 
welfare of the audience. 369 
(365) Broadcasting Act 1976, s 24. 
( 3 6 6 ) Ibid , s 2 4 ( 1 ) ( c ) • 
(367) This Standing Committee was established pursuant to 
section 26 of the Broadcasting Act 1976; See the 
Broadcasting Regulations 1977. 
(368) Broadcasting Act 1976, ss 25, 91. Separate rules have 
been promulgated for television and radio; namely, the 
Television Standards and Rules (August 1978) and the 
Radio Standards and Rules (May 1978). 
(369) Television Standards and Rules, Ru~l.3; Radio 
Standards and Rules, Rule 1.3. 
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ii) No television or radio advertisement shall 
l bl . . l h d f . 370 emp oy su ~m~na met o s o presentat~on. 
iii) Children should not be urged in advertisements 
to ask their parents to buy particular products for 
them, 371 nor should advertisements be framed in 
such a way as to take advantage of the natural 
credulity of children. 372 
Under the Broadcasting Act 1976 complaints alleging a 
breach of 373 any of the statutory standards or the 
programme 374 rules had to be lodged with the Broadcasting 
Corporation or with the Committee of Private Broadcasters 
. th f . t t t' 375 ~n e case o a pr~va e s a ~on. The Corporation or 
Committee were under an obligation to investigate any such 
complaint and if the complaint was found to be justified 
then "appropriate action" had to be taken. 376 If the 
complainant was dissatisfied with the decision or action 
(370) Television Standards and Rules, Rule 1.4; Radio 
Standards and Rules, Rub 1.4. 
(371) Television Standards and Rules, Rule 2(2)b; Radio 
Standards and Rules, Rule 2(2) (b). 
(372) Television Standards and Rules, Rule 2(2)a: Radio 
Standards and Rules, Rule 2(2) a. 
(373) As enumerated in section 24(1}. 
(374) Such as those outlined above. 
(375) Broadcasting Act 1976, ss 25, 91. 
(376) Idem. 
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taken by the Corporation or Committee, of if the relevant 
body failed to notify the complainant within 14 days 
after receiving the complaint of the date on which the 
complaint was to be considered, the complainant could 
refer the complaint to the Broadcasting Tribunal. 377 This 
Tribunal, comprising three members appointed by the 
Governor General on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Broadcasting, 378 has been fairly active and has considered 
a number of complaints relating to advertising. 379 This 
complaints procedure has been outlined to place the matter 
in historical perspective, for the Broadcasting Amendment 
Act 1982 has implemented some changes in this area. 380 
Under this Amendment Act, formal complaints are to be 
referred in the first instance to the Broadcasting 
Corporation or the appropriate private broadcasting station 
whtch is under an obligation to investigate any such 
complaint381 - the Committee of Private Broadcasters is 
( 3 7 7) Ibid, s s 2 5 ( 5) , 91 ( 5} . 
(378) Ibid, s 61. 
(379) For example, Broadcasting Tribunal Decisions: No. 10/80 
(exaggerated claim made for a brand of anti-dandruff 
shampoo); No. 11/81 (alleged breach of Rule 2.2(b) 
relating to children being urged in Broadlands Finance 
advertisements to ask their parents to purchase 
products for them}; No. 12/81 {complaint arising from a 
promotion 11 Tuckers Turf Analysis" conducted by Radio 
Pacific Ltd); No. 14/81 (breaches by Lion Breweries Ltd 
in respect of liquor advertising). Numerous other 
complaints have been lodged by C.R. Turner of Hamilton 
primarily in respect of liquor advertisements; for 
example Broadcasting Tribunal Decisions Nos. 2/77, 
2/80, 3/80, 9/80, 6/81, 7/81 and 13/81. 
(380) This Act carne into force on 1 November 1982. 
{381) Broadcasting Act 1976, ss 95B and s 95C; new provisions 
inserted in the principal Act by the Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 1982, s 11. 
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abolished382 - and it is envisaged that most complaints 
should be capable of resolution "by proper consideration 
and proper response on the part of the holder of the 
warrant or authorisation issued in respect of the 
broadcasting station".383 If the complaint is found to be 
justified, in whole or in part, the Broadcasting 
Corporation or private broadcasting station must, as 
under the original provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1976 384 
take "appropriate action" and advise the complainant of 
this action. 385 If the complainant is dissatisfied with 
the decision or the action taken, or if the complainant 
is not notified within 15 working days after delivery of 
the complaint advised of the date on which the complaint 
is to be considered, the complainant may refer the 
complaint to the Broadcasting Tribuna1. 386 A new body, 
known as the Broadcasting Complaints Committee comprising 
one person appointed by the Governor General on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Broadcasting, is 
established. 387 This Committee is empowered to investigate 
(382) Broadcasting Amendment Act 1982, s 12. 
(383) Broadcasting Act 1976, s 95A(h) 
(384) Namely, sections 25 and 91, which are repeated by 
the Broadcasting Amendment Act 1982, s 13. 
(385) Broadcasting Act 1976, s 95D. 
(386) Ibid, s 95E; the composition of this Tribunal remains 
unchanged, but the principal Act is amended by repealing 
section 67 and by substituting a new section 67 relating 
to the powers and functions of the Tribunal. 
(387) Broadcasting Act 1976, s 95F; as inserted in the 
principal Act by the Broadcasting Amendment Act 1982, 
s 11. 
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complaints made against broadcasting stations, 388 and has 
limited authority to consider formal complaints. 389 It 
is duty bound to comply with'directions given to it by 
the Tribunal and is under an obligation to report to the 
T 'b 1 390 r1 una • 
Against this background, it must be asked: 'How 
effective are these rules and channels of complaint in 
countering psychological and unfair advertising abuses?' 
First~ it must be recognised that considerable 
sanctions may be imposed on a station that fails to 
comply with the rules and this must constitute a 
considerable deterrent. For example, if the Tribunal forms 
the view that a station is being operated contrary to the 
programme rules it may give the station directions in 
. . h t th 1 1' d 'th 391 wr1t1ng to ensure t a e ru es are comp 1e w1 . 
Following a number of complaints against the Broadcasting 
Corporation relating to the advertising of Lion Breweries' 
liquor advertisements the Tribunal issued a detailed 
direction to the Broadcasting Corporation to terminate 
{ 3 8 8} Ibid, s 9 5 0 ( 1) ( a) • 
(389) That is, it may consider complaints of unjust and 
unfair treatment in programmes broadcast by any 
station or unwarranted infringement of privacy in. 
connection with the obtaining of material included 
in any programmes. See 2 9 5 0 ( 1) (b). 
(390) SS 95 O(l) (c), 67(7}. 
( 391) s 83 {1). 
340 
it·s publication of these advertisements. 392 The Tribunal 
commented further in their decision that a 'failure to 
comply with the directions or the broadcasting of any 
matter contrary to the directions is deemed to be a 
breach of the conditions of the relevant warrant•. 393 The 
consequence of non-compliance in these circumstances may be 
drastic indeed; only a company or body incorporated in New 
Zealand may operate a broadcasting station, and may only do 
so if it has been granted a warrant by the Broadcasting 
T 'b 1 394 r1 una • Warrants for broadcasting stations are 
normally issued subject to certain conditions, such as 
the necessity to comply with the programme rules, and if 
the holder of a warrant fails to comply with directions 
from the Tribunal it is deemed to have committed a breach 
395 
of the conditions of it's warrant. A station which has 
breached, or is deemed to have breached the conditions of· 
it s warrant, may be subjected to sanction at the hands of 
the Tribunal. The Tribunal may refuse to renew its 
warrant, or renew it for a lesser term than the normal 
396 5 years. Alternatively, the Tribunal may suspend or 
revoke the warrant for such period as it thinks fit, or 
(392) See Broadcasting Tribunal decision no. 14/81, dated 
17 June 1981. Basically, the rules relating to sale 
of alcohol limit advertising to disclosure of 
information relating to details of points of sale.and 
the service and the description of the general range 
of merchandise {eg. NZ and overseas wines); 
advertisements must not use brand names nor exton the 
qualities of any liquor etc. See Television 
Standards and Rules, Rule 1.11. 
(393) Ibid, at page 2. 
{394) See the Broadcasting Act 1976, ss 70, 76. 
(395) Broadcasting Act 1976, ss 83, 95U. 
(396) Ibid, s 81 (2) I ( 3). 
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reduce the term of the warrant, or impose on the holder a 
substantial fine. 397 Furthermore the Tribunal may order 
in any proceedings that a broadcasting station, for 
1 th t f h 1 . 39 8 examp e, pay e cos s o t e comp a~nant. 
Second, strict interpretation of the rules may 
reduce their impact. For example, consider the Monitor 
Incorporated complaint about a Broadlands Finance 
advertisement. 399 The advertisement showed a girl 
colouring in on the lounge floor who asks her father a 
series of questions; for example, "Daddy - one day can we 
have a swimming pool? 11 , 11 l)ad- will I be able to have a 
bedroom to myself?", etc. Monitor alleged that the 
advertisement was in breach of Rule 2.2(b): 
"Children should not be urged in 
advertisements to ask their parents 
to buy particular products for them". 
The Tribunal dismissed the complaint since the advertisement 
had not directly urged the child to ask her parent to buy 
the particular products. If the result had merely been that 
some children might ask their parents, this would be 
insufficient. To succeed the complainant would need to 
'have the rule changed to provide a stricter standard' . 400 
( 39 7) Ibid, s 81(4). 
( 39 8) Ibid, s 67C. 
(399) See Broadcasting Tribunal decision no. 11/81, dated 
9 June 1981. 
( 400) Ibid, at page 3. 
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This narrow approach, if consistently followed, would 
reduce substantially the efficacy of the Rules for, 
unless they are given a liberal construction, they become 
ill-suited to regulate psychological persuasion. 
Third, the Rules may be criticised as being too 
vague; for example, the requirement that "advertisements 
observe high standards of ethics, propriety and good 
taste" 401 is very difficult to apply. Potential exists 
for greater elaboration in the form of more detailed 
guidelines. For example, tn§ Credit Contracts Act 1981 
provides guidelines for the re-opening of credit 
402 h f '1' th d . . f th contracts t at ac1 1tate e eterm1nat1on o e 
question as to whether a credit contract is oppressive or 
not. 
Overall, however, this writer is of the opinion that 
adequate rules have been promulgated pursuant to the 
Broadcasting Act 1976 for the control of psychological and 
unfair advertising, that abundant sanctions exist to 
promote compliance, and, subject to a more liberal 
interpretation of the rules being pursued, that there is 
little need for concern in this area. 
(401) Television Standards and Rules, Rule 1.3; 
Radio Stations and Rules, Rule 1.3. 
(402) See s 11. 
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(b) Print Media Rules 
Unlike the position vis-a-vis broadcasting, control 
in the print media of psychological and unfair 
advertising practices is contingent upon compliance with 
the codes of advertising practice as promulgated by the 
' f Ad ' ' P t ' 4 O 3 Comm1ttee o vert1s1ng rae 1ce. The Committee of 
Advertising Practice states that one of its main 
objectives is as follows: 
"To seek to maintain at all times and in 
all media a proper and generally-acceptable 
standard of advertising and to ensure that 
·advertising is not misleading, either by 
statement or by implication".404 
Specific codes have been drafted in an endeavour to meet 
this objective and the following illustrations taken from 
the codes serve to demonstrate the Committee's concern 
for psychological advertising and unfair advertising 
practices; namely 
i) Advertisements for cigarettes must not 'depict 
anyone smoking who is participating (or has just 
participated) in an event that requires physical activity, 
stamina or athletic conditioning to a standard beyond that 
of normal recreation'; nor must such advertisements imply 
that cigarette smoking is helpful to romance, success, 
personal advancement, public prominence or that it 
1 . 405 promotes sexua attract1veness. 
(403) See Chapter II, Business Self-Regulation, supra. 
(404) See Codes of Practice, issued by the Committee of 
Advertising Practice, at page 1. 
(405) Ibid; Code for the Marketing of Cigarettes, 
paragraph 4. 
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ii) The Code for Liquor Advertising proscribes 
advertisements that suggest that liquor is 'a necessary 
element of success in life, or an essential part of the 
pleasure and excitement of living'; nor should liquor 
advertisements suggest a relationship between liquor and 
sex which is capable of being regarded as offensive. 406 
iii) In accordance with the general principle of 
good taste, people should not normally appear to be 
basically unpleasant, neurotic etc. unless these 
characteristics are the basic reason for the existence 
of the product or service, and advertisements should 
avoid the promise of unrealistic psychological reward as 
a result of the use of the product or service. 407 
There is no specific enjoinder of subliminal 
advertising but the Committee of Advertising Practice 
comment that 
"This is a very difficult area to cover in a 
code of practice and we have sought to 
regulate the quality, good taste and 
manipulative potential of advertising by 
incorporating general passages in the code 
referring to the use of innuendo and 
implication in advertisements".408 
This is difficult to follow as the Broadcasting Rules 
Committee had no difficulty whatsoever in outlawing 
subliminal presentation. 409 
( 406) Ibid. 
(407) Ibid; Code of Practice - People in Advertising, 
paragraphs 5, 6. 
(408) Per Theresa Connally-Brown, Secretary, Committee of 
Advertising Practice, letter dated 9 July 1982. 
{409) See Television Standards and Rules, Rule 1.4; 
Radio Standards and Rules, Rule 1.4. 
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The Press Council410 claims jurisdiction in 
respect of complaints relating to advertising where the 
advertisement concerned was published by a member of the 
Newspaper Publishers Association. 411 As a matter of 
practice, however, such complaints are referred to the 
Newspaper Publishers Association where they are adjudicated 
upon b~ an advertising advisory sub-committee of that 
organisation by reference to the various codes of conduct. 412 
Kingsbury 413 contends this practice is less than desirable 
fur 
. "the reader of a newspaper could reasonably 
expect that his formal complaint about an 
advertisement would be the subject of an 
adjudication by the Press Council rather 
than a group composed solely of newspaper 
interests •.• ". 
(410) The Press Council is a voluntary organisation sponsored 
by the Newspaper Publishers Association and the 
Journalists Association. See Burrows, News Media Law 
in New Zealand (2 ed, 1980}, 418. 
(411) See Kingsbury, 'Complaints Against the Media', (1981) 1 
Canterbury Law Review 155, 169. Complaints must, in 
the first instance, be referred to the editor of the 
publication, and only if the response is not 
satisfactory, or if the editor does not respond, may 
the matter be referred to the Press Council. 
(412) Ibid, 169-170. The results of such adjudication are 
not always satisfactory. Kingsbury cites a case 
involving a complaint against a Labour Party 
advertisement. Altho~gh the Advertising Advisory 
Committee accepted that if the economic figures 
employed in the advertisement were inaccurate to ~he 
extent alleged the advertisement would be deceptive, 
the Committee merely advised the complainant that the 
Newspaper Publishers Association intended reviewing 
the rules on political advertising at its next annual 
conference. See (1975} 3 NZPC Rep. 17-18. 
(413) Ibid, 171. 
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As regards complaints concerning newspapers and magazines 
published by persons who do not belong to the Newspaper 
Publishers Association, there is no procedure for the 
consideration of these complaints. Similarly, no 
procedure exists for the consideration of complaints in 
respect of mailbox leaflets etc. The effectiveness of the 
Committee of Advertising Practice's codes are greatly 
diminished through the lack of adequate sanctions and less 
414 than full subscription to the codes, and it seems strange 
that broadcasting should be subjected to such potentially 
rigorous controls while the print media is left largely 
to its own devices. 
Having considered the nature of present controls 
over unfair advertising in New Zealand (with particular 
emphasis upon psychological advertising) it is proposed 
now to canvass briefly the approaches adopted in some 
h . . d. . . d 1' 415 h ot er JUrls 1ct1ons. As ment1one ear 1er, t e 
Federal Trade Commission is the primary government 
regulator of advertising in the United States and it 
derives its authority, in part, from section 5 of the 
d 1 d C . . 416 h. h . 1 . Fe era Tra e omrnlSSlon Act, w lC st1pu ates, ~nter 
alia, that: 
(414) See Chapter II, Business Self Regulations, supra. 
(415) Supra, at 314. 
(416) 15 USC 45 (1970), as amended by 15 USC 45 
(Supp. IV, 1974). 
347 
"Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are declared 
unlawful". 
Under this broad mandate the Federal Trade Commission has 
exercised its power to proscribe untruthful and misleading 
d . . . abl . 417 a vert~s~ng on ~nnumer e occas~ons. The Commission 
has been permitted to categorise such advertising as 
misleading in the absence of actual deception being shown 
as the relevant enquiry is whether the advertisement is 
l 'k 1 t d . 418 d f h ~t . ~ e y o ece~ve, an , urt er, 4 ~s not necessary 
for the Federal Trade Commission to demonstrate that the 
advertisement is likely to deceive a majority of consumers 
. 419 
or even the average consumer as it is sufficient if 
'an appreciable or measurable segment of the public' could 
be misled. 420 Pursuant to the mandate under section 5, the 
Federal Trade Commission has also sought to outlaw 
advertisements that are "unfair", although neither 
untruthful nor deceptive. The Commission has issued a 
"cigarette rule" that stipulated that cigarette packaging 
and advertisements should carry warnings of the hazards 
associated with smoking. 421 This rule was justified by 
(417) For example, see FTC v Winstead Hosiery Co. 258 US 483 
(1922); Gimbel Bros Inc v FTC 116 F 2d 578 (1941); 
Pep-Boys Manny~ Moe & Jack Inc v FTC 122 F 2d 158 (1949); 
Double Eagle Lubricants Inc v FTC 360 F 2d 258 (1966); 
Charles of Ritz Distributors Corp. v FTC 143 F 2d 676 
(1944). 
(418) Idem. 
(419) Idem. 
(420) FeiZ v FTC 285 F 2d 879, 892 (1960). 
(421) FTC Trade Regulations Rules, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 
9324-75 (1964). This rule was rendered superfluous by 
the enactment of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act 1965. 
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the Commission on the basis that 'a method of selling 
violates section 5 if it is exploitative or inequitable 
and if, in addition to being morally objectionable, it is 
seriously detrimental to consumers or others•. 422 More 
recently, the Federal Trade Commission published proposed 
rules designed to restrict commercial television 
advertising directed at children~ 23 The Federal Trade 
Commission has proposed to 
"(a) Ban all televised advertising for any 
product which is directed to, or seen by, 
audiences composed of a significant 
proportion of children who are too young 
to understand the selling purpose of or 
otherwise comprehend or evaluate the 
advertising. 
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared 
food products directed to, or seen by, 
audiences composed of a significant 
proportion of older children, the 
consumption of which product poses the 
most serious dental risks. 
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared 
food products not included in Paragraph (b) , 
which is directed to, or seen by, audiences 
composed of a significant proportion of 
older children, to be balanced by 
nutritional and/or health disclosures 
funded by advertisers." 
In justifying these proposals the Federal Trade Commission 
asserted that television advertising directed at 
children under eight exploits a naive audience and that 
sugared products pose a significant health risk to 
children. 424 A recent survey in Sydney would endorse 
(422) Ibid, at 8355. 
(423) Children's Advertising Proposals, 43 Red. Reg. 17967 
(1978). 
(424) See Note, 'Can't Get Enough of that Sugar Crisp: The 
First Amendment Right to Advertise to Children', 
(1979) 54 New York University Law Review 561, 563. 
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th . 425 ese assert1.ons. Considerable doubts exist about 
the constitutionality of the above Federal Trade 
426 Commission proposals, but the proposals do demonstrate 
the usefulness of an unfairness doctrine. As one American 
writer notes: 
"Both Congress and the [Supreme] court have 
stressed ..• that unfairness is a flexible 
concept, and that the FTC may serve 'like a 
court of equity' in weighing business 427 practices against the public interest". 
In the United Kingdom, the concept of "fairness" 
is embodied in the Fair Trading Act 1973. If a 'consumer 
trade practice• 428 has the effect of misleading or 
confusing consumers or of subjecting consumers to undue 
t t . t t . 429 th pressure o en er 1.n o consumer ransact1.ons, e 
Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection, or 
any other Minister, or the Director General of Fair 
Trading may refer to the Consumer Protection Advisory 
(425) A survey conducted by the Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal revealed that television advertising of 
confectionery and fast foods is effective on 
children who are heavy TV viewers. The remedy, it 
said, would be to'require television advertisements 
to transmit information designed to give children a 
clearer idea of what was nutritionally valuable. 
See "The Press", 9 July, 1982. 
(426) Supra, note 420; that is, would such a rule infringe 
the constitutional right of free speech. 
{427) Supra, note 420? at 591. 
{428) 'Consumer trade practice' is defined in section 13 as 
any practice carried on in relation to the supply of 
goods or services to consumers and must relate to, 
inter alia~ the promotion (by advertising, labelling 
or marketing of goods, canvassing or otherwise) of 
such goods or services. 
(429) Sees 17{2); the examples given are not comprehensive. 
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Committee430 the question whether the particular practice 
adversely affects the economic interests of consumers in 
the United Kingdom. 431 If the answer to this reference is 
in the affirmative then the practice, while remaining 
entirely lawful and permissible, is tainted with 
disrepute. 432 However, if the reference to the Committee 
was made by the Director General of Fair Trading, and this 
reference was accompanied by proposals for proscribing the 
practice, the Secretary of State may make an order giving 
433 
effect to the proposals. These powers have been 
exercis~d in respect of advertising. For example, the 
Business Advertisements (Disclosure) Order 1977434 provides 
that a person seeking to sell goods in the course of a 
business must not publish any advertisement indicating that 
goods are for sale unless it is reasonably clear that the 
goods are to be sold in the course of a business. As the 
buyers rights of redress, for example, will depend to some 
extent upon the status of the person selling the goods, the 
consumer may be misled as to his rights in the absence of 
such an indication. 435 
(430) An independent body created by the Fair Trading Act 
197 3, s 3. 
(431) s 14. 
{432) See Mickelburgh, Consumer Protection {1979) 1 279. 
(433) S 22; such an order may only be made if the report of 
the Advisory Committee states that it agrees with· the 
Director General's proposals. 
(434) S.I. No. 1918. 
{435) For example, the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) implies 
terms as to fitness for purpose and merchantable 
quality into contracts for the sale of goods where the 
vendor is a dealer in such goods; see section 16. 
Other orders pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1973 in 
relation to advertising are: the Mail Order Transactions 
(Information) Order 1976, S.I.No. 1812; Consumer 
Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Order 1976, 
S.I. No. 1813. 
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Furthermore, Section 34 of the Fair Trading 
Act 1973 authorises the Director General of Fair Trading 
to take appropriate action where he uncovers a course of 
conduct which is unfair and detrimental to consumers. 
Conduct is "unfair" where it consists of breaches of the 
criminal or civil law, whether or not there has been a 
conviction or whether or not civil proceedings have been 
brought. 436 The Director General must first endeavour to 
obtain a satisfactory written assurance from the offender 
that such conduct will cease, but if no such assurance 
is forthcoming of if such an assurance is broken, the 
Director General may bring proceedings before the 
. . p - . C 4 3 7 Th . . d Restr~ctlve ract~ces ourt. lS court ~s empowere 
to make an order prohibiting the particular conduct or may 
itself obtain an assurance - failure to comply with such an 
order or assurance constitutes an imprisonable offence 
f t t Of Court. 438 p t t th .. or con emp ursuan o ese prov~s~ons 
a 'cease and desist• order has been obtained against a 
chain of London restaurants for constant breaches of food 
h . 1 . 439 d h . b . 1 yg~ene regu at~ons an t ere ~s o v~ous y scope 
(436) s 34 (2). 
(437) S 35; Such proceedings may be commenced in the 
county court in particular circumstances; see 
section 41. 
(438) s 37. 
(439) See Cranston, op. cit., 261; this writer comments 
further that 'the power should be used more widely' 
as 'the present levels of fines being imposed by 
magistrates' courts is quite inadequate to deter some 
businesses from breaching the Food and Drugs Act 1955 
because they can simply treat fine s as a minor 
business expense'. 
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to employ these provisions in the regulation of 
unfair advertising practices. 
Division 1 of Part V of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) of Australia is headed "Unfair Practices" 
but this is in the nature of a passing reference to the 
concept of "unfairness" as the term "unfair" is not taken 
up in the ensuing provisions. Sections 52 and 53, the 
major provisions dealing with advertising, are confined 
to the prohibition of conduct and statements which are 
either false, misleading, or deceptive. Although it 
h b · . d 440 th t th A t I t t t' as een po1nte out a e c s n erpre a 10n 
Act 1901-1973 (Cth) deems the heading to be part of the 
Act, it is most unlikely that any court will extend, on 
this basis, the ambit of sections 52 and 53 to strike at 
unfair advertising that lacks any false or deceptive 
element. To date all cases dealing with sections 52 and 
53 have involved factual mistatements. 441 
As against this background the most appropriate 
form of regulation of unfair advertising practices in New 
Zealand falls to be considered. The promulgation of a 
general statutory proscription of all unfair advertising 
techniques and practices has advantages and disadvantages. 
As the Australian Trade Practices Review Committee 
commented 442 
(440) Goldring and Maher, op. cit., 206. 
(441) See text, supra. 
(442) See Goldring and Maher, op. cit., 207. 
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" .•. a general prohibition of •unfair' 
conduct, as contained in the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, could, under 
Australian conditions, result in a 
considerable degree of uncertainty in 
commercial transactions. Accordingly, 
we are strongly of the view that a like 
prohibition should not be incorporated 
into the Trade Practices Act at this 
time". 
This is undoubtedly a very powerful consideration but it 
may be observed that some uncertainty is inevitable 
whenever any new legislation comes into force and the 
wide discretion arrogated to the New Zealand courts in 
Acts such as the Illegal Contracts Act 1970, the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 and the Credit Contracts Act 1981 are hardly 
conducive to certainty in the field of contract, for 
example - and yet there is little evidence to suggest 
that commercial activity has, or will be, unduly affected. 
A more compelling argument against the adoption of 
a general formula such as that outlineq in section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act is that such a formula 
. 1 d f . d t . t 'dth' 443 1s extreme y vague an o 1n e erm1na e Wl • Are 
all image appeals and psychologically oriented 
advertisements to be categorised as "unfair" merely 
because they are persuasive and directed at the 
444 
subconscious? Such an approach, it has been suggested, 
(443) Obviously, the same criticism could be directed at 
self regulatory codes of conduct. 
(444) Reed and Coalson, 1 Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrine 
Meets Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: FTC 
Regulation of Emotionally Conditioning Advertising•, 
11 Georgia Law Review 733. 
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"could require all advertisements to become a catalogue 
of consumer information, its selling purpose completely 
obscured". 445 Duggan therefore recommends that a line 
be drawn between image appeals in general, on the one 
hand, and those which are directed at specific audiences 
with peculiar subsceptibilities which the appeals actively 
exploit, on the other. Another commentator would permit 
all psychological appeals save those which 'exploit 
and cultivate desires that contradict societal principles 
in law • • 446 This latter suggestion has nothing to 
commend it as the identification of 'societal principles 
in law' would seem to be an impossible task, and 
Duggan447 readily concedes that there would be 
considerable difficulty with his approach in distinguishing 
between exploitative claims and other forms of image 
appeal. Possibly the best approach would be that adopted 
in the European Economic Community Draft Directive on 
. 1 d' d U f . Ad ' ' 448 h f ' M1s ea 1ng an n a1r vert1s1ng w ere un a1r 
advertising is defined to mean, inter aZia, advertising 
which 
"(c) abuses or unjustifiably arouses 
sentiments of fear; or 
(d} abuses the trust, credulity or lack 
of experience of a consumer or 
influences or is likely to influence 
a consumer or the public in general 
in any other improper manner". 
(445} Op. cit., 70. 
{446} Note, 'Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product 
Advertising' (1978) 76 Michigan Law Review 498, 529. 
(447) Op. cit., 70. 
(448) This directive issued in July 1979 is set out in Lawson, 
Advertising and Labelling Laws in the Common Market, 
(2 ed, 1981). 
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Such a formula is also open to the charge of vagueness 
but in an area as mercurial and indeterminate as unfair 
advertising this is, perhaps, unavoidable. However, to 
impose criminal sanctions in respect of non-compliance 
with a general statutory prohibition against 'unfair 
advertising' would be extremely harsh given the inherent 
difficulties in determining the ambit of this term. 
In conclusion the following observations are made: 
i) The Broadcasting Rules Committee have done an 
admirable job in promulgating codes for television and 
radio. These codes are sufficiently detailed,~ 49 thereby 
minimising the force of a "vagueness" allegation, and 
adequate sanctions exist for the enforcement of these 
rules. 
ii} The Committee for Advertising Practice 
similarly have drafted fairly detailed codes of conduct 
catering for particular types of advertising. In Chapter II 
it has been suggested that the efficacy of these voluntary 
codes may be enhanced by the adoption and implementation of 
certain measures; namely, by the inclusion of a consumer 
representative or representatives on the Committee, by the 
monitoring of such codes by a Consumer Affairs 
450 Department, and by ensuring that adequate sanctions exist 
(449) That is; specific rules are directed at subliminal 
advertising, advertisements associated with the sale of 
alcohol, financial advertising, advertising and 
children, and political advertising. 
(450) This suggestion will be elaborated upon in Chapter VI, 
Conclusion, infra. 
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to back up the codes. It is also envisaged that the 
Consumer Affairs Department be empowered to approve 
such codes and necessary directions could be given as 
to the content of such codes. The problems associated 
with non-membership of an organisation that does 
subscribe to the codes of practice, or the difficulties 
arising where certain organisations themselves do not 
subscribe to the codes, may be dealt with by promulgating 
a rule making the lawful receipt of advertising revenues 
contingent upon the affiliation of the newspaper, 
magazine, direct mail publisher etc. to the Newspaper 
Publishers Association or some other organisation which 
b 'b th d f . 451 su scr1 es to e co es o pract1ce. 
iii} It is recommended that provision be made for 
a statutory prohibition against unfair advertising. 
Negative features associated with such legislative 
control could be obviated by providing: (a) That no 
prosecution be brought in respect of unfair advertising 
except with the leave of the Minister of Consumer 
Protection; where media organisations such as the 
Broadcasting Tribunal and the Newspaper Publishers 
Association are implementing their codes of practice, the 
need for leave to prosecute would not arise. (b) That in 
any prosecution, the court should be directed to have 
regard to the codes of practice in the particular medium 
(451) Idem. 
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in assessing the unfairness or otherwise of the 
advertising; this would mitigate- against "vagueness" 
deficiencies and promote compliance with the codes of 
. . th b d t -d . t d' 452 pract1ce 1n e roa cas an pr1n me 1a. 
{6) SUMMARY 
a) Consultation with offenders is to be encouraged 
as a means to settle disputes inexpensively; however, it 
is submitted that there is no place for compulsory 
consultation provisions in advertising regulation due to 
(i) the·delays involved, and (ii) paradoxically, the 
inflexibility that this entails. 
b) Offences against advertising provisions should 
be strict liability offences, subject to the proviso that 
the offender may escape liability by demonstrating 
(i) that he acted innocently, and (ii) that he took all 
reasonable steps or precautions to ensure compliance. 
c) The informational content of advertisements 
should be bolstered by mandatory disclosure of price 
information and the increased dissemination of product 
quality and performance information. 
(452) Idem. 
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d) Consideration should be given to: 
(i) Advertisement substantiation in that this facilitates 
detection of deceptive or misleading advertising claims 
and if advertisers are compelled in advance of 
publication to prepare material substantiating their 
claims, this could have a beneficial impact on the 
reliability of claims; (ii) Corrective advertising, in 
that this constitutes a powerful deterrent and is a means 
whereby the residual impact of deceptive or misleading 
advertisements may be dissipated; (iii} Legislative 
control of unfair advertising. 
e) It is submitted that the Consumer Information 
Act 1969, the Merchandise Marks Act 1954, the Wool 
Labelling Act 1949 and labelling provisions of the Weights 
and Measures Act 1925 453 be consolidated into one statute. 
This would not only assist consumers but would make the law 
more intelligible and accessible for manufacturers. 
f) Finally, consideration must be given to the 
establishment of a Department, say a Consumer Affairs 
Department, with sole responsibility for the administration 
f t t . 1 . 1 . 454 o consumer pro ec 1on eg1s at1on. 
(453) See, for example, s 18(3) which makes it an offence 
for any person to sell or offer or expose for sale by 
retail by weight or by measure any goods enclosed in 
a package, unless the net weight or measure of the 
goods is legibly written or printed on the outside 
of the package or on an attached label. 
(454) Discussed in Chapter VI, Conclusion, infra. 
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V. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Before a decision to purchase a product or service 
is made a consumer usually consults, or is exposed to, 
several sources of information ranging from advertising 
to point of sale disclosure by the seller. As stressed 
in earlier chapters, the importance of the provision of 
accurate and reasonably detailed information to consumers 
cannot be overestimated as adequate knowledge by consumers 
of the full range, quality and price of goods and services 
sold in the market is a prerequisite for "workable" 
competition. Without adequate information consumers 
cannot compare prices and assess the relative quality of 
competing goods, and consequently are unable to make a 
rational choice. 
Although it is suggested in the preceding chapter 
that the informational content of advertisements may be 
improved via the mandatory disclosure of the price of 
goods and certain services and through increased 
disclosure of quality and performance criteria, advertising 
does not lend itself to extensive or even reasonably 
detailed disclosure; amongst other things, the brevity of 
advertisements makes it practically impossible to demand 
that detailed information be incorporated in an 
advertisement and there is 'a real problem of consumer 
overload if detailed scientific data is reproduced in 
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advertisements•. 1 However, considerable scope exists 
outside the advertising arena whereby information 
regarding goods and services can be communicated to the 
consumer. In this chapter it is proposed to consider 
some of these avenues of disclosure. 
(1) See Blakeney and Barnes, 'Advertising Regulation in 
Australia- An Evaluation', (1982) 8 Adelaide Law 
Review 29, 32. 
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l. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN CREDIT TRANSACTIONS 
(l) INTRODUCTION 
There has been a phenomenal increase in the 
availability and use of credit by consumers in recent 
times 2 with a number of factors fuelling a transition from 
a cash to a credit society. Of primary significance has 
been the growth of the economy in general, the rising 
income of the population, the expansion of consumer 
aspirations and the increasing social acceptability of 
credit. From the point of view of the manufacturing and 
retailing sectors the availability of credit means that 
they are able to sell goods and services to consumers 
which their current income or wealth would preclude them 
from purchasing - the net result is that turnover, and 
hence profitability is increased. The consumer benefits 
(2) For example, the total amount owing under hire 
purchase agreements in New Zealand has shown a steady 
increase over the years as the following figures 
reveal. Amount as at: 
31 December 1959 
31 December 1964 
31 December 1969 
31 December 1975 
31 March, 1980 
Total 
(millions) 
$ 11.7 
$ 26.2 
$ 84.8 
$220.1 
$596 
[Source: New Zealand Yearbooks for the relevant years.] 
The Finance Houses Association (Inc.) in their Annual 
Report for the year ending 31 March 1980 reported that 
total gross loans and advances of members increased 
33.4% or $279.6 million for the year. While this 
lending was distributed widely throughout all areas of 
the economy and was not confined to consumers in the 
narrow sense, it is nevertheless indicative of the 
type of growth experienced in the credit industry. 
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in that he can purchase goods and services as opportunity 
or desire arises with little or no reference to his 
immediate cash position. Credit serves, therefore, as a 
mechanism for bridging the gap between the low income 
years when consumer needs are perhaps at their greatest 
and the high income years when these needs may have 
declined. 3 As Katona explains the disjunction between the 
family life cycle and the income cycle of the average 
salaried employee is a significant factor in the promotion 
of instalment credit. This form of credit is used as a 
device to level the income curve over the occupational 
career and enables the consumer to meet his consumer wants 
immediately without having to wait for the higher income 
years. 
Credit may be provided in an infinite variety of ways 
but as the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
point out 4 credit transactions fall basically into two 
categories; namely, deferred payment sales and loans. The 
two major types of de rred payment sales in New Zealand 
are credit sales and hire purchase agreements of the 
HeZby v Matthews 5 varie or Lee v ButZer6 variety. 
{ 3) G. Katona, The Mass Cons (1964), 232. 
(4) Credit Contracts Report {February 1977), 1.01. Similarly 
the Crowther Committee Report on Consumer Credit (1971) 
1.1.2, takes credit to mean 'either the deferment of 
payment for goods delivered or services rendered at 
once or the straight lending of money'. 
( 5) [ 18 9 5] AC 4 71. 
(6) [1893] 2 QB 318. Hire purchase agreements are most 
frequently drafted in this form in New Zealand; that is, 
as conditional purchase or conditional sa agreements. 
The Chattels Trans Act 1957, s 57, makes it possib 
for certain sellers to avoid the operation of the Sa 
of Goods Act 1908, s 27(2). 
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The feature that distinguishes hire purchase agreements 
from credit sale agreements is that while possession of 
goods subject to a hire purchase agreement is given to 
the purchaser, property in the goods remains with the 
vendor until all the instalments have been paid; 
conversely in a credit sale arrangement property in the 
goods is transferred to the purchaser at the time of 
the sale or delivery of the goods and the passing of 
propery is not contingent upon the payment of the full 
h . 7 pure ase prlce. The second major category of credit 
transactions are loans. The primary source of loan 
monies in New Zealand are the banks and finance houses 
who provide credit to consumers to facilitate the purchase 
(7) There is the familiar buying'on account' where 
retailers allow credit to certain responsible 
customers and many retail outlets operate a type of 
revolving credit - often termed a budget account -
whereby the customer agrees to pay so much a month 
and at the same time can have goods on credit up to 
a certain va,lue; as the customer's payments reduce 
his outstanding debt, he can then buy more goods or 
'top up' his debt to the arranged maximum amount. 
As a further alternative most retailers accept 
payment by a credit card. There are two main types 
of credit card in New Zealand, namely, three party 
cards and two party cards. With respect to the former 
variety the first party is the cardholder, the second 
party is the outlet that accepts the card, and the 
third party is the bank or credit card ompany that 
issues the card. In this case the credit not 
provided by the retailer but by the bank or credit card 
company operating the scheme. As regards two-party 
cards, again the cardholder is the first party and the 
retailer the second party. There is no third party 
though because the retailer issues its own card. 
These two party credit cards are often called 'in 
house' cards and are offered on store charge accounts 
by most of the big business houses in New Zealand. 
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of goods and services. 8 Banks, for example, provide 
credit through loans or the extension of overdraft 
facilities, the former usually being a loan of a fixed 
sum at a fixed rate of interest to be paid off by fixed 
regular instalments, while the latter is an arrangement 
whereby a customer may borrow on his current account. 
As the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
emphasise, 9 loans and deferred payment sales serve a 
similar objective in the usual case; namely, to enable 
h t . d d . 10 a consumer to pure ase cer aln goo s an servlces. 
Furthermore, if a person has insufficient cash to acquire 
a particular chattel, for example 1 he may enter into a 
hire purchase agreement or raise a loan from a finance 
company or bank. Such a lending institution may require 
the borrower to execute an instrument by way of security 
over the particular chattel, which has the effect of 
transferring the property in the chattel to the lender. 
In effect, therefore, the position of the secured lender 
is the same as that of the seller under a hire purchase 
agreement; that is, property in the goods is retained 
until such time as the amount owing, including interest 
(8) For example 1 the total gross loans and advances of the 
Finance Houses Association member companies as at 
31 March 1980 was $1,167 million representing an 
increase of 33.4% .or $279 million over the previous 
year. Of this sum $185 million was lent in order to 
finance the purchase of vehicles and $143 million was 
distributed by way of personal loan. See the New 
Zealand Finance Houses Association (Inc.) Annual 
Report and Review of Activities for 1979/80. 
(9) Credit Contracts Report, 1.02. 
(10) See also the Crowther Committee Report 1 1.2.2. and 
Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1962] AC 600, 626. 
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charges, is paid. Another obvious similarity between 
deferred payment sales and loans is that the purchaser 
and borrower, respectively, pay a charge for the 
privilege that is afforded them. 
The expansion of the credit industry has brought 
significant and obvious advantages. In addition to 
advancing the business of those in industry, commerce and 
finance, the growth of consumer credit may well have been 
a factor in raising the standard of living of the average 
and low income earner. 11 However as Ison comments12 
11 [The growth of credit marketing] has also 
provided the opportunities and incentives 
for predatory practices, deceit and other 
abuses. Complaints have been voluminous 
about, for example, misleading advertising, 
fraud, the concealment of credit terms, high 
pressure tactics, defective goods, dubious 
accounting methods and oppressive collection 
tactics. These problems were not created by 
the expansion of new forms of consumer 
credit, but they may have been aggravated. 
For example, it is often thought to be easier 
for a high-pressure salesman to induce a 
signature on an instalment contract than to 
induce a signature on a cheque for the same 
amount 11 • 
Furthermore it is clear that there is a substantial 
difference between the simplicity evidenced by the 'buy 
now, pay later', 'easy terms' type of exhortation and the 
complicated credit contract that the consumer actually 
signs. It is probably fair comment to assert that the 
average person who buys goods on credit is usually only 
interested in the practical aspects of the transaction 
(11) D. Caplovitz, 'Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society' 
published in Consumer Credit Reform (1970), 9. 
(12) Credit Market and Consumer Protection (1979), 14. 
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and is seldom aware of the precise nature of his legal 
rights and obligations. This may in part be ascribed 
to the apathy of the buying public, but is also a 
reproach to the complexity of documents employed in this 
area, that buyers aware of the futility of trying to 
comprehend all the complexities, are prepared to blindly 
sign any form that is placed before them, if by so doing 
they can obtain possession of the goods on payment of a 
fraction of the purchase price, or indeed, without paying 
anything at a11. 13 There is also a significant 
difference in expertise between the credit supplier and 
the consumer, with the consequence that the 'potentiality 
f 1 • • t • · f t 14 or exp o1tat1on 1s man1 es . 
Various approaches towards the regulation of the 
credit market have been adopted in New Zealand. The 
Moneylenders Act 1901 was the first attempt in this country 
to control lending transactions. This Act was replaced by 
the Moneylenders Act 1908 and this in turn was extensively 
amended by the Moneylenders Amendment Act 1933. The 
moneylenders legislation had as its primary objective the 
protection of debtors against unconscionable bargains and 
sharp practices of moneylenders. To this end the following 
techniques were adopted: (1) a system of licensing and 
registration was set up, the idea being that only fit and 
(13) Roebuck, Duncan and Szakats, Law of Commerce (1968), 
226. 
(14) Collinge, Law of Marketing in Australia and New 
Zealand (1971), 323. 
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proper persons should be entitled to carry on the 
b . f 1 d. 15 us1ness o money en 1ng; (2) the courts were empowered 
to re-open a harsh and unconscionable transaction and were 
given a wide discretion regarding the remedy to be granted 
against a lender in appropriate cases; 16 (3) disclosure 
of certain information such as the amount of the principal 
and the interest payable was required. 17 
Furthermore, the legislature turned its attention 
to instalment sales when the Hire Purchase Agreements 
Act 1939 was enacted. Under this Act the courts were 
entitled to reopen harsh and unconscionable hire purchase 
18 
agreements, repossession was regulated, and a formula 
was adopted by which the amounts owing to the purchaser 
19 
were to be computed. The protection that was afforded 
to the consumer under this Act was incorporated in, and 
expanded upon, in the Hire Purchase Act 1971. In 
particular, this latter Act stipulates that the number of 
instalments, their amounts and other financial details 
must be disclosed. 20 There is also implied into all 
contracts of hire purchase, terms as to title, fitness for 
purpose and merchantable quantity. 21 
(15) Moneylenders Act 1908, s 4. 
(16) Ibid, s 3. 
(17) Moneylenders Amendment Act 1933, s 8. 
( 18) See s 8. 
(19) See ss 4, 51 6. 
(20) See ss 5, 6. 
( 21) ss 11, 12 1 13. 
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Brief mention must be made also of the Hire Purchase 
and Credit Sales Stabilisation Regulations 1957 which, 
although primarily directed at restricting the 
availability of credit, 22 do enjoin each contract covered 
b h 1 . 23 t t t . f 1 . . t y t e regu at~ons o mee cer a~n orma requ~remen s. 
Contracts must be in writing, must be signed by the 
purchaser, and describe the goods to which they relate. 24 
As well, the agreement must state the number and amounts 
of separate instalments. 25 In so far as hire purchase 
agreements are concerned the requirements as to formalities 
and disclosure are largely reproduced in the Hire Purchase 
Act 1971. 
The rapid escalation in the availability and use of 
credit has prompted legislatures around the world to 
commission studies with a view to reform. For example, in 
1968, United States Federal legislation, popularly known 
as "Truth-in-Lending" was enacted as the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 26 and a Uniform Consumer Credit Code was 
prepared for adoption by the various States 27 following 
(22) As McCarthy J. observed in Credit Service Investments Ltd 
v Carroll [1973] 1 NZLR 246, 257,the Regulations 
" ... were enacted pursuant to the Economic Stabilisation 
Act 1948 as part of the Government's economic, monetary 
and fiscal policy in the control of inflationary 
conditions observable in the economy". To this end 
minimum deposits and maximum periods of credit are 
stipulated for certain goods. See also Motor Mart 
Ltd v Webb [1958] NZLR 773, 778. 
(23) See Hire Purchase and Credit Sales Stabilisation 
Regulations 1957, reg. 2. 
(24) Ibid., reg. 3. 
( 2 5) Idem. 
(26) 15 USCA 1601 et seq. 
(27) National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Law, Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1968). 
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extensive investigations. In the United Kingdom the 
Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit in 197128 
precipitated the passage of the Consumer Credit Act 
1974 (UK). In Australia, reports were compiled in 
Queensland by the Law Reform Commission on moneylending29 
and in Western Australia by an Honorary Royal Commission 
30 
on hire purchase. The Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General invited two committees to undertake studies on 
consumer credit laws and to propose comprehensive reforms. 
The first, known as the Rogerson Committee, operating 
under the auspices of the University of Adelaide Faculty 
of Law, presented its report in 1969. 31 The second, 
known as the Molomby Committee, conducted under the 
auspices of the Law Council of Australi~presented its 
report in 1972. 32 In New Zealand, the legislature's 
concern over the dramatic transformation to a credit 
society led the Minister of Justice in 1968 to instruct 
the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee to study 
the law relating to moneylending transactions and to other 
agreements involving the extension of credit, with a view 
to recommending necessary reform. The result of this 
( 2 8) Cmnd 4 59 6. Known as the 'Crowther Commit tee' . 
(29) Law Reform Commission of Queensland, Report on a Bill 
to Consolidate and Amend the Law Relat1ng to 
Moneylending (1972). 
(30) Honorary Royal Commission into Hire Purchase and 
Other Agreements (1972). 
(31) Report to the Standing Committee of State and 
Commonwealth Attorneys-General on the Law Relating to 
Consumer Credit and Money Lending (1969). 
(32) Report on Fair Consumer Credit Laws to the Attorney-
General for the State of Victoria (1972). 
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Committee's deliberations and consultations was a 
voluminous Report on Credit Contracts presented in 
July 1977. 33 Many of the recommendations in this Report 
have now received statutory recognition in the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981. 
This Act, which came into force on 1 June 1982, has 
four basic objectives, namely -
i) To prevent oppressive credit contracts and 
conduct; 
ii) To ensure that all terms of credit contracts 
are disclosed to debtors before they become 
irrevocably committed to them; 
iii) To ensure that the cost of credit is disclosed 
on a uniform basis in order to prevent 
deception and encourage competition, and, 
. ) . 1 d' d' d . 34 1v To prevent m1s ea 1ng ere 1t a vert1sements. 
In order to attain these objectives the legislature has 
35 provided for the re-opening of oppressive credit contracts, 
the disclosure of information, 36 the regulation of credit 
d . 37 a vert1sements, and the prohibition of certain 
financiers and terms. 38 The Moneylenders Act 1908 and 
39 
amendments are repealed and the Hire Purchase Act 1971 
(33) See note 4, supra. 
(34) See the Preamble to the Act; as regards the fourth 
objective see the discussion above in Chapter IV, 
Statutory Control of Advertising. 
(35) Credit Contracts Act 1981, ss 9-14. 
(36) 
( 3 7) 
(38) 
(39) 
.!_bid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
ss 15-33. 
ss 34-38. 
ss 39-41. 
s 48. 
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is amended to ensure conformity and uniformity in the 
treatment of credit contracts. 40 It is against this 
general background, and in light of the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981, that the adequacy or otherwise of consumer 
information in the credit market falls to be assessed. 
In the context of this dissertation the following questions 
are of primary concern to a consumer who wants credit to 
purchase certain goods or services, namely: what information 
must be disclosed? When must such disclosure be effected? 
Is disclosure required for all credit transactions? How is 
such disclosure compelled and what are the sanctions for non-
compliance? 
(2} THE CONTENT OF STATUTORY DISCLOSURE 
(a) General 
What must be disclosed? As the Contracts and 
Commercial Law Reform Committee comment41 
"The simple answer is, of course, 'All 
the terms of the contract', but a moments 
reflection shows that that answer would 
be quite unsatisfactory". 
Full disclosure of all the terms is not the answer for the 
following reasons: 
(40} Ibid, s 49. 
{41) Credit Contracts Report, para 8.04. 
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{i) Debtors are seeking understanding as much as 
they are seeking information and consequently disclosure 
must be in form that renders it intelligib to the average 
42 
man in the street. To provide too much information is 
self defeating. The consumer can absorb only so many 
items of information at one time; beyond this he loses 
interest or does not have the time or inclination to digest 
the multitude of facts, and the law of diminishing returns 
comes into play. Detailed disclosure is required in the 
United States under the so-called 'Truth in Lending Act• 43 
and the rules promulgated under this Act, which are coll-
t . 1 k 1 . z 44 h d 1 ec 1ve y nown as Regu at1on • T e Fe era Reserve 
Board, who issued Regulation z, were forced to concede that 
there was substantial opposition and justifiab 
of Regulation z. 45 
criticism 
"Critics have argued not only that the numerous 
technical disclosures are burdensome for 
creditors but also that the disclosure statement 
so lengthy and complicated that most consumers 
do not bother to read it. The criticism concludes 
that, in attempting to give consumers all the 
meaningful information they need to make an 
informed credit choice, Truth in Lending 
Legislation has gone too far and, in many cases, 
has only confused consumers with extraneous 
information not directly related to the cost of 
credit". 
(42) Ibid para 8.05. 
{43) The so-called Truth-in-Lending Act is subchapter 1 of 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See note 32, supra. 
(44) 12 CFR ss 226.1- 226.15 (1979). 
(45) 1976 Report to Congress; cited in Goode, Consumer 
Credit (1978),59. 
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(ii) Many contract terms are incorporated by reference 
to other documents which may or may not be available to, or 
d b 11 . 46 rea y, a part1es. For example, a clause that is 
commonly to be found in insurance proposal fo'rms is one 
whereby the proponent agrees to accept the insurance 
company's policy 'subject to the terms and conditions to 
be contained therein or endorsed thereon•. 47 Furthermore, 
various terms are implied by statute into contracts. If 
the debtor is to be appraised of all the terms then he 
would need copies of all statutory provisions that impinge 
upon the transaction that he is entering and he would also 
need copies of any other documents or terms that are 
incorporated by reference. The fundamental objection which 
is recognised by the Federal Reserve Board in the United 
States raises its ugly head. 
(iii) If on the occasion of each and every credit 
contract there was a meticulous and exhaustive perusal of 
all the express and implied terms business efficiency would 
be severely impaired. In light of the reopening provisions 
of the Act48 this would not only be counter productive, in 
that any additional costs are likely to be passed on to the 
consumer, but unnecessary; that is,there is little danger 
involved if a consumer is taken by surprise by some unduly 
(46) Credit Contracts para 8.04. 
(47) See, for example, Southern Cross Assurance Co Ltd v 
Australian Provincial Assurance Association Ltd {1939) 
39 SR (NSW) 174. 
(4 8) Ss 9-14. 
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harsh or onerous term as the court may reopen the 
t t . . th . t 49 d h . . d ransac 1on 1n ese c1rcums ances an t ere 1s a w1 e 
discretion conferred upon the court to order relief. 50 
These conditions lead one to the irresistible 
conclusion that a balance has to be struck. There is an 
optimum level of information that the consumer needs if he 
is to make a relatively informed decision about the merits 
of a credit transaction and is to compare its cost with 
that of alternative credit sources. One writer51 suggests 
that 
"Three issues are important to the consumer 
who contemplates the acquisition of goods 
or services financed by instalment credit. 
First, he should assess the cost of credit 
to weigh the relevant factors, consumer 
must know the cash price for which he could 
obtain the goods or services and compare it 
with the total sum payable under the credit 
contract. Secondly, he should consider whether 
he can afford the commitment; to assess this, 
the consumer must know the size of each 
instalment and budget them, together with his 
other commitments and contingencies, against 
his future income. Thirdly, he should investigate 
whether the credit might be available more cheaply 
from an alternative source; to accomplish this, 
the consumer must know the rate of credit charges 
expressed in a manner which makes a ready 
comparison possible.52 
These issues that the learned writer isolates all 
relate to financial particulars of a particular type of 
credit transaction, but it is clear that for credit 
(49) Under s 10. 
(50) See s 14. 
(51) O'Hare, 'Issues in Consumer Credit Reform', in Duggan 
and Darvall (eds) , Consumer Protection Law and Theory 
(1980)' 108-109. 
(52) The underlining is my own. 
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transactions in general financial particulars are of the 
essence. Disclosure of financial particulars performs 
both a descriptive and a shopping function53 in that the 
form of disclosure enables the debtor to determine whether 
the utility of the loan or instalment sale justifies the 
price, and disclosure of these financial matters provides 
the means whereby consumers may shop effectively for 
credit by comparing prices from different sources. 
In addition to the disclosure of financial 
particulars the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform 
Committee recommend54 that the name and address of the 
financier55 and the express terms of the credit 
transaction, with the exception of terms imposed by law, 
be disclosed. These topics will now be considered in 
isolation. 
(b) Financial Particulars 
The difficulty facing any legislature here is to 
give financial particulars in a meaningful, uniform manner 
that would be readily intelligible to the average consumer. 
(53) Jordan and Warren, 'Disclosure of Finance Charges: A 
Rationale', (1966) 64 Michigan Law Review 1294. 
(54) Credit Contracts para 8.30. 
(55) "Financier" is defined in section 2(1) of the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981 as "any person who (a) carries on 
the business of providing credit (whether or not the 
business is his only business or his principal 
business); or {b) makes a practice of providing 
credit in the course of a business carried on by him; 
or {c) makes a practice of entering into credit 
contracts in his own name as a creditor on behalf of 
or as trustee or nominee for any other person". 
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This task is complicated at the outset by the number and 
variety of credit transactions in existence with the 
resultant difficulty of stipulating a method of disclosure 
56 
applicable to credit transactions in general. 
In order to enable the proverbial man-in-the-street 
to compare terms offered to him by different financiers 
the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
recommended57 that the relevant financial details, namely, 
the total cost of credit58 and the finance rate59 be 
quoted in a uniform manner by the various sources. Lack of 
uniformity in the methods adopted in indicating the price 
that a debtor has to pay for the credit extended to him 
makes comparison between the credit charges of different 
suppliers of credit and the relative merits of borrowing 
as between one type of financial institution and another 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine. 6° For 
example, the financier may express the credit charge rate 
as a flat rate, simple rate, reducible rate, compound rate, 
add-on rate, nominal rate or effective rate; moreover, the 
rate may be expressed on an annual basis, monthly or other 
periodic basis. In these circumstances a meaningful 
(56) See, for example, the Credit Contracts 
para 9.01-9.06. 
(57) Ibid, para 9.08. 
(58) Ibid, para 9.11. 
(59) Idem. 
( 60) Ibid, para 8.19. 
377 
comparison of credit costs is unlikely and the full play 
of market forces is not able to operate with the 
consequence that the consumer may pay more for his credit 
than he needs. 
As mentioned above, the key elements of financial 
disclosure in the Credit Contracts Act 1981 are the 'total 
cost of credit' and the 'finance rate'. The finance rate, 
being the rate that expresses the total cost of credit as 
f h t f d . 61 . h a percentage per annum o t e amoun o ere 1t 1s per aps 
the item of information that will have the greatest impact 
upon consumers seeking and comparing credit sources. 
However the most vexed question in the field of financial 
disclosure is: What items ought to be treated by law as 
comprising the total cost of credit? The resolution of 
this question is vital for the following reasons: 
i) The computation of the finance rate is totally 
dependent upon the calculation of the total cost of credit. 
It is not possible to determine the rate of the credit 
charge imposed in a particular transaction unless it is 
known what comprises the charge itself. 
ii) The inclusion of certain items in the total cost 
of credit may be supported for the purpose of rate 
disclosure but inappropriate for the calculation of rebates 
and if the total cost of credit is to remain constant in any 
legislation this may require some compensating adjustment 
where rebates are in issue. 62 
(61) See the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 6. 
(62) See the Hire Purchase Act 1971, s 23. 
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iii) The division of the debtor's total 
indebtedness as between the amount of the credit and 
total cost of credit may determine whether a transaction 
is outside the upper financial limit of the legislation63 
the characterisation of the transaction as oppressive, 64 
and so on. 
Two broad approaches are possible. First, the total 
cost of credit may be represented by the excess of the 
debtor's repayment obligations over the amount of credit 
provided to him. 65 Alternatively, the approach adopted in 
the Hire Purchase Act 197166 could be endorsed, where the 
total cost of credit is defined as the total amount 
payable less the cash price and certain disbursements 
specified in the definition. Logically, the former 
approach should be adopted as being sound in principle. 
However, nanciers have argued that although part of the 
total cost of credit paid by a consumer represents a 
return on their investment, another part represents cost 
(63) For example, the terms as to merchantable quality and 
rebate entitlement do not apply where the cash price 
of goods disposed of on hire purchase terms exceeds 
$15,000. See the Hire Purchase Act 1971, ss 12(1) (c), 
23(5) (b) and the Hire Purchase (Specified Sums) Order 
1980. See also the definition of a 'Controlled 
Credit Contract' under the Credit Contracts Act 1981, 
s 15 (1) (f) • 
(64) The court is directed under the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 to consider, inter alia, whether the finance 
rate for a contract is oppressive in reaching its 
decision whether to re-open the Contract or not. 
See s 11(2) (b) (i). 
(65) Credit Contracts Report, para 9.25. 
(66) s 2. 
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incurred. in the granting of credit. This latter component, 
it is asserted, should not be reflected as forming part of 
the total cost of the credit. Bearing in mind that the 
'finance rate' expresses the total cost of credit as a 
percentage per annum of the amount of credit, a reduction 
in the total cost of credit makes for a much more 
attractive finance rate percentage. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
recommended67 that certain disbursements should not form 
part of the total cost of credit, and this is implemented 
in the Credit Contracts Act 1981. Total cost of credit 
is defined as the total of all money and money's worth 
payable by the debtor by virtue of the credit contract, 
less the amount of credit provided pursuant to the 
68 
contract and certain specified fees and charges. For 
example, amounts payable in respect of incidental 
69 
services to the debtor, or for legal services relating 
70 to the credit contract, or the surveys, inspections or 
71 
valuations of property, do not form part of the total 
cost of credit inasmuch as they are reasonable. Some of 
the disbursements that are excluded from constituting 
part of the total cost of credit are very liberal 
(67) Credit Contracts Report, para 9.28. 
( 6 8) See s 5. 
(69) S 3(3) (b) (i); see the Credit Contracts Amendment Act 
1982, s 2(2). 
(70) S 3(3) (b) (v). 
(71) s 3(3)(b)(iv). 
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dispensations. By comparison, in the United Kingdom 
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit 
{Total Charge for Credit) Regulations 1977 72 are based 
on the premise that the amount of credit is to be treated 
as restricted to the actual financial facility received 
by the debtor, and does not include expenses generated 
by the credit transaction itself; these are classified 
as part of the credit charge, for they are expenses which 
the debtor would have avoided if he had not taken credit 
and accordingly their payment by the creditor cannot be 
said to have conferred a financial benefit upon the debtor. 
According to regulation 4 of the Consumer Credit (Total 
Charge for Credit) Regulations 1977 the total cost (charge) 
of credit consists of two main items; viz.,first, and 
most obviously, the total of the interest on the credit 
provided under the agreement and, second, subject to 
exceptions, any other compulsory charge payable by the 
debtor as a condition of the granting of the credit. 
Included under this second head are charges such as 
creditors' administrative charges, brokers' fees, survey 
fees, legal fees, insurance premiums and, so far as the 
acquisition of goods on credit is concerned, installation 
and maintenance charges. Certain compulsory charges are 
however excluded from the total cost of credit by 
(72) S.I. 1977 No. 327; see also the Truth in Lending 
Act, s 106. 
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regulation 5. These excluded charges are essentially 
(1} charges payable to the creditor upon default by the 
debtor, 73 (2} charges payable even if the transactions 
were for cash, (3) charges for the care, maintenance or 
protection of land or goods where either the services are 
essential to preserve the land or goods or the debtor can 
choose with whom to make the arrangements, and (4} insurance 
premiums payable either before the making of the credit 
contract under a pre-existing policy or under any policy 
with an insurer chosen by the debtor except where the 
policy moneys are to be used to repay the credit or total 
charge for credit. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
74 
rejected this approach in that: 
i) A majority of the Committee were of the opinion 
that the distinction between compulsory and voluntary 
charges would give rise to practical difficulties. That 
there would be a degree of uncertainty is undeniable but 
this is by no means an insurmountable obstacle - the 
regulations under the Consumer Credit (Total Charge for 
Credit} Regulations 1977 have identified and categorised 
the various charges in some detail thereby reducing the 
scope for dispute. 
(73) Cf. Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 3(3)(b) (ii). 
(74) Credit Contracts Report, para 9.28. 
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ii) The majority also believed that where a financier 
retains or acquires property in goods as a security, he 
has a legitimate interest in insisting on terms aimed at 
maintaining them in good condition as well as seeing them 
insured. As mentioned above, such charges are also 
excluded from the total charge for credit under the United 
Kingdom provisions. Furthermore the Committee, without 
giving reasons, were unanimous that charges incurred in 
regard to surveys or valuations should not form part of 
the total cost of credit. 75 
It is submitted that the far narrower category of 
charges excluded from constituting part of the total cost 
of credit under the United Kingdom legislation is preferable. 
What is vitally important is that the true cost to the 
debtor, and not the net return to the creditor, should be 
fl d A . t 76 re ecte • s one wr~ter commen s, 
"The fact that the creditor likewise does 
not benefit from these items is irrelevant, 
for what is involved is the cost to the 
debtor and not the benefit to the creditor". 
In addition the Credit Contracts Act would exclude from the 
total cost of credit any reasonable amount payable for 
incidental services to the debtor 77 - it is open to 
speculation as to the number and quantum of miscellaneous 
(75) Idem. 
(76) Goode, supra, 53. 
(77) S 3{3) {b) (i); the Credit Contracts Amendment Act 
1982, s 2 (2). 
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charges that will gain exemption under this head. 78 The 
position is clarified to a certain extent in the Credit 
Contracts Amendment Act 1982 in that 'incidental services' 
are defined as meaning benefits (not being benefits that 
consist in the provision of credit) such as the provision 
by the lender of insurance or services for the protection, 
79 
maintenance or preservation of the property. What benefits 
outside the scope of those mentioned in the amending legisl-
ation will qualify is an open question. The more exemptions 
granted the less accurate and useful the disclosure will be, 
as it will not reflect the total cost of borrowing. It 
remains to be seen whether financiers will attempt to exploit 
these exemptions so as to create the impression of a more 
favourable finance rate than competitors. 
Turning now to the finance rate, a choice exists 
between nominal rate disclosure and effective rate 
. h . 80 1 . th d1sclosure. T e Comrn1ttee exp a1n at 
11 If a creditor has advanced an amount of money 
('the principal') at a rate of interest of r% per 
month, then it is a matter of convention how this 
is to be translated into an annual rate for the 
purpose of a comparison with other contracts. It 
may be translated into a nominal rate of 12r% per 
annum. This method is not realistic, however, since 
it does not take into account the fact that the 
creditor is able to re-invest money as soon as he 
receives it, and the debtor is unable to invest 
money he has paid out. The effective annual rate of 
interest is the rate of interest which, if applied 
to the original amount advanced, would bring the 
same return at the end of the contract period as 
the actual return calculated by adding the amount 
which all the intermediate monthly repayments would 
accumulate to if interest at the rate of r% were 
paid on them until the end of the contract period". 
(78) It would be much easier to foreclose loopholes of this 
nature by limiting the number of exceptions or ·by 
adopting tighter wording of disclosure provisions. 
See Ison, s a 184. 
(79) Sees 2(2). 
(80) Credit Contracts para 9.38. 
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While the nominal rate of computation has the merit of 
simplicity it is an unacceptable form of rate disclosure 
for it grossly understates the effective rate; that is, it 
fails to take into account the fact that the greater the 
number of payment periods a year the faster the debtor is 
parting with his money. For example, the nominal rate is 
ascertained by multiplying the period rate by the number of 
payment periods in a year, so that a period rate of 2% per 
month would produce a nominal annual rate of 24% per annum. 
However, to calculate the effective annual rate the first 
repayment has added to it the compound interest which would 
accumulate if it was invested for the remaining 11 months 
at a rate of 2% per month. Similarly, the second repayment 
has added to it the compound interest that would accurnu.late 
if it was invested for the remaining 10 months of the year 
at a rate of 2% per month. Other payments are similarly 
treated. Thus where interest payments are being made monthly 
a nominal annual rate of 24% corresponds with an effective 
rate of 26.8%. The difference between the effective rate 
and the nominal rate becomes increasingly pronounced as 
interest levels increase. 81 
The nominal annual rate does not, therefore, provide 
a reliable bas for comparing credit costs under contracts 
of differing payment intervals. However the nominal rate 
mode of disclosure does have an advantage in that the mode 
of computation is relatively straightforward by comparison. 
(81) Ibid, Appendix IV. 
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The choice therefore is between simplicity, on the one hand, 
and accuracy, on the other. The United States Regulation z82 
adopts the nominal rate mode of disclosure for as one 
. 83 t d wr1ter as asser e 
"The precision required in determining the 
annual percentage rate must represent a 
compromise between the time and costs of 
its calculation and the anticipated 
benefits of the descriptive and shopping 
functions provided. It is a compromise 
between what is mathematically feasible, 
and what is commercially feasible". 
The New Zealand Legislature has succumbed to the 
tantalising simplicity of the nominal rate mode of 
disclosure. In the original Credit Contracts Bill it was 
required that both the nominal and effective rates were to 
be disclosed, 84 but the Select Committee excised the 
ef ctive rate, presumably, on the ground that its 
computation was too complicated. Consequently, the finance 
rate is defined as the rate that expresses the total cost 
of credit as a percentage per annum of the amount of credit 
and that is, either (i) calculated by the financier himself 
by reference to the formula given in the First Schedule, or 
(ii) correctly derived or calculated from tables, or in 
accordance with a formula, prepared and published by the 
85 Government Actuary. Where the financier employs the first 
(82) Supra, note 50. 
(83) Johnson, 'The New Law of Finance Charges: Disclosure, 
Freedom of Entry and Rate Ceilings', Consumer Credit 
Reform, edited by C.C.Havighurst (1970), 36. 
(84) Credit Contracts Bill, First Schedule, clause 2. 
(85) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 6. 
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mode of calculation the percentage derived may be 
86 
rounded to the nearest quarter of one per cent and the 
preparation of interest tables has made it a relatively 
simple operation to determine the finance rate in most 
transactions. Given the substantial criticism that has 
been directed at the Credit Contracts Act 198187 the 
requirement of disclosure of an effective rate as well 
as the nominal rate would have intensified objections to 
the Act. However, it is submitted that the compromise 
adopted in the Act is an unacceptable submission to 
inaccuracy; the disclosure of the effective rate would 
give a more much realistic measure of the price of credit 
and mathematical complications could be overcome by the 
preparation of further interest tables. Given the high 
rates payable for credit at the current time the 
difference between effective and nominal rates may be 
signi cant. 
It is clear that disclosure of the finance rate lies 
at the heart of financial particulars that must be 
imparted to a prospective debtor. In the case of 
(86) Idem. 
(87) See, for example: Public Issues Committee of the 
Auckland District Law Society, 'Criticism of the 
Credit Contracts Act', [1982] NZLJ 117 (some of the 
criticisms outlined in this critique have been resolved 
by the Credit Contracts Amendment Act 1982 ); Black, 
'Credit Contracts', [1982} NZLJ 92i Forsell, 'A Few 
Comments on the Credit Contracts Act', [1982] NZLJ 219. 
387 
closed-end transactions 88 subject to a fixed charge, 89 
there is no difficulty in effecting this disclosure as 
the amount of credit, total cost of credit and, 
consequently, the finance rate, are readily 
ascertainable. 90 With closed end transactions subject 
to variation either in the amount advanced or in the 
finance rate the position is more complicated. For 
example, a financier may agree to advance 80% of the cost 
of an engineering contract subject to a specified limit 
and here the amount of credit will not be determined at 
h . th . d 91 t e t1me e contract lS ma e; or, a contract may be 
made whereby the interest payable is tied to the prevailing 
bank rate from time to time. How is disclosure to be 
effected in these circumstances? In closed-end trans-
actions where the amount advanced is uncertain the 
legislatures solution is that (i) if the credit it not 
to exceed a known maximum amount then the amount of credit 
shall be deemed to be that maximum amount or (ii) if 
there is no such maximum amount the amount or credit 
shall be that amount which in the creditor's opinion will 
(88) Credit transactions in which the amount advanced is 
stipulated in the contract itself are closed end credit 
transactions. See the Credit Contracts Report, para 9.02. 
An illustration would be a house loan whereby the 
financier agrees to lend a specified sum repayable by 
instalments over a specified period. 
(89) When the amount which the debtor is obliged to pay under 
the credit contract for the privilege of obtaining his 
advance is specified in the contract, then that 
transaction is subject to a fixed charge. See the Credit 
Contracts Report, para 9.03. For example, the deb 
may be obliged to pay a fixed rate of interest, say 
15 per cent per annum, on the declining balance. 
(90) See the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 16 and the Second 
Schedule thereto. 
(91) See Credit Contracts Report, para 9.44. 
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be advanced. 92 In relation to closed end transactions 
with a varying interest rate a similar solution is 
adopted; that is, (i) if the interest rate or other 
component of the total cost of credit is subject to 
variation calculations shall be on the basis of the terms 
prevailing at the time the contract is made or (ii} where 
such rate or other component is not known at the time of 
contracting, the rate or amount will be that figure that 
the creditor deems to be likely. 93 Furthermore with all 
closed end transactions, the debtor must be appraised of 
the payments to be made pursuant to the contract, if 
those payments have been ascertained at the time the 
disclosure documents are prepared; that is, the amount 
number and frequency as well as the time and place for 
b . 94 payment must e g~ven. 
Disclosure of financial particulars in open-end 
credit transactions 95 occasions more difficulty. Here the 
financ r is allowing the debtor to draw at his 
discretion for amounts needed by him from time to time up 
(92) Credit Contracts Act 19811 s 5 (2} (a}. 
(9 3) Ib i d , s 5 ( 2 ) ( c ) • 
(94) Ibid. Part I of the Second Schedule, Clause 5. Note, 
too, that in the case of a de rred payment 
disposition, the cash price of the property or services 
must be given (Clause 7) . 
(95} Contracts that enable the debtor to call upon the 
financier's resources within a specified limit are 
known as open end credit transactions. As the 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee point 
out (at para 9.02 of the Credit Contracts Report)bank 
overdraft arrangements and credit cards which enable 
the holder to charge his purchases to a financier are 
common examples of this type of credit transaction. 
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d '1' 96 to an agree eel lng. With open end credit contracts, 
where the amount advanced is revolving it is difficult 
to determine the actual finance rate in that the actual 
rate payable will vary according to the time of the month 
when a debtor draws against this facility; for example, by 
using his credit card to purchase goods or services, and 
the time of month when payments are made. Not only is the 
total cost of credit dependent upon the debtors debiting 
and repayment patterns, but the amount of credit is 
indeterminable in advance. Consequently, with regard to 
open end credit, or revolving credit accounts, the 
h . 97 h h Crowt er commlttee t oug t 
" ... that the matter can best be dealt with 
by requiring the credit grantor to state 
the basis of calculation of the credit 
charge before the first transaction takes 
place - e.g. that the charge is one per 
cent a month on the balance carried forward 
from the end of the billing cycle - and to 
show the effective annual equivalent of the 
quoted rate, on the basis of annual 
compounding" . 
This view is endorsed by the Contracts and Commercial Law 
Reform Committee98 and is adopted in part in the Credit 
(96) Credit Contracts Report, para 9.49. 
( 9 7) the Committee on Consumer Credit (1971, 
, para 
(98) Credit Contracts Report, para 9.51. The Committee 
recommend, inter alia, that if the financier provides 
for a finance charge this should be disclosed as an 
effective annual rate: this could be effected by a 
quotation based on the total cost of credit that 
would be charged by the financier on the amount of 
the agreed ceiling for the period for which the 
facility is extended. 
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Contracts Act 1981 in that, while the financier must 
disclose the maximum amount of the credit99 and the basis 
of calculation of the credit charge, 100 there is no 
requirement that the finance rate be disclosed on opening 
a revolving credit account. 101 However, other 
recommendations of the Committee102 are implemented in 
full in that at the end of each billing period the 
financier must disclose the details outlined in Part III 
of the Second Schedule to the Act; that is, the opening 
balance, details of the credit provided, amounts paid by 
the debtor during the billing period, the amount and 
description of each charge payab under the contract that 
does not form part of the total cost of credit and that 
has been charged during the billing period, the cost of 
credit and the interest rate. Obviously with revolving 
credit accounts it is not possible to give the actual 
finance rate in advance, but if the debtor knows the rate 
to be applied to any amount owing at the end of any 
billing cycle, this may be of more significance to him. 
Finally, the financier must disclose the time and places 
103 
where payments have to be made. 
( 9 9) Second Schedule, Part I, Clause 2. 
(100) .!_bid, Clause 6. 
( 101) Ibid, Clause 4 ( 4) • 
(102) Credit Contracts para 9.52. 
( 10 3) Second Schedule, Part I, Clause 5. 
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(c) Other Information 
It is obviously important that the debtor should be 
able to identify and locate the financier to whom he is 
indebted and the Credit Contracts Act 1981 provides that 
the name and address of the financier must be provided. 104 
Furthermore, all terms of the contract, other than terms 
· 1· db 1 t b d' 1 d 105 As the Cornm1'ttee106 1mp 1e y aw, mus e 1sc ose . 
stress 
" ... the insertion in the disclosure 
statement of long extracts from statutes 
can defeat the purpose of the disclosure 
statement, which is to give as simple a 
description as possible of the express 
terms of the particular contract". 
Not only is the provision of excessive detail likely to 
obscure more salient information from the debtor's 
consideration, but this superfluous material is confusing, 
makes for an unwieldy and excessively verbose document, 
and will impair the efficient transaction of credit 
business. For these reasons this limitation on the 
disclosure of contractual terms is to be welcomed. Little 
restraint is placed on the nature of the terms that may 
(104) Second Schedule, Part I, Clause 1. See also the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971, s 6(1) (b) (v). As the Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee note (at para 8.31 
of the Credit Contracts Report): 'When moneylenders 
employed touts who made loans on tangible securities, 
such as pledges of personal property, the debtor 
found not infrequently that he could not redeem the 
security because he could not find the money nder. 
We do not believe that such evasive conduct takes 
place today on any scale, but the fact remains that 
the interests of the debtor require him to be able to 
identify and locate his creditor'. 
(105) Second Schedule, Part I, Clause 6. 
(106) Credit Contracts para 8.32. 
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be agreed upon, but in light of the extensive reopening 
. . h . . 1 10 7 prov~s~ons sue restra~nts are strlct y unnecessary. 
With deferred payment dispositions of goods a statement 
of rights must be incorporated in the disclosure document 
1 . . h db 1 1 . h d h 108 h' out ln~ng t e e tors ega rlg ts un er t e Act. T lS 
topic will be dealt with below, but the underlying premise 
is that if a debtor is ignorant of these rights then 
obviously he cannot even begin to exercise these rights -
disclosure in a prominent fashion goes a long way towards 
rectifying this ignorance. 
3. WHEN SHOULD DISCLOSURE BE MADE? 
{a) General 
This question can only properly be answered by 
reference to the objectives of disclosure. Succinctly 
stated these objectives are: 
i) To facilitate comparison shopping; that is, to 
ensure that before commitment to a particular 
credit transaction the consumer has the information 
before him to compare the various sources credit 
{107) Credit Contracts Act 1981, ss 9-14; note, however, that 
penalty and certain termination clauses are prohibited 
{see ss 40, 41) . 
(108) Ibid, ss 21(1) (a), 22 and the Second Schedule, Part I. 
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. 1 bl h. I f th . 109 ava1 a e to 1m. n act, e Comm1ttee go 
so far as to assert that 
"The cardinal principal of our proposals 
regarding disclosure is that information 
should be provided in a form enabling the 
public to 'shop for credit'". 
ii) To facilitate rational choice as between credit 
and cash. If the consumer has adequate information 
about the cost of credit more intelligent decisions 
about the use of credit compared with buying for cash 
may be made. 
iii) To ensure that persons who enter into credit 
contracts are aware of their rights and obligations 
under that contract. 110 
iv) To ensure that during the term of a credit contract 
the debtor can ascertain his position under that 
contract. 111 
If all these objectives are to be met there has to be 
provision for disclosure of information before a debtor is 
committed to a particular contract, and provision must also 
be made for post-contract disclosure. 
(109) Credit Contracts Report, para 8.08. 
(110) Ibid, para 8.01. 
(111) Idem. 
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(b) Pre-commitment disclosure 
It is well recognised that disclosure of information 
at or immediately before the conclusion of a particular 
credit transaction is inadequate in itself, for by then the 
consumer usually will be psychologically committed to the 
transaction and disclosure will have only a limited effect, 
if at a11. 112 Credit contracts are notoriously complicated 
documents and it would be totally unrealistic to expect 
a prospective debtor to even read, let alone understand, 
h d h h . t f . 113 sue a ocument w en at t e po1n o s1gnature. Very 
few persons would insist on a time for consideration, 
especially when goods are to be acquired pursuant to the 
d . t 114 ere 1t contrac . How then is pre-commitment disclosure 
to be effected so as to facilitate comparison shopping for 
credit, the rational use of credit compared with buying 
for cash, and to ensure prior familiarity with the terms 
of the credit transactions? 
Various possibilities exist, namely: 
i) Advertisements and price tickets could give all 
relevant financial details, including the total cost of 
credit and the finance rate. . 115 As one wr1ter comments 
{112) See, for example, Credit Contracts Report, para 8.08; 
Ison, op. cit. 189; O'Hare, . cit. 110; Goode, op.cit. 
50; Cranston . cit., 196. 
(113) See Note, 'Truth in Lending- Time of Disclosure', 
[1973] Wise. L. Rev. 290; Credit Contracts Report, 
para 8.08. 
(114) Idem. 
(115) Goode, . cit. 50. 
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"This is a sound approach, not merely for 
the informational value to the consumer, 
but also (and perhaps more importantly) 
because of the competitive impact as 
between rival institutions, each of which 
will be reluctant to advertise rates 
higher than those of it s colleagues". 
However, this is not the complete answer because it would 
obviously not be possible to disclose all the terms of the 
contract in a credit advertisement. 116 Disclosure via 
the medium of advertising and on price tickets would not 
only fail to ensure disclosure of all requisite information 
but would also not ensure disclosure of information for all 
credit transactions; i.e., not all credit transactions are 
made pursuant to public advertisements or are entered into 
in relation to the purchase of goods that have price 
tickets displayed. 117 Furthermore disclosure of the finance 
rate on an across the board basis will be extremely 
difficult because of its dependence upon the total cost of 
credit that may vary from transaction to transaction. 118 
Consequently, while pre-contract disclosure via the medium 
of advertising and on price tickets can assist the cause of 
informed decision making and comparison shopping, it is not 
sufficient in itself. 
ii) The possibility of adopting standard terms of 
contract prescribed by law was considered by the Contracts 
d C . 1 f . 119 b t . t d b . an ommerc~a Law Re arm Comm~ttee u reJec e as e~ng 
(116) See Blakeney and Barnes, op. cit.
1
32. 
(117) Credit Contracts para 8. 42 (a). 
(118) Idem. 
(119) lbid, para 8.42(b). 
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impracticable in the area of credit contracts given the 
infinite variety of terms employed in such contracts and the 
number of legitimate variations in the credit transactions 
themselves. In addition it could be argued that such an 
approach would inhibit the evolution of new forms of credit 
d b . . d b d b . 12 0 an e an unnecessary restr1ct1on an ur en on us1nesses. 
The adoption of standard term credit contracts would 
obviously ensure that any debtor who was so minded could 
acquaint himself with the terms of any particular type 
of credit transaction before committing himself, but 
vital variables such as the financial particulars would be 
absent. Consequently the adoption of standard term 
contracts is at best a partial reform in the arena of 
disclosure, and would have to be employed in conjunction with 
other measures aimed at the provision of information. One 
benefit that would flow from the adoption of standard terms 
would be the elimination of surplus verbiage that tends 
to obscure more relevant information. Judge White, 
Chairman of the South Australian Credit Tribunal, comments 
that existing documentation is concerned less with 
consumer understanding than industry advantage and that 
the industry should welcome shorter, clearer contracts 
to 'save time, paper and anxiety about compliance with 
legislation•. 121 However, it is clear that the adoption 
of standard term documents is not the complete answer to 
pre-contract disclosure. 
(120) Crowther Committee Report, para 6.5.7 
(121} Fair Dealing with Consumers (1975), 36. 
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iii) The third possibility is to give the 
prospective debtor 'the right to be informed in writing in 
advance of the making of the contract of the terms available 
f h f . . ' 12 2 rom t e ~nanc~er • This approach was tried in the 
123 Moneylenders Act 1908 which imposed a duty on moneylenders 
to give the borrower a note or memorandum in writing 
'containing all the terms of the contract including the date 
on which the contract was made, the amount of the principal, 
124 
and interest payable.' This had to be signed by the 
borrower before any money was lent or security given for 
the loan and non~compliance with this provision meant 
that the contract and any security given pursuant to that 
contract was unenforceable. A copy of the note or 
memorandum had to be forwarded to the debtor within seven 
days of the making of the contract if the moneylender wanted 
to ensure that the contract was enforceable •125 The rationale 
behind this provision was explained by Sugerman J in 
Jaques v Pacific Acceptance Corp. Ltd126 as follows: 
(122) Credit Contracts 
(123) s 8. 
(124) Idem. 
(125} Idem. 
para 8. 42 (c) • 
( 126) . { 1962} 80 WN {NSW) 130 8, 131 2-1313, discussing the 
analogous NSW provision: cited in Pannam, The Law of 
Moneylenders (1965), 150. See also Motel Mar~ne Pty 
Ltd v IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd (1964} 110 CLR 9, 12. 
Allingham v London and Westminster Loan and Discount 
Co. Ltd [1940] 2 KB 630, 634. 
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"[F]irst, as to the initial signature of the 
note or memorandum, that the borrower may be 
in a position to inform himself as to the 
terms of the contract and as to certain 
matters in relation thereto before he binds 
himself by acceptance of the loan or execution 
of the security, and secondly, as to the 
delivery of the copy, in order that the 
borrower may have by him a complete and 
accurate record to which he may refer in order 
to ascertain the nature and extent of his 
liabilities. A third possible purpose has also 
been suggested - namely, to provide a binding 
record of the transaction for purposes of its 
reopening .•• ". 
Clearly, these objectives are laudable, but the 
implementation of this provision has occasioned much 
difficulty. 127 For example, the requirement that the date 
on which the loan was made be reflected in the note or 
memorandum precluded moneylenders from entering into forward 
commitments for the provision of finance and from offering 
1 . d. f . 1 . . 12 8 current account or revo v1ng ere 1t account ac1 1t1es. 
In addition, it was contended that it was not possible for 
parties to 'make an effective agreement for the provision of 
security covering a present advance and further advances, 
with the consequence that the cost of securing further 
advances was increased due to the necessity of rearranging 
securities on the occasion of such further advances. 129 
Furthermore, it was also held that it was not possible to 
l 'dl 1 d' t t' 130 va 1 y vary a money en 1ng ransac 1on. As Greer L.J. 
{127) See Pannam, op. cit, 149-177. 
(128} Credit Contracts para 8.35. 
(129) Ibid, para 8.36. 
(130) See B.S. Lyle Ltd v ChappeZZ[1932] 1 KB 691; 
Temperance Loan Fund Ltd v Rose [1932] 2 KB 522; 
United Dominions Coreoration (Jamaica) Ltd v Shoucair 
[1968] 2 All ER 904 .U96'?] Ac .'?J40. 
I 
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131 
stated in Temperance Loan Fund Ltd v Rose: 
"In my judgment the only way in which the 
statute can be complied with in dealing with 
the renewal of the balance of an old loan is 
for the old loan to be treated as paid off 
and a new loan granted. The memorandum must 
be signed before the notional loan of that 
kind is made, otherwise [the provision] is 
not complied with". 
This obviously involved the borrower in considerable 
additional, and unnecessary, expense. While redrafting 
could overcome difficulties of this nature, the idea of 
presenting a prospective borrower with a formal loan offer 
for acceptance or rejection, or of requiring a lender to 
provide a memorandum or note embodying all the terms before 
making an advance, is subject to other limitations. While 
the disclosure provision in the Moneylenders Act 1908 
ensures that the borrower may ascertain the terms of the 
contract at the time of commitment, the memorandum or note 
is usually handed to the borrower at or just before he is 
given the credit documentation for signing and as a result 
there is not a reasonable period for detached evaluation 
of the financial and other data prior to contracting. Th 
along with the problems of delay, complexity, inflexibility, 
and repetition experienced under the Moneylenders Act 1908 
persuaded the Committee that a pre-contract disclosure 
provision of this nature as a prerequisite to the validity 
of a credit contract was not the answer. 132 
(131) ~upra, 532. 
{132) Credit Contracts Report, para 8.42(c). 
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iv) A fourth possibility would be to postpone the 
binding effect of an intended credit contract until the 
debtor has had the required information and a reasonable 
' ' ' 
133 Th' ld h opportun1ty to appra1se 1t. 1s wou overcome t e 
objection outlined above that the timing of disclosure 
does not permit detached evaluation or facilitate shopping 
for credit. While this approach has considerable merit the 
Committee rejected it in favour of the final possibility. 
v) The debtor should be afforded a right to rescind 
the contract within a reasonable time of the required 
d . 1 b . d h' 134 1sc osure e1ng rna e to 1m. This possibility, and the 
one mentioned above, would ensure that the prospective 
debtor knew the terms of a credit contract before that 
contract became irrevocably binding upon him, and would 
enable him to compare the terms of the various sources of 
credit available to him. From the point of view of the 
consumer it matters little whether the binding effect of a 
proposed credit contract suspended for a stipulated 
period, or whether he is afforded a right to cancel that 
contract over a similar time period. 
Having canvassed the various possibilities to point-
of-sale disclosure, attention may now be focussed upon the 
legislature's response. As mentioned in the chapter on 
Statutory Control of Advertising, provision is made in the 
Act for the disclosure of the finance rate in credit 
(133} Ibid, para 8.41. 
(134) Ibid, para 8.43. 
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advertisements where the advertisement states a rate of 
. 
13 5 b th . . . 1 t . 1 d d 1nterest, ut 1s 1s on y a par 1a an secon ary 
response to the problem of disclosure. In order to 
facilitate rational choice and comparison shopping the 
legislature has made extensive provision for "initial. 
disclosure 11 and has permitted the prospective debtor a 
period of reflection. 
The Credit Contracts Act 1981 provides that every 
creditor who enters into a "controlled credit contract" 136 
must ensure that initial disclosure of the contract is 
effected before the contract is made or will be made not 
later than the end of the fifteenth working day after the 
d 137 I 't' ld' 1 . b .. contract was rna e. n1 1a 1sc osure 1s to e g1ven 1n one 
or more legible documents and must encompass all the 
information, statements and other matters spe fied in the 
Second Schedule. 138 Furthermore, the debtor may cancel 
such a credit contract not later than the end of the third 
working day after the day the initial disclosure is made. 139 
The joint objective of these provisions is to ensure that 
the debtor has sufficient information at his disposal to 
assess the merits and demerits of a particular transaction 
(135) Supra; see the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 36. 
(136) The term "controlled credit contract" is defined in s 15 
of the Act. See the discussion below at 412. Basically 
all credit contracts entered into by professional 
financiers as creditors, or by any person as creditor 
through the instrumentality of a professional 
intermediary or credit contract that has been 
prepared by such professional intermediary, fall within 
the definition. 
(137) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 16. 
(138) Ibid, ss 20, 21. 
(139) Ibid, s 22. 
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and the three 11 days of grace" enable him to determine not 
only whether he wishes to be finally bound, but also to 
ascertain whether more attractive terms are available 
elsewhere. This topic of "debtor1s reconsideration" 
may appropriately be subsumed under the head of 
"pre-commitment" disclosure as the opportunity for appraisal 
will frequently come after the signing of the credit 
documentation. However, not only must disclosure be effected 
140 before a credit contract is enforceable, but the 
statutory "cooling-off" period must have elapsed before a 
debtor is irrevocably bound by the terms of the credit 
contract. 141 However, as mentioned above, it matters 
little to the consumer whether the binding effect of a 
proposed credit contract is suspended until a debtor has 
had the necessary information and a reasonable opportunity 
to examine it, or whether he is afforded a right to cancel 
that contract within a stipulated period after the receipt 
of the requisite information - in effect, pre-contract 
disclosure is achieved. 
Cancellation has the effect of extinguishing the 
debtor~ liability and entitles him to recover payments made 
and goods tendered in part exchange or for any other 
142 purpose. Furthermore, the creditor must ensure that 
(140) Ibid, s 24. But note that this section is to be read 
subject to sections 31 to 33 of the Act. 
(141) ~upra, at 400. 
(142) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 23. 
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all security given by the debtor pursuant to the credit 
contract is released143 and, subject to certain exceptions, 
the debtor is not liable to pay any part of the cost of 
144 
credit or other charges. It is vitally important to 
145 
note that the purchaser who has received goods cannot 
cancel completely; he can only cancel 'the credit part' of 
the contract. 146 Generally, therefore, where a debtor has 
entered into a credit sale or hire purchase agreement for 
the purchase of goods he may cancel the credit provisions 
of the contract by giving written notice of cancellation to 
the creditor or dealer and by paying the cash price not 
1 th 15 k . d f . . . 14 7 ater an wor 1ng ays a ter g1v1ng not1ce. 
148 Dugdale comments that 
"It was desired to avoid a situation where 
for example someone could take delivery of a 
car under a hire purchase agreement on a 
Friday, use it until the follow~ng Wednesday 
and then with some thousands more miles on 
the clock, return it and demand his deposit 
back". 
( 14 3 ) Ib i d I s 2 3 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i i ) . 
{ 14 4) Ibid I s 2 3 ( 1) (c) • 
(145) Under a controlled credit contract that is (a) a 
deferred payment disposition of goods where the debtor 
has received a statement of his rights to cancel; or 
(b) a deferred payment disposition comprising a sale of 
property by auction; or (c) a deferred payment 
disposition of property that the debtor wishes to keep; 
see section 2 2 ( 2) (a) , (b) , (c) • Note the amendment 
effected by the Credit Contracts Amendment Act 1982, 
s 4. 
{146) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 22(2). 
{147) Ibid, s 22{2) (d), (e). 
(148) The Credit Contracts Act 1981 (1981), 52. 
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Moreover, cancellation is precluded altogether in the 
case where the credit is provided for a specified period 
not exceeding 2 months and no part of the credit is used, 
with the knowledge of the creditor, to pay amounts owing 
to the creditor under another credit contract. 149 This 
provision is designed to prevent the debtor from taking 
advantage of a series of 11 cooling-off" periods to his own 
benefit in short term transactions, but is also framed in 
such a way to avoid the potential abuse of a creditor 
evading the cancellation provisions by a series of short 
term contracts of the "roll over" variety with a particular 
debtor. 150 
How effective then are these measures when assessed 
against the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee's 
primary objective to enable the public to shop for credit? 
Very rarely will advertisements do more than indicate the 
availability of credit and the desirability of, say, buying 
now rather than later. If a prospective debtor wishes to 
be appraised of financial particulars in sufficient detail 
to make an informed choice, he will have to visit or 
contact each alternative credit outlet. Needless to say 
this will be a time consuming exercise and it may well be 
that the prospective debtor will settle for the first loan 
or credit transaction that "sounds" reasonable, rather than 
{ 14 9) Ibid I s 2 2 { 4) . 
(150) See the Credit Contracts para 8.48. 
405 
acquaint himself with the terms available from a large 
number of creditors before making a selection. True 
"shopping for credit" would entail the latter course of 
action. It is submitted that in the usual case the 
consumer will first consider the question of credit at the 
time when he sees goods that are to his liking; if he elects 
to buy those goods pursuant to a credit sale agreement or 
hire purchase agreement initial disclosure will usually be 
effected at or immediately before the conclusion of the 
particular transaction. Such a consumer is not entitled to 
return such goods in terms of the cancellation provisions 
and so if he elects to cancel the credit provisions of the 
contract he must 11 front up" with the cash within 15 days 
of giving written notice of such cancellation. If he does 
not have funds to meet the cash price he must frantically 
scour the credit market in the three day "grace" period 
after initial disclosure in an endeavour to find an 
alternative, and cheaper, avenue of finance. It is 
suggested that this would not be an attractive, and hence 
likely, proposition for the average consumer who has the 
desired goods in hand. Consequently, it is suggested that 
significant practical barriers could stand in the way of the 
Committee, and the Act, achieving one of its avowed 
objectives; namely, the shopping for credit. The extent 
to which consumers will utilise rights of cancellation 
conferred by the statute remains a matter for speculation 
but, at least, the legislature has ensured that the 
effectiveness of the cancellation provisions will not 
f .ounder through ignorance of their existence. A 
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prominent statement of the rights under the cancellation 
provisions must accompany the disclosure documentation in 
the case of deferred payment dispositions of goods. 151 
Finally, a potential drawback of the statutory 
cooling off period is that under a deferred payment 
disposition of goods the financer may be reticent about 
advancing loan monies or finance until this period has 
elapsed and a consumer may be inconvenienced if he wishes 
to finalise a transaction quickly. However this is a small 
price to pay when measured against the advantage of 
reconsideration that ensures a reasonable period of 
detached evaluation of the financial and other data as 
well as an opportunity to compare alternative credit 
arrangements - whether a consumer will, in practice, avail 
himself of this opportunity is of course another matter. 
Furthermore it is to be hoped that the existence of the 
cancellation provisions will have a beneficial impact in 
making creditors more reticent and cautious in the 
construction of their contracts and imposition of charges 
f d . 152 or ere ~ t. 
(c) Post Contract disclosure 
One objective of disclosure provisions is to ensure 
that during the term of the credit contract the debtor can 
(151) Credit Contracts Act 1981, Second Schedule, Part I, 
Clause 8. Recognition of the futility of legislation 
conferring rights where those rights are either unknown 
or are not readily understood by consumers led the 
legislature to insist upon documents explanatory of 
such rights under the Hire Purchase Act 1971, 
SS 26(1) (b) 1 28(1) 1 28(3) 1 29(1} • 
(152) The same could be said for re-opening provisions. 
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ascertain his position under the contract. Statutory 
endorsement of this objective was found in both the 
153 Moneylenders Amendment Act 1933 and the Hire Purchase 
Act 1971154 in that provision was made for debtors under 
moneylending contracts and hire purchase agreements to 
obtain copies of their respective agreements as well as 
155 
statements of account. . 
Post contract disclosure under the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 may be briefly canvassed under the following heads: 
i) Request disclosure: A debtor or guarantor under 
a controlled credit contract may request in writing that the 
creditor disclose to him all or part of the information 
6 
specified in Part IV of the Second Schedule of the Act. 
Upon receipt of a specified fee 157 the creditor must ensure 
that disclosure of the information or documents requested 
shall be made not later than the end of the fifteenth 
working day after the day the fee is received. 158 In order 
to avoid vexatious inquiries and the disruption of normal 
business, a creditor is relieved of compliance with a 
request if disclosure of the information or documents 
requested has been made during the three months preceding 
receipt of a request. 
(153) 8 11. 
{154) s 19. 
9 
(155) Sections 11 and 19 of the Moneylenders Amendment Act 
1933 and the Hire Purchase Act 1971, respectively, are 
repealed by Section 49 of the Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
(156) See ss 19, 21(1) (b); disclosure of outstanding amounts, 
payments required, details of alterations in terms and 
of previous disclosure, as well as the finance rate under 
a revolving credit contract, may be requested. 
(157) See sl9(b) and the Second Schedule,Part IV, Clause 6. 
(158) s 19. 
(159) Idem. 
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ii) Modification disclosure: The Act also makes 
provision for the situation where the terms of a 
controlled credit contract are modified or varied160 and 
such a contract is known as a modification contract. 161 
Where a creditor enters into a modification contract he 
must ensure that disclosure of the information specified 
in Part II of the Second Schedule is made, 162 either 
before the contract is made, or, not later than the end 
of the fifteenth working day after that contract is made. 163 
Clearly the problems encountered under moneylenders' contracts 
with regard to the variation of such agreements are laid to 
164 
rest. 
iii) Continuing disclosure: Furthermore where 
1 . d' t t 165 . 1 d h 1 . 1 t revo Vlng ere lt con rae s are lnvo ve t e egls a ure 
have recognised that a different disclosure provision is 
needed by virtue of the distinct nature of this credit. 166 
A creditor under a revolving credit contract must ensure that 
(160) s 17. 
(161) See the definition in s 2. 
(162) See ss 17, 21(1) (a). Disclosure of all the terms of the 
modification contract other than those implied by law, 
total cost of credit and the finance rate is required. 
Disclosure of the finance rate and total cost of credit 
is not required in the case of a modification of a 
revolving credit contract. 
(163) s 17(1). 
(164) Supra, . See also the Credit Contracts 
para 8.37. 
(165) See the definition in s 2. 
(166) s 18. 
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not later than the end of a specified period167 after the 
end of each billing period during which credit has been 
provided under the contract or the whole or part of the 
cost of credit has become due, that he discloses all the 
16 8 information specified in Part III of the Second Schedule. 
This comprehensive set of provisions ensures that a 
debtor may ascertain his position during the currency of a 
credit contract. Disclosure of financial particulars, such 
as the amount outstanding under a credit contract, is of 
vital importance to a debtor; e.g., a purchaser under a hire 
purchase agreement may complete the purchase of goods by 
paying the unpaid balance at any time during the continuance 
f h 169 d . f h d h . . l d o t e agreement an 1 e oes so e 1s ent1t e to 
170 
certain statutory rebates. However, it is not only the 
financial particularsthat are of concern to debtors, but 
other terms as well. The Act ensures that a debtor has, or 
may obtain, a copy of the agreement encompassing all the 
terms of the Credit Contract other than those implied by 
171 law and where any variation of those terms occurs, the 
terms of the contract effecting that variation must be 
d . 1 d 172 1sc ose . 
(167) As defined in s 18(2). 
(168) See ss 18, 21(1) (a). Disclosure of the opening and 
closing dates of the billing period, the opening and 
closing balances, as well as details of the credit 
provided, amounts paid, charges and cost of credit, is 
required. 
(169) Hire Purchase Act 1971, s 22. 
(170) Ibid, s 23. 
(171) Ss 16, 21(1) (a). 
(172) S 21(1) (a). 
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Post contract disclosure vis-a-vis credit contracts 
is also required under the Hire Purchase Act 1971. A 
vendor may not exercise any power of repossessing goods 
subject to a hire purchase agreement unless the purchaser 
is in default under that agreement and the vendor has served 
the purchaser with a notice in writing in the form set out 
in the Third Schedule to the Act, specifying the default 
complained of, and, if the default is capable of remedy, 
requiring the purchaser to remedy the default 'within a 
, d f t 1 th lQ d ft • I 17 3 per1o o no ess an ays a er serv1ce . Where 
the vendor has served the notice required by section 26 he 
must wait for the period specified therein before exercising 
his right to repossess. Within 21 days of taking possession 
of the goods the vendor must serve on the purchaser and 
every guarantor a notice in the form set out in the Fourth 
Schedule. l?4 Th h . d f h' . ht e pure aser 1s rna e aware o 1s r1g s 
following repossession in a clearly worded statement. He is 
advised that he has three courses of action open to him: 
namely, that (i) he may within 21 days of service of such a 
(173) Hire Purchase Act 1971, s 26(1). An exception to the 
general requirement of notice is provided by s 26(4) 
whereby a vendor is excused from compliance with 
s 26(1) if 'he has reasonable grounds to believe that 
the goods comprised in the hire purchase agreement have 
been or will be destroyed, damaged, endangered, 
disassembled, removed or concealed contrary to the 
provisions of the agreement'. As Dugdale Hire Purchase 
Law (1978}, 35, comments: 'It was no doubt sensible 
for the legislature to recognise that there are some 
purchasers who are likely to react to the receipt of 
the Statutory notice by folding their tents like the 
Arabs and as silently stealing away'. 
(174) Hire Purchase Act 1971, s 28(1). 
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notice remedy his default by paying the arrears together 
with various reasonable costs and expenses incurred by the 
vendor including costs of repossession, storage, repair and 
. 175 ( .. ) h . h. th . d ma1ntenance ; or 11 e may w1t 1n e same per1o 
introduce a purchaser prepared to buy the goods at a price 
not less than the vendor's estimate of value set out in 
h . 176 t e not1ce; · or (iii) he may at any stage up to the time 
when the vendor has bound himself to sale settle the 
agreement by paying the net balance due thereunder plus the 
various reasonable costs and expenses of the vendor. 177 
If none of these options is exercised the vendor is, in 
the usual case, 178 obliged to sell the goods and the purchaser 
is advised of his rights regarding the sale, the obligations 
on the vendor, and of his entitlement to a refund in the 
event of their being any excess or, conversely, his residual 
liability to the vendor. 179 
The Act also stipulates that a hire purchase 
agreement must incorporate a statement in the form set out 
in Part II of the First Schedule to the Act. 180 This 
statement advises the purchaser of his right to a copy of 
the agreement, of his right to assign with the written 
consent of the vendor181 and of his right to early 
completion and the corollary of rebate entitlement. 182 
(175) Ibid, s 29 (1) (a). 
(176) Ibid, s 29(l)(b). 
( 177) Ibid, s 30. 
( 17 8) .!_bid, s 28(5) • 
(179) Ibid, s 34. 
(180) Ibid, s 6 ( 1) (d) . 
( 181) .!_bid, ss 20, 21. 
(182) Ibid,ss 22, 2 3. 
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Provisions such as the above go a long way towards 
ensuring the effectiveness of legislation in that 
consumer ignorance of their legal rights may lead to the 
non-litigation of many valid claims, and result in the 
continuance of undesirable practices and mischief that 
the legislation set out to prevent. 
4. TRANSACTIONS TO WHICH THE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS APPLY 
The identification of transactions that should be 
subject to the rules as to disclosure is a controversial and 
difficult issue. While the term "credit contract" must be 
defined widely with a view to subjecting most credit 
contracts to the unconscionability doctrine, such a wide 
definition would be unsuitable in respect of the disclosure 
. t 183 requ1remen s. For example, the small investor in a 
company or the depositor of money with a bank should not be 
obliged to inform the company and the bank, respectively,of 
the terms of the transaction. 184 Consequently the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981 has restricted the requirements as to 
disclosure to a narrower class of credit contracts than 
that embraced by the general definition. The disclosure 
provisions apply in the main to 'controlled credit contracts' 
and categorisation of this limited class of credit contracts 
has been done by reference to the following considerations: 
(a) Status of the creditor; (b) Status of the debtor; 
(c) Nature of the transaction. 
(183) See the Credit Contracts t, para 8.23. 
(184) Idem. 
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a) Status of the creditor 
A controlled credit contract is defined as meaning 
" ..• a credit contract - (a) where the 
creditor, or one of the creditors, for 
the time being is a financier acting in 
the course of his business; or (b) which 
results from an introduction of one of the 
parties to the contract to another such 
party by a paid adviser; or {c) that has 
been prepared by a paid adviser".l85 
Clearly the intention of the legislature is to exclude from 
the ambit of the disclosure provisions transactions where 
the credit is extended by private persons. As the Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee remarked 
"Simple loans or other credit transactions 
between members of a family or between 
neighbours or friends, should not, we think, 
be subjected to the legal formalities 
appropriate to transactions at arm~ length 
of a more formal nature".l86 
Furthermore, while a person who is in the business of 
extending credit can be expected to acquaint himself with 
the statutory rules and to comply with them the same cannot 
be said of the private creditor, such as a private individual 
making a casual loan to a friend or disposing of his car on 
instalment terms. In any event, if any term of such a 
private credit transaction is oppressive, or is oppressively 
exercised, the court may re-open the contract. 
(185) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 15(1). 
(186) Credit Contracts t para 8. 24. 
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The basic definition of controlled credit contract 
refers therefore, to credit transactions where the person 
extending the credit is a financier, or where the credit 
t . d th h db 'd d . 187 con ract 1s rna e · roug , or prepare y, a pa1 a v1ser. 
The term 'financier' embraces those persons who carry 
on the business of providing credit, or who make a practice 
of providing credit in the course of a business, or who make 
a practice of entering into credit contracts in their own 
names as creditors on behalf of other persons. 188 Any 
controls and exemptions by reference to the status of the 
creditor run into problems of definition. Under the 
Moneylenders Act 1908, for example, the legal categorisation 
of a person as being a moneylender was vital, in that it was 
the identification of the lender and not the fact of the 
loan that attracted the provisions of the moneylenders 
legislation. The basic definition of moneylender as 'a 
person whose business that moneylending or who 
advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any 
. h b . 1189 . d . d abl way as carry1ng on t at us1ness occas1one cons1 er e 
d 'ff' 1 . . t t t' 190 1 1cu ty 1n 1n erpre a 1on. Similarly the same could 
be identified as being a potential problem with regard to 
the term "financier" in the Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
Fortunately though, the definition of "financier" wider 
than the corresponding definition of "moneylender" under the 
(187) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 15{1). 
(188) Ibid, s 2(1). 
(189) Moneylenders Act 1908, s 2. 
(190) See Pannarn, op. cit., 33, and the cases there cited. 
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Moneylenders Act 1908, and specific reference is made to 
a person 'who makes a practice of providing credit in the 
course of a business carried on by him•. 191 The question as 
to whether a person is a financier, or not, may be answered 
more easily by reference to the regularity of transactions, 
than by reference to the difficult concept of carrying on 
business as a financier. Furthermore the dire consequences 
visited upon transactions negotiated by unregistered 
1 d d h . f . . 19 2 b money en ers an t e necesslty or reglstratlon may e 
said to have promoted much litigation about the scope and 
ambit of the term, moneylender. Categorisation as a 
financier entai compliance with the disclosure provisions 
but the consequences of non-compliance are not so drastic~93 
and there is no requirement of registration. So the 
Committee thought it reasonable to expect such a person 
in doubt as to his status to comply with the disclosure 
provision out of an abundance of caution and the term 
194 
"financier" is unlikely to generate as much controversy. 
The Credit Contracts Act 1981 demands disclosure, not 
only in credit contracts where the credit is extended by 
(191} Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 2(1}. 
(192) A moneylender had to be registered in accordance with 
section 4 of the Moneylenders Act 1908, and abide by 
the restrictions therein imposed. Non-compliance with 
any part of section 4 rendered the transaction null and 
void. See Ansford v New Plymouth Finance Co [1933] NZLR 
209; Re A.R. Mackay Ltd [1971] NZLR 289; cf 
Combined Taxis Cooperative Society v SZobbe [1972] 
NZLR 354. 
(193) See the Credit Contracts Act 1981, ss 24-33 and the 
discussion below. 
(194) Credit Contracts Report, para 8.28. 
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financiers, but also in those credit contracts where paid 
d . . 1 d 195 a v~sers are ~nvo ve . The term "paid adviser" 
encompasses any person who 'acts for reward as an adviser 
to, or as a trustee, nominee, or agent of, one or more of 
the parties' to a credit contract. 196 Clearly the 
legislature's intention is that the activities of the 
burgeoning body of professional intermediaries, such as 
solicitors, mortgage brokers and trustees, should be 
regulated. Therefore, the disclosure provisions apply to 
credit contracts made through the instrumentality of these 
intermediaries197 and to credit contracts prepared by such 
198 persons notwithstanding the fact that both creditor and 
debtor may be private persons. However, such transactions 
negotiated through, or prepared by, paid advisers are 
clearly distinguishable from the private transaction in the 
strict sense where both parties will usually be in a position 
of equal bargaining power. 
b) Status of the debtor 
Exempted from categorisation as controlled credit 
contracts are those credit contracts where the debtor can be 
presumed to be capable of looking after himself. For example, 
the disclosure provisions do not apply where the debtor 
himself is a financier and consequently must himself know 
(195) SlS(l)(b), (c). 
(196) s 2 (1). 
(197) s 15 (1) (b). 
( 19 8) s 15 (1) ( c) . 
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and comply with the laws which oblige him to make 
disclosure to others. 199 Similarly where the debtor is 
200 the Crown, a local authority or a Government agency or 
201 
a large company, or where the total amount of credit 
outstanding between the same creditor and debtor is not 
less than $250,000 202 then the disclosure provisions do 
not apply. 
The Credit Contracts Act 1981 also ensures that 
members of the public who subscribe for debentures or 
securities issued by companies are not covered by the 
disclosure provisions as it would be absurd if the investor 
had to make statutory disclosure of terms better known to 
the debtor. 203 s· ·1 1 db · f d' 1 1m2 ar y, no soun as1s or 1sc osure 
exists where every party to a credit contract is a body 
corporate related to every other such party to the 
contract. 204 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
considered whether the reasoning, that no disclosure be 
required where the debtor can be presumed to look after 
his own interests, would justify the exclusion from the 
ambit of the disclosure provisions transactions in which 
(199) s 15 (1) (d) (i). 
(200) s 15 (1) (d) (ii). 
(201} S 15(1) (d) (iii}. The company must have a paid up capital 
of at least $1,000,000 or must be a company related to 
such a company. 
(202) s 15(1) (f). 
(203) s 15(l)(g). 
(204) s 15(1) (e). 
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the debtor is a businessman. 205 However, the Committee 
concluded that ordinary businessmen could not be treated 
in the same way as financiers in that they did not possess 
the same financial expertise. 206 This is undoubtedly the 
case with many unincorporated traders, small partnerships 
and even small companies that are ill-equipped to bargain 
on equal terms with creditors and so it is appropriate 
that they should enjoy the full benefit of disclosure. 
c) Nature of the transaction 
The nature of certain transactions renders them for 
various reasons unsuitable for the imposition of general 
or even limited disclosure requirements. Consequently, 
some transactions are for sound reasons of business 
efficacy exempt from the disclosure provisions. For example, 
where banks' customers, without obtaining the prior consent 
of their respective banks, 'go into overdraft', or exceed 
the agreed limit of overdraft facilities extended to them, 
an intolerable burden would be placed upon banks if they 
were obliged to make statutory disclosure whenever such an 
207 
overdraft were created or extended. Similarly contracts 
that facilitate and form part of import/export transactions 208 
and contracts entered into pursuant to an approved 
t . h 209 t t t' superannua lOn sc erne are exemp ransac lons. 
(205) Credit Contracts Report, para 8.27. 
( 2 0 6 ) Idem . 
(207) Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 15(2). 
( 2 0 8) Ibid I s 15 ( 1) ( k) . 
(209) Ibid, s 15(1) (j). See also s 2(1) as to an "approved 
superannuation scheme". 
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Other contracts such as those entered into pursuant 
to revolving credit contracts and those for the 
modification of controlled credit contracts are exempted 
from the general disclosure provisions in that special 
provision is made for these contracts. 21° For the same 
reason credit agreements made otherwise than at 
appropriate trade premises are subject to the rules 
specified in the Door to Door Sales Act 1967211 and are 
exempt transactions for purposes of the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981. 212 
Finally, it should be noted that the Hire Purchase 
·Act 1971 covers both Helby v Matthews 213 and Lee v ButZer214 
215 type agreements and the disclosure provisions in that 
Act apply therefore to both varieties of agreement. 
5. SANCTIONS FOR NON COMPLIANCE 
The Credit Contracts Act 1981 provides for two basic 
sanctions for non-compliance with the disclosure provisions. 
(210) See ss 17, 18 and the Second Schedule, Part II and 
Part III. See also the Credit Contracts Report, 
para 8.37. 
( 211) Ss 5, 7; see discussion of this Act, infra. 
(212) s lS(l)(Z.). 
(213) .§.upra. 
(214) §_upra. 
(215) Hire Purchase Act 1971, s 2 ( 1) • 
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First, no person other than the debtor may enforce a 
controlled credit contract, or any right to recover property 
to which the contract relates, or enforce any security given 
pursuant to the contract, until the requisite disclosure is 
made. 216 
Second, failure to make disclosure results in a loss 
to the creditor of part or all of the total cost of credit 
217 payable under the contract. The exact computation of 
the amount forfeited is dependent upon the nature of the 
disclosure provision that is breached and the time when 
disclosure is made. For example, if initial disclosure is 
not made in accordance with the Act the debtor's liability 
'f' d . . . h d 218 h' to pay a specl 1e amount lS extlnguls e . T 1s 
specified amount is the smaller of (a) an amount equal to 
three times the part of the total cost of credit that relates 
to the period from the day the contract is made until the 
earlier of the following days: (i) the day on which initial 
disclosure is made; (ii) the day that is 8 months after the 
day the contract is made; (b) the total cost of credit 
219 payable under the contract. Accordingly for any medium 
{216) S 24; subject, however, to ss 31-33. 
(217) Ss 25-28; The Credit Contracts Bill, s 27, provided 
that if initial disclosure was not made within 14 
working days after the the day when the contract was 
made, liability for the total cost of credit was 
extinguished completely; this was considered unduly 
harsh by the Statutes Revision Committee who inserted 
the current and, in this writers view, more acceptable 
provision. To visit such drastic consequences upon non-
disclosure could be counter-productive; for example, 
inordinate delays in effecting credit transactions 
through a meticulous attention to every conceivable 
detail. 
(218) s 25. 
(219) s 25 (2). 
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or long term contract it is highly unlikely that a 
creditor will forfeit the total cost of credit, but will 
forfeit a lesser amount. 
Notwithstanding non-compliance with the disclosure 
provisions outlined in the Act relief may be accorded the 
debtor if he shows that: 
"(a) the failure was due to inadvertence or to 
events outside the control of the creditor, 
and 
(b) disclosure was made as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the failure was discovered 
by the creditor or brought to his notice; and 
(c) where disclosure documents relating to the 
contract state as the finance rate of the 
contract a rate that is less than the correct 
finance rate, the creditor has reduced the 
finance rate of the contract to the rate 
disclosed in those documents; and, 
(d) the creditor has compensated or offered to 
compensate the debtor under the contract for 
any prejudice caused the debtor by the 
failure". 220 
In these circumstances the penalties for non-compliance do 
not apply. Even where the creditor cannot satisfy these 
criteria he may apply to court for an order directing that 
the penalties not apply or that a lesser penalty be 
. d 221 lmpose • In exercising its discretion the court must 
have regard to whether the creditor is a financier, the 
extent and reasons for non-disclosure, whether the debtor 
has been prejudiced by the non-disclosure and any other 
(220) s 31. 
(221) s 32. 
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circumstances as the court thinks fit. 222 Finally the 
penalties for non-disclosure may be waived by a debtor 
provided he has received written notice of the failure 
and his rights that arise from the failure. 223 
Under the Hire Purchase Act 1971 a failure to observe 
th d . 1 . . 224 t t ff . t e 1sc osure prov1s1ons amoun s o an o ence aga1ns 
the Act punishable by a fine not exceeding $500. 225 
Similarly it is an offence against the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 to produce a misleading credit advertisement and a 
fine of up to $5,000 may be imposed for any contravention 
of sections 35 to 37. 226 
The extent to which these sanctions will promote 
compliance is a matter for speculation. While the vast 
majority of creditors will comply voluntarily with the 
disclosure provisions, it is clear that really effective 
sanctions are required to secure the compliance of the 
fringe operators. As Ison227 comments 
(222) 
(22 3) 
(2 2 4) 
(225) 
(226) 
( 22 7) 
s 
s 
"If profit margins are at stake, the incentive 
of non-compliance can be strong. Unless honest 
merchants who willingly comply are to be 
penalised by less scrupulous competitors, the 
sanctions for violation of the (disclosure} 
legislation must be sufficiently tough and 
sufficiently certain of application that com-
pliance is very close to 100 percent. If a 
government is not willing to enact tough san-
ctions and to provide the resources for their 
consistent application, it would be better not 
to have enacted compulsory disclosure legislation 
at all". 
32 (2). 
33. 
See, for example: ss 2 6 ( 1} , 26 (5) . 
s 4 8. 
s 38. 
Op. cit. , 190. 
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On the face of it the sanctions for non-compliance under 
the Credit Contracts Act 1981 are sufficiently tough. Loss 
of all or a substantial part of the total cost of credit 
is in itself a significant incentive to compliance. 
However, the effectiveness of this sanction and the non-
f . 228 h b 1 . . d b h en orcement sanct~on ave een great y ~mpa~re y t e 
overly generous savings sections, namely sections 31 to 33. 
For example, if a creditor fails to make initial 
disclosure of the cost of credit, certain of the contract 
terms, and even the finance rate, he may still be excused 
non-compliance if he successfully shows: (1) that the 
failure was due to inadvertence; (2) that he made 
disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable after the 
debtor brought this failure to h notice, and; (3) that 
he has offered to compensate the debtor under the 
contract for any prejudice caused to the debtor by the 
f "1 229 a~ ure. Often the question of compliance will never 
arise as debtors, ignorant of their legal rights, will not 
take steps to secure disclosure. Furthermore adjudications 
of the type envisaged under section 32 involves a decision 
making process the cost of which will generally be in 
excess of the amount in issue. Consequently a strong 
argument may be advanced in favour of strict liability in 
the event of there being non-compliance. This may seem 
like rough justice, but it has the advantages of 
(228) S 24; i.e. contract may not be enforced before 
disclosure. 
(229) s 31. 
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certainty, of avoiding litigation on the amount of the 
penalty, and of creating a substantial inducement to 
compliance. As a practical matter, financiers and other 
creditors are not likely to lose the total cost of credit 
in many transactions at all, and the absence of savings 
sections would not be any too severe. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is generally accepted that many of the problems 
associated with the marketing of credit may be traced to 
the paucity of information available to a prospective 
debtor at the time when he makes the decision whether or 
d . h' h f d' 230 not to use ere lt or w lC source o ere lt to pursue. 
Consequently, the enactment of rules designed to facilitate 
rational choice and decision-making is a most meritorious 
development from the point of view of the prospective 
debtor and from the point of view of the economy as a 
whole - the greater the extent to which consumers are not 
fully or properly informed, the greater the extent to which 
the market cannot be said to be competitive and the greater 
the risk that a misallocation of resources will result. 
(230) See for example: Report of the Royal Commission on 
Banking and Finance (1964), 207, 366 (Canada); Final 
Report of the Select Committee of the Ontario 
Legislature on Consumer Credit (1965), 29-41; Royal 
Commission on the Cost of Borrowing Money, The Cost 
of Credit and Retail Matters in the Province of Nova 
Scotia, Final Report (1965), 363-387; Molomby 
Committee Report, para 1.2.5; Crowther Committee 
Report, para 6.5.1; Credit Contracts 
para 8.18. 
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In legislating for disclosure, recognition must be 
extended to the fact that the provision of too much 
information is counter productive as a consumer can 
absorb only a certain quantity of information at one time 
and beyond this optimum point the law of diminishing 
returns is operative. The Credit Contracts Act 1981 does 
not require the disclosure of terms implied by law but 
all other terms must be disclosed. The danger here is 
that much relevant information may be obscured in the 
midst of unnecessary padding and in order to prevent 
this some consideration could be given to prescribing 
statutory forms for credit contracts, with standard sets 
of terms laid out in uniform manner. The task of drawing 
up such standard form credit contracts could be allocated 
to a Consumer Affairs Department231 and potential 
disadvantages that such standard form documents would 
inhibit the evolution of new forms of credit and be a burden 
on businesses could be easily overcome if consultation with 
interested parties was required on a regular basis, e.g. 
the Finance Houses Association (Inc.), the Retailers 
Federation (Inc.). The N.Z. Retailers Federation have 
already produced an 'official conditional purchase 
agreement' that is a short, clear document that saves 
time, paper and anxiety about compliance with the 
provisions of the Hire Purchase Act. 
(231) See Chapter VI, Conclusion, infra. 
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It is clear that disclosure of financial 
particulars and, more specifically, the finance rate, has 
the greatest capacity to promote shopping for credit and 
to stimulate competition in the credit market. This is 
well recognised in the Credit Contracts Act 1981 with the 
result that the finance rate and other financial 
particulars such as the amount of credit and total cost 
of credit must feature prominently in most disclosure 
documentation. Furthermore the Act ensures that the 
finance rate is quoted on a uniform basis so that 
comparisons may be readily made. The effectiveness of 
such disclosure when measured against the avowed 
objective of promoting shopping for credit is, however, 
open to considerable doubt. In terms of the Act 
disclosure only has to be made within 15 working days 
after the day the contract is made and the consumer for 
practical reasons is unlikely to shop around for credit 
after he has acquired goods pursuant to a deferred 
payment disposition. He cannot return the goods subject 
to this deferred payment disposition and may only cancel 
the 'credit part' of the transaction if he can find the 
cash price for those goods. For an effective 
'shopping for credit' regime consumers must be appraised 
of the finance rate of various credit providers before 
committing themselves to the purchase of particular goods 
and services. Advertisements for credit and price 
tickets offer the best means for such disclosure but 
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as has been mentioned earlier, mandatory disclosure of 
the finance rate in this area has been rejected (i) due 
to the dependence of the finance rate on the total cost 
of credit which may vary from transaction to transaction 
and (ii) because many loans are not arranged in 
conjunction with the purchase of goods, or made following 
public advertisements. Do these considerations stand in 
the way of a mandatory disclosure provision to the effect 
that retailers and other sellers of goods who advertise 
the monthly or weekly instalments at which goods are 
available should disclose, with equal prominence, the 
finance rate? With respect, they do not. The total cost 
of credit in respect of hire purchase transactions is 
readily calculable by a retailer who fills in the 
statutory form as prescribed by the Hire Purchase Act 
1971; 232 that is, the additional cost over and above the 
equivalent cash transaction for the particular commodity. 
Components of this additional cost are specified as the 
finance charge for the relevant period, the booking fee, 
maintenance and repair charges and other miscellaneous 
charges which must be specified. It is current practice 
for retailers to specify a cash price in respect of 
advertised goods and to indicate further that the 
consumer can acquire the goods for, say, '$12.57 per week 
or $55.68 per month'. In order to arrive at these 
specific figures the retailer must have done the 
(232) See the new Part I of the First Schedule to the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971 as inserted by the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981, s 49(5) (a). 
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calculations in respect of the particular product as 
specified in the Hire Purchase Act 1971 and must 
therefore be in a position to specify the finance rate 
for that transaction. Similarly where the retailer 
envisages a disposition on credit sale terms the 
additional cost in excess of the equivalent cash 
transaction is readily ascertainable. What possible 
impediment there to the imposition of a mandatory 
disclosure requirement vis-a-vis the finance rate for 
deferred payment dispositions of goods? In this writer~ 
view there are none and it is submitted that retailers 
should be obliged to disclose such rate in their 
advertisements and price ckets. In order to avoid the 
imposition of an undue burden on retailers such finance 
rate could be required only in respect of goods bearing 
a price in excess of, say, $100. While it is undoubtedly 
true that many loans are not arranged in conjunction with 
the purchase of goods or made following public 
advertisements, consumers would be much better informed 
as to finance rates app cable and attainable in the 
market and so in approaching a finance company directly, 
for example, could measure that company's rate as against 
those rates advertised by various retail outlets. Where 
a retailer purports to charge a rate in excess of the 
advertised rate this could be made p~ima facie evidence 
th t th d t . t d t. . 1 d. 2 33 a e a ver 1semen was ecep 1ve or m1s ea 1ng. 
(233) See the Credit Contracts Act 198l,s 35; and the 
Crowther Committee Report, para 6.4.13, for their 
discussion regarding advertisements for non-purchase 
money loans. 
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The scheme outlined, it is submitted, would greatly 
bolster 'shopping for credit' in the area of goods and 
services, in particular, and put the consumer in a better 
bargaining position; that is, he could point out to a 
particular retailer that while the cash price for certain 
goods was the same as that advertised by a competitor, the 
retailer had less favourable credit terms. Better informed 
consumers make for a more competitive credit market and 
for this reason alone the above approach, it submitted, 
merits attention. 
Disclosure of financial particulars obviously lies 
at the heart of the mandatory disclosure scheme in the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981 for entirely obvious and 
desirable reasons. It must, however, be recognised that 
such disclosure has attendant disadvantages. First, 
excessive emphasis on financial particulars may be mis-
leading in that a consumer's attention may be diverted 
from other highly relevant considerations. For example, 
while one creditor may be offering goods for sale on 
credit terms that are marginally lower than those of a 
competitor, the latter creditor may be offering a longer 
or better guarantee, or a better after sales service. 
Furthermore, in times of high inflation a longer term 
loan at a higher effective finance rate may be a more 
attractive proposition than a short term loan at a lower 
finance rate. Second 1 it is also contended that 
competition among financiers to reduce the stated finance 
rate will often be false competition and that deceptive 
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practices will develop. For example, the cash price of 
goods could be artificially inflated to make the finance 
rate appear more favourable. While it is undoubtedly 
true that where the seller himself extends credit there 
is some scope for him to bury some of the total cost of 
credit in his cash price, this is not a significant 
problem - a comparison of the cash prices asked for a 
particular commodity will reveal an obvious deception 
occasioned by an inflated cash price, and in any competitive 
market a retailer who inflates his cash price will 
prejudice his cash sales even if this device does assist in 
the promotion of deferred payment dispositions. Third, 
disclosure is not achieved without cost. Complexities 
of rate computation and compliance with disclosure 
provisions in general can create substantial 
administrative burdens leading to additional costs which 
inevitably would be passed on, thus increasing rather than 
reducing the level of credit charges. Therefore, rate 
disclosure for all its advantages does have drawbacks. 
Finally, in assessing the effectiveness and value 
of disclosure legislation, it is important to see it in 
its proper context. Accurate market information is 
useful only to those who have the power and ability to 
choose. While disclosure legislation will assist middle 
and upper income earners to take advantage of competitive 
market conditions, market information will not have much 
impact on low-income earners who have few real alternatives 
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from which to choose. In the case of a low income 
earner disclosure will in most cases be ineffective in 
relation to any form of credit for his credit standing 
will normally be so low that he will be obliged to take 
whatever credit he can get and on whatever terms. In 
addition, the ability to choose will determine the 
usefulness, or otherwise, of disclosure. To many 
prospective debtors the important thing is the ability 
to make the required periodic payments rather than 
concern about the cost of credit or the finance rate. 
General lack of knowledge on the part of consumers is a 
problem that pervades the whole area of consumer 
protection, and there are undoubted benefits that will 
flow from consumer education in this field. However as 
the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
emphasise 'credit education is a long term solution• 234 
and the Credit Contracts Act 1981 goes a long way towards 
ensuring that a consumer is given the tools for making 
a more effective comparison between one form or source 
of credit and another, even if not all consumers are 
yet in a position to utilise these tools. 
(234) Credit Contracts para 9.12. 
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2. PACKAGING AND LABELLING 
{1} INTRODUCTION 
In a sense packaging and labelling is simply another 
manifestation of advertising in that goods will be 
packaged and/or labelled in such a way as to appeal to 
consumers and thereby promote sales; this being so, this 
topic may have been subsumed under the previous chapter 
heading. However, for purposes of this thesis this topic 
has been isolated for separate treatment as there is a 
basic difference in function between advertising, on the one 
hand, and packaging and labelling, on the other. While 
advertising is primarily directed at the promotion of sales 
with the consequence that the informational content is 
subordinated, and secondary to, this function, labelling 
has as its main objective the transmission of information 
as to identity, quantity, quality, composition, safety 
235 
and use. 
The Molony Committee proposed that informative 
labelling should be actively pursued in accordance with the 
philosophy that if all relevant information about a class of 
(235) As DiPrima, 'Advertising of OTC Drugs: Proposed TRR 
Warnings•, (1977} 32 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal, 
96, 97 explains 
"A consumer needs to know how to use a product, and 
how not to, at the time he wants to use it. If the 
information accompanies the product, then the 
information is there when he needs it. He expects 
advertising to be commercially partial and has the 
right to expect it to be truthful. But when he 
wants to use the product, and wants to find out 
how, even a naive consumer does not think he is 
supposed to turn on the television to catch a 
commercial or drive in the country to find a 
billboard". 
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goods is available to a prudent consumer then a prudent 
shopping. decision is possible; that is, information must 
be annexed to goods so as to assist the consumer to judge 
for himself whether or not they will satisfy his 
. 1 . 236 partlcu ar requlrements. Furthermore informative 
labelling also assists consumers after a product has been 
purchased if there are instructions as to care and use, 
and labelling of certain goods is essential to warn 
consumers of potential hazards associated with 
consumption or use. 
The laws that regulate the packaging and labelling 
of goods may be traced back to the earliest times 237 and 
today regulation in this area is found in a forbidding 
mass of subsidiary legislation as well as in a number of 
important Acts of Parliament. Regulation in this area is 
designed to ensure (i) that certain information is 
contained on packages or labels, and (ii) that the goods 
are not packaged or labelled in a way that misleads. It 
is proposed in this part to concentrate on the former 
objective and to identify and deal with the various types 
or categories of information that must be disclosed on 
packaging or on labels. 
(236) Consumer Protection: Final Report,· (HMSO 1962, 
Cmnd 1781), para 48. 
(237) See Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair 
Trading (1978), 1-6. 
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(2) TYPES OF INFORMATION 
(a) Identi 
Questions of relevance here are: Who made the 
goods? What are they called? Where were they made? 
The Consumer Information Act 1969 stipulates that 
'all packagers of goods shall cause the packages to bear 
a label showing the name and address of the packager or 
238 the person on whose behalf the goods were packaged'. 
Provision also is made for the mandatory disclosure of 
'the name by which the goods are commonly known or if 
there is no such name, the generic name or other 
• d • t • I 2 39 b t d t appropr1ate escr1p 1ve term , ut o a e no 
regulation has been promulgated in this regard. Neither 
the Food Act 1981 nor the Medicines Act 1981 contain 
provisions requiring the disclosure of the name and 
address of the manufacturer on the package, container 
or label of a food, medicine or medical device, but 
provision is made in both of these Acts for regulations 
to be drafted to achieve this object. 240 The Food and 
241 Drugs Regulations 1973 enacted pursuant to the now 
repealed Food and Drug Act 1969, provided that a 
(238) S 3(1). No such disclosure is required where the 
package is too small to accommodate the information, 
nor where the packaged goods are sold by retail 
from the premises on which they were packaged. See 
ss 3(3), 3(8) respectively. 
(239) s 5(2). 
(240) See Food Act 1981, s 42; Medicines Act 1981, s 105. 
(241) As amended by Regulations 1974/188; 1976/68; 
1978/41; 1979/207; 1980/73; 1980/265. 
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manufacturer had to state on a package containing food 
242 
or drugs his name and address and a regulation to this 
effect will undoubtedly be promulgated under the new 
legislation in this area. The Food and Drug Regulations 
1973 also stipulated that every package containing food 
should bear a label containing the common name of the 
food or a description of the food containing the common 
names of the principal ingredients243 and it is 
reasonable to assume that this provision will be 
reproduced in any regulation made pursuant to the Food 
Act 1981. As regards animal remedies and pesticides, 
these products may only be sold under labels containing the 
name and address of the licensee or proprietor, 
. 1 244 respect1.ve y. Furthermore, an animal remedy may only be 
sold under a label that gives the name of the remedy as 
entered in the licence under which the remedy is 
manufactured or imported245 and the label to any container 
of pesticide must give the name and proprietary brand of 
the pesticide. 246 The aforementioned provisions ensure 
that the consumer has an address to which he may complain, 
and endeavour to reduce the risk of confusion or mistake by 
stipulating for "common" or "brand" names to appear on labels. 
(242) See Reg 5 (1) (c). 
(243) See Reg 5 (1) (a) . 
(244) See Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36(1) (b); Pesticides 
Act 1979, s 38(1) (a). 
(245) Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36 (1) (a). 
(246) Pesticides Act 1979, s 38 (1) (a). 
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Provision is also made for disclosure of the origin 
of manufactured goods in that the Merchandise Marks 
Act 1954 empowers the Governor General, by Order in Council, 
d . th d b h . d' . f . . 24 7 to 1rect at goo s ear sue an 1n 1cat1on o or1g1n. 
Orders have been made pursuant to this Act requiring that 
clothing, footwear and dry cell batteries indicate their 
country of origin and any such product may not be sold or 
exposed for sale in New Zealand unless such indication 
248 
appears on the product concerned. Provision is also 
made in the Food Act 1981 for packages containing food to 
be branded, stamped or marked so as to indicate the fact 
of their importation and the country of origin, 249 and 
the Medicines Act 1981 similarly would authorise the 
. . . f d. . d. 1 f . . 250 1mpos1t1on o con 1t1ons as to 1sc osure o or1g1n. 
The validity and usefulness of such mandatory disclosure 
may be questioned on the grounds that it constitutes an 
obstacle to trade and that it is an unreliable indicator 
of quality and properties of products. The Molony 
Committee recommended that mandatory disclosure of the 
origin of manufactured goods should be abolished for 
these reasons and suggested that consumers would benefit 
from the increased competition where foreign goods were 
ld d d . d 251 d 'th h so un er no 1sa vantage. In accor ance w1 t e 
(247) See ss 3, 4, 5. 
(248) See Footwear Marking Order 1955; Clothing Marking 
Order 1956; Dry Cell Batteries Marking Order 1957. 
(249) s 42 (1) (Q). 
(250) s 105 (1) (d). 
(251) Consumer Protection: Final Report, op. cit., 
pages 232-233. 
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Molony Committee recommendation, the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1968 no longer required imported goods to bear 
indications of origin, but in 1972 this requirement was 
re-introduced on the ground that the origin of a product 
is frequently as significant as its weight or composition 
. . fl ' h . 252 Th' b b 1n 1n uenc1ng consumer c o1ce. 1s may e true, ut 
the real issue is whether this information is desirable 
from an economic perspective. It may be argued that 
disclosure of origin will promote consumption of home 
produced footwear and clothing, for example, ahd that 
because this stimulates local industry such disclosure 
should be mandatory; conversely, consumers may opt for 
imported footwear or clothing thinking it to be of better 
quality. If this latter assumption is correct then 
obviously no harm will be done as a rational choice has 
been made (albeit for irrational reasons) , but if 
incorrect, then origin marking will have an anti-
competitive effect in promoting the sale of inferior 
merchandise. 
(b) Quantity 
Since earliest times the law has concerned itself 
'th th . h d . f d b . ld 253 Wl e we1g t an quant1ty o goo s e1ng so . This 
concern is manifest in the number and variety of statutory 
(252) See Trade Description Act 1972 (UK), s 4(2); Cranston, 
Consumers and the Law (1978), 286. 
{253) Harvey, op. cit., 2-3. For example, the Assize of 
Bread and Ale of 1266 laid down a scheme to control 
the amount of bread or ale obtainable for a farthing 
or penny respectively. Short weight or quantity was 
punishable by a fine or, in more serious cases, 
flogging or the pillory. 
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provisions concerning themselves with this matter today. 
While basic information as to quantity and weight is of 
considerable importance to the consumer it is evident 
from the legislation covering this area that simple 
directions to the effect that the quantity or weight 
must be displayed on packages, labels or the goods 
themselves is inadequate. Two reasons account for this: 
i) With packages or containers of greatly varying 
size and content, it becomes very difficult for a 
consumer to make a rational choice. Thus he is confronted 
with one brand of a product which is in a 2.2 kilogram 
package at price 'x' and another brand in a 2.5 kilogram 
package for more than price 'x'. The consumer is faced 
with a fairly complex calculation in order to determine 
the best quantity/price ratio and in a supermarket 
environment, for example, he may not have the time, 
inclination or even ability to work out the 'best buy•. 254 
ii) Where a variety of measures is used accurate 
comparison is possible only where the conversion rate is 
known. For example, where the weight of one brand is 
expressed in ounces and the competing brand's weight is 
given in grams. 
For these reasons the New Zealand Legislature has 
recognised that something more than mandatory disclosure 
(254) See Trebilcock, 'Consumer Protection in the Affluent 
Society', (1970) 16 McGill Law Journal 263, 286. 
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of weight and quantity alone is required; there must be 
uniformity in expression of weights and measures and 
standardisation in packaging is required. 
The Weights and Measures Act 1925 is an appropriate 
starting point in this area. This Act provides for 
standards of measurement which are the basis upon which 
weights and measures may be verified, limits the 
denominations of weights and measures which may be used 
and stipulates the measures appropriate in certain 
. t 255 clrcums ances. This Act, and regulations made pursuant 
to the Act, provide, inter alia, that -
i) No person shall sell, offer or expose for sale by 
retail by weight or measure any goods enclosed in a 
package unless the net weight or measure of the goods is 
legibly printed on the outside of the package or upon a 
256 label that is attached to the package. Where the 
goods are weighed and measured in the presence of the 
customer this provision does not apply. 
ii) Goods sold by retail by weight or measure may 
257 
only be sold by net weight or measure and the marking 
of such net weight or measure on any article must be in 
(255) Weights and Measures Act 1925, ss 5, 6; Weights and 
Measures Amendment Act 1976, s 3; Weights and Measures 
Amendment Act 1977, s 2; Weights and Measures 
Amendment Act 1980, s 2. 
(256) Weights and Measures Act 1925, s 18(3). 
{257) Ibid, s 18(1). 
440 
accordance with the Weights and Measures Regulations 
1926-1951. 258 By virtue of the Metrication (Retail 
Trading) Regulations 1978 weights and measures of the 
metric system are obligatory in retail sales by weight 
and measure, and any person who uses any other weight or 
measure in packaging goods for sale by retail or in 
selling goods by retail, is liable on summary conviction 
to a fine of up to $50o. 259 
iii) The denominations in which goods can be 
packaged or sold by retail are restricted. The Metrication 
(Retail Trading) Regulations 1978260 provide that goods 
specified in the schedule to the regulations must be 
disposed of in standard metric packages. For example, 
butter may only be enclosed in 250g and 500g packages, and 
sugar must be disposed of in 250g, 500g or multip s of 
261 500g packages. Similarly the Weights and Measures 
(258) Reg 3 provides that: '(a) Where an article is solid, 
semi-liquid or partly solid and partly liquid •.• such 
marking shall be expressed in terms of weight, and not 
otherwise: (b) Where an article is liquid, such 
marking shall be expressed in terms of liquid 
measure: (c) Where an article is commonly sold by 
lineal or superficial measure, such marking shall be 
expressed in terms of such measure'. 
(259) See Reg 2. 
(260) As amended by the Metrication (Retail Trading) 
Regulations 1978, Amendment No. 2; SR 1980/126. 
(261) Other articles for which standardised metric 
packages are prescribed are chocolate powder, cocoa 
and cocoa powder, coffee, dairy spreads, golden 
syrup and treacle, haricot beans, honey, lentils, 
lima beans, margarine, milk, mustard, pastas, 
peanuts, pepper, rice in bags, sago, salt in bags, 
soup mix, cereals, split peas, tapioca, tea, nai 
paints, tobacco and turpentine. 
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Regulations 1926-1951262 provide for the disposition of 
firewood, coke and coal in standardised quantities 263 
and for the disposal of bread according to specified 
. h 264 we1g ts. 
The Weights and Measures Act 1925, and the 
Regulations made pursuant to it, go a long way towards 
facilitating rational choice. The standardisation of 
packages assists the consumer in making quantity/price 
comparisons between competing brands and the mandatory 
disclosure of quantity in metric terms alone means that 
the consumer is not faced with difficult conversion 
calculations. The only negative feature associated with 
standardisation of packaging is that this may involve 
the manufacturer in additional cost which in turn will be 
passed on to the consumer. 
The Consumer Information Act 1969 provides that 
the Minister of Trade and Industry may by notice 1n the 
Gazette require that packages of certain goods bear a 
265 label showing the quantity of goods in the package. 
The Minister has exercised this power on two occasions 266 
(262) Amendment No 11; SR 1975/298. 
(263) Ibid, Reg 5(1). 
(264) Ibid, Reg 6(1). 
(265) s 4. 
(266) See Consumer Information (Quantity) Notice 1971; 
Consumer Information (Quantity) Notice 1973. 
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and information relating to quantity is demanded in 
267 
respect of a wide variety of goods. This writer 
concurs in the view of the Ministerial Working Party 
. . t . c d c . 1 . 1 . 268 rev1ew1ng cer a1n onsurner an ornrner1ca Leg1s at1on 
in categorising these notices as 'unnecessarily 
bureaucratic'. As the Working Party point out, it would 
be far better if all packaged goods were labelled as to 
quantity in terms of the Weights and Measures Act 1925 
thereby reducing the degree of fragmentation of measures 
designed to achieve the same object. 
The Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981 
empower the Governor General by Order in Council to make 
regulations providing for detailed quantity information 
269 to be incorporated on any package or label. Under the 
Regulations 270 made pursuant to the now repealed Food and 
Drugs Act 1969 every package containing a food or drug had 
(267) The weight, volume or fluid measure, as the case may 
require, of cosmetics and toileteries, deodorants, 
air fresheners, bleaches, dyes, starches, blues, 
polishes, window cleaning fluids, insect repellents, 
abrasive soaps, laundry soap, toilet soap, soap flakes, 
soap powder, enzyme cleaning preparations, shaving soap, 
shaving cream, talcum powder, toothpaste, tooth powder, 
dentifrices, pet food, liquid soap, shampoo and 
detergent liquids, must be shown on the label of the 
relevant goods; furthermore the number of preserving 
jar seals, drinking straws, paper cups, paper plates 
and paper sues and paper napkins must be disclosed; 
finally, the dimensions by length and width of paper 
tissues and paper napkins, blankets, sheets and 
greaseproof paper, wrapping foil, wrapping plastic 
and other food wrapping material must be given. 
(268) See Proposals for a Selling Practices Act, (8 July, 
1980}, p. 14. 
{269) See Food Act 1981, s 42(l){p); Medicines Act 1981, 
s 1o5 (1) ( n. 
(270) Food and Drug Regulations 1973. 
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to bear a label indicating the net weight or volume or 
number of the contents of the package depending on what 
measure was most appropriate for the retail sale of the 
271 item concerned, and regulations to the like effect 
may be anticipated under the Food Act 1981 and under the 
Medicines Act 1981. Finally, as regards agricultural 
products the net weight and quantity of animal remedies 
must be displayed on the label of the remedy concerned272 
and pesticides must be labelled similarly. 273 
Even if goods are not pre-packed, weight and quantity 
may still have to be made known to consumers. The Weights 
and Measures Act 1925 provides that where any person offers 
or exposes any goods for sale by retail by weight or 
measure he shall at the request of the purchaser to whom 
such goods are sold weigh or measure the goods in the 
presence of the purchaser and for this purpose must have 
an accessible and suitable weighing instrument or 
measure.
274 In accordance with the Metrication (Retail 
Trading) Regulations 1978, weights and measures of the 
metric system are obligatory in all retail sales. 275 
(271) Ibid, Regs 5(1); 238. 
(272) See Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36(1) (g). 
(273) See Pesticides Act 1979, s 38(9). 
(274) Weights and Measures Amendment Act 1977, s 2; 
substituting a new section 20 in the principal Act. 
(275) Reg 2. 
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Before leaving this brief appraisal of mandatory 
disclosure of quantity and weight information it may be 
noted that where weight is the appropriate means to 
reflect quantity information the legislature has opted 
for the disclosure of "net" weight. It has been argued 
that such disclosure requirement does not take sufficient 
cognisance of technically unavoidable deviations which are 
said to occur with even the most sophisticated filling 
and packaging equipment276 and that the tendency is to 
overfill to allow for any variation. While at first sight 
this may appear to be to the consumer~ advantage, on 
closer reflection, permanent overfill may have an adverse 
effect on prices. Consequently some legislatures have 
opted for the disclosure of 'average net weight' to allow 
for deviations, sometimes without a specification of the 
1 . d 277 to erances perm1tte • However it is suggested that it 
is cold comfort to a consumer to know that his or her 
short weight is compensated for by another consumer se-
where receiving an amount in excess of the average net 
weight. Furthermore, provision is made in New Zealand for 
certain tolerances; e.g., provision is made for permissible 
. . h. . . 2 78 d h errors 1n we1g 1ng or measur1ng equ1pment, an w ere 
goods are subject to variation in weight by reason of 
climatic influences no offence is committed if the package 
(276) OECD, Compulsory Labelling of Prepacked Consumer 
Goods ( 19 7 4) , 35. 
(277) See, for example, the Fair Packaging and Labelling 
Act, 15 USC (USA) . 
(278) See the Weights and Measures Regulations 1926-1951, 
Table 2-15. 
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bears a conspicuous label showing the net weight when 
2 79 packed. Therefore, on balance, it is submitted that 
the current regime is perfectly adequate. 
(c) Quality and composition 
Much mandatory disclosure is directed at the 
composition of products and this is particularly true of 
the food and drug area. Holt, 280 in discussing ingredient 
and nutrient labelling in Australia, comments that 
" ... legislative policy has reflected a 
belief that the best way to look after the 
consumer was to control what goes into 
certain standard foods rather than leave 
judgments about the suitability of 
ingredients to the consumer 11 • 
This policy is reflected in New Zealand legislation 
281 
covering the same ground but the increased level of 
consumer awareness has made informational labelling a more 
realistic and desirable supplementary measure today. The 
modern consumer is better acquainted with nutritional and 
dietary matters and, therefore, more likely to find 
compositional disclosure of assistance in facilitating 
choice between competing products. Furthermore, such 
disclosure of the composition of products ensures that 
I 
the consumer is not misled. As a result much legislation 
is directed to this end. 
(279) Weights and Measures Amendment Act 1968, s 3; 
substituting a new s 18(4) in the principal Act. 
(280} 'Food Packaging and Labelling', in Duggan and 
Darvall, Consumer Protection Law and Theory (1980} ,68. 
(281) See for example the voluminous Food and Drug 
Regulations 1973. 
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Both the Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981 
empower the promulgation of regulations designed to 
achieve comprehensive disclosure of the composition of 
f d d t . 1 282 d th F d d D oo s or rugs respec 1ve y, an e oo an rug 
Regulations 1973 made extensive provision for such 
disclosure. For example; the label on a package 
containing food for which no standard was prescribed in 
the regulations had to specify the amounts of the 
283 ingredients in the package; no package containing any 
food could bear a statement as to the presence in that 
food of any vitamins unless detailed disclosure of those 
vitamins and the quantity of each vitamin was effected on 
284 the package; and, every package containing a 
therapeutic drug had to bear a label giving the appropriate 
. . . 1 f ' h f h . . d. 2 85 quant1tat1ve part1cu ars o eac o t e act1ve 1ngre 1ents. 
In all likelihood regulations to the same effect will 
msure that similar disclosure is required under the Food 
Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981, respectively. 
Provision is also made in the Consumer Information Act 
1969 for the disclosure of particulars as to the content 
of any goods as may be specified in any regulation, 286 
but to date no such regulation has been promulgated. 
(282) See Food Act 1981, s 42(j) to (m); Medicines Act 1981, 
s 105(h), (Z.). 
(2 83) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 6, as amended by 
Reg 3 of 1976/68. 
(2 84) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 13, as amended by 
Reg 6 of 1974/188, and Reg 6 of 1976/68. 
( 2 85) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 239. 
(286) S 5 (1); s5 (2) (b), (c). 
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As regards the agricultural sector, the Pesticides 
Act 1979, the Animal Remedies Act 1967 and the Wool 
Labelling Act 1949 contain provisions designed to compel 
compositional disclosure. The Pesticides Board may direct 
that the label attached to any pesticide registered under 
the Act should contain particulars of the chemical 
. . f h . 'd 287 d . '1' . compos1t1on o t e pest1c1 e, an a s1m1 ar power 1s 
attributed to the Animal Remedies Board; that is, an 
animal remedy may only be sold under a label containing 
such particulars of the physical, chemical or biochemical 
composition of the remedy as the Board may require. 288 
Recognition of the vital role which wool plays in the 
New Zealand economy was instrumental in ensuring that 
special legislation was enacted to provide for the labelling 
and marking of wool. The Wool Labelling Act 1949 provides 
289 inter alia~ that any wool product must be labelled as 
such and indicate the percentage by weight of wool in the 
290 product. Only if such a wool product contains one 
h d d b . h f 1291 . b . un re per cent y we1g t o woo may 1t e descr1bed 
as being 'all wool' or 'pure wool' or be similarly 
described. 292 The Ministerial Working Party reviewing 
{287) Pesticides Act 1979, s 38 (l) (c). 
(288) Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36(1) (d). 
(289) See the definition of "wool product" in section 2; 
note, that a product which contains less than fifty 
per cent by weight of wool is not a "wool product". 
(290) s 3 (1). 
(291) See, however, the Wool Labelling Amendment Act 1969, 
s 2, inserting a new subsection 6(A) into section 3 
of the principal Act. 
(292) Wool Labelling Act 1949, s 3(6). 
448 
certain Consumer and Commercial legislation, while 
recognising that wool enjoys a special position and that 
there was a need to 'avoid other fibres and fibre suppliers 
"piggy backing" on the market premium achieved by wool' , 293 
recommended that the concept of the Wool Labelling Act 1949 
should extend to all textile products where fibre content 
claims are made. However, no disclosure of content should 
be required for woollen or any other texti products, in 
the opinion of the Working Party, where the seller 
f . f k' f'b t 1 . 294 re ra~ns rom rna ~ng a ~ re con ent c a~m. Only where 
such a claim is made must the claim be truthful and 
complete and in the case of a product that is described 
as being a mixture, then the percentage by weight the 
predominant fibre should be given. 295 The Working Party 
do not favour mandatory disclosure of fibre content in 
all cases as they consider that the increased costs 
associated with such mandatory disclosure would outweigh 
h . db f' f . . . . f . 296 t e perce~ve ene ~ts o max~m~s~ng consumer ~n ormat~on. 
This may or may not be true. However the following 
observations are advanced: (i) The Working Party's 
conclusion in this regard is open to some doubt given the 
laissez-faire attitude that pervades the whole Report; 
( 29 3) Proposals for a Selling Practices Act, 8 July 1980, 
page 15. 
( 294) Ibid, page 16. 
( 295) Idem. 
( 29 6) Ibid, page 15. 
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(ii) The pre-eminence of wool and extraordinary 
reputation that it enjoys is in no small measure 
attributable to the clear iden'tification of the product 
by the use of proprietary trade names such as the 
"Woolmark"; given this reputation most woollen products 
will continue to be labelled as such, but it is only 
through mandatory disclosure that consumers will be 
educated as to suitable alternatives to woollen products. 
Why not a 'rayon-mark' or 'polyester-mark' for such 
synthetic fibres? By clearly identifying products 
competition is stimulated in that rational choice as 
opposed to random selection becomes possible, and repeat 
purchases may be based on experience with a particular 
fabric or fibrei (iii) Provided a reasonable tolerance is 
allowed for variations in processing, expenses associated 
with testing for individual fibre content and maintaining 
that exact content may be significantly reduced; 
(iv) Proposals suggesting less, rather than more, information 
run counter to prevailing trends in most Western countries 
and must be viewed with some caution. Therefore, unless it 
is clearly demonstrated on a cost-benefit basis that 
mandatory labelling of all textiles as to content would be 
prohibitively expensive, it is submitted that such a policy 
b . 1 t d 297 e 1mp emen e . 
(297) The United States, Canada, Australia and all EEC 
countries compel fibre content labelling for all 
textiles. See Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 
15 USC s 70(b) (USA): Textile Labelling Act 1970 
(Canada); Textile Products Labelling Act 1954-70 (NSW); 
Directive on Textile Labelling, 26 August 1971, O.J. 
1971 1 185/16. This EEC directive provides that the 
names of fibres must be specified on a fabric or in 
any advertisements for the same, together with the 
percentage of the different fibres used. 
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Date-marking on packaged goods provides consumers 
with an important piece of information that enables them 
to assess, before purchase, the likely quality and 
storage life of goods. This is particularly true of 
perishable foodstuffs but by no means limited in 
application to this arena. The Consumer Information 
Act 1969, 298 the Food Act 1981, 299 the Medicines Act 
1981, 300 the Animal Remedies Act 1967 301 and the Pesticides 
Act 1979 302 all contain provisions that would authorise 
compulsory date-marking. The two basic alternative methods 
of expressing the date are embodied in the date-marking 
provision of the Consumer Information Act 1969; that is, 
the Governor General may prescribe by regulation that 
goods be marked with 'the date on which they were packaged 
or the date before which the goods should be used to ensure 
maximum use or effectiveness•~ 303 Holt304 suggests that 
the approach to be endorsed is largely a matter of personal 
preference, although the nature of the product may dictate 
that one approach is to be preferred over the other. 
Proponents in favour of 'expiry dating' claim that it is 
most appropriate in the case of short-life goods, for 
(298) s 5 (2) (g). 
(299) S 42 (l) (rn). 
(300) S l05(l)(Z). 
( 30 l) s 36 ( l) (k) • 
(302) s 38(1) (i). 
(303) s 5(2)(g). 
( 304) ' 66. 
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example, and that consumers who have little or no 
knowledge of the durable life of foods and other perishable 
packaged goods are not greatly assisted by 'commencement 
dating'. Conversely, proponents in favour of 
'commencement dating' point to the reliability and 
certainty of such a date and the fact that it is not 
dependent upon a manufacturer's subjective calculations, 
based on optimum storage conditions, of his product's life 
305 
span. Both approaches have been adopted in New Zealand. 
For examp ; every package of corned, cured, pickled or 
salted meat intended for retail sale had to be labelled with 
the date on which the package was filled306 and butter sold 
in hermetically sealed containers had to be labelled with 
the year and month of the year in which the butter was 
30 7 
manufactured. Conversely, yoghurt had to be labelled 
or embossed with the date until which the product would 
. . h . . . 1' 30 8 d reta1n, w1t out any ter1orat1on, 1ts qua 1ty an a 
biochemical animal remedy must be labelled with the date 
until which the remedy may reasonably be expected to 
309 
retain its potency. Finally, Regulation 243 of the 
Food and Drug Regulations f973 illustrative of a 
provision requiring the disclosure of both dates; that is, 
as regards biochemical preparations such as vaccines and 
anti-biotics, the date of manufacture and the date after 
( 3 0 5 ) Ibid, 6 7 . 
(306) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 86(5). 
(307) Ibid, Reg 131(4) i see also the Meat Regulations 1969, 
Reg 174, which requires all cans of meant to be marked 
to indicate the date on which the meat was canned. 
(308) Ibid, Reg 139. 
(309) Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36 (1) (k) (ii). 
452 
which the preparation should no longer be used had to be 
given. 310 Whichever approach is preferred it is clear 
that information of this type is of considerable use to a 
consumer. 
But date marking is not a complete answer to the 
problem of stale food, for example, as it amounts to no 
more than an indication of "freshness". Unless products 
are kept under appropriate storage conditions at all 
stages between manufacture and consumption 'their optimum 
li will be curtailed and consequently the date mark 
ld b 't' 1 • 1 d' I 311 h' cou ecome pos1 1ve y m1s ea 1ng . For t 1s reason 
numerous provisions are directed at ensuring that storage 
facilities and the mode of storage of products is 
312 
adequate and the usefulness of date marking is 
contingent upon compliance with storage requirements. 
Grading yet another means whereby information 
about the quality of goods may be conveyed to the consumer. 
While the advantages of compositional labelling should not 
be underestimated it must be appreciated that information 
must be in a form that renders it intelligible to the 
average consumer. As Trebilcock313 remarks 
(310) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 243(2) (d). 
(311) Holt, op. cit., 66. 
(312) Re r to the Food and Drug Regulations 1973. For 
Example, see Regulations 28, 32, 37, 85, 103 and 187. 
(313) 'Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society•, (1970) 
16 HcGill Law Journal 263, 287. 
Grading 
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"To tell the average consumer that X 
toothpaste contains 'hexa-chlorophene for 
whiter teeth' (and four other named 
components}, or that Y soap powder contains 
'bio-enzymes' (and other components) • a 
cleaner wash • tells him nothing". 
a possib solution to this di culty; that 
is,goods may be graded according to their nutritional 
value in the case of foodstuffs and in accordance with 
their efficacy in the case of soaps, detergents, drugs, 
and so on. 314 Compulsory grade labelling is therefore a 
useful way of indicating quality where consumers appreciate 
the difference between goods of different grades. About 
thirty fruits and vegetables, eggs and wine are subject to 
d . 1 t. . th k 315 d . gra 1ng regu a 10ns 1n e Common Mar et an , 1n New 
316 . 317 Zealand, eggs, fru1t and vegetables, and poultry 
have been subjected to grading requirements. · For example; 
no eggs may be sold which have not been graded for 
quality and size in accordance with the Poultry Board 
Regulations 1980 and these regulations make provision for 
f d f . 318 our gra es o s1ze; similarly, the New Zealand Grown 
Fruit and Vegetables Regulations 1975 empower the Director-
General of Agriculture and Fisheries to determine grade 
standards for any fruit or vegetable, and any such fruit or 
vegetable for which a standard grade 
(314) See Trebilcock, ibid, 287-288. 
(315) See Cranston, op. cit., 282. 
determined and which 
(316} See the Poultry Board Regulations 1980, Regs 22-24. 
(317) See the New Zealand Grown Fruit and Vegetables 
Regulations 1975, Regs 13-15. 
(318) Reg 23. 
454 
is in a package which bears a standard grade mark 
. 319 
must conform to the specifications of that grade. 
However, it is submitted, that compulsory grade 
marking amounts to no more than an appealing idea with very 
limited scope. While grades may be established for natural 
products such as fruit and vegetables, how one to 
establish grades for complex and composite consumer lines, 
such as video cassette recorders, etc? Even in relation 
to a basic commodity such as a breakfast cereal, medical 
and nutrition experts may disagree as to what is the most 
nutritious combination of vitamins, etc. 320 Not only is 
objective measurement and determination of grades a forlorn 
hope, but the expense involved in administering an 
11 across-the-board" grading system would be prohibitive. If 
these factors are not sufficient deterrent then mention 
might also be made of the fact that grading is of little 
use unless the consumer appreciates the difference between 
the goods of different grades. A grading system will only 
reveal some difference in quality but not the nature of 
h d 'ff 321 t e 1 erence. 
Finally, on the question of quality and compositional 
information on packages or labels, reference must be made 
to quality marking. Designmarks may be awarded by the New 
Zealand Industrial Design Council to New Zealand made 
products that measure up to the standard of excellence 
. d 322 requ1re • Before a designrnark is awarded the product 
(319) Reg ss 131 14 • 
(320} See Trebilcock, 
(321) Idem. 
. cit., 288. 
(322) See the Industrial Design Act 1966. 
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must have at least fifty per cent New Zealand content, 
must meet all the appropriate New Zealand standards, and 
workmanship must be of a high calibre. Furthermore, the 
product must be good value for money and must be safe and 
reliable. 323 If these criteria are met then the designmark 
may be awarded and products bearing this mark are 
obviously of an extremely high quality. In its early years 
of operation the Industrial Design Council encouraged 
companies with their products already in the marketplace 
to apply for a designmark, but this emphasis changed in 
1980. Now, prototypes can be evaluated and the 
manufacturer may be advised of requisite changes or 
modifications to ensure that the final product will be 
eligible a designmark. Products displaying the 
designmark are becoming increasingly evident in the 
marketplace and this mark carries connotations of good 
l •t 324 qua 1 y. 
Quality assurance also may be conveyed when a product 
is marked as complying with a New Zealand Standard, or 
better still, when it carries a Standard Certification Mark; 
that is, a manufacturer may claim compliance with a New 
Zealand Standard by marking his product with the relevant 
New Zealand Standard number, but to acquire the independent 
guarantee of product quality represented by the Standard 
(323) Ibid, s 15; see also 'The Press', 16 September 1981, 
Ior-an article based on an interview with Mr. David 
Hamilton, the Christchurch based field adviser for 
the Industrial Design Council. 
(324) See 'The Pressr, 16 September 1981. 
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Certification Mark, the manufacturers own quality control 
procedures are inspected, or established, by the Standards 
. . 'f' t' . ff 325 Assoc1at1on Certl 1ca 1on sect1on sta . Numerous 
consumer products are covered by standards and the 
information that a product is made to a New Zealand 
Standard, especially if supported by the Standard Certific-
ation Mark, 326 assures the consumer that essential technical 
requirements are met and he can then select the design, 
colour and price that suits his own needs. 
(d) Safety and Use 
A large body of law relating to packaging and labelling 
is directed at forewarning the consumer as to the potentially 
harmful nature of the g.oods concerned or of the hazards 
associated with, or allied to, their use. For example: 
i) Regulations made pursuant to the Dangerous Goods 
Act 1974 327 require that containers of dangerous goods be 
marked with either their technical or trade name and the 
nature of any hazard (e.g. flammable liquid, spontaneously 
combustible, poison gas). Manufacturers are obliged to 
place warning symbols on hazardous products and in the case 
of flammable products additional marking is required. 328 For 
example, an aerosol container must bear a label reading 'keep 
in cool place away from heat. Do not puncture or throw in 
fire even when empty', and where the contents of such an 
(325) See the Standards Act 1965, ss 23-25. 
(326) 'S' Mark. 
(327) S 35; see the Dangerous Goods (Labelling) Regulations 
1978. 
(328) See the Schedules to the Regulations. 
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aerosol are flammable, there is the additional requirement 
that a clear marking to this effect be marked on the 
. 329 
conta1ner. 
ii) Two recent interventions have been aimed 
p rimarily at the welfare and safety of children. The 
Safety of Children's Night Clothes Act 1977 directs that 
certain instructions and warnings should be affixed to 
330 garments. For example, certain garments must bear the 
words 'designed to reduce fire risk, keep away from fire• 331 
and instructions as to the cleaning of certain garments 
must be given so as to avoid a reduction in the fire 
332 
resistant qualities of the garment concerned. Another 
provision designed specifically for the protection of 
children is contained in the Plastic Wrapping Regulations 
1979. 333 These regulations require that a suitable 
warning be printed on certain types of plastic bags that 
point to the danger of children being suffocated if the 
bags are drawn over their faces. 334 The Explanatory Note 
(329) Dangerous Goods (Labelling) Regulations 1978, Reg 9. 
(330) See s 5; "Garment 11 is defined in section 2 (1) as 
meaning 'a pair of pyjamas, an over-garment of 
pyjama style, a nightdress, or a dressing gown, which 
under Standard Specification for Children's Night-
clothes Having Low Fire Risk (NZS 8705), is suitable 
for children aged 12 months to 14 years inclusive'. 
(331) Safety of Children's Nightclothes Act 1977, s 5(a). 
(332) Ibid, s 5(c). 
(333) Enacted pursuant to the Health Act 1956, s 119. 
(334) Reg 2. 
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to the regulations observes that these regulations differ 
from their predecessors 335 in that bags that are of 
sufficient stiffness to avoid the clinging properties that 
present the principal hazard are exempt from compliance 
with this warning directive. 
iii) Voluminous regulations, entitled the Poisons 
Regulations 1964, have been promulgated pursuant to the 
Restricted Drugs Act 1960 336 and detailed provisions are 
set out for the labelling of poisonous goods sold at 
wholesale, at retail, and by medical practitioners, 
pharmacists and dentists. There are also elaborate rules 
specifying the data to be placed on such sundry but 
potentially hazardous items such as hair dyes, aerosols 
or antihistamines. For example, containers of anti-
histamines must bear a label warning of the dangers of 
driving within six to eight hours after taking such a drug, 
and a warning directing pregnant women not to use the drug 
without medical direction must also be incorporated on the 
labe1. 337 For numerous substances it is not sufficient to 
simply warn against improper use or consumption, the label 
must contain a statement indicating the appropriate first 
aid treatment to be followed in the event of a poisoning. 338 
(335) Viz.i the Plastic Wrapping Regulations 1960, the 
Plastic Wrapping Regulations, Amendment No. 1. 
(336) The Restricted Drugs Amendment Act 1979, s 2(1), gives 
this title to the Act previously known as the Poisons 
Act 1960. This legislation eventually will be 
replaced by the Toxic Substances Act 1979. 
(337) Poisons Regulations 1964, Reg 50. 
(338) Ibid, Reg 39. 
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iv) The Food Act 1981 and the Medicines Act 1981 
empower the promulgation of regulations designed to warn 
consumers about potential hazards associated with the 
t . . d/ f f d d t' 1 339 consump 1on an or use o oo or rugs respec 1ve y. 
The Food and Drug Regulations 1973, enacted pursuant to 
the now repealed Food and Drug Act 1969, contained 
numerous provisions to this effect; for example, no 
infant's food that did not conform in approximate 
proportion to the composition of human milk and that was 
recommended for use as the main food for infants had to 
bear a warning label to the effect that the food should 
not be given to infants under 4 months of age except under 
k 'll d . . 340 s 1 e superv1s1on; furthermore, any medicine 
containing more than a certain proportion of ethyl 
alcohol had to be labelled with a statement declaring 
341 the presence, and percentage, of alcohol. In the area 
of food and drugs, reference also could be made to the 
Meat Regulations 1969; 342 for example, containers of pet 
food must bear a statement that the contents are not 
suitable for human consumption. 343 
The illustrations above bear adequate testimony to 
the extensive nature of the legislature's concern for 
consumer safety vis-a-vis the consumption and use of certain 
(339) Food Act 1981, s 42; Medicines Act 1981, s 105. 
(340) Food and Drug Regulations 1973, Reg 236. 
(341} Ibid, Reg 242. 
(342) Enacted pursuant to the Meat Act 1964. 
(343) Meat Regulations 1969, Reg 159. 
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hazardous goods. Furthermore, mention might be made of the 
fact that the government and the tobacco industry have 
entered into a voluntary agreement that health hazard 
warnings must appear on cigarette packets and in poster 
and press advertisements, and must be such that they can 
be easily seen by consumers. 
Finally, some consideration must be given to 'use 
marking'. What provision is made in statutes for use 
marking is primarily directed at safety considerations 
(e.g. keep out of the reach of children; do not drive a 
vehicle within 6 hours of consuming this drug) but some 
provision is made for more general "use" disclosure. For 
example, the Consumer Information Act 1969 authorises the 
Governor General to make regulations aimed at compelling 
the disclosure of particulars relating to the application 
344 
or use of any goods. Similarly, the width of the 
discretion afforded under the Food Act 1981 and the 
Medicines Act 1981 for the promulgation of regulations 
would cover regulations designed to achieve "use" 
d . 1 345 1sc osure. Finally, the Pesticides Act 1979 and the 
Animal Remedies Act 1967 authorise the respective 
administrative Boards to stipulate that directions for the 
use of any pesticide or animal remedy be displayed on the 
products' labe1. 346 However much use marking is of a 
voluntary nature and this is particularly true of "care" 
{344) Consumer Information Act 1969, s 5(2) (e). 
(345) See the Food Act 1981, s 42; the Medicines Act 1981, 
s 105. 
(346) See the Pesticides Act 1979, s 38(1} (e); the Animal 
Remedies Act 1967, s 36 (1) (f). 
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labelling by the textile industry; that is, many goods are 
labelled to inform consumers of what cleaning process or 
processes are most appropriate and irable for the fabric 
concerned. This is advantageous in two respects, in that 
(i) this prevents/alleviates consumer dissatisfaction by pro-
longing the lifespan the product, and (ii) there is a red-
uction in the wastage of economic resources. 347 In some 
countries, notably the United States . 348 Amer1ca, care 
labelling is mandatory, but whether this is a desirable 
state of affairs is debatable. 349 As Cranston observes 
"The objection to compulsory care labelling has 
been mainly that the variety of factors determin-
ing how texti s respond to treatment is too 
great - and includes behaviour solely within the 
province of consumers - for manufacturers to 
threatened with criminal sanctions". 
Therefore, while manufacturers ought to be encouraged to 
incorporate more general "use" information on labels, 
cautious evaluation must be undertaken before such dis-
closure compelled. Not only is there the danger that 
general 11 use" information will obscure more pertinent 
information, such as s statements, but the costs 
associated with such disclosure may outweigh the estimated 
benefit. Detailed "use" disclosure, not directed at sa ty 
considerations, must be subordinated to information that 
does pertain to identi , quantity and safety. 
(347) OECD, Labelling and Comparative Testing (1972), 19-20. 
( 34 8) Cranston, 287. 
( 349) Idem. 
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(3) PRESENTATION 
The brief discussion above on the types of disclosure 
conveys an idea of the myriad of statutory provisions and 
regulations that provide for mandatory disclosure of 
information on packages or labels. As an essential 
complementary measure, and in an endeavour to ensure the 
effectiveness of this disclosure, most statutes and 
subordinate legislation contain provisions directed at 
(a) the mode of disclosure, and (b) the accuracy and 
honesty of disclosure. It is proposed in this part to 
consider briefly these two elements. 
(a) The Mode of Disclosure 
"Detail" is the word that most appropriately summar-
izes the legislature's response to regulating the mode of 
disclosure. It is not proposed to consider all the 
provisions designed to regulate the mode of disclosure on 
packages and labels, as this would be a well nigh imposs-
ible task, but to identify the thrust of these requirements. 
In this writer's opinion two basic objectives may be 
isolated: (i) To ensure the availability and presence 
of the required information at the time of sale; and 
(ii) To ensure that the required information is readily 
discernible. 
As regards the first objective, labels must be 
firmly attached, and must be of a nature or material that 
will not fade or become defaced. For example the Poisons 
Regulations 1964 provide, inter alia~ that labels must be 
firmly affixed and be of such a nature and material that 
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they 'will not fade or become detached by the influence 
of light, of atmospherichumidity or dryness, or of 
350 
normal atmospheric temperatures'. Furthermore, any 
marking or label must be so positioned so as to prevent 
it being destroyed or defaced when the package is opened 
351 for inspection by a prospective purchaser, and the 
label must be made of sufficiently durable material to 
withstand handling damage. 352 These, and analogous 
provisions, are designed to ensure that the information 
is available at the time of sale and that the host of 
provisions relating to informational content are not 
rendered nugatory through the absence, or defacement, of 
any label. 
As regards the second objective, the information must 
be readily discernible. To this end, provisions regulate 
the height, shape and comparative size of lettering, 
stipulate that the information must be conspicuous and be 
prominently displayed, and must not be obscured. For 
example, the Safety of Children's Night Clothes Act 1977 
stipulates that a required marking must be in easily 
legible lettering of not less than 3 millimetres353 
(350} Reg. 36. 
(351) See, for example, the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
s 6(2) (d); the Poisons Regulations 1960, reg. 36(e); 
the Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36(9) (e). 
(352) See, for example, the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
s 6(2) (k); the Poisons Regulations 1960, reg. 
36 (d) . 
(353} S6(l)(c). 
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and must not be accompanied by or combined with any 
other matter tending to contradict or obscure the 
. d k. 354 requ1re mar 1ng. Furthermore, markings or other 
information must be affixed to such parts of a container 
or package so that the information may be readily 
examined by prospective purchasers355 and in the case of 
certain goods there must be compliance in terms of the 
size of lettering, layout and colour. 356 Such provisions 
ensure the prominence of the requisite information and 
endeavour to prevent the possibility of salient informat-
ion being obscured in a mass of trivia. 
(b) The Accuracy and Honesty of Disclosure 
Generally speaking, no package or container must 
bear, or have attached to it, any false or misleading 
357 
statement, word, brand, picture, mark or label. For 
example, in Wark (In spec tor of He a Z·th) v New Zealand 
(354} S6(3). 
(355) For example, see the Weights and Measures Regulations 
1926-51, Part VI, reg. 9; the Food and Drug Regul-
ations 1973, reg. 9; the Consumer Information Act 
1969, s 6(2) (e); the Footwear Marking Order 1955, 
reg. 4; the Clothing Marking Order 1956, reg. 4 and 
the Schedule. 
(356) See, for example, the Dangerous Goods (Labelling) 
Regulations, 1978, reg. 6; the Plastic Wrapping 
Regulations 1979, reg. 2; Poisons Regulations 
1964, reg. 37. 
(357) See, for example, the Consumer Information Actl969, 
ss 6,7; the Food Act 1981, s 10; the Medicines Act 
1981, s 61; the PesticidesAct 1979, s 38(10); the 
Animal Remedies Act 1967, s 36(4); the Wool Labell-
ing Act 1949, s 4(1) (c); the Merchandise Marks Act 
1954, s 9; the Dangerous Goods Act 1974, s 29. 
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Products Ltd358 section 6(3) of the then Food and Drug 
Act 1947 fell to be considered. This subsection 
provided that it was an offence to sell 
"a food or drug in any package which bears 
or has attached thereto any false or mis-
leading statement, word, brand, label or 
mark". 359 
The defendant manufactured tinned foods, which according 
to the label contained "Baked beans in tomato sauce with 
bacon". However, it was established that the proportion 
of bacon in the tins was infinitesimal and Astley S.M. 
remarked that there was "(n)o taste of bacon in the 
mixture such as would be experienced by the ordinary person 
whose mind was not directed to an effort to find that 
taste". 360 
Applying the test laid down in Concentrated Foods Ltd 
361 
v Champ the learned magistrate concluded that while 
the words may be literally true, in that the mixture did 
contain some bacon, it was misleading to an average 
consumer to describe such a mixutre as being "with 
bacon". 
(358) (1953-55) 8 MCD 23. 
(359) See the analogous provision in the Food Act 1981, 
slO(l). 
(360) Supra, at 25. 
(361) [1944] 1 KB 342, 350. Wrottesley J held that "The 
test is: What does the ordinary person understand 
by the language? Is he misled?" See also Burch & 
Co Ltd v Hughes [1950] NZLR 423, 426 per Smith J. 
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As with the provisions designed to control misleading 
and deceptive advertisements362 the approaches adopted in 
the different statutes vary. For example, any person who 
sells any food that bears a misleading label is liable on 
conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 
months or a fine not exceeding $3000 if the offence was 
committed knowingly, or to a fine of up to $1000 in any 
h 363 th' . t . t 1' b'l' ff d ot er case; 1s 1s a s r1c 1a 1 1ty o ence an 
there is accordingly no necessity for the prosecution to 
364 prove mens rea. The Merchandise Marks Act 1954 
represents something of a compromise in that the normal 
onus of proof is reversed; that is, a person who has, 
for example, applied a false trade description to goods 
may escape a prison term of up to two years, or a fine 
of $1000, or both, by negativing an intention to defraud} 65 
Such a person must prove either (i) that he acted 
innocently; or, (ii} that he took all reasonable 
precautions to ensure compliance and that on demand from 
the prosecutor he assisted by giving all information in 
his power to trace the person(s) from whom he obtained 
the goods. 366 At the other end of the specrum, the 
(362) See Chapter IV, Statutory Control of Advertising, 
supra. 
(363} Food Act 1981, s 10(2). 
(364) Ibid, s 30; see also the Medicines Act 1981, 
ss 80, 82; Pesticides Act 1979, s 38(10); Dangerous 
Goods Act 1974. 
(365) Merchandise Marks Act 1954, s 9(1). 
(366} Merchandise Marks Act 1954, s 9(2). 
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Consumer Information Act 1969 embraces the philosophy 
that any prosecution for an infringement of the pack-
aging and labelling provisions in that Act, is to be a 
measure of last resort, and that the normal procedure 
will be consultation and negotiation between the 
offender and the Examin~r of Trade Practices or his 
. 367 
representat1ve. To date, no such prosecution has 
been embarked upon. 
The provisions outlined in this cursory appraisal 
of "Presentation" are designed to ensure the conspicuous 
presence of accurate information about any goods for 
which mandatory disclosure exists, and are an essential 
corollary to the substantive disclosure provisions. 
(4) CONCLUSIONS 
It is submitted that, generally speaking, the laws 
relating to packaging and labelling make provision for 
the adequate transmission of information as to identity, 
quantity, quality, composition, safety and use. More 
specifically, the following points may be made: 
i) These laws provide for the adequate identificat-
ion of goods in that the risk of confusion is minimised 
by rules requiring the disclosure of the "common" names 
of certain goods where the consumer may be misled by some 
(367) Consumer Information Act 1969, s 19. 
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368 
technical name or obscure brand name. 
ii) Disclosure of the origin of goods is of a more 
doubtful nature and value in that, while this may 
stimulate domestic consumption, it is an unreliable 
indicator of quality and may reduce competition. 
iii) As regards disclosure of quantity, the legis-
lature has recognised that the disclosure of this inform-
ation, without more, is reduced greatly in impact. 
Quantity information must go hand in hand with standard-
isation of package and container sizes so that comparison 
as between competing brands is facilitated. Furthermore, 
the required use of metric weights and measurements in the 
retail trade obviates difficulties in conversion; for 
example, as where one brand's weight is expressed in 
pounds and ounces and the competing brand's weight is 
expressed in kilograms and grams. The promulgation of 
Q t 't t' 369 h f . uan 1 y no 1ces pursuant to t e Consumer In ormat1on 
Act 1969 is an instance of needless fragmentation in that 
all requirements relating to weights and measures may be 
promulgated pursuant to the Weights and Measures Act 1925 
and be incorporated in the regulations to that Act. 370 
Finally, on the question of quantity disclosure, it is 
(368) Supra. 
(369) Consumer Information (Quantity) Notice 1971; 
Consumer Information (Quantity) Notice 1973. 
(370) Viz., the Weights and Measures Regulations 1926-1951. 
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submitted that the New Zealand legislature's adoption of 
"net" weight disclosure is the most appropriate means of 
communicating this information; obviously disclosure of 
"gross" weight is of lesser merit because the consumer 
is purchasing the contents of a package or container and 
could be misled by an unduly heavy container or package, 
and disclosure of "average" weight means that. some 
consumers will benefit at the expense of others. 
iv) While recognising that compositional disclosure 
may be meaningless where the components of a good are 
complicated, the value of such disclosure must not be 
underestimated. Just as it may be a mistake to assume 
a high level of sophistication and intelligence on the 
part of the average consumer, so it would be a mistake 
to assume that the average consumer lacks the capacity 
to benefit from such disclosure. While today's consumer 
is not necessarily a backroom pharmacist he is, in this 
writer's opinion, much more aware of compositional 
matters (such as the presence or absence of additives, 
preservatives and vitamins) than he is given credit for. 
v) In relation to clothing, fabrics and other such 
materials there is a case to consider for the disclosure 
of content for all textile products, and not to confine 
such disclosure to woollen products. Consistent dis-
closure of fibre content may enhance competition and 
educate consumers who will acquire a familiarity with the 
range of natural and synthetic fibres employed in the 
textile industry. 
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vi) Datemarking is to be recommended as the consumer 
is given an indication of the age and/or storage life of 
the product concerned and it is strongly recommended that 
such marking be extended to all perishable goods. 
vi) Grading, it is submitted, is too expensive and 
impracticable to implement on a large scale, although it 
is readily conceded that where consumers understand the 
significance of each grade, and the distinction between 
such grades, then grade marking is a useful way to convey 
quality information. But the chances of extensive 
across-the-board grading must be very slender. 
viii) Safety marking is undoubtedly of paramount im-
portance and it is therefore appropriate that considerable 
emphasis is placed on such disclosure in the various 
statutes and subordinate legislation. 
In summary, it is submitted that the law relating to 
packaging and labelling is in a satisfactory state from 
the consumers' perspective. He is given, subject to minor 
reservations, adequate information, detailed rules ensure 
that this information is given accurately and honestly, 
and from this writer's observations over the past four 
years there is substantial compliance with packaging and 
labelling laws. From the point of view of the manufacturer 
the position may be less desirable in that there is no 
cohesive packaging and labelling law, and compliance in 
respect of any particular good may necessitate reference 
to a multitude of diverse regulations that are not the 
most accessible nor easily located rules. 
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3. OTHER MANDATORY DISCLOSURE MEASURES 
Legislative concern for consumer information has 
manifested itself in areas aside from those discussed 
above. In this part it is proposed to highlight a 
further two major measures. 
(1) DIRECT SELLING 
11 Direct" or "in-house" selling describes the 
practice of selling goods and services otherwise than at 
. d . 371 appropr1ate tra e prem1ses. This practice is some-
times described as 'door to door selling' but this 
description is too limited as it takes no account of more 
sophisticated and diverse techniques; that is, door to 
door selling appropriately describes 'cold canvassing' 
which is the practice of random door knocking employed by 
many companies who sell in the home, but many companies 
have adopted the so-called "party" or "home show" method 
whereby goods and/or services are demonstrated to a 
number of consumers at the same time. Therefore, a 
more accurate term embracing these selling techniques 
would be 'direct selling or in-house selling•. 372 
(371} The expression 'appropriate trade premises' is 
employed in the Door to Door Sales Act 1967. 
(372) See du Fresne, 'Both Feet in the Door', 
'The Listener', 5 January 1980, at page 10. 
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Direct selling had its origins in the United States 
· of America towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
made its first appearance in New Zealand during the 
1920's. Karl du Fresne reports373 
"Electrolux, the Swedish vacuum cleaner 
company, began selling door to door here 
in 1924. The Rawleighs man, with his 
quaintly labelled medicines and toilet-
ries, has been calling on New Zealand 
housewives since 1931, and Christchurch 
based Bon Brushes took to the road in 
1935." 
Since that time there has been a rapid escalation in the 
number of firms engaged in direct selling, and in the 
volume of sales effected using this technique. Tupperware 
NZ Ltd have an annual turnover in excess of $10 million 
and the Avon cosmetic company have, by employing direct 
selling techniques, captured a big percentage of the New 
Zealand cosmetics market in an extraordinarily short time 
- at the expense of the local pharmacist's business in 
cosmetics. 374 
The Legislature has sought to regulate direct selling 
by enacting the Door to Door Sales Act 1967,375 which 
endeavours to protect housewives and other persons who 
decide to buy goods or services on credit, or to hire such 
(373) Idem. 
(374) Ibid, at 12. See also Consumer 192, 37 where it is 
reported that Electrolux's share of the vacuum 
cleaner market is some 45 percent, despite the fact 
that nearly all its selling is done door-to-door. 
(375) As amended by the Door to Door Sales Amendment Act 
1973. 
473 
goods or services, where the agreement is made other than 
at appropriate trade premises. Control in the area of 
direct selling is desirable for a number of reasons; 376 
namely -
(i) Direct selling employs elements of psychological 
advantage and fait accompli that may negate the 
possibility of the consumer making a rational choice. 
As Malcolm Cubitt of the New Zealand Chemists Guild 
is reported377 as saying 
"Direct selling techniques are well thought 
out. Once they get inside the house, sit 
down and lay their products on the table, 
they're virtually assured of a sale. To 
say no, the customer has to get them to 
pack all their products up again and show 
them the door. A lot of people just aren't 
used to that sort of hustling." 
Similarly, with 'party plan' direct selling the 
party-goer may be. psychologically pre-disposed to buy 
especially where the prospective customer has been 
invited by a friend. 
(ii) Prospective customers are deprived of the advantage 
and opportunity of making an informed purchasing 
decision based on knowledge concerning comparable 
goods and services. 
(376) For some of the extensive literature on the topic 
see: Moore, 'Australian Regulation of Deceptive 
Selling Practices', (1972) 4 Adelaide Law Review 
423; Duggan, 'The Cooling-Off Period in Victorian 
Door to Door Sales Legislation', (1973) 8 Melbourne 
University Law Review 134; Wilson, 'Consumer 
Protection at the Front Door', (1976)12.University 
of Western Australia Law Review 557. 
(377) See du Fresne's article, at page 12; footnote 
372, supra. 
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(iii) High-pressure salesmanship can do irreparable 
harm to other participants in the direct sales 
market. 378 
(iv) Frauds may be perpetrated on householders by 
unscrupulous salespersons. 
The Door to Door Sales Act 1967 is directed at sales 
of goods or services on credit379 and at hiring agreements 
under which goods are disposed of on terms which entitle 
the hirer to apply the instalments in reduction of the 
purchase price and to ultimately retain the goods as his 
380 
own. The Act does not apply to cash sales, nor does 
381 it apply to credit sale agreements for small amounts 
and, most importantly, the Act does not apply if the 
transaction takes place at appropriate trade premises, 
which are defined in the Schedule to the Door to Door 
(378) Concern about the doubtful direct selling practices 
employed by some sellers has led some of the main 
companies involved to form a Direct Sellers Assoc-
iation, which aims at ridding the industry of its 
tarnished image. See du Fresne, op. cit., 11. 
However, not all sellers belong to this Association, 
nor do all the members necessarily 'practice what 
they preach'. See Consumer 192, 36. Therefore, 
statutory controls must supplement any voluntary 
controls. 
(379) Including hire purchase agreements; sees 2(1). 
(380) Sees 2(1) and the definition of 'hiring agree-
ment'; see also Walsh v Industrial Acceptance 
Corpn [1936] SR (Qd) 275. 
(381) For example, the Act does not apply to credit sale 
agreements in respect of books where the purchase 
price does not exceed $20; nor does it apply to 
other credit sale agreements where the purchase 
price does not exceed $40: sees 2(1}. 
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Sales Amendment Act 1973. 382 Finally, the Act does not 
apply where 'the first enquiry specifically relating to 
the sale and purchase of the goods that are the subject 
of the agreement is made by the purchaser•. 383 Section 
11(2) stipulates that in determining who made the first 
enquiry any solicitation by a vendor in an advertisement 
addressed to the public at large or any section of the 
community must be ignored. Flitton384 observes that 
this provision 
" ... (i)s designed to cull out the sale 
resulting from a deliberate request for 
a home demonstration. To exclude all sales 
where the purchaser has made the first 
enquiry is not sufficient. This has been 
demonstrated in the United States, where 
radio advertisements promise 'a television 
set in your living room today if you call 
this number'. This is the clearest appeal 
to impulse buying and will be followed by 
the 'hard sell' in the home later in the 
day." 
Having briefly outlined the scope of the Door to Door 
Sales Act 1967, the mechanics of the consumer protection 
measures contained in that Act fall to be considered. 
Section 7 states that where a purchaser has acquired 
goods, or entered into an agreement for the provision of 
(382) See also s 5; Flitton, Legislation Note, (1968) 3 
NZULR 86 comments that the applicability of the Act 
to transactions made otherwise than at 'appropriate 
trade premises' may lead to complications in that 
the 'result may be the necessary application of the 
Act to unanticipated but legitimate business 
forums'. 
(383) Sll(l). 
(384) Legislation Note, (1968) 3 NZULR 86, 87. 
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services on credit, that purchaser is to be given a 
seven-day period of reflection. If during that period, 
he or she elects not to continue with the agreement, then 
it may be cancelled; it is totally irrelevant that the 
agreement was negotiated fairly and honestly and that 
'hard sell' techniques were not employed. As Lawson 385 
points out 'the consumer is given the right to annul an 
otherwise entirely valid contract'. 
In an endeavour to ensure the efficacy of this 
provision the legislature has (i) provided that all 
attempts to contract out of the Act's provisions are 
ineffective, 386 and (ii} stipulated that notice be given 
to the purchaser of his right to cance1. 387 If the 
consumer is unaware of his right to cancel the legislation 
will be worthless. Consequently, the Act provides that no 
door to door sale is enforceable unless the agreement is 
in writing and is signed by all the parties concerned; 
the agreement must contain a conspicuous statement 
advising the purchaser of his legal right to cancel the 
agreement and this must be accompanied by a prescribed 
cancellation form. 388 Failure to notify the purchaser of 
(385) 'Protection of the Consumer in New Zealand - Some 
Recent Developments', (1973)Sotago University Law 
Review 49, 53. 
(386) s 12. 
(387) S 6; note that the disclosure provisions under the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981 do not apply; see the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 15(1} (/). 
(388) Ss 5, 6 and the Schedules to the Act. 
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his right to cancel results in the period of cancellat-
ion being extended to one month. 389 The agreement 
does not automatically become binding upon the 
expiration of the one month period as the vendor can 
only enforce the contract once he has given the 
customer full particulars of the contract and his right 
to cancel, coupled with a cancellation form; the 
purchaser then has seven days to cancel after the lapse 
390 
of which period the vendor has an enforceable contract. 
The right to cancel, coupled with a notice drawing 
the customer's attention to this right, represents a major 
improvement for consumers who are pressurized into 
unwanted credit agreements by direct selling techniques. 
However, less scrupulous direct selling concerns can 
nullify the impact of this legislation by not providing 
any notice of cancellation entitlement, 391 and in the 
majority of cases the consumer will complete his 
instalment payments in respect of unwanted 
(389). s 7(3). 
(39e) Sees B; Flitton, op. cit., 89 argues that' (u)nder 
section 7(3) the seller could ignore section 6, 
a 
inform the purchaser that as with all other 
contracts, he has no right to cancel, wait 
month, and have an enforceable contract'. 
assertion ignores the effect of section 8 
This 
although 
that the I would concur in the view of that writer 
drafting leaves a lot to be desired. 
(391) Co~sumer 193, 80 reports that Starlite Studios 
order forms (for photographs taken by 
travelling salesmen) include a clause 'Notice 
to Customer: Right to Cancellation' but the 
cancellation clause did not stay with 
customers; once the order was made the form 
was taken away. 
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goods or services in total ignorance of his rights. 
Only where the consumer reneges in respect of these 
payments, or seeks legal advice, will the true legal 
position be revealed. Consequently one is forced to 
concede that consumer education is the ultimate solution 
and counter to sharp practices but at least compliance 
with the law by the majority of honest direct sellers 
will further public awareness of legal rights in this 
area
392 
- whether or not there will be disclosure in 
every case is, of course, a separate issue. 
(2) MOTOR VEHICLE SALES 
In 1975 the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act was passed by 
Parliament and the Minister of Justice when introducing 
the Bill to Parliament said: 
"It makes better provision for the licensing 
and disciplining of motor vehicle dealers 
and their staff and reforms the law relat-
ing to contracts for the sale of motor 
vehicles by dealers in order to promote 393 
and protect the interest of the consumer." 
(392) Trebilcock, 'Consumer Protection in the Affluent 
Society', (1970) 16 McGill Law Journal 263, 293 
observes that the Ontario Consumer Protection Act 
1966 confers a right of cancellation on a consumer 
in respect of door to door sales but does not 
require that notice of this right be given. 
Therefore, he asserts 1 (t}his piece of legislation 
no doubt satisfies the honour of door-to-door 
salesmen while doing minimal damage to their 
pockets'. 
(393) See Hansard~ Vol 402, at p. 5153. 
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As with . . d' . 394 'd d d' t t other JUr1S 1ct1ons, w1 esprea 1scon en 
with the second hand car industry prompted this legislat-
ion and it is interesting to note that considerable 
pressure for the legislation emanated from within the 
industry itself. 395 In drafting the legislation 
extensive consultation with the Motor Trade Association, 
the Motor Vehicle Dealers Association, the Consumers' 
Institute, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 
and the Finance Houses Association was undertaken. The 
main features of this legislation, in very general terms, 
are as follows: 
(i) The Act sets up a comprehensive licensing system 
operated by the Motor Vehicle Dealers Licensing Board396 
with the object of ensuring that only suitable persons 
(394) See, for example, Goldring and Maher, Consumer 
Protection in Australia (1979}, 163. 
(395) See Hanhard, Vol. 402, p. 5160. The actions of 
unethical dealers may reflect badly on the whole 
used car market to the detriment of reputable 
traders; therefore it is not surprising that 
the latter group should press for better controls 
as it is in their economic interest. 
(396) The Magistrate's Court was the original licensing 
authority but the Motor Vehicle Dealers Amendment 
Act 1979 transferred this responsibility to the 
Board; this change was envisaged in 1975 as the 
Minister of Justice, when introducing the original 
Bill, said he considered registration by a 
specialised body, rather than the Courts, as an 
emerging trend in occupational licensing. See 
Hansard~ Vol. 395, p. 5472. 
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in sound financial positions should be licensed; 397 it 
is an offence to carry on the business of a motor 
h . 1 d 1 . h h . . 1' 398 ve 1c e ea er w1t out t e requ1s1te 1cence. 
(ii) A second aspect of the Act is the setting up of a 
Motor Vehicle Dealers Institute to which all licensees 
must belong. The Institute is empowered to make rules 
for a wide range of purposes; e.g., to prescribe 
payments by members to the Institute, to impose penalties 
on members, and to prescribe a code of ethics for 
1 ' th . th t mb . h bl . 3 9 9 regu at1ng e serv1ces a me ers g1ve to t e pu 1c. 
(iii) The Act establishes a Fidelity Guarantee Fund to 
be administered by a Council comprising members of the 
Institute and a barrister or solicitor of the High 
Court. 400 All motor vehicle dealers must contribute to 
this fund, 401 and monies may be paid out of the fund to 
reimburse consumers who have suffered loss by reason of 
dishonoured cheques or breaches by a licensee of any 
warranty implied under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975 
or under the Sale of Goods Act 1908, and to compensate 
(397} See ss 8, 11; cf. the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 
1958 which also erected a licensing scheme but the 
criteria to be satisfied for the award of a licence 
were less demanding. 
( 3 98} See s 7. 
(399) See Part II of the Act. 
(400) s 33. 
(401} s 35. 
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f f '1 t . bl' t. 402 or any a~ ure to carry ou repa~r o ~ga ~ons. 
(iv) A number of provisions are directed at consumer 
warranties 403 and a Disputes Tribunal is set up to deal 
with the enforcement of bhese warranties. 404 
(v) A Motor Vehicle Dealers Disciplinary Committee is 
established under the auspices of the Institute to deal 
. h 1 . . 1' 405 w~t comp a~nts aga~nst ~censees. 
Most important for purposes of this thesis is that 
certain 'relevant information must be given to prospect-
ive purchasers of vehicles being offered for sale by any 
motor vehicle dealer. 406 No secondhand motor vehicle 
may be offered or displayed for sale unless a clear and 
1 . bl . . . b d f 4 07 . . h eg~ e not~ce ~n prescr~ e orm conta~n~ng t e 
particulars specified in section 90(2) is attached to the 
vehicle. This notice, which must be displayed in a 
prominent position and which must be capable of being 
d bl d . 408 rea from a reasona e ~stance, must set out 
(402) S 39. Note that the examples given are by no means 
exhaustive. Since its inception on April 1, 1976, 
the Fidelity Guarantee Fund has greatly assisted 
consumers. As at April 1, 1980, 96 claims had been 
met and paid pursuant to the provisions of section 
39 of the Act for a sum total of approximately 
$200,000. 
(403) See Part VII of the Act; for example, a term as to 
title is implied into every contract for the sale 
of a motor vehicle (s 89). 
(404) See ss 96-108. 
(405) See ss 119-122. 
( 4 06) See ss 90-95. 
( 4 07) See the Motor Vehicle Dealers 
Form 21 set out in the Second 
Regulations. 
{ 4 08) Idem and see s 90(5) of the 
Regulations 1980 and 
Schedule to those 
Act. 
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information such as the dealers name and business 
address, the cash price of the vehicle, the year in which 
the vehicle was first registered, the registration number 
of the vehicle and the category of the car with the 
409 dealer's warranty in respect of that category. 
Furthermore, the fact that a vehicle has been or is used 
as a taxi or rental-car must be revealed410 as this may 
have considerable bearing on a correct estimation of its 
market value, 411 and if the car is being sold by "tender", 
is "ex-overseas" or has been rebuilt or repossessed this 
must also be disclosed in the notice and in these cases 
it must be stated that "no warranty" is given. 412 Some 
flexibility is introduced into the above rules in that a 
licensee may offer a category C motor vehicle413 for 
sale with "no warranty", provided: (i) the prescribed 
notice draws this fact to a purchaser's attention; 
(409) Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, s 90(2); second-
hand motor vehicles are divided into 4 categories 
(A-D) and the dealer is liable to make good any 
"defects" in any vehic falling in category A-C 
so that it is in a reasonable condition having 
regard to its age and the distance it has 
travelled. See the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, 
ss 92-93. 
(410} Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, s 90(2). 
(411) See, for example, Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham 
[1975] 1 NZLR 576. 
(412) Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, s 90(3). 
(413} A 'category C' motor vehicle is defined in section 
92 as 'a secondhand motor vehicle, not being 
a category A or category B motor vehicle, that 
was first registered not more than 8 years 
ago and that has driven not more than 100,000 
kilometers' . 
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(ii) the purchaser is given a reasonable opportunity to 
take the vehicle to an independent person, such as the 
Automobile Association, for evaluation; (iii) the 
purchaser signs a statutory declaration in the prescribed 
form414 that he understands he is waiving his rights; 
and (iv) he signs and receives a copy of the notice that 
d h • tt t • t th II t II • • 415 rew 1s a en 10n o e no warran y prov1s1on. 
Furthermore, where a licensee attaches a notice in 
prescribed form setting out with reasonable particularity 
each defect that he believes to exist in respect of any 
category A-C vehicle together with his own estimation of 
the reasonable cost of rectifying that defect, the 
obligation of the licensee to make good any defects is 
extinguished as regards those defects drawn to the 
. 416 purchasers attention. 
If the vehicle is substantially different from the 
vehicle as represented in the notice attached to it, the 
Motor Vehicle Disputes Tribunal is empowered to rescind 
the contract or order that compensation be paid by the 
dealer; 417 if the latter remedy is granted recourse 
(414) See Motor Vehicle Dealers Regulations 1980 and the 
form set out in the Second Schedule to those 
regulations. 
(415) Motor Vehicles Dealers Act 1975, s 94. 
(416) Ibid, s 95, Note, however; (i) that where the true 
reasonable cost of repairing a vehicle exceeds that 
estimated by the licensee the purchaser may 
recover the difference from the licensee; 
(ii) that disclosure of defects with 'reasonable 
particularity' is no easy task in the case of 
secondhand cars for as Trebilcock, op. cit., 292 
remarks' ... where does wear and tear stop, and 
where do defects start?'. 
(417) Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975, s 101. 
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may be had to the Fidelity Fund in the event of the 
d 1 k . t't t' 418 ea er not rna ~ng res ~ u ~on. 
Given the importance of the motor vehicle industry 
in modern society, the hazards associated with the 
purchase of secondhand cars and the volume of complaints 
in this area, the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1975 repres-
ents a significant move to improve the operations of a 
particular industry. As has been stressed elsewhere in 
this thesis, knowledge by consumers of the full nature, 
price and quality of goods and services is a pre-condition 
for workable competition. The disclosure provisions in 
this legislation ensure that a prospective purchaser is 
given sufficient information to make a rational decision 
and the vendor is encouraged to draw the purchasers 
attention to any defects if he wishes to escape liability 
. t f th . . 419 ~n respec o e~r repa~r. Provided a purchaser can 
(418) Ibid, s 39 (e). 
{419) Goldring and Maher, op. cit., 175, comment that 
provision for optional defect disclosure by dealers 
is of dubious assistance as many purchasers will be 
disinclined to purchase a vehicle that is demonst-
rably defective; therefore dealers with knowledge of 
defects may as an exercise in merchandising judgment 
decide not to reveal defects, relying on the defect 
not manifesting itself within the guarantee period. 
'Rather than place a premium on silence, the legis-
lation should compel full disclosure of such circum-
stances'. It is respectfully submitted that while 
this argument has considerable merit, mandatory dis-
closure of defects is undesirable because: (i) what 
is a defect in respect of a used car? It is a matter 
of opinion as to where defects begin and normal wear 
and tear ends; (ii) such disclosure would obscure 
other information; and (iii) the statutory warranties 
under the Act are generous in nature. 
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resist sales pressure and is not abysmally gullible, 
the information as revealed in the statutory notice 
h ld . h' b . . 't' 420 s ou 1mprove 1s arga1n1ng pos1 10n. 
{420} For example, the prospective purqhaser 
appraised of the fact that a car is an 'ex-rental 
car' could argue strongly for a price 
reduction on the basis of doubtful treatment 
at the hands of numerous drivers. 
486 
4. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
various consumer organisations perform a vital role 
in advising and informing consumers about the merits and 
de merits of various goods and services offered for sale 
or hire in New Zealand. For example: 
(1) THE CONSUMER COUNCIL AND THE CONSUMERS' INSTITUTE 
The Consumer Council and Consumers' Institute were 
first established in 1959 and were under the administrative 
control of the Department of Trade and Industry, but were 
reconstituted as an independent body under the Consumer 
Council Act 1966. 
The Council's functions are 
"to protect and promote the interests of 
consumers of goods and services by 
whatever lawful means appear to it 
expedient, and by so doing to encourage 
the improvement and development of 
industry and corrunerce". 421 
The Council consists of 12 persons appointed on their 
personal qualifications by an Appointments Committee and 
do not represent any organisation, and 3 ex officio 
members who represent the Departments of Trade and 
Industry, Health, and Scientific and Industrial Research.422 
The Council itself is primarily a policy-making body and 
most of the Council's functions are carried out by the 
Consumers' Institute~2~ 
(421) Consumer Council Act 1966, s 16. 
(422) Ibid, s 5. 
(423) Ibid, ss 14-22. 
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In carrying out the functions mentioned the 
Consumers' Institute covers a full range of consumer 
protection activities, including the following: 
(i) Comparative performance testing. The Institute, 
l 'k . t ' 1' 424 d h 't d 1 e 1ts coun erparts 1n Austra 1a an t e Un1 e 
K. d 425 f 1 d h 1ng om, or examp e, tests an reports on t e 
quality, price and construction of goods and services in 
order to facilitate rational choice and to prevent 
possible harm through health and safety defects. While 
the goods and services that are tested are chosen gener-
ally from those most widely used by consumers or upon 
which consumers spend large sums of money, 426 priority 
is accorded to testing those goods and services that may 
affect the safety of consumers. 427 Tests are carried 
out by the Institute's own laboratory, or by independent 
specialised laboratories and authorities,and results are 
published in Consumer. 428 Results are not published 
until the manufacturer, importer or supplier of the product 
or service concerned has had a reasonable opportunity to 
comment, and full details of the tests conducted are 
1 . d 429 supp 1e . 
( 424) Au.stralian Consumers Association. 
(425) British Consumers Association. 
(426) See the 'Fifteenth Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts' of the Consumer Council for the twelve 
months ended 31 December 1978 1 p 5. [Hereinafter 
referred to as the Consumer Council Report 1978.] 
(427) Idem. 
(428) Consumer is published by the Consumer Council and 
issued 11 times a year pursuant to section 17{d) 
of the Consumer Council Act 1966. 
(429) Consumer Council Report 1978, 5. 
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This service of the Consumers' Institute is particularly 
valuable in that consumers are provided with objective 
information in a readily understandable form and, 
consequently, are placed in a position to distinguish 
between competing brands of substantially similar products 
or services. Given that product differentiation sustains 
oligopoly and diminishes competition430 comparative 
performance testing plays a vital role in counteracting 
this segmentation of the market. The only limitation to 
the effectiveness of this service is that the information 
is not all that accessible; that is, the estimated 
readership of Consumer in 1978 was 409,000 431 and as one 
A t 1 . 't 432 t 't us ra 1an wr1 er pu s 1 -
"It seems clear that if the assembly of 
product data is to have any significant 
impact it must, at least in the case of 
expensive items, be provided at point 
of sale so that the consumer's search 
costs are reduced to a minimum." 
While the cogency of this argument cannot be rebutted with 
respect to cheap goods and services where the projected 
saving doesn't warrant consultation of independent 
product information sources, the argument is less tenable 
with respect to major consumer goods and services, and 
(430) See Chapter I, Introduction, supra. 
(431) Consumer Council Report 1978, 10. This readership 
is diminishing as membership numbers decline. 
(432) Duggan, 'The Great Soap Opera', {1978) 11 
Melbourne University Law Review 467, 499. 
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where unsafe products are involved the Consumers' 
Institute in New Zealand releases warnings about those 
products to the news media, thus obviating any delay in 
bl . . d h' h 'd d' 433 pu lcatlon an reac lng a muc Wl er au lence. 
Furthermore, the Consumers' Institute's contribution to 
d . d t 1 . . 434 d h ra lO an e evlslon programmes serve to expan t e 
range and number of recipients of information about goods 
and services. 
(ii) Consumer Education. Publications such as Consumer 
make for a much better informed and discriminating public 
and various specialist publications, 435 which the Institute 
produces from time to time, considerably assist the 
consumer. However, it is perhaps the Consumers' Institute's 
promotion and discussion of consumer affairs at primary 
and secondary school level that holds the greatest potent-
ial for the future. Teaching Notes are available on a 
wide range of topics436 and education officers are avail-
able to discuss consumer rights and responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the Institute arranges numerous seminars and 
discussion sessions with adult groups and organisations. 
(434) For example, Television New Zealand's 'Fair Go' 
programme, and Radio New Zealand's 'Counter 
Measure' programme. 
(435) For example, Buying or Building a House; Consumer 
in Law; Buying a Used Car; Cosmetic care for your 
skin. 
(436) For example, Teaching Notes No 95/96 deals with 
'Advertising in New Zealand'. 
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Consumer itself, in addition to carrying test results 
of various products, contains a wide variety of informat-
ive articles. For example, in 1978, articles on 
appliance advertising, food labelling, minors' contracts, 
bankcards and on challenging high prices emphasised 
particular areas of consumer concern. 
(iii) Complaints Advisory Service. Complaints Advisory 
Officers in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and 
Dunedin assist without charge in an advisory and mediatory 
capacity with consumer complaints. During 1978 over 
19,000 complaints were received and in accordance with the 
Consumers' Institute's policy the vast majority of 
complainants whose complaints were considered justified 
were given sufficient advice on how to settle their own 
claims (64.3 percent). With respect to 8.2 percent of 
complaints suitable redress was obtained with the 
assistance of the Institute, and a further 5.2 percent of 
complaints were referred to other bodies such as the 
Department of Trade and Industry which has formal powers 
to investigate such matters as controlled prices. The 
complaints advisory service offered by the Consumer Council 
is now operating in conjunction with the Citizens' Advice 
Bureaux network. 437 Consequently complaints advice is 
available through some 40 bureaux in·addition to the 
(437) See below. 
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Institute's complaints advisory offices. In addition, 
the Institute provides 'training and back up assistance 
to each participating bureau, including the provision of 
438 
a training module and reference manual'. 
In addition to these vitally important informative 
functions the Consumer Council and Consumers' Institute 
research into and advise on legislative, financial and 
welfare matters; 439 are represented on various Parliament-
ary Committees and public inquiries, and liaise with 
b . t d d f t . t' 44 0 us1ness, ra e an sa e y organ1sa 10ns. It is 
therefore not surprising that this independent body has 
earned high praise and considerable potential exists for 
additional use to be made of this organisation. 441 
(2) THE CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAUX 
There are Citizens Advice Bureaux in most cities and 
towns in New Zealand that are staffed by groups of volun-
teers who have been trained to listen and help sort out 
problems. One Citizens Advice Bureau describes its prime 
objective as follows 
(438)Consumer Council Report 1978, 9. 
(439) For example, see Proposed Recommendations for 
Securities Regulations (1980), 12.1.2. 
(440) For example, the Standards Association; the 
Accident Compensation Commission. 
(441) See Chapter VI, Conclusion, infra. 
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"We offer friendly, free, and confidential 
service to anyone needing help or advice 
on any problem. If we can't help with 
your problem we will find someone else 
who can. We may be able to assist with 
enquiries about: 
Housing, property, and land; family 
and personal matters; marriage; 
accommodation and evictions; Social 
Security and health, consumer questions; 
financial and budgeting; legal matters." 442 
For example, in the year ending 30 September 1980 the 
Christchurch Citizens Advice Bureau dealt with 15,381 
enquiries. The largest category of enquiries related to 
consumer, trade and manufacture issues, followed closely 
by tenancy and accommodation matters. 443 
Many citizens Advice Bureaux operate in conjunction 
with Legal Referral Centres that are staffed by solicitors 
who attend on a voluntary, unpaid basis, and act as a 
referral service for people who consider that they may 
444 have a legal problem. The solicitor on duty at one of 
these centres will advise whether the matter ought to be 
referred to a solicitor, or in the event of the problem 
being uncomplicated, may give on-the-spot advice. 
(442) Quoted in McBride, The New Zealand Civil Rights 
Handbook (1980), 101-102. 
(443) 'News Advertiser', 28 October 1980. 
(444) McBride, op. cit., 102. 
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As mentioned above, the Citizens Advice Bureaux now 
work in close collaboration with the Consumers' 
Institute and many of their staff benefit from training 
courses and seminars run by the Institute. 445 This free 
and readily accessible service provided by the Citizens 
Advice Bureaux is a commendable attempt to redress 
inadequacies in consumer information; amongst other 
things, consumers are advised of their legal rights under 
contracts for the sale of goods and services and assoc-
iated credit transactions and may be directed to organis-
ations (such as trade associations) or the small claims 
tribunal in order that their complaints may be speedily 
d h 1 1 d A t . d 1' 446 . an c eap y reso ve . s men 1one ear 1er, 1gnorance 
of legal rights and available relief renders the most 
benevolent legal doctrines superfluous and any measures 
designed to combat this problem are to be welcomed. 
(445) 'News Advertiser', op. cit. The Consumers 
Institute, for examPTe, held a South Island 
Regional Seminar for CAB interviewers on 
October 4, 1980. 
(446) See Chapter III, Private Law Remedies, supra. 
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VI CONCLUSION1 
{1) THE NEED FOR BETTER INFORMED CONSUMERS 
As a general rule2 promotion of competition is a 
desirable objective for any consumer protection legislat-
ion due to the recognised benefits deriving from compet-
itive pressures. Where impersonal market forces dictate 
the behaviour of manufacturers and sellers 'workable 
competition• 3 exists in a market and consumers are able 
to influence factors such as the price, quantity and 
quality of goods and services as well as general business 
practice by casting their 'dollar votes' 4 The attain-
ment of workable competition is in no small measure 
dependent upon the existence of adequately informed 
consumers as it is these persons who are equipped to make 
a rational assessment as to the respective merits of 
competing alternatives. In the absence of adequate 
knowledge about competing goods, services or credit 
sources, a choice must of necessity be predicated upon 
(1) It is not proposed in this final chapter to reiterate 
all the points made in the conclusions to the 
preceding chapters or parts, but to draw together 
some particular threads and themes of general 
significance in the area of advertising and disclosure 
of information relating to goods, services and 
associated credit. 
(2) Economies of large scale production may be conducive 
to lower costs of production and, consequently, lower 
prices to the consumer; therefore concentration may 
be better than unrestrained competition in some areas. 
(3) Supra, page 35. 
{4) Supra, page 4. 
495 
random selection or impulse. A serious misallocation of 
resources may result in that the producer of an inferior 
product, for example, may derive the benefit of its sale, 
and the consumer has not made the optimum choice having 
regard to that product's price and quality. While it is 
undeniably true that the producer of a superior product 
has a considerable incentive- to inform the public of his 
product's advantages through advertising this message is 
often obscured in the morass of competing claims couched 
in laudatory terms. The consumer may well opt for a 
product that is the most heavily advertised, though not 
necessarily the best value for money, and when this occurs 
competition in advertising has displaced competition in 
respect of price and quality. Therefore, it is in the 
interests of consumers and the producers of a superior 
product that consumers are better informed as to the 
nature and quality of competing goods on the market; more 
advertising alone is not the answer, but more informative 
advertising may well promote a more discerning consumer 
body. 
It is also clear that a better informed consumer may 
safeguard his own interests. For example, in the field 
of consumer credit it is recognised that paucity of 
5 information is one of the main causes of abuse and 
inadequate knowledge about competing goods and services 
(5) See the discussion, supra, at pages 365 1 424. 
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perpetuates undesirable business practices such as 
unwarranted product and price differentiation. 6 A 
better informed consumer is in a position to 'shop for 
credit' and is less likely to be manipulated into buying 
a more expensive product for which specious claims of 
uniqueness have been made. Furthermore, it is necessary 
that information about rights and remedies and means of 
redress is disseminated. A consumer who is ignorant of 
his substantive rights will not know whether he has a 
complaint sustainable at law and the absence of information 
pertaining to low cost forums for the resolution of dis-
putes may inhibit any action even where substantive rights 
are known. 
In advocating the need for better informed consumers 
three factors must be born in mind. First~ it must be 
recognised that the interests of consumers generally is not 
going to be advanced by modelling consumer protection laws 
7 
on the basis of the maxim lex proourator fatuorum est as 
the costs associated with the implementation of an excess-
ively protective regime may outweigh the benefits. For 
example, a requirement that advertisers disclose an 
enormously detailed array of information in their 
advertisements for goods, services and credit so as to 
counter informational deficiencies will increase the costs 
(6) Supra, page 16. 
(7) See Atiyah, 'Consumer Protection - Time To Take 
Stock', (1979) 1 Liverpool Law Review 20, 44. 
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of advertising greatly, and these costs inevitably will 
be passed on to the consumer body in general. Therefore, 
caution must be exercised lest the cost of the cure 
exceed the proposed benefit and informational disclosure 
must be designed to assist the consumer of average 
intelligence and comprehension in order that he be placed 
in a position to best evaluate his appropriate course of 
action. It is submitted that to require advertisers to 
have regard to the most gullible members of society in 
framing their advertising claims is an undue and unnec-
essary imposition upon advertisers and that this would not 
be in the interests of the general body of consumers who 
would ultimately bear the burden of the advertisers 
additional research and precautionary costs. 8 Second~ 
'consumers will only search out and utilize information so 
long as the costs of their search are lower than the 
savings which they expect to make'. 9 Therefore, the time 
and energy involved in acquiring accurate product informa-
tion in respect of low cost items may deter consumers from 
making the effort to acquaint themselves with the relevant 
information, even if such information is available. 
(8) For example, an advertiser will incur additional 
expenditure in framing his claims with gullible 
consumers in mind as more time and effort will be 
involved, and if liability is determined by reference 
to such individuals, insurance against potential 
liability will, of necessity, command higher 
premiums. 
(9} Duggan, 'Fairness in Advertising: In Pursuit of the 
Hidden Persuaders', (1977-78) 11 Melbourne 
University Law Review 50, 57-58. 
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Three~ accurate market information is useful only to those 
who have the power and ability to choose, and the provis-
ion of such information can never ensure that a rational 
choice will be made; however the absence of such informa-
tion deprives the consumer of even the possibility of 
rational selection. 
Therefore, while bearing these limitations in mind, 
it is submitted that the provision of more and better 
information will make for a more competitive market place 
and discerning consumer to the collective benefit of 
manufacturers, sellers and consumers. 
(2} QUALITY OF INFORMATION 
Here the greatest lacuna in terms of control is the 
absence of legislative proscription of unfair advertising. 
The distinction between truth and falsity is wholly 
inappropriate as a means of control in the arena of unfair 
advertising where, in particular, psychological appeals 
persuade a consumer to purchase an advertised commodity. 
The need for regulation in this area is no less pressing 
than in respect of claims which fall foul of current 
legislative standards demanding that claims be true. The 
consumer who is persuaded to purchase an inferior product 
by virtue of unfair advertising appeals is indistinguish-
able from his counterpart who in reliance upon a false 
advertising claim purchases a similar product. The result 
is the same; that is, there is a misallocation of 
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resources in economic terms as an inferior product has 
captured his 'dollar votes' to his detriment and to the 
detriment of the manufacturer of the superior product. 
While it is undeniably true that the measurement of what 
is true as opposed to false is clear in comparison to an 
assessment of what is 'unfair', this should not stand in 
the way of the control of unfair advertising and trade 
practices in general. The courts have long been accustomed 
to grappling with the issue of what constitutes an 
'oppressive credit contract• 10 and determination of what 
is an 'unfair' advertisement is no more, nor less, 
complicated. Initial uncertainty as to the scope of what 
is 'unfair' could be countered by the enactment of guide-
lines and by directing the courts to have regard to the 
relevant code or codes of advertising practice in that 
11 
area. 
Another area where the quality of information needs 
to be reassessed is in the area of "puffery". While it 
is not suggested that the law should lend its assisance to 
the unduly gullible, the advertiser's current latitude to 
extol the virtues of his goods or services in exaggerated 
and laudatory terms should, it is submitted, be curtailed. 
Given that goods, for example, are often encompassed in 
elaborate packaging and that the goods themselves often 
(10) See the Credit Contracts Act 1981, ss 9-14; Barret v 
Harttey (1866) LR 2 EQ 789; Samuet v Newbold [1906] 
AC 461; Curtett v Clarke (1908) 11 GLR 284. 
(11) See, infra, page 519. 
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are highly sophisticated, the opportunity for, and 
ability of, a consumer to make his own evaluation is 
reduced considerably. In these circumstances the 
average consumer may take more cognisance of exhortations 
of the 'ours-is-the-best' variety, and to dismiss such 
claims as mere puffery may not be in accord with the 
realities of the modern market place. Furthermore, the 
disparity in bargaining power between trader and consumer 
frequently means that the consumer is in a 'take it or 
leave it' predicament and it is fanciful to visualise a 
haggling process as to price and other attributes of a 
product or service. Finally, this writer is concerned 
that widescale use .of puffery diminishes the impact and 
usefulness of advertising generally. It is often argued 
that no control over puffery is required as everyone 
knows and recognises puffery for what it is. The quest-
ion then is: Why do so many advertisers resort to 
puffery? Either they are wedded to old traditional sales 
rhetoric or they believe sales will be promoted by the use 
of exaggerated commendations. This writer is of the 
opinion that it would be a grave injustice to ascribe the 
former motivation to such an innovative and progressive 
industry as advertising, and if the latter is the object-
ive of puffery, then some constraint is dictated. The use 
of exaggerated claims in advertising has the additional 
disadvantage of driving honest and restrained advertisers 
to make more exaggerated and expansive claims in order to 
attract custom and to avoid a loss of their market share 
to rivals who employ flamboyant and exaggerated 
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commendations in advertising. The really significant 
danger is that competition in advertising may become 
a surrogate for true competition in respect of criteria 
such as price and quality. 
(3) QUANTITY OF INFORMATION 
Much advertising is uninformative as the primary 
function of advertising from the sellers point of view is 
to promote the sale of goods or supply of services or 
credit. Of course, all advertisements convey some 
information such as the name of the product or existence 
of a service or credit facility and where it may be 
obtained; but, certain types information will never be 
disclosed voluntarily by advertisers as such disclosure 
would run counter to the avowed objective of sales promot-
ion. For example, confectionery manufacturers are not 
going to disseminate information relating to potentially 
harmful dental consequences attendant upon the consumption 
of their product and cigarette and tobacco manufacturers 
will not commit corporate suicide by emphasising voluntar-
ily, or even referring to, health hazards in promotional 
material. The brevity of advertisements and the complexity 
of many advertised commodities proscribe detailed inform-
ational disclosure in advertisements but it is suggested 
that the quantity of information may be improved upon 
without significant increases in costs in the following 
ways. First, mandatory disclosure of the price of all 
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advertised goods and services. Second, where a retailer 
sells goods on credit terms in the ordinary course of 
business, any advertisement in respect of advertised 
goods should display the finance rate with equal promin-
ence to the cash price. Third, the promulgation of 
information standards vis-a-vis certain goods would 
ensure that any advertisement or other communication in 
respect of such goods incorporated the designated 
information. 12 
Outside the advertising arena progress has been made 
in respect of informational disclosure. The Credit 
Contracts Act 1981 marks the most significant step forward 
and while the efficacy of the disclosure regime introduced 
by that legislation remains to be seen, the philosophy 
behind the Act and the desire to promote shopping for 
credit is, with respect, highly commendable. In specific 
areas such as motor vehicle dealer sales and door to door 
sales the legislature has sought further to advance the 
consumer interest through mandatory disclosure of salient 
particulars. Out side these areas it is suggested that 
mandatory disclosure of price information in advertisements 
and price tickets and of information laid down in product 
information standards will improve the purchaser's posit-
ion. Furthermore, a Consumer Affairs Department13 could 
(12) See, infra, page 521-522. 
(13) See, infra, page 510 et seq. 
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fulfil a useful function in this area by publicising in 
the media the results of any surveys conducted by that 
Department or by the Consumers' Institute. The 
Consumers' Institute at present publish invaluable inform-
ation about goods and services and comparative tests 
conducted in respect of competing products in Consumer~ 
but this information only reaches a comparatively small 
section of the public. 14 
(4) CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT. 
Self regulatory codes of practice and other codes of 
conduct have considerable potential to advance the 
consumer interest in the field of consumer information 
and should, therefore, be encouraged and extended. Chief 
drawbacks of any self regulatory scheme are incomplete 
membership of organisations promoting such schemes and 
lack of adequate sanctions for enforcement. However, the 
position as regards broadcasting is a salutary exception 
as all broadcasters must adhere to the standards and rules 
promulgated by the Broadcasting Rules Committee, and the 
Broadcasting Tribunal has an array of sanctions which it 
may impose to secure compli~nce; the ultimate sanction at 
(14) Certain information is released to the news media for 
early publication where unsafe products are involved 
due to the need to avert the delay of two months 
before warnings in respect of such products can be 
published in Consumer; and, other general information 
and test material published in Consumer is released 
to the news media to keep the name of Consumers' 
Institute before the public. See the Consumer 
Council Annual Report for the year ending 31 December 
1978, at page 11. 
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the Tribunal's disposal is the powe<' to refuse 
the renewal of a broadcasting licence of a station which 
does not abide by these codes of practice. Of course, 
these codes derive their efficacy from statutory backing 
and hence are quite distinguishable from voluntary codes 
of conduct. The position as regards the print media is 
severely deficient by comparison in that (i) not all 
organisations and publications subscribe to the codes of 
practice promulgated by the Committee of Advertising 
Practice; (ii) the penalties for non compliance which may 
be visited upon supposed adherents who transgress are 
woefully inadequate; 15 and (iii) complaints in respect 
of advertisements in newspapers are heard by a subcommitt-
ee of the Newspaper Publishers• Association which is 
composed solely of newspaper interests and no complaints 
procedure or body exists for the adjudication of complaints 
in respect of mailbox advertising, in-store advertisingetc. 
These deficiencies may be remedied in the following 
ways: 
FirstJ by securing across-the-board membership and sub-
scription to the codes of advertising practice. One way to 
achieve this objective would be through legislative inter~ 
vention; for example, the legislature could pass a law 
(15) Namely, a complaint is upheld or rejected without 
more. 
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making the lawful receipt of advertising revenues 
contingent upon the advertiser's membership of the 
Committee of Advertising Practice. Non compliance with 
this law could entail the forfeiture of any advertising 
revenues or result in the imposition of a fine. 
Alternatively, a less interventionist approach may be 
pursued, and organisations such as the Direct Mail Assoc-
iation and publications such as the New Zealand Listener 
could be encouraged by the Department of Consumer 
Affairs16 to join the Committee of Advertising Practice; 
whether a government department would succeed where the 
industry itself has failed is, of course, a moot point. 
Second~ by establishing an independent complaints body. 
Here the alternatives are again between government inter-
vention on a substantial basis, on the one hand, and 
industry response to persuasive press ures, on the other. 
The former approach would entail the establishment of a 
Print Media Tribunal along the same lines as the Broadcast-
ing Tribunal. This organisation would be empowered to 
adjudicate upon, inter alia~ all complaints in respect of 
advertisements appearing in the print media. Like the 
Broadcasting Tribunal, this body could comprise three 
members appointed by the Governor General on the recommend-
ation of the Minister of Consumer Affairs. Alternatively 
the advertising industry could be encouraged to form an 
Advertising Standards Authority analogous to the organisa-
(16} See discussion, infra, page 510 et 
----~ 
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tion developed by its British counterpart. The Advert-
ising Standards Authority in the United Kingdom is an 
organisation created by the advertising industry to 
supervise the Code of Advertising Practice and its 
enforcement. Its chairperson is a person from outside the 
industry and a substantial number of its members must have 
no connection with advertising. Similarly, the Department 
of Consumer Affairs could press for the establishment of 
such an organisation in New Zealand with a mixed compos-
ition of industry and 'outside' representatives. All 
complaints in respect of alleged breaches of the codes of 
advertising practice could be referred to this body. 
Third~ by providing adequate sanctions in respect of 
non-compliance. If the extreme and, some would say, 
draconian interventionist approach is pursued extremely 
effective sanctions could be imposed. For example, the 
Print Media Tribunal could be empowered, as a measure of 
last resort, to expel any member who persistently or 
regularly violated the codes of advertising practice. 
Such expulsion would disentitle the offender from law-
fully receiving advertising revenues until such time as he 
is reinstated as a member. For the isolated or minor 
breach the Tribunal simply could direct that the advert-
iser 'go and sin no more'. If the alternative persuasive 
approach is adopted in an endeavour to secure industry 
co-operation it is difficult to see what effective 
sanctions could be imposed - in these circumstances the 
Advertising Standards Authority would adjudicate upon the 
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validity or otherwise of the complaint, leaving the 
complainant to pursue the matter further in any civil 
action available or to refer the matter to the Department 
of Consumer Affairs for possible prosecution. 
Which approach, then, is to be preferred? This 
writer favours the less stringent of the approaches 
outlined above for a number of reasons: 
First~ it is proposed below that more stringent legislat-
ion governing advertising be enacted; if such legislat-
ion is promulgated the necessity for rigorous control at 
the first tier self regulatory level is diminished 
considerably. 
Seaond~ more stringent legislation governing advertising 
will have a powerful deterrent effect within the industry 
and the incentive to comply voluntarily will be increased 
immeasurably. 
Third~ the approach advocating compulsory membership of 
the Committee of Advertising Practice and the creation of 
a Print Media Council with extensive powers marks a 
total departure from self regulation in the true sense as 
it constitutes another form of quasi-governmental control. 
While it is submitted that there is no logical reason for 
the current discrimination17 as between the broadcast and 
(17) Namely, the broadcast media are obliged under threat 
of heavy sanctions to comply with codes of practice, 
while the print media are left largely to their own 
devices. 
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print media, this is not an argument in tavour of the 
imposition of similar controls in the print media. 
FinaZZy~ if industry co-operation can be obtained by the 
Department of Consumer Affairs this will be to the mutual 
advantage of advertisers and consumers alike; the 
consumer body will benefit through more accurate and 
'fair' advertising, and the advertising industry will not 
be subjected to a dual tier of in terrorem compliance; 
namely, compliance under threat of Print Media Council 
sanctions as well as prosecution under proposed new 
legislation. If advertisers do not take steps to secure 
voluntary compliance with the codes of advertising pract-
ice it is always possible to implement the more draconian 
approach at a later stage. 
(5) CONSUMER REDRESS 
Consumer redress for misleading advertising and other 
claims in respect of goods will be greatly enhanced if the 
recommendations of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform 
Committee in its on Warranties in the Sale 
of Consumer Goods18 are adopted. A new warranty of 'ord-
inary acceptability' would be implied by statute into all 
contracts for 'consumer sales'. The Committee recommends· 
(18) See recommendation 14, at page 13 of this Working 
Paper . (Wellington 197 7) . 
that 
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"Goods should be acceptable in accordance 
with the new Act if they are as fit for 
the purpose or purposes for which goods 
of that kind are commonly bought as it 
is reasonable to expect having regard 
to any statement~ description or promise 
applied to them~ their age, the presence 
of defects of which, at the time of sale, 
the buyer had actual knowledge, and all 
other relevant circumstances including 
the price at which they were sold." 
The committee also recommends that the absence of 
consideration or privity of contract19 between manufactur-
er and consumer should not prevent a claim by a consumer 
20 
against a manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. 
Therefore; the necessity for a consumer to find a collat-
eral contract or to establish the existence of a fraudu-
lent or negligent misrepresentation by the manufacturer in 
advertising or other promotional material would disappear. 
Furthermore, it is proposed below that new legislation 
governing advertising should confer a right of civil 
action on any consumer in respect of any breach of the 
statutory duties outlined in that legislation. This would 
promote consumer redress and, even more importantly, make 
for effective policing of misleading and unfair advertising 
practices by extending the category of potential complain-
ants; in effect, use will be made of private interests 
(19) See also the Contracts (Privity) Bill 1981, 
clause 4. 
(20) See recommendation 19, pages 21-22 of the Working 
Paper. 
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to promote the public good. 21 
As regards facilitating redress it is recommended 
that (i) the jurisdiction of small claims tribunals be 
extended to encompass all tortious claims and that the 
tribunals monetary restriction in respect of orders be 
increased to $2,000; and (ii) that damages be recoverable 
as an appropriate remedy in a representative action. 
{6) GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
{a) A Consumer Affairs Department 
At the outset it is recommended that a Consumer 
Affairs Department be created with responsibility, inter 
a~ia> for overseeing consumer information in the market 
place. Such a department is essential, in this writer's 
opinion, for the following reasons: 
First> there is a need for co-ordination in the consumer 
protection field in general. As Ann Hercus, Member of 
Parliament for Lyttelton, asserted recently: 
{21) See Grimes, 'Control of Advertising in the United 
States and Germany: Volkswagen has a better idea', 
(1971) 84 Harvard Law Review 1769, where the benefit 
of a broad category of potential complainants in 
respect of any deceptive claim or dishonest business 
practice are extolled. 
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"Ask the Department of Trade and Industry 
about a food complaint, and you will be 
sent to the Department of Health. Ask 
the Department of Justice about a possible 
rip-off in pricing, and they'll say 'go 
to the Department of Trade and Industry'. 
Ask the Department of Trade and Industry 
about the Sale of Goods Ac_t- they' 11 say 
that's administered by the Department of 
Justice. It's a bit of a shambles, for 
consumers, sorting out which Government 
Department has which responsibility for 
which legislation." 22 
Consequently, it is suggested that the case for a Consumer 
Affairs Department charged with the administration of all 
major consumer-oriented legislation rests in part on the 
co-ordination that this would bring to bear; that is, 
rather than have consumer legislation scattered around 
many unconnected departments its administration could be 
'under one roof•. 23 C · · d 1 · t onsumer enqu1r1es an camp a1n s 
will focus on a Consumer Affairs Department as the name of 
the Department itself would suggest itself as the approp-
riate starting point. The Consumer Affairs Department 
could then investigate and endeavour to resolve the 
complaint, or refer the consumer to the appropriate person 
or organisation so as to facilitate resolution of the 
dispute. 
(22) Speech on 'Consumer Policy', delivered at St 
George's Hall, Christchurch, 28 October 1981. 
(23) Idem. 
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Second, a Consumer Affairs Department would have specific 
responsibility for consumer protection and would not 
regard the fulfilment of this duty as being ancillary to 
other major functions. For example, the Department of 
Trade and Industry is charged with an enormous diversity 
of responsibilities and it is naive to assume that this 
Department has the time and resources to devote to the 
discharge of all of these responsibilities in a compre-
hensive manner. At the present time the Department of 
Trade and Industry has been forced to hire additional 
staff just to cope with complaints and enquiries relating 
to the price freezei 24 furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
the Examiner of Commercial Practices does not regard his 
function as involving a policing of the market place and 
exclusive reliance is placed on consumers bringing 
complaints vis-a-vis advertising to the attention of the 
Examiner or the Department of Trade and Industry. 25 A 
Consumer Affairs Department would have as its focus the 
interests of consumers and, given adequate resources, 
would be in a position to maintain a surveillance of 
market practices. 
Third, a Consumer Affairs Department could be charged with 
a number of specific duties; namely: 
(24) See the Price Freeze Regulations 1982. 
(25) Correspondence with the Office of the Examiner of 
Commercial Practices, 12 July 1982. 
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(i) The administration of a new Consumer Information Act.26 
(ii) The promotion of codes of practice and membership of 
organisations promulgating such codes. 
(iii) The approval of particular codes if satisfied that 
the code safeguards and promotes the interests of consum-
ers and that the trade association etc. intends to make 
. 27 1t a success. 
(iv) The promulgation of information standards in respect 
of certain goods and services. For example, the Governor 
General may, by Order in Council made on the advice of the 
Minister of Consumer Affairs, be empowered to make regul-
ations designed to secure the disclosureof particular 
information in advertisements and elsewhere in respect of 
specified goods and services. 
(v) The publication of results of surveys, tests and other 
information about competing goods, services and credit 
sources, and of information relating to the existence and 
contents of various codes of practice, consumer rights, 
etc. 
(vi) The advancement of consumer education through public-
ity campaigns 1 the dissemination of information and 
teaching materials to schools and through the promotion of 
(26) See infra, page 518 et seq. 
(27) See the Fair Trading Act 1973 (UK), s 124(4). 
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clear standard form contracts. In New York, a recently 
enacted statute requires consumer contracts to be 
written 'in a clear and cogent manner using words with 
common and everyday meanings•, 28 but as Mr Justice Kirby, 
Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, 
remarks, it remains to be seen 'whether such a pious 
command in a statute book will have any great effect ... •29 
The Consumer Affairs Department, however, could negotiate 
with trade organisations, such as the Retailers Federat-
ion, to ensure that contracts are clearly worded and that 
they incorporate a section advising consumers of their 
rights and obligations. 
(vii) The support of organisations such as the Consumers' 
Institute, Citizens Advice Bureaux and other community 
consumer organisations. 
These specific functions could only be properly discharged 
by a government department with a specific brief in this 
regard - to allocate such functions to a number of exist-
ing government departments would destroy any prospect of 
cohesive action and create the risk of these duties being 
submerged in the morass of other responsibilities. 
(28) New York General Obligations Law 1978, para. 5-701 B. 
(29) 'Ending Legal Gobbledygook', Advocatus 1981, 3, 
at page 5; see also I.L. McKay, 'Intelliglble 
Drafting', Paper for the New Zealand Law Society's 
Conference, Dunedin, April 1981. 
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Fourth~ a Minister of Consumer Affairs and his ministry 
can promote new legislation from the 'inside', examine 
any pertinent cabinet papers and examine the effects of 
any proposal from any other Government Department on 
consumer matters. 30 
Finally 3 it is noted that the establishment of such a 
department would, by no means, be a revolutionary step. 
All Australian states have such a ministry and the Labour 
Party in New Zealand advocate the establishment of a 
Ministry of Consumer Protection.~ 1 Given the number of 
government departments, the absence of a department 
charged with the specific responsibility of looking after 
consumers reflects poorly on government priorities. 
Naturally there will be costs involved in the establish-
ment of an additional government department but the 
benefits that may accrue have the potential to outweigh 
this negative feature, and many staff for a new Consumer 
Affairs Department could be drawn from existing departments 
whose responsibilities are reduced. 
The arguments advanced in favour of the establishment 
of a Consumer Affairs Department are in no way intended as 
an indirect attack on the Consumer Council and Consumers' 
Institute. While the Consumer Council and Institute are 
empowered to fulfil some of the functions that this writer 
would foresee a Consumer Affairs Department as being 
(30) Speech by Ann Hercus, M.P., supra. 
(31) Labour Party Consumer Policy 1981. 
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32 
obligated to perform, there would not necessarily be 
a conflict of interest. The Consumer Council and 
Consumers' Institute are, first and foremost, not in a 
position to administer consumer protection legislation -
this, of neces ty, must be the function of a government 
department. Second, the Consumers' Institute enjoys a 
unique reputation for impartiality and the role of consumer 
advocate with interventionist powers would diminish this 
admirable reputation. 33 Third, the consumer needs a voice 
in Cabinet and a Minister of Consumer Affairs can promote 
the consumer interest from the 'inside' -the Consumer 
Council and Consumers' Institute obviously are 'outsiders' 
in this regard. Finally, far from derogating from the 
immensely valuable work done by these statutory bodies, a 
Consumer Affairs Department could support these bodies 
financially and otherwise. Therefore, the Consumer Affairs 
Department, Consumer Council and Consumers' Institute are 
envisaged as being complementary, rather than as altern-
atives. 
Finally, mention must be made of the possibility of 
establishing a Consumer Ombudsman's Office. In Sweden, 
(32) For example, the Consumer Council is empowered to 
encourage educational work in the interests of 
consumers of goods and services and to collect and 
disseminate information relating to consumer matters. 
See the Consumer Council Act 1966, s 17(2) (b), (d). 
(33} One of the major grounds for the prohibition against 
the use of findings of the Consumers' Institute is 
a desire to protect the Institute's reputation for 
impartiality. See Consumer 87, 211. 
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the Consumer Ombudsman is given extensive powers to 
1 . k . t' 34 d . 1 h d 'th th po 1ce mar et1ng prac 1ces an 1s a so c arge w1 e 
responsibility of monitoring standard form contracts. 35 
This person is empowered to bring actions before a 
36 Market Court in respect of alleged market malpractices 
and employment of 'improper contract terms'. Like the 
Examiner of Commercial Practices in New Zealand, 37 the 
Ombudsman must endeavour to secure compliance through 
negotiation and only if satisfactory agreement is not 
reached does the Ombudsman initiate any action; however, 
he has not exhibited any reluctance to initiate actions 
and, in any event, consumer groups and others are given 
locus standi to apply to the Market Court to bring an 
38 action where the Ombudsman fails to act. The Market 
Court is empowered to give injunctive relief and may refer 
cases to the Public Prosecutor for criminal prosecution in 
appropriate cases. There is little doubt that the Consumer 
Ombudsman in Sweden has done much to advance the consumer 
(34) Pursuant to the Marketing Practices Act 1970. 
(35) See the Act Prohibiting Improper Contract Terms 
1971. 
(36) King, Consumer Protection Experiments in Sweden 
(1974), 15, observes that this court is 'primarily 
for considering problems relating to the 
consumer' and has as its primary function the 
resolution of cases brought by the Consumer 
Ombudsman. 
(37) Pursuant to the Consumer Information Act 1969, 
s 19. 
(38) King, op. cit., 9 remarks that 'this tends to 
serve as a check on any Consumer Ombudsman who 
might not sufficiently press consumer interests'. 
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interest but it is submitted that the establishment of 
similar position in New Zealand is unnecessary given 
the existence of the Consumers' Institute, the Office of 
the Examiner of Commercial Practices and the proposed 
establishment of a Consumer Affairs Department. Never-
theless, the device of a Consumer Ombudsman merits some 
attention if only as a benchmark whereby the functioning 
of the proposed scheme may be assessed. In this 
writer's view, however, the creation of a Consumer 
Ombudsman could never be an effective substitute for a 
Consumer Affairs Department in that he would not be able 
to exercise the "insider" advantages of a Minister of 
Consumer Affairs, and he could not "administer" or 
co-ordinate all consumer protection legislation. 
(b} A New Consumer Information Act 
Having outlined the suggested administrative 
machinery for the promotion of consumer information and 
surveillance of market practices, it is recommended that 
a new Consumer Information Act be passed to effect the 
following objectives: 
(i} Prohibition of misleading and unfair advertisements. 
It is recommended that the relevant provision be 
drafted in the following, or like, manner. 
"(1) No person shall, for the purpose of effecting 
or promoting the sale or supply of any product or 
service, publish or cause to be published~ either 
on that person's own account or as the agent or 
employee of the person seeking to effect or promote 
the sale~ any advertisement relating to a product 
or service that -
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(a) Is likely to deceive or mislead a reasonable 
person with regard to any material 
particular; or 
(b) Is unfair. 
(2) For purposes of subsection (l)(b) of this section, 
in deciding whether an advertisement is unfair the 
Court shall have regard to such of the following 
matters as are applicable (if any): 
(a) Whether the codes of advertising practice 
or standards of conduct existing in respect 
of the media in which the advertisement 
appeared proscribe such advertisements; 
(b) Whether the advertisement is immoral, unethica~ 
oppressive or unscrupulous; 
(c) Whether the advertisement offends public 
policy; 
(d) Whether it is likely to cause substantial 
injury to a significant number of consumers; 
and 
(e) Such other matters as the Court thinks fit. n 39 
As regards misleading advertising, such a provision would, 
it is submitted, strike a balance between consumers, on 
the one hand, and advertisers, on the other. In determin-
ing whether an advertisement is misleading or deceptive it 
would not be necessary to point to actual deception as a 
deceptive or misleading capacity would be sufficient. 
However, the potential stringency of this approach would 
be mitigated by the requirement that this capacity to 
deceive or mislead must be more than a bare possibility40 
(39) See the Medicines Act 1981, s 57; the Food Act 1981, 
s 11; the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 35; FTC v 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co 405 US 233, 244 (1972), Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Australia), s 52(1). 
(40) See Transport Ministry v Simmonds [1973] 1 NZLR 
359, 363. 
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and must relate to a material particular. Furthermore, 
in determining this capacity or tendency to mislead or 
deceive the focal point of the inquiry is a reasonable 
person; it would not be enough the advertisement had 
the capacity to mislead an extremely impressionable or 
gullible consumer. 41 
As regards unfair advertising it is suggested that the 
adoption of guidelines would alleviate uncertainty 
surrounding the scope of an 'unfairness doctrine' and 
successive decisions by the courts will further erode 
f t . t 42 areas o uncer a~n y. 
(ii) Informational disclosure in advertisements. 
It is submitted that a provision to the following 
effect should be incorporated in the proposed legislation; 
namely: 
"2. (1) Every advertisement in respect of any product 
or service shall state the cash price in respect of 
the product or service. 
(2) any person represents in an advertisement 
that he has goods available for sale below the 
normal or usual price he shall~ if the reduced 
price per unit of goods is more than $30~ state 
in the advertisement the number of units available 
for sale to the publ at the reduced price. 43 
(41) Compare the approach in the United States as reflected 
in cases such as Florence Manufacturing v J.C. Dowd 
Co 178 F 73, 75 (1910); Charles of Ritz Distributors 
Corpn v FTC 143 F 2d 676 (1944). 
(42) See Burrows, 'Contract Statutes and Judicial 
Discretion', (1981) 1 Canterbury Law Review 253, 254. 
(43) See the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10(4). 
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(3) Every advertisement published by~ or on 
behalf of~ a retailer or supplier~ in respect of 
goods or services which are available on deferred 
payment terms~ shall state the finance rate in 
respect of the deferred payment dispositions of 
those goods or services. 
(4) Every advertisement shall state such other 
particulars as may be required by regulations 
made pursuant to this Act." 44 
As regards the proposed provision 2(3), an alternative 
approach could be adopted; namely: 
"No advertisement advertising deferred payment 
dispositions of goods or services shall state the 
weekly or monthly instalments payable in respect 
of the goods or services unless it also states 
with equal prominence~ and describes as such~ 
the finance rate in respect of the deferred payment 
dispositions of those goods or services. " 45 
However, this alternative approach may have the undesir-
' ':
able effect of reducing the amount of information disclos-
ed in advertisements; at present retailers frequently 
disclose weekly and monthly instalments payable in respect 
of deferred payment dispositions and the enactment of i.this 
alternative provision may tip the balance against such 
disclosure because such disclosure would have to be 
accompanied by disclosure of the finance rate. This 
alternative approach gives the retailer an option to 
disclose, whereas the provision as embodied in the 
(44) See the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10; the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 37; the Medicines 
Act 1981, s 57(1) (a-e); the Food Act 1981, 
s 11 ( 1 ) (a -e ) • 
(45) Cf. Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 37. 
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proposed section above requires disclosure in all cases. 
It is proposed that regulations could be promulgated 
making it necessary for additional information to be 
disclosed in respect of advertisements for certain 
specified goods and services; that is, informational 
standards could be developed by the Consumer Affairs 
Department requiring the disclosure of additional factors 
such as durability, the length and nature of any guaran-
tees and performance characteristics. 
(iii) Prohibition of bait advertising. 
Here it is recommended that this practice should be 
curtailed in the following manner. 
"3. (1) A person that has 3 in trade or commerce 3 
advertised goods or serv es for supply at a 
reduced price shall offer such goods or services 
for supply at that price for a period that is~ 
and in quantities that are, reasonable having 
regard to the nature of the market in ~hich that 
person carries on business and the nature of the 
advertisement. 46 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if the 
advertisement states the quantity of goods 
available for sale at the reduced price and there 
is in fact that quantity available for sale to 
the public. " 47 
(iv) Prohibition of false or misleading labelling and 
packaging. 
In this regard it is submitted that the provisions in 
the Consumer Information Act 1969 48 should be retained. 
(46) See the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia), s 56; 
cf. the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10(3). 
(47) See the Consumer Information Act 1969, s 10(3). 
{48) See sections 5, 6, 7, 8. 
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However, there is scope for a more succinct statement of 
the law in this area and regard could be had of the 
corresponding provisions in the Food Act 198149 and 
Medicines Act 198150 which cover much the same ground in 
a commendably concise fashion. 
(v} Adequate enforcement of the legislation. 
Here a number of submissions are made. 
First~ that the approach adopted in the Food Act 1981 51 
and Medicines Act 198152 as regards strict liability be 
implemented in this legislation. In any prosecution in 
respect of a breach of any provision it should not be 
necessary for the prosectuion to prove that the defendant 
intended to commit the offence. However, it should also 
be provided that it would be a good defence in any such 
prosecution if the defendant proves: (a) That he did not 
intend to commit an offence against this legislation or 
any regulations made pursuant to the legislation; and 
(b) That he took all reasonable steps to ensure that there 
was compliance with the gislation and any relevant 
regulations. 53 This, it is submitted, represents the 
ideal compromise; the prosecution is not saddled with the 
(49) s 10. 
(50) s 61. 
(51) s 30. 
(52) s 80. 
(53) See the Food Act 1981, s 30; the Medicines Act 1981, 
s 80; the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 38. 
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difficult task of proving mens rea and the advertiser 
is given an escape route provided he can point to adequate 
screening and other controls over advertisements. It is 
recognised that the proposed provisions outlined earlier 
would impose responsibility on a number of persons; for 
example, the seller, the advertising agent and, say, the 
newspaper publisher of the advertisement. It is submitted 
that this approach may be justified on a number of 
grounds: 
(a) This would not represent a departure from pre-exist-
ing practice as many of the statutes relating to 
advertising which provide penal sanctions apply to 
publishers54 and do not confine their attention to 
the "author" of the communication. 
(b) The consumer pays for the advertising in the long 
run and, therefore, is entitled to an honest and 
informative service and the greater the net of 
potential liability the more widespread will 
screening procedures be. 
(c) It is a settled rule of the law of defamation that 
the fact that a defendant correctly reported the 
statements of another affords him no defence in an 
(54) See, for example, the Consumer Information Act 
1969, ss 9(4), 21; Food and Drugs Act 1969, 
ss 8-10. 
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action for defamation - the wrong resides in the 
bl . t' 55 pu 1ca 10n~ Why should a different position be 
taken in respect of the publication of false, 
. 1 d. d f . d t. . ? 56 m1s ea 1ng an un a1r a ver 1s1ng. 
(d) Finally, a person may, in terms of the legislation 
outlined above, escape liability by negativing the 
existence of a guilty mind and by demonstrating that 
he took all reasonable steps to ensure that there 
was compliance. The content of this duty to take 
care will vary according to the circumstances57 and 
it is submitted that regard will be had to the 
relevant expertise and experience of the seller, 
advertising agent or bureau, or publisher, respect-
ively, in assessing whether all reasonable steps 
have been taken. The publisher whose incidental 
function involves the publication of advertisements 
cannot be expected to take the same precautions as 
an advertising agency whose main business is the 
production of advertisements, for example, and the 
concept of "reasonableness" is flexible enough to take 
into account this, and other, factors. 
(55) See Burrows, News Media Law in New Zealand {2 ed, 
1980), 36. 
(56) See Securities 
for Securities 
Proposed Recommendations 
{1980), para. 12.4.5.(£). 
(57) Cf. the position with the tort of negligence. See 
British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877; 
Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645, 663. 
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For these reasons it is submitted that the net of 
potential liability should be cast widely. 
Second, every person who commits an offence against this 
legislation should be liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding $5000, 
and if the offence is a continuing one, to a further fine 
not exceeding $200 for every day or part of a day during 
which the offence has continued. 58 
Third, the court should be empowered to order corrective 
advertising to eliminate residual consumer deceptions and 
continuing competitive injury. In deciding whether to 
make such an order the court should be directed to have 
regard to such of the following matters as are applicable; 
namely: {a) The residual impact of the advertisement or 
d . . . 59 a vertlslng campalgn; (b) The nature of the deceptive 
. 1 d. 1 . 60 or mls ea lng c alm; (c) The size and characteristics 
of the audience; (d) The sales volume and market position 
(58) See the Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 38; the Food 
Act 1981, s 28; the Medicines Act 1981, s 78; the 
Consumer Information Act 1969, s 18(2). 
(59) Thain, 'Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases', 
(1973) 19 New York Law Forum 1, 24 observes that 
advertisements are most likely to have residual impact 
in situations 
" •. in which television rather than print media is 
used, the advertising campaign is long running and 
often repeated rather than a one-shot affair, 
there is significant brand loyalty in the relevant 
market, and the termination of the deceptive 
advertisement was fairly recent and thus more 
likely to influence purchasers." 
(60) For example, with certain nutritional, efficacy and 
safety claims consumers have no prospect of determin-
ing the accuracy or otherwise of a claim. 
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of the advertiser; (e) The blatancy of the deception; 
(f) The potential danger to the health and safety of the 
consumer; and (g) Such other matters as the court thinks 
fit. 61 
Fourth~ the Minister of Consumer Affairs, or his delegates 
in the Department of Consumer Affairs, should be empowered 
to require advertisers to submit all tests, .studies or 
other data purporting to substantiate claims, statements 
or representations made regarding the performance, 
efficacy or any other matter of the product or service 
to the Department of Consumer Affairs. Such a power would 
have two major benefits; that is, (a) the investigation 
of complaints and alleged abuses would be facilitated, 
and (b) advertisers would be more cautious in framing 
their advertising claims etc by ensuring that such claims 
are firmly founded. 
Finally~ the legislation should authorise consumers to 
bring a civil action in respect of any breach of the 
duties imposed by the legislation. A broad category of 
potential complainants in respect of any advertising, 
packaging or labelling that is calculated to mislead or 
deceive a reasonable consumer makes for more effective 
policing of such undesirable practices and effective use 
is made of private interests to promote the public good, 
and at no expense to the taxpayer. 
(61} See Thain, op. cit.; Corn£ eld, 'A New Approach to an 
Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal 
Trade Commission', (1976) 61 Iowa Law Review 693. 
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It is submitted that legislation embodying the 
provisions as outlined above would promote honest and 
informative advertising and other disclosure to the 
benefit of consumers and businesses. By enhancing the 
quality and quantity of information that a consumer 
receives this may ensure that a consumer is better able 
to choose between competing goods and services and dis-
tortions occasioned by deceptive or misleading claims 
may be eliminated, thereby fostering workable competition 
and combatting resource misallocation. 
Finally, as a matter of public policy, some consid-
eration should be given to prohibiting the dissemination 
of certain product and service information, and to 
restricting the level of expenditure associated with the 
promotion of products and services. It is well recognised 
that the cost of advertising is born by the consumer as 
the costsof advertising are reflected as a component in 
the product price and certain types of advertising,such 
as liquor advertising and cigarette advertising, is open 
to serious and justifiable criticism. As the Minister of 
62 Justice, Mr McLay, recently observed 
"Many people are rightly concerned about the 
effects that the misuse of liquor can have, 
not only on the individual who drinks but 
also on his or her family and the community 
in general." 
(62) See "The Press", 26 July 1982. 
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The New Zealand Government has already intervened in 
respect of cigarette advertising and by agreement 
there is no advertising in respect of cigarettes and 
tobacco products on television or on the radio. 63 
Liquor advertising and television advertising aimed at 
young children are other areas that may merit governmental 
attention. 64 Furthermore, the costs to the consumer of 
advertising and other promotional activities may be 
reduced by imposing a limit or ceiling on such 
expenditure in those industries where advertising excesses 
are most prevalent. The rationale of this approach is 
that it would 'stop the escalation of advertising 
expenditures and eliminate some the self-cancelling 
wastage, so that rms would compete through advertising 
only up to a point, returning thereafter to price and 
l 't t' • I 65 1 t' 1 h ' qua 1 y compe 1t1on . A terna 1ve y, as t e Pr1me 
Minister, Mr R.D. Muldoon, recently suggested, a tax 
could be imposed on advertising expenditures. 66 This 
(63) New Zealand Official Yearbook (1979), 340. 
(64) See, for example, Note, 'Can't Get Enough of that 
Sugar Crisp: The First Amendment Right to Advertise 
to Children', (1979) 54 New York University Law 
Review 561; Barnes and Blakeney, 'The Regulation of 
Children's Television Advertising- The Australian 
Experience', (1980) 3 Journal of Media Law and 
Practice, 265. 
{65) Duggan, 'The Great Soap Opera', (1978) 11 Melbourne 
University Law Review 467, 494. 
(66) See "The Press", 29 May 1982. The Prime Minister 
suggested that 'advertising was crying out to be 
taxed' • 
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might be achieved directly through the taxation of 
advertising expenditure above a specified level, or 
indirectly by not permitting advertising expenditure as 
a deductible expense for income tax purposes. These 
issues of public policy lie outside the scope of this 
writer's enquiry, but are very important matters for the 
legislature to consider in proposing and formulating any 
regime of control in the field of consumer information. 
- oOo -
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